[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 150 (2004), Part 13]
[House]
[Pages 17335-17337]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




        ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF ISLAND OF CYPRUS BY TURKISH TROOPS

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Bilirakis) is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. BILIRAKIS. Mr. Speaker, as I have done every year, I rise again 
today to reiterate my

[[Page 17336]]

fierce objection to the illegal occupation of the island of Cyprus by 
Turkish troops and declare my grave concern for the future of the area. 
The island's three decades of internal division make the status quo 
absolutely unacceptable.
  In July 1974, Turkish troops captured the northern part of Cyprus, 
seizing more than a third of the island. The Turkish troops expelled 
200,000 Greek-Cypriots from their homes and killed 5,000 citizens of 
the once-peaceful island. The Turkish invasion was a conscious and 
deliberate attempt at ethnic cleansing. Turkey proceeded to install 
40,000 military personnel on Cyprus. Today, these troops, in 
conjunction with United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping forces, make the 
small island of Cyprus one of the most militarized areas in the world. 
Over a quarter of a century later, approximately 1,500 Greek-Cypriots 
remain missing, including four Americans.
  The Green Line, a 113-mile barbed wire fence, separates the Greek-
Cypriot community from its Turkish-Cypriot counterpart. For thirty 
years, the Turkish Northern Republic of Cyprus (TNRC), recognized by no 
nation in the world except for Turkey, has prohibited Greek-Cypriots, 
until recently, from freely crossing the Green Line to visit the towns 
and communities of their families. With control of about 37 percent of 
the island, Turkey's military occupation has had severe consequences, 
most notably the dislocation of the Greek-Cypriot population and the 
resulting refugees.
  Thirty years later, the forced separation of these two communities 
still exist despite efforts by the U.N. and G-8 leadership to mend this 
rift between north and south. The U.N., with the explicit support of 
the United States, has sponsored several rounds of proximity talks 
between the former President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Glafcos 
Clerides, and Mr. Rauf Denktash, the self-proclaimed leader of the 
occupied northern part of the island.
  In March 2003, the United Nations-sponsored Cyprus peace talks at the 
Hague between the President of Cyprus, Tassos Papadopoulos, and Mr. 
Denktash came to an abrupt halt. Responsibility for this unfortunate 
setback in the peace process rested largely with Mr. Denktash, who 
rejected U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan's plan to end the 29-year 
division of Cyprus. It was shameful that the Secretary General's 
personal diplomacy was met by this kind of flat-out rejection. A large 
share of the blame also rested with the Turkish military and hard-line 
nationalists in Ankara, who have maintained the illegal Turkish 
military occupation of Cyprus since Turkish forces invaded the island 
in 1974. If the Government of Turkey was sincere about settling the 
Cyprus problem, it could have put the necessary pressure on Mr. 
Denktash to say ``yes'' to the U.N. Plan at that time.
  Nearly a year later, the Turkish government finally expressed 
interest in renewing negotiations using the Annan plan as a basis. 
However, the clock was ticking toward Cyprus becoming a full member of 
the European Union (EU) on May 1, 2004. The goal was to have a 
completed and agreed-to settlement plan by the week before so Cyprus 
could enter the EU as a united island. Even though both sides knew they 
were not going to get everything they wanted, each side was guaranteed 
a fair plan and one that would be immediately functional. 
Unfortunately, the final version of the Annan plan which was submitted 
for a referenda vote to both communities was unbalanced and biased 
against the Greek-Cypriots.
  On several occasions, my colleagues and I strongly voiced our serious 
concerns with the Annan plan through letters, meetings and floor 
statements. We wanted to make sure that all those involved in the 
negotiation process were well aware that unless these issues were 
addressed and resolved, the Greek-Cypriots would not agree to the plan. 
Greater efforts should have been made to address these legitimate 
concerns which could have secured a positive vote from the Greek-
Cypriots.
  On April 24, 2004, the people of Cyprus had the opportunity to speak 
for themselves and vote on a United Nations settlement plan. The Greek-
Cypriots' rejection of the suggested settlement plan should not be 
interpreted as a vote against reunification, but rather, as an 
important statement about the fundamental principles that must be 
addressed in any viable and workable settlement.
  The Greek-Cypriot voters have made clear that the suggested 
settlement plan failed because it did not provide for guarantees to 
ensure the complete implementation of commitments under the plan. 
Security was a major concern for the Greek-Cypriots.
  The Annan plan did not thoroughly satisfy the condition of the 
removal of foreign troops from Cyprus and the elimination of the right 
of the guarantor powers to interview in Cyprus. Although previous 
versions of the Annan plan called for the complete withdrawal of Greek 
and Turkish forces once Turkey joint the E.U., the final version of the 
Annan plan provided for an indefinite presence of Turkish troops in 
Cyprus. According to the plan, the number of troops would gradually 
decrease to 650 over a period of 14 years. However, their continuing 
presence and intervention rights would make a full and genuine 
independence of Cyprus impossible.
  The plan also provided for the continuation of the Treaty of 
guarantee. This treaty gives the guarantor powers (Turkey, Greece, 
United Kingdom (UK)) the right to unilaterally intervene in order to 
preserve the ``constitutional order'' of the United Cyprus Republic and 
its constituent states. However, the Annan plan failed to specifically 
clarify that this treaty does not authorize military intervention. This 
was a critical point because Turkey insisted that it would continue to 
have the right to intervene militarily in Cyprus. This Turkish 
arrogance increased the Greek-Cypriot fear of a repetition of the 1974 
invasion and its tragic consequences.
  The Annan plan also did not provide for a property recovery system 
that would recognize the rights and interests of displaced Greek-
Cypriots, and a property compensation system that would not force 
Greek-Cypriots to pay for their own restitution. The plan allowed for 
one-third restitution and two-thirds compensation for property owned in 
the north by Greek-Cypriots who would be losing the use of their 
properties. The funds for the restitution would be guaranteed by the 
Federal State. However, nine-tenths of the Federal State's resources 
would derive from Greek-Cypriots and the remainder from Turkish-
Cypriots. Essentially, the Greek-Cypriots, to a large extent, would be 
paying for their own loss of property.
  In addition, compensation for the property would have been required 
to be paid by the constituent states. This meant that Greek-Cypriot 
refugees would have to request compensation from the Greek-Cypriot 
Constituent State. Again, Greek-Cypriot taxpayers, who were the victims 
of the invasion, would be paying for their own loss of use of property.
  Lastly, the Annan plan ignored the right of all Cypriots to buy 
property and to live wherever they choose without being limited by 
ethnic quotas and failed to provide a viable, functional government 
free of built-in deadlocks and voting restrictions based on ethnicity. 
It set complicated and restrictive provisions regarding the right of 
Greek-Cypriot refugees to return to their homes in the north. More 
specifically, a restrictive moratorium of 6 years would be implemented 
for those Greek-Cypriots who wished to return and permanently live in 
the Turkish-Cypriot Constituent State (TCCS). For the first 19 years or 
until Turkey's accession to the EU, the number of Greek-Cypriots who 
wished to permanently live in the TCCS would not be able to exceed 18 
percent of its total population. After that time period, they would not 
be able to exceed 33.3 percent of the total population of the TCCS. 
This restriction would have been permanent.
  The Annan plan established a system based on permanent ethnic 
division, while denying fundamental democratic rights to a segment of 
the population. Under the plan, Greek-Cypriots permanently living in 
the TCCS and possessing its internal citizenship status would not have 
the right to participate in the elections for its 24 representatives in 
the federal Senate.
  Since the vote on the referenda, Greek-Cypriots have been criticized 
for allegedly rejecting peace and the ``only chance'' for 
reunification. Many people--including the Greek-Cypriots themselves--
regret that the plan presented to them did not allow both communities 
to respond positively. Criticism and anger, however, will only further 
divide the island precisely when the Cypriot people need the support of 
the international community to continue on the path toward lasting 
peace.
  Greek-Cypriots should not be blamed for voting against a plan that 
they believed did not meet the interests of their country and their 
futures. It is one thing for others to comment on the terms and 
conditions for settlement, but it is the Cypriots who must live with 
whatever plan is adopted.
  The Government of Cyprus continues to emphasize that it remains 
committed to persevering in its efforts to reunify Cyprus as a bizonal, 
bicommunal federation with democratic and human rights for all 
Cypriots. Earlier this year, the Cypriot Government announced a series 
of measures aimed at assisting those Turkish-Cypriots residing under 
the control of the Turkish occupation army. This package includes a 
wide range of political, social, humanitarian, educational and economic 
measures that will enhance the ability of the Turkish-Cypriots to enjoy 
many of the benefits that the Republic of Cyprus offers to its 
citizens--as well as to share in the benefits of European Union 
membership. Far beyond a merely symbolic gesture, the package is a 
substantive program to integrate the Turkish-Cypriot community into the 
larger Cypriot society.

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  At the same time, the Turkish occupation regime partially lifted 
restrictions on freedom across the artificial line of division created 
by Turkey's military occupation. Since then, hundreds of thousands of 
Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots have crossed the line to visit 
homes and areas of their own country that were inaccessible to them for 
nearly 30 years. It isn't clear whether opening the border was just a 
tactic to ease the frustrations, or a sign of a fundamental change of 
heart. But it has produced rare displays of human kinship, exchanges of 
flowers and pastries, and emotional visits to homes abandoned in the 
mid-1970s.
  However, neither the Government's measures for the Turkish-Cypriots 
nor the partial lifting of restrictions by the occupation regime should 
be seen as a substitute for a comprehensive resolution to end the 
division of Cyprus.
  I urge this Administration, the United Nations and the European Union 
to respect the democratic decision of the Cypriot people, to remain 
engaged in efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem, and to work toward a 
fair and lasting reunification of Cyprus.

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