[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 150 (2004), Part 13]
[House]
[Pages 17215-17224]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




 PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 4842, UNITED STATES-MOROCCO FREE 
                   TRADE AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION ACT

  Mr. LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART of Florida. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the 
Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 738 and ask for its 
immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                              H. Res. 738

       Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it 
     shall be in order without intervention of any point of order 
     to consider in the House the bill (H.R. 4842) to implement 
     the United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement. The bill 
     shall be considered as read for amendment. The bill shall be 
     debatable for two hours equally divided and controlled by the 
     chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Ways 
     and Means. Pursuant to section 151(f)(2) of the Trade Act of 
     1974, the previous question shall be considered as ordered on 
     the bill to final passage without intervening motion.
       Sec. 2. During consideration of H.R. 4842 pursuant to this 
     resolution, notwithstanding the operation of the previous 
     question, the Chair may postpone further consideration of the 
     bill to a time designated by the Speaker.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Lincoln 
Diaz-Balart) is recognized for 1 hour.
  Mr. LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART of Florida. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of 
debate only, I yield the customary 30 minutes to the distinguished 
gentlewoman from New York (Ms. Slaughter), pending which I yield myself 
such time as I may consume. During consideration of this resolution, 
all time yielded is for the purpose of debate only.
  Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 738 is a standard, closed resolution 
for consideration of the underlying trade legislation that provides for 
fair and extensive debate on H.R. 4842, the United States-Morocco Free 
Trade Agreement Implementation Act.
  The rule provides 2 hours of general debate evenly divided and 
controlled by the chairman and the ranking minority member of the 
Committee on Ways and Means.
  Mr. Speaker, the relationship between the Kingdom of Morocco and the 
United States of America has existed throughout the history of the 
United States. In December of 1777, when war raged between the American 
colonies and Britain, Sultan Sidi Mohammed boldly recognized our young, 
and not yet free, Republic. That magnanimous act of recognition was 
cemented in a Treaty of Peace and Friendship between our countries, 
ratified in July of 1878. That enduring document remains the oldest 
unbroken treaty in the history of the foreign relations of the United 
States. Quite simply, the Kingdom of Morocco is our most permanent and 
enduring friend.
  The gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. English), the gentleman from 
Tennessee (Mr. Tanner), the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. John), and I 
came together to form the Morocco Caucus in Congress to highlight and 
to further deepen the truly magnificent and critically important 
relationship between the United States and the Kingdom of Morocco. The 
United States has no better friend and ally in the Maghreb, in North 
Africa and in the Arab world than Morocco.
  We are cognizant of, and grateful for, the help Morocco provided 
during the reign of the great statesman King Hassan II in the dangerous 
and prolonged struggle known as the Cold War and in the initial and 
ultimately delicate stages of the peace process between Israel and her 
neighbors.
  We are cognizant of, and grateful for, the unequivocal and decisive 
help Morocco has provided during the reign of another great statesman, 
King Mohammed VI, in our common war against the forces of international 
terrorism. Both our peoples have been victims of the scourge of 
cowardly attacks upon unarmed civilians, and both nations have answered 
the challenge of this difficult time with strong leadership and 
decisive action.
  The United States must be cognizant and supportive of the wisdom and 
experience of Morocco, that great influence for stability in North 
Africa, in the Middle East, regarding issues related to international 
terrorism. We must understand that Morocco's insistence upon its 
territorial integrity and its refusal to accept a terrorist state in 
the Western Sahara is critically important, not only for the national 
security of Morocco, but also for the security of the United States and 
of our European allies.
  Today, Mr. Speaker, we celebrate another milestone in the wonderful 
relationship between the United States and Morocco as we prepare to 
consider H.R. 4842, legislation to implement the United States-Morocco 
Free Trade Agreement. This agreement will benefit both our peoples as 
it facilitates and encourages ever-growing commerce between our 
countries and the creation of many new jobs in Morocco and in the 
United States. This agreement will help turn an already solid 
relationship into an even greater friendship.
  Mr. Speaker, I would like to take this opportunity to publicly thank 
a few distinguished leaders for making this important free trade 
agreement a reality.

                              {time}  1145

  Understanding the importance of this agreement and with the August 
recess quickly approaching, the gentleman from California (Mr. Thomas) 
made great efforts to expedite the consideration of this agreement in 
the House. The gentleman from Illinois (Speaker Hastert) has been 
especially solid in his leadership on this critical issue, as has been 
the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay), the majority leader, and the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier), chairman of the Committee on 
Rules. Ambassador Bob Zoellick has been and continues to be a stalwart, 
strong advocate on behalf of the economic interests of the United 
States and especially job creation in America, and President Bush's 
leadership has truly been the linchpin for great accomplishments such 
as this.
  While we fight terror across the globe, the United States, under this 
President, has deepened economic and security-based relationships with 
our friends for the benefit of our protection and our freedom.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support both the rule and the 
underlying legislation that we bring before the House today.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Lincoln Diaz-
Balart) for yielding me the customary 30 minutes.
  Mr. Speaker, an important part of our job is to encourage the 
purchase of U.S. goods and services by others in the international 
community, especially now when the economy is limping along and failing 
to replace the 1.1 million jobs lost since the Bush administration took 
office. Hopefully opening up foreign markets for American products will 
lead to the creation of good, high-paying jobs here in the United 
States. However, we must be mindful of the consequences of free trade 
agreements such as the U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement.
  Last week this body considered the free trade agreement, FTA, between 
the United States and our ally Australia. Serious questions were raised 
about the impact patent protection language might have on the ability 
of the United States to reimport lower cost drugs from other countries 
and the impact on the Australian government's low-cost pharmaceutical 
drug program.
  According to the Wall Street Journal, urged by the drug industry, the 
U.S. Trade Representative is seeking to strengthen protections for 
costlier brand-name drugs, defending the U.S.

[[Page 17216]]

companies from foreign competition of foreign producers of generic 
drugs. So far the USTR has successfully added this safeguard to the 
trade agreements with Jordan, Chile, Singapore, Australia, Costa Rica, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, and 
Morocco.
  The U.S.-Morocco agreement contains patent protection language which 
restricts Morocco for 5 years from approving generic-drug applications 
if the application is based on the data of the original manufacturer. 
What impact will this 5-year ban have when enforced? Will this 
interfere with a developing African nation's ability to get affordable, 
generic pharmaceuticals to fight public health crises like the HIV 
infection?
  In response to these serious concerns, the USTR points to a letter of 
understanding between the United States and Morocco. In the letter, 
both countries agree that the patent provisions ``do not affect the 
ability of either country to take necessary measures to protect public 
health by promoting access to medicine for all, and in particular 
concerning cases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and other 
epidemics as well as circumstances of extreme urgency or national 
emergency.''
  This mutual understanding is promising. However, it is not directly 
part of the free trade agreement or the implementing legislation. 
According to Robert Weissman of Essential Action, ``This statement of 
understanding expresses noble sentiments, but is unlikely to make much, 
if any, material difference in the implementation of the agreement.'' I 
hope Mr. Weissman is wrong.
  Approximately 16,000 Moroccans are infected with HIV, and the 
pandemic of HIV and AIDS is devastating the nations of Africa. Will 
Morocco be able to purchase or produce less expensive, generic anti-
viral and other medications needed to fight HIV infection? Of the 40 
million people with HIV or AIDS globally, less than 10 percent have 
access to drugs that have transformed many cases of HIV infection to a 
chronic illness, from a death sentence. In most of the developing 
world, drugs to fight HIV infection and AIDS are far too expensive for 
most. Any barrier to access to more affordable generic medicine denies 
essential health care to the poor.
  Women are nearly half of the 40 million infected with HIV, and the 
infection rate of women is climbing faster than the infection rate of 
men in many regions. Irene Khan, Secretary-General of Amnesty 
International, told last week's World AIDS Conference that ``gender 
inequality is driving new infections among women and girls like never 
before.''
  Mr. Speaker, more free trade agreements are in the works. The U.S. 
Trade Representative has negotiated with six Central American countries 
and has just initiated negotiations with Thailand. The consequences of 
trade agreements go far beyond merely eliminating trade barriers, such 
as tariffs. These agreements enforce significant public policy 
decisions made not by Congress, but by the Trade Representative. 
Congress has a narrow role in trade agreements, so I urge my colleagues 
to carefully consider the language in this and all future agreements. 
Free trade must be fair trade.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such 
time as he may consume to the gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier), 
the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Rules.
  Mr. DREIER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the U.S.-Morocco 
Free Trade Agreement. Let me begin by responding to some of the 
comments my very good friend, the gentlewoman from Rochester, New York 
(Ms. Slaughter), offered. Those have to do with HIV/AIDS and with 
gender inequality. We are all very concerned about dealing with those 
very serious crises that are out there. Most of us have come to the 
conclusion that one of the best tools that we can utilize to deal with 
those challenges is to encourage greater economic growth. Improving the 
standard of living for people will dramatically enhance the chance to 
deal with gender inequality, to deal with the challenge of having the 
resources to tackle greater education when it comes to the 
proliferation of HIV/AIDS.
  So let me say that this agreement is itself a very, very 
comprehensive, unique and cutting-edge agreement which will create 
opportunities on both sides of the Atlantic.
  Last week this body overwhelmingly passed the U.S.-Australia Free 
Trade Agreement. There is certainly a great deal of differences between 
Australia and Morocco. Australia has an economy which is very much like 
ours. They are a developed, industrialized nation with stringent labor 
and environmental standards. And like the United States, they have an 
economy that is increasingly based on services.
  Morocco, by contrast, is a developing country facing many of the 
challenges that confront nations throughout the developing world. They 
are working very hard in Morocco to modernize their infrastructure and 
develop new sectors even as they strengthen the traditional industries 
like agriculture and textiles. They are aggressively pursuing labor and 
environmental reforms as well as combating piracy and counterfeiting. 
In short, Morocco is working diligently to climb higher and higher up 
that proverbial economic ladder.
  The very remarkable thing about trade liberalization is these two 
trade agreements, with vastly different economies, can both be 
unequivocally good for all parties involved, making it a win/win. Trade 
is not only beneficial for big economies like the United States or 
wealthy economies like Australia, but it is very, very important for 
small, developing economies like Morocco, and I would argue in many 
ways because of the contrast that exists, trade agreements like this 
for developing nations create a potential for an even more dramatic 
improvement in the quality of life and the standard of living in those 
countries.
  Unfortunately, economic isolationists often hide behind the guise of 
fair trade, an argument that was just put forth by my colleague from 
New York. They use fair trade to argue that because some countries lack 
the resources to pay American wages or enforce identical labor 
standards that we have in America, the most developed nation in the 
world, that we should somehow not trade with these countries. This is a 
tragically misguided argument.
  It is precisely because these countries have further to go up that 
economic ladder that we should and must pursue open trade. Trade 
liberalization provides the tools for economic growth by opening up new 
markets, by building the legal framework necessary for a healthy 
business and investment environment by creating the resources to set 
high labor and environmental standards. Morocco is a perfect example of 
just such a country.
  Mr. Speaker, for many years Morocco has been working to bring its 
economy into this new and vibrant 21st century. It has been working to 
increase its standard of living, and it has been striving to raise its 
labor and environmental standards. In fact, Morocco's aggressive 
efforts to reform its labor laws since the start of the free trade 
agreement process began, culminated in a groundbreaking new labor law 
that was passed just a few weeks ago.
  These reforms address issues ranging from child labor to the minimum 
wage to nondiscrimination of women and the disabled, leading again to 
deal with the challenge that the gentlewoman from Rochester, New York 
(Ms. Slaughter) raised. This new labor code makes Morocco a leader in 
the developing world, and it is a testament both to Morocco's 
commitment to high standards and the effectiveness and the importance 
and the dynamism of economic engagement.
  Morocco is living up to its commitments even before implementation of 
this free trade agreement, but I want to make it very clear, while the 
FTA is critical to helping Morocco stay on its current path of economic 
development, it is by no means a mere gift from the United States of 
America. American businesses, American consumers, American workers and 
investors will

[[Page 17217]]

all benefit from this agreement. Mr. Speaker, 95 percent of all trade 
in consumer and industrial goods will immediately become duty free. 
American farmers will have a huge advantage as they gain greater access 
than even Morocco's traditional European trading partners currently 
enjoy. U.S. service providers will benefit from broad-based 
liberalization across all service sectors, and American producers will 
benefit from the highest intellectual property protections ever 
negotiated in a free trade agreement, and that is particularly of 
concern to those Members from areas like southern California where our 
entertainment industry is so important. Setting an example and dealing 
with this issue of intellectual property is key.
  The FTA also grants us an opportunity to strengthen our relationship. 
I want to say that relationship has been dramatically strengthened from 
the work that the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Lincoln Diaz-Balart) has 
done in developing this important relationship we have. He and the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. English) and others he mentioned have 
been very critical to building this U.S.-Morocco Caucus, and I 
congratulate them for their hard work in doing what we can to build 
that relationship which I believe has played a big role in leading us 
to this point where we, by an overwhelming margin, are going to pass 
this.
  I believe this trade agreement is going to have a chance to deal with 
one of the challenges that exists in Morocco, and that is dealing with 
a challenge which has been going on for a long period of time with the 
Western Sahara. It is my hope that as we strengthen further this 
relationship between our two countries, we will be able to see a 
resolution to that.
  Mr. Speaker, we know this has been a very important relationship 
between our two countries. Since 1777, when our friendship formally 
began, Morocco has proven to be an important and strategic partner. 
This friendship has never been more apparent than throughout our recent 
global efforts to combat terrorism. We all know Morocco has been a 
critically important ally to us in that effort, and as a Muslim-Arab 
country, they have been an ardent U.S. supporter in a part of the world 
where our list of very good friends is not as strong as we would have 
liked.
  Mr. Speaker, on both economic and political fronts, Morocco is making 
tremendous efforts. Today we are able to strengthen this important 
relationship while tearing down barriers, creating new opportunities 
for, as I said, American workers, American investors, American business 
people, and Moroccans alike. I urge my colleagues to demonstrate their 
support for our pro-economic growth agenda by voting for this rule and 
for the underlying measure.
  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to 
the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Levin), a valued member of the 
Committee on Ways and Means.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I support this rule. However, I want to make 
it clear that we do not want this as a precedent that on trade 
agreements only 2 hours of debate always are allowed. In this case I 
think 2 hours will be satisfactory. That will not always be true.

                              {time}  1200

  There are good reasons to support this FTA, and I do so. There is the 
historical relationship between our two countries, as mentioned. There 
are the present realities in our relationship, Morocco's important role 
in its area and beyond that. Also, there are some important provisions 
in this agreement; for example, relating to manufacturing goods outside 
of the textile area. Ninety-five percent of them will become duty-free. 
There are strong services commitments, strong IPR commitments. So there 
are good reasons to be supportive of this.
  I do want to put in perspective, though, several issues that have 
come up in our discussion, and these issues really were raised by us on 
the minority side. The gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier) likes to 
talk about raising issues as if it is a reflection of economic 
isolationism. That is the rubric, the mantra, the propaganda of the 
majority. They try to pin it on Democrats, including John Kerry. It is 
absurd. We raised several issues because they were legitimate ones, not 
because we opposed expanded trade, but because we want expanded trade 
to work for everybody. We want expanded trade to be shaped. We do not 
think it is some magic bullet that we simply have to shoot and 
everything will work out. We do not think trade policy should be on 
automatic pilot. We do not think that what is necessarily appropriate 
in one trade agreement is appropriate in another. These cookie cutter 
approaches of this administration are wrong, and surely we do not 
support this agreement because we think that the economic record of 
this administration is worthy of support by anybody in this country.
  So we raised a couple of issues. And the gentlewoman from New York 
(Ms. Slaughter) referred to the prescription medicine provision, and I 
want to talk about it. Before I do that, a brief word and we will have 
more discussion during the 2 hours about the core labor standard 
provisions. The gentleman from California said we should not impose 
U.S. wages, identical laws on other countries. That is not what we are 
talking about. That again is propaganda from the majority side. What we 
are talking about are basic core international standards, and 
countries, including ours, have signed on to a declaration that says 
that people should have the right to associate, to bargain, to be free 
from discrimination, there should be no child or forced labor. That is 
what we are talking about when we say they should be incorporated into 
free trade agreements.
  We asked the question, an important one, where is Morocco? Where is 
Morocco today in terms of their laws and their enforcement of these 
core labor standards? And the majority, because of their view that 
trade always works out for the best, it is always win-win, did not 
raise any questions about that. In fact, as to the reforms of 2003 in 
Morocco, there was not even within our government an English 
translation of these laws. And we asked for one and we looked at them. 
We talked to the Moroccan government about these laws, and I am pleased 
to say that we had a very useful discussion, which we initiated and the 
Moroccan government responded to, regarding the status of these core 
labor standards in Moroccan law and in Moroccan practice.
  The reforms that were inaugurated last year were a major step 
forward. The Moroccan society has some history of some freedom for 
workers, and the independent union in Morocco supports this agreement, 
I think, as a result. But there were issues raised as to the ability of 
people to associate, to bargain, and to strike, and so we asked the 
Moroccan government to give us in writing the status, and I want to 
quote from their letter and I will place that letter in the Record. The 
letter read this way:
  ``The government of Morocco is committed to protecting the right to 
strike in conformance with ILO, International Labor Organization's core 
principles. In particular, the government will not use Article 288 of 
our penal code against lawful strikers.''
  So I very much disagree with the administration's approach in 
general. They have in the agreements enforce their own laws. They put 
these in the agreements regardless of whether the laws incorporate the 
standards and whether there is implementation of them. And when we have 
a chance, when we take over, that will change. But in the meanwhile, 
the question is, is there conformance, is there conformance basically 
in Morocco with the core labor standards? And I think the realities as 
we were able to dig them out indicate that they are basically in 
conformance with the core labor standards.
  Now a few words about prescription medicines. Why did we inquire? 
First of all, there is the same provision here as there is in the 
previous agreement, including Australia, the general patent provision 
that could be applied to reimportation of prescription medicines. It 
turns out in the case of Morocco that that provision is not going to 
have

[[Page 17218]]

any potential effect. All of the legislation that has been introduced 
regarding reimportation does not include Morocco. They have a very 
small pharmaceutical industry. So I do not think, though I do not like 
this provision as a general rule, that we should vote against Morocco 
because of it, but we should make clear that we do not believe these 
provisions or this provision should be in trade agreements.
  Now what about the impact of these provisions not on our important 
health needs but the important health needs of the people of Morocco? 
And we were concerned about that. The gentleman from California (Mr. 
Dreier) talked about AIDS. Look, if we are really concerned, and I 
think we all are, we need to look at these agreements to see what is 
the potential impact on the availability of medicines to people in 
Morocco who are suffering from AIDS and where there is in other cases 
as well some kind of a health emergency? And there were several 
provisions in this agreement that raised questions about the 
accessibility of the people of Morocco in these cases to necessary 
pharmaceuticals and the ability of the government of Morocco to take 
the steps necessary to make these drugs available. And these are fairly 
technical provisions, but they relate to the lives of hundreds of 
thousands of people. One relates to so-called parallel imports and the 
other to test data protections.
  So I will make a long story short, and, if necessary, we can talk 
more about this when we have the debate of 2 hours. We entered into 
discussions with USTR. We on the Democratic side sent a letter to USTR, 
and they responded. And I include those two letters in the Record. And 
we said, in a few words, would the provisions in these two cases 
prevent accessibility to necessary drugs in a real case of emergency or 
necessity? And essentially what USTR has said: The agreement in the 
side letters, when read together, would not prohibit action by the 
Moroccan government to provide access to these drugs. And these side 
letters do have effect. The USTR has told us the following, and I want 
to read them so there is clarity. This is from page 8 of the mentioned 
letter to me:
  ``As stated in the side letter, the letter constitutes a formal 
agreement between the parties. It is thus a significant part of the 
interpretive context for this agreement and not merely rhetorical.'' 
And they also then earlier have said: ``Therefore, if circumstances 
ever arise in which a drug is produced under compulsory license,'' 
meaning the government of Morocco has given that license to make these 
drugs available, ``and it is necessary to approve that drug to protect 
public health or effectively utilize the TRIPS/health solution, the 
data protection provisions in the FTA would not stand in the way.'' And 
they say the same as to the parallel import issue.
  So I just finish by saying this to make it very clear: We were 
concerned. There is an AIDS epidemic. There are other health issues of 
serious import for the lives of children and other citizens of Morocco, 
and we took the initiative to be sure that this agreement would not 
prevent the availability of medicines in these circumstances. The 
Declaration, the language that was worked out in Doha, made it clear as 
to WTO that countries could protect themselves and their citizens when 
there was an overriding health need, and we wanted to make sure that 
nothing in this FTA would override that ability. And I am satisfied 
because of the exchange of letters. I am satisfied because of what was 
written to us by USTR. I am now satisfied by their categorical 
statement at our hearing just a few days ago that there would be 
nothing that would prevent access to these medicines in the 
circumstances I mentioned because of the FTA.
  For all of those reasons, I believe that the issue for Morocco has 
been addressed. But I want to make it very clear that when we negotiate 
these agreements in the first place, as is true for core labor 
standards, as is true for health needs, as is true for anything else, 
we should be sensitive to what the possible impact would be. We should 
not be using cookie cutter approaches when the lives and the 
livelihoods of people in our country and in other countries are 
involved.
  So I support this agreement. I urge passage of the rule. But I think 
this has been a healthy process, and I think we have both clarified the 
meaning of this agreement, and also I think what we have done is to 
serve notice as to how these agreements should be negotiated in the 
future.

                                                    Embassy of the


                                           Kingdom of Morocco,

                                    Washington, DC, July 14, 2004.
     Hon. Sandy Levin,
     Rayburn House Office Building,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Congressman Levin: I have deeply appreciated the 
     continuing opportunity to work with you on the U.S. Morocco 
     Free Trade Agreement. In particular, I welcome your interest 
     in our nation's labor law, specifically the comprehensive 
     reforms, passed last year.
       I want to address through this letter some of the issues 
     that have been highlighted in conversations with you and your 
     staff. Under Moroccan law, it is illegal to fire an 
     individual because they are a member of a labor organization 
     or have engaged in labor organizing. To fire someone on these 
     grounds would be arbitrary under the 2003 law and would make 
     available the full remedies provided under that law.
       Under Moroccan law, it is illegal to refuse to hire an 
     individual because they are a member of a labor organization 
     or have engaged in labor organizing. It is also illegal to 
     refuse to rehire or extend the contract of an individual for 
     these reasons.
       Section 473 is a provision in the 2003 Labor Law and the 
     provision's intent is to ensure that labor representatives do 
     not undermine the traditional labor organizations. The 
     government intends to implement this provision to achieve 
     that goal, consistent with the core provisions of the ILO.
       The right to strike is protected in the Moroccan 
     constitution. Further clarification of these rights is 
     underway. The government of Morocco is committed to 
     protecting the right to strike in conformance with the 
     International Labor Organization's core principles. In 
     particular, the government of Morocco will not use Article 
     288 of our penal code against lawful strikers.
       Concerning the questions regarding Labor Representatives, 
     employers have the obligation to organize the elections for 
     the labor representatives. Employers cannot vote in these 
     elections and are not able to choose labor representatives. 
     Only employees can vote and elect freely the labor 
     representatives.
       Employees can join freely the Union of their own choice. 
     Unions designate their representatives within the companies.
       On the ILO involvement, Morocco has always worked with ILO. 
     For instance, ILO assisted Morocco to write the Labor Code of 
     2003 and the new law on child labor. Morocco, as in the past, 
     will continue to ask the support of ILO and work with this 
     organization in all labor issues such as new laws and will 
     ask its help in providing assistance for the implementation 
     of the current rules.
       I look forward to continuing to work with you on these 
     issues and any others of potential concern. Nevertheless, I 
     wanted to get back to you in a timely manner on the key 
     issues addressed in this letter.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Aziz Mekouar,
     Ambassador.
                                  ____

                                                    Embassy of the


                                           Kingdom of Morocco,

                                    Washington, DC, July 19, 2004.
     Hon. Sandy Levin,
     Rayburn House Office Building,
     House of Representatives.
       Dear Representative Levin: I deeply appreciate the 
     opportunity to work with you on the U.S.-Morocco Free Trade 
     Agreement. In particular, I appreciate the opportunity to 
     talk to you about the pharmaceutical provisions in the Free 
     Trade Agreement, and about how the Government of Morocco is 
     meeting the health needs of its citizens.
       The Government of Morocco has a well-developed health 
     system, including a comprehensive public health program. For 
     example, free medical care, including medicines, is available 
     through our hospitals. Morocco's health care policy includes 
     a strong emphasis on generic drugs.
       Morocco has not needed to engage in emergency measures such 
     as compulsory licensing or parallel imports. In fact, there 
     is a well-developed domestic pharmaceutical industry in 
     Morocco, producing also generics, and in 2000, well in 
     advance of the Free Trade Agreement and completely 
     independent of it, Morocco decided to bar parallel imports.
       In addition, as a separate, but quite important matter, the 
     Government of Morocco is strongly committed to and has agreed 
     to the highest-standard intellectual property rights 
     provisions in the Free Trade Agreement. The Government of 
     Morocco believes that effective intellectual property right 
     protection will play a vital role in the continued economic 
     development of our country.
       The pharmaceutical provisions in the Free Trade Agreement 
     were carefully considered in Morocco. They were discussed in 
     detail

[[Page 17219]]

     with all parties. All sectors of our health system were 
     involved, including the pharmaceutical industry. The 
     discussions also included the members of the civil society in 
     Morocco.
       The Government of Morocco achieved in this agreement full 
     flexibility to meet our nation's health concerns. In 
     particular, the Government of Morocco believes the agreement 
     fully preserves its right to issue a compulsory license in 
     the event that this should prove necessary.
       The Agreement does bar ``parallel imports'' in 1.5.9.4. 
     However, as described above, the Government of Morocco 
     already bans ``parallel imports.'' In addition, the 
     Government of Morocco believes that in the event that it 
     faced a situation where extraordinary action was required, it 
     could meet the needs of its people through a compulsory 
     license.
       The Government of Morocco considered carefully the data 
     exclusivity provisions in the agreement. We do not believe 
     that they present any risk to our ability to meet the health 
     needs of our citizens.
       Under the Agreement, a compulsory license does not override 
     obligations to provide data exclusivity under 15.10.1 and 2. 
     The Government of Morocco believes it is unlikely that a 
     situation would ever arise where data exclusivity would be a 
     barrier to the issuance of a compulsory license. If such an 
     event did occur, the Government of Morocco believes that an 
     accommodation could be reached with the owner of the data.
       The Government of Morocco supports the Paragraph 6 solution 
     of the Doha Declaration. The Free Trade Agreement does not 
     restrict our ability to export under the Paragraph 6 solution 
     of the Doha Declaration. To the specific, 15.9.6 does not 
     create a barrier to exports under the Paragraph 6 solution of 
     the Doha Declaration.
       The June 15, 2004 side letter between our two countries 
     addresses the ability to amend the Free Trade Agreement, 
     responsive to amendments to the WTO Agreement on Trade-
     Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. Under the 
     Agreement, the Government of Morocco believes it can consult 
     immediately to amend the Agreement responsive to any WTO 
     amendments. Under the Agreement, it is not required to wait 
     for there to be an application in dispute of the Agreement.
       I look forward to keep working with you.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Aziz Mekouar,
     Ambassador.
                                  ____

                                    Congress of the United States,


                                     House of Representatives,

                                    Washington, DC, July 15, 2004.
     Hon. Robert B. Zoellick,
     U.S. Trade Representative,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Ambassador Zoellick: We are writing to express our 
     ongoing concern about sections of recently negotiated U.S. 
     free trade agreements (FTAs) that could affect the 
     availability of affordable drugs in developing countries. In 
     particular, we are concerned about the impact of restrictions 
     on parallel imports and about marketing exclusivity 
     requirements for pharmaceuticals included in the Morocco FTA. 
     Our concern relates to two points.
       First, it appears that some of the provisions contradict, 
     both explicitly and in spirit, commitments made by the United 
     States in the World Trade Organization in both the November 
     2001 Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
     (the Doha Declaration) and the September 2003 Implementation 
     of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
     and Public Health (the Paragraph 6 Decision). Section 
     2101(b)(4)(C) of the Trade Act of 2002 (Trade Promotion 
     Authority or TPA) directs the Administration to respect the 
     Doha Declaration, necessarily including subsequent agreements 
     related to that Declaration.
       Second, we are concerned that the FTA's restrictions on 
     obtaining regulatory approval for drugs, including drugs that 
     are already off-patent, are likely to increase prices in the 
     Moroccan market. These restrictions, described below, could 
     undermine the availability of generic versions of drugs to 
     treat serious health problems, including HIV/ADS, that are 
     widespread in many, if not most, developing countries. 
     Moreover, any increase in the price of drugs in a developing 
     country like Morocco will be borne by consumers because most 
     developing countries have large rural, uninsured, and poor 
     populations who pay out-of-pocket for drugs.
       In discussions with your staff and in recent testimony 
     before the Committee on Ways and Means, we understand that 
     your office is of the view that the FTA does not interfere 
     with a country's efforts to ensure broader access to 
     medicines. We request that you explain that view to us in 
     writing, and in particular, by responding to the questions 
     outlined below. We have focused on Chapter 15 of the U.S.-
     Morocco FTA, because it may be considered by Congress in the 
     coming weeks.


                  restrictions on parallel importation

       Article 15.9.4 of the U.S.-Morocco FTA requires both 
     countries to recognize the exclusive right of a patent holder 
     to import a patented product, at least where the patent 
     holder has restricted the right to import by contractual 
     means. In practical terms, this provision means that neither 
     Morocco, nor for that matter, the United States, may allow 
     parallel imports of patented pharmaceutical products from the 
     other country, or where a national of the other country owns 
     the patent.
       With respect to Morocco, which is a developing country, 
     this provision appears to limit one of the flexibilities 
     identified in the Doha Declaration for increasing access to 
     medicines, and accordingly, it appears to contradict the 
     direction in section 2102(b)(4)(c) of TPA. Specifically, the 
     Doha Declaration reaffirmed that the TRIPS Agreement provides 
     flexibility for WTO Members to take measures to protect 
     public health, including ``promot[ing] access to medicines 
     for all.'' One of the key flexibilities identified in the 
     Doha Declaration is the right of each country to determine 
     for itself whether to allow parallel imports.
       Does Article 15.9.4 of the Morocco FTA prevent Morocco from 
     allowing parallel imports of a patented pharmaceutical 
     product?
       Given that the Doha Declaration explicitly confirms the 
     right of each country to retain flexibility in allowing 
     parallel imports of drugs as one way of meeting the public 
     health needs of its citizens, please explain why the 
     provision was included given that TPA directs the 
     Administration to respect the Doha Declaration?
       Which country sought inclusion of this provision?
       If Morocco or the United States eliminated the exclusive 
     right of a patent holder to import a patented product, would 
     either be in violation of Article 15.9.4?


               market exclusivity and related provisions

       Article 15.10.1 of the U.S.-Morocco FTA requires that both 
     countries prevent the use of data submitted to support an 
     application for marketing approval (e.g., approval from the 
     Food and Drug Administration (FDA)) for a new pharmaceutical 
     chemical product without the consent of the person submitting 
     such data, for a period of five years from the date of 
     approval. In layman's terms, this means that if a company 
     submits data to meet FDA-type safety and efficacy standards, 
     and obtains marketing approval based on that data, other 
     companies cannot obtain regulatory approval based on those 
     data for five years. Given the cost of generating such data, 
     this provision operates effectively as a grant of market 
     exclusivity in virtually all cases, including in cases where 
     the drug is off patent. Article 15.10.2 appears to allow an 
     additional three years of marketing exclusivity for new uses 
     of an already-approved pharmaceutical product. Article 
     15.10.3 requires both countries to extend patents where there 
     is a delay in the marketing approval process.
       The provisions described above appear to be based on 1984 
     amendments to U.S. law known as the Hatch-Waxman Act. The 
     objectives of the Hatch-Waxman Act were to accelerate and 
     increase the availability of generic drugs in the United 
     States while balancing the need for continued investment in 
     new drugs. As you are aware, the Hatch-Waxman Act was 
     necessary because prior to 1984, U.S. law made it extremely 
     difficult and expensive to bring a generic version of a 
     pharmaceutical product to market, even after a patent 
     expired. This was because prior to the 1984 changes, a 
     company seeking marketing approval for a copy of an already-
     approved drug had to generate its own data to support its FDA 
     application. The cost of generating those data effectively 
     precluded second entrants from entering the market. (First 
     entrants were able to offset the cost for generation of the 
     data because they enjoyed patent protection.) The Hatch-
     Waxman Act allowed second entrants to rely on data submitted 
     by first entrants, thereby reducing costs and speeding 
     introduction of generic versions of drugs to the U.S. market. 
     In exchange for allowing second entrants to ``piggy-back'' 
     off first entrants, first entrants were given a period of 
     market exclusivity, even for drugs that are off-patent.
       The Hatch-Waxman Act's provisions on market exclusivity 
     were part of a compromise necessary to ensure that the U.S. 
     regulatory structure was updated to facilitate the entry of 
     generic drugs into the U.S. market. Most developing countries 
     already have robust generic markets, in large part because 
     they already allow producers of generic versions of drugs to 
     obtain regulatory approval based on data submitted by first 
     applicants or based on prior approval. In light of that fact, 
     and given that innovative drug companies largely develop 
     drugs for developed country markets and conduct the necessary 
     tests to get marketing approval in those markets regardless 
     of whether they are given market exclusivity in low-income 
     developing countries, what is the rationale for including 
     these provisions?
       Please describe the circumstances under which the three 
     additional years of marketing exclusivity described in 
     Article 15.10.2 would apply.
       Neither Article 15.10.1 or 15.10.2 on marketing exclusivity 
     appear to allow for reliance on previously submitted data or 
     prior approval during the period of market exclusivity absent 
     consent of the first applicant. The Doha Declaration 
     reaffirmed the right of countries to use flexibilities under 
     the TRIPS Agreement, such as compulsory licenses. A 
     compulsory license allows someone

[[Page 17220]]

     other than the patent holder to produce and sell a drug under 
     patent. It is not clear to us why the grant of a compulsory 
     license would override a grant of market exclusivity, as 
     provided in Articles 15.10.1 and 15.10.02. (We note that 
     there is no exception to protect the public.) Please describe 
     how the market exclusivity provisions in Article 15.10.1 and 
     Article 15.10.2 relate to Morocco's ability to issue a 
     compulsory license.
       Where a compulsory license has been issued, may a Party 
     automatically deem that the first applicant has consented to 
     reliance on the data or prior approval for the drug produced 
     under the compulsory license?
       If the patent and test-data were owned by different 
     entities, does a compulsory license result in legal 
     ``consent'' by both the patent holder and the data owner for 
     use of the patented material and the test data?
       When the drug is off patent, and a Party wishes to permit 
     marketing for a second entrant, what mechanism exists in the 
     FTA to allow for an exception to the provisions on market 
     exclusivity?
       Is a grant of market exclusivity pursuant to Articles 
     15.10.1 and 15.10.2 considered an ``investment'' with respect 
     to Chapter 10 of the agreement? If so, would an abridgement 
     of the period of market exclusivity constitute a compensable 
     expropriation under Chapter 10?
       Article 10.6.5 of the FTA appears to clarify that any act 
     of patent infringement carried out by a Party in the issuance 
     of a compulsory license in accordance with the TRIPS does not 
     constitute a compensable expropriation. Issuance of a 
     compulsory license, however, is only one aspect of the 
     process of getting a drug to market. Does the clarification 
     in Article 10.6.5 also ensure that other measures taken by a 
     government to ensure that a drug on which a compulsory 
     license has been issued can be lawfully marketed (e.g., a 
     grant of marketing approval to a generic or second producer 
     before the period of marketing exclusivity has expired) will 
     not constitute compensable expropriations? If not, is there 
     another provision in the agreement that would ensure that 
     such measures do not constitute expropriations?
       Article 15.10.3 requires that a patent term be extended 
     where there is a delay in the regulatory approval process. 
     The provision does not state whether delays attributable to 
     the applicant (e.g., failure to provide adequate data) 
     mitigate against extension. Article 15.9.8, the comparable 
     provision for extension of a patent term because of a delay 
     in the patent approval process, makes clear that delays 
     attributable to the patent applicant should not be considered 
     in determining whether there is a delay that gives rise to 
     the need for an extension. Why was similar language not 
     included in Article 15.10.3?
       Is Morocco, or for that matter the United States, required 
     by the FTA to extend a patent term where there is a delay in 
     the regulatory approval that is attributable to the 
     applicant?


                Bolar-Type Provisions That Limit Export

       Article 15.9.6 of the U.S.-Morocco FTA appears to allow a 
     person other than a patent holder to make use of a patent in 
     order to generate data in support of an application for 
     marketing approval of a pharmaceutical product (e.g., 
     approval from the FDA). However, Article 15.9.6 also states 
     that if exportation of the product using the patent is 
     allowed, exportation must be limited to ``purposes of meeting 
     marketing approval requirements.'' This provision appears to 
     preclude Morocco from exporting generic versions of patented 
     pharmaceutical products for any reason other than use in 
     obtaining marketing approval because that is the only 
     exception noted.
       If that is the case, the provision would seem to curtail 
     Morocco's ability to act as an exporter of pharmaceutical 
     products to least-developed and other countries under the 
     Paragraph 6 Decision. Specifically, the Paragraph 6 Decision 
     allows countries to export drugs produced under a compulsory 
     license to least-developed countries or to countries that 
     lack pharmaceutical manufacturing capabilities. Were the 
     provisions to constrain Morocco's ability to export under the 
     Paragraph 6 Decision, the United States could be accused of 
     backtracking on commitments that have been made.
       Please explain whether this Article prohibits Morocco from 
     allowing the export of generic versions of patented 
     pharmaceutical products for purposes other than ``meeting 
     market approval requirements.'' If it does not, please 
     explain in detail how you came to that conclusion.
       If this provision does in fact limit Morocco's ability to 
     allow the export of generic versions of patented 
     pharmaceutical products, please explain how Morocco could 
     serve as an exporting country to help least-developed and 
     other countries address public health needs under the 
     Paragraph 6 Decision. (Exporters under the Paragraph 6 
     Decision are exporting to meet the health needs of an 
     importing country, not merely to obtain marketing approval.)
       Does Article 15.9.6 allow export of a generic version of a 
     patented drug to get marketing approval in a third country 
     (i.e., other than the United States or Morocco)? (Article 
     15.9.6 states that ``the Party shall provide that the product 
     shall only be exported outside its territory for purposes of 
     meeting marketing approval requirements of that Party.'')


                      Side Letter to the Agreement

       The Morocco FTA includes an exchange of letters dated June 
     15, 2004, between the Governments of Morocco and the United 
     States. The letters appear intended to clarify the 
     relationship between the intellectual property provisions of 
     the FTA and the ability of Morocco and the United States to 
     take measures to protect the public health.
       The letters address two issues. First, the letters state 
     that the intellectual property provisions in the FTA ``do not 
     prevent the effective utilization'' of the Paragraph 6 
     Decision. Second, the letters state that if the TRIPS 
     Agreement is amended on issues related to promotion of access 
     to medicines, and that either the United States or Morocco 
     takes action in conformity with such amendments, both 
     countries will ``immediately consult in order to adapt [the 
     intellectual property provisions of the FTA] as appropriate 
     in light of the amendment.''
       On the Paragraph 6 Decision, please explain how the 
     statement that the FTA does not ``prevent the effective 
     utilization'' is not merely rhetorical. Please be specific as 
     to why you believe the provisions in the FTA do not preclude 
     Morocco from acting as an importer or exporter of drugs under 
     the Paragraph 6 Decision, including how the FTA's provisions 
     related to market exclusivity can be waived if Morocco acts 
     in either capacity.
       On the issue of consultation, do the letters mean that both 
     Parties agree to amend the FTA as soon as possible to reflect 
     access to medicines amendments to the TRIPS Agreement? Will 
     the United States refrain from enforcing provisions of the 
     FTA that contravene the TRIPS Agreement amendments while the 
     FTA is being amended? Is USTR willing to engage in an 
     exchange of letters with the Government of Morocco 
     memorializing such an understanding?
       We appreciate your prompt response to these questions.
           Sincerely,
     Charles B. Rangel,
       Ranking Democrat, Committee on Ways and Means.
     Jim McDermott,
       Member, Committee on Ways and Means.
     Sander Levin
       Ranking Democrat, Subcommittee on Trade, Committee on Ways 
     and Means.
     Henry A. Waxman,
       Ranking Democrat, Committee on Government Reform.
                                  ____

         Executive Office of the President, Office of the United 
           States Trade Representative,
                                    Washington, DC, July 19, 2004.
     Hon. Sander M. Levin,
     House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Congressman Levin: Thank you for your letter of July 
     15, 2004, regarding certain provisions of the intellectual 
     property chapter of the U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement 
     (FTA).
       I have addressed each of your specific questions below. As 
     a general matter, for the reasons also set forth below, the 
     FTA does not conflict with the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
     Agreement and Public Health or otherwise adversely, affect 
     access to medicines in Morocco. The FTA does not require 
     Morocco to change its policies with respect to any of the 
     flexibilities noted in the Doha Declaration. Furthermore, we 
     believe that this FTA can advance Morocco's ability to 
     address public health problems, both by putting in place 
     incentives to develop and bring new medicines to market 
     quickly and by raising standards of living more broadly.
       The experience of Jordan under the U.S.-Jordan FTA is 
     illuminating. The United States and Jordan signed the FTA in 
     2000, during the prior Administration, and we worked with 
     Congress to enact that agreement in 2001. The U.S.-Jordan FTA 
     contains a strong intellectual property chapter that covers, 
     for example, data protection, one of the issues highlighted 
     in your letter. Jordan has witnessed a substantial increase 
     in pharmaceutical investment, creating new jobs and 
     opportunities. In addition, Jordan has approved 32 new 
     innovative medicines since 2000--a substantial increase in 
     the rate of approval of innovative drugs, helping facilitate 
     Jordanian consumers' access to medicines. The Jordanian drug 
     industry has even begun to develop its own innovative 
     medicines. This is an example of how strong intellectual 
     property protection can bring substantial benefits to 
     developing and developed countries together.
       Your specific questions with respect to the U.S.-Morocco 
     FTA are addressed below.


                          Parallel Importation

       1. Does Article 15.9.4 of the Morocco FTA prevent Morocco 
     from allowing parallel imports of a patented pharmaceutical 
     product?
       Article 15.9.4 of the FTA reflects current Moroccan law and 
     therefore does not require Morocco to do anything it does not 
     already do. The FTA also reflects existing U.S. law. Both 
     Morocco and the United States already provide patent owners 
     with an exclusive

[[Page 17221]]

     right to import patented products, including pharmaceuticals 
     but also all other types of patented products. Many 
     innovative industries and their employees in the United 
     States--from the high tech and pharmaceuticals sectors to 
     sectors covering chemicals and agricultural inputs, and on to 
     engineering and manufacturing--benefit from this long-
     standing protection in U.S. patent law.
       2. Given that the Doha Declaration explicitly confirms the 
     right of each country to retain flexibility in allowing 
     parallel imports of drugs as one way of meeting the public 
     health needs of its citizens, please explain why the 
     provision was included given that TPA directs the 
     Administration to respect the Doha Declaration?
       Providing patent owners with an exclusive import right is 
     consistent with Article 28.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, which 
     states that patent owners have the exclusive right to make, 
     use, sell, offer for sale, and import products covered by 
     their patents. U.S. law, developed through a long line of 
     Supreme Court and lower court cases, has recognized this 
     right for over a hundred years. The TRIPS Agreement more 
     precisely articulated the exclusive import right, and, when 
     implementing TRIPS in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 
     Congress amended the patent law by providing for such a right 
     expressly in the statute.
       At the same time, however, the TRIPS Agreement also allows 
     countries to choose to permit ``international exhaustion'' 
     without challenge under WTO dispute settlement. International 
     exhaustion would allow parallel imports. The Doha Declaration 
     affirms this approach, and states that ``[t]he effect of the 
     provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to the 
     exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to leave each 
     member free to establish its own regime for such exhaustion 
     without challenge, subject to the MFN and national treatment 
     provisions of Articles 3 and 4.''
       Importantly, neither the TRIPS Agreement nor the Doha 
     Declaration require WTO members to adopt an international 
     exhaustion rule; they merely recognize that countries may do 
     so without challenge. WTO members are free to exercise their 
     sovereign right to choose an alternative policy. As noted, 
     the United States does not permit parallel imports. Morocco 
     also decided in 2000, well before the FTA negotiations, not 
     to permit parallel imports. The fact that the FTA reflects 
     principles already present in both Parties' laws does not in 
     any way lessen our commitment to the Doha Declaration. In 
     fact, in previous FTA negotiations with developing countries 
     that do not have parallel import restrictions in their 
     domestic law (e.g., Central America, Chile, and Bahrain), the 
     final negotiated texts do not contain provisions on parallel 
     importation.
       3. Which country sought inclusion of this provision?
       This provision is a standard component of the U.S. draft 
     text, which USTR staff has presented to Congress for review 
     and comment on numerous occasions. Morocco readily accepted 
     the proposal, without objection, and noted during the 
     negotiations that Moroccan patent law, like U.S. law, already 
     provided patentees with an exclusive importation right.
       4. If Morocco or the United States eliminated the exclusive 
     right of a patent holder to import a patented product, would 
     either be in violation of Article 15.9.4?
       It would depend on the details of the particular 
     legislation. A change in U.S. law would, however, affect many 
     other innovative sectors that rely on patents besides the 
     pharmaceutical sector. Many U.S. technology, manufacturing, 
     and other innovative businesses--as well as Members of 
     Congress--urge us regularly to vigorously safeguard U.S. 
     patents and the jobs they help create.


                           market exclusivity

       5. The Hatch-Waxman Act's provisions on market exclusivity 
     were part of a compromise necessary to ensure that the U.S. 
     regulatory structure was updated to facilitate the entry of 
     generic drugs into the U.S. market. Most developing countries 
     already have robust generic markets, in large part because 
     they already allow producers of generic versions of drugs to 
     obtain regulatory approval based on data submitted by first 
     applicants or based on prior approval. In light of that fact, 
     and given that innovative drug companies largely develop 
     drugs for developed country markets and conduct the necessary 
     tests to get marketing approval in those markets regardless 
     of whether they are given market exclusivity in low-income 
     developing countries, what is the rationale for including 
     these provisions?
       In negotiating the U.S.-Morocco FTA and other recent FTAs, 
     USTR has been mindful of the guidance provided in the Trade 
     Act of 2002, which directs USTR to seek to ``ensur[e] that 
     the provisions of any multilateral or bilateral trade 
     agreement governing intellectual property rights that is 
     entered into by the United States reflect[s] a standard of 
     protection similar to that found in United States law.'' We 
     understand the rationale of this guidance is to help protect 
     and create high-paying jobs in leading American businesses. 
     As a developed economy, it is understandable that U.S. 
     workers will be increasingly employed in higher value (and 
     better paid) innovative and productive jobs. On the basis of 
     Congress' direction, the United States sought to include 
     provisions that reflect U.S. law, including with respect to 
     the protection of data.
       The protection of clinical test data has long been a 
     component of trade agreements negotiated by U.S. 
     Administrations with both developed and developing countries. 
     Data protection provisions were included, for example, in 
     many past trade agreements, including the U.S.-Jordan FTA and 
     the U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement--both negotiated 
     by the prior Administration after the passage of the law to 
     which you refer. Such provisions were included in NAFTA, too. 
     They are in all recent FTAs, including the U.S.-Singapore FTA 
     and the U.S.-Chile FTA. Data protection provisions have also 
     been included in many bilateral intellectual property 
     agreements.
       The TRIPS Agreement itself requires protection of clinical 
     test data against unfair commercial use. While the United 
     States protects data to obtain approval for new chemical 
     entities for five years, other countries provide different 
     terms. The EU, for example, protects such data for 6-10 
     years.
       Implicit in the question, however, appears to be an 
     assumption that data protection is disadvantageous for 
     developing countries like Morocco. Yet, protection of data 
     actually has the potential of facilitating and accelerating 
     access to medicines. As recognized in Chapter 15 of the FTA 
     (footnotes 12 and 13), Morocco does not currently approve 
     generic versions of medicines based on approvals granted in 
     other countries. As a result, today a generic producer 
     wishing to sell pharmaceuticals in Morocco may obtain 
     approval only if an innovative producer first obtains 
     approval in Morocco or if the generic producer invests the 
     significant money and time necessary to recreate the data 
     itself. After an innovative producer obtains approval in 
     Morocco, a generic producer may rely on such data to obtain 
     approval for its generic product.
       Therefore, under existing Moroccan law, generic 
     manufacturers in Morocco cannot obtain marketing approval for 
     a generic drug until an innovator has first obtained approval 
     for the drug in Morocco. Without data protection, innovative 
     producers will be less likely to enter the Moroccan market in 
     the first place because, once they obtain approval, generic 
     producers may capture most of the market. The data 
     exclusivity provisions of the FTA can thus provide an 
     important incentive for innovators to enter the market, which 
     may in turn expand the potential universe of generic drugs in 
     Morocco. As noted above, this is the development we are 
     seeing in Jordan, to the benefit of Jordan consumers.
       6. Please describe the circumstances under which the three 
     additional years of marketing exclusivity described in 
     Article 15.10.2 would apply.
       The question seems to imply that the basic five year term 
     of protection for data submitted to obtain approval of new 
     chemical entities may be extended to eight years. This is not 
     correct. There is no circumstance in which the FTA requires 
     that an innovator receive a data protection period longer 
     than five years for new chemical entities.
       The three year period of protection reflects a provision in 
     U.S. law, which relates to new information that is submitted 
     after a product is already on the market (for example, 
     because the innovator is seeking approval for a new use of an 
     existing product). In that situation, at least in cases where 
     the origination of this new data involves considerable 
     effort, the FTA requires that the person providing the new 
     data gets three years of protection for that new data 
     relating to that new use. This three year period only applies 
     to the new data for the new use; it is not added to the 
     exclusivity period for any data previously submitted.
       For example, if a new chemical entity is given marketing 
     approval, the data supporting that approval is protected for 
     five years. After that time, generic producers may rely on 
     the data to obtain approval for a generic version of the drug 
     for the use supported by the original data. If a new use is 
     subsequently discovered for the chemical entity, and the 
     health authority approves the new use based on new data, then 
     the originator of the new data is entitled to three years of 
     protection for that data. During that time, however, generics 
     can continue to produce and market the drug for the original 
     use.
       7. Neither Article 15.10.1 or 15.10.2 on marketing 
     exclusivity appear to allow for reliance on previously 
     submitted data or prior approval during the period of market 
     exclusivity absent consent of the first applicant. The Doha 
     Declaration reaffirmed the right of countries to use 
     flexibilities under the TRIPS agreement, such as compulsory 
     licenses. A compulsory license allows someone other than the 
     patent holder to produce and sell a drug under patent. It is 
     not clear to us why the grant of a compulsory license would 
     override a grant of market exclusivity, as provided in 
     Articles 15.10.1 and 15.10.2. (We note that there is no 
     exception to protect the public.) Please describe how the 
     market exclusivity provisions in Article 15.10.1 and Article 
     15.10.2 relate to Morocco's ability to issue a compulsory 
     license.

[[Page 17222]]

       The Doha Declaration recognizes that the TRIPS Agreement 
     allows countries to issue compulsory licenses to address 
     public health problems. The U.S.-Morocco FTA is fully 
     consistent with this principle. It contains no provisions 
     with respect to compulsory licensing, leaving the 
     flexibilities available under WTO rules unchanged.
       In the negotiation of the U.S.-Morocco FTA, both parties 
     recognized the importance of protecting public health. Your 
     questions pertain to whether provisions of Chapter 15 (which 
     is the Intellectual Property Rights chapter) might affect 
     this common interest. To address this type of concern, the 
     United States and Morocco agreed to a side letter on public 
     health in which both Parties stated their understanding that 
     ``[t]he obligations of Chapter Fifteen of the Agreement do 
     not affect the ability of either Party to take necessary 
     measures to protect public health by promoting access to 
     medicines for all, in particular concerning cases such as 
     HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and other epidemics as well 
     as circumstances of extreme urgency or national emergency.'' 
     The Parties also stated that ``Chapter Fifteen does not 
     prevent the effective utilization of the TRIPS/health 
     solution'' reached in the WTO last year to ensure that 
     developing countries that lack pharmaceutical manufacturing 
     capacity may import drugs. Therefore, if circumstances ever 
     arise in which a drug is produced under a compulsory license, 
     and it is necessary to approve that drug to protect public 
     health or effectively utilize the TRIPS/health solution, the 
     data protection provisions in the FTA would not stand in the 
     way.
       8. Where a compulsory license has been issued, may a Party 
     automatically deem that the first applicant has consented to 
     reliance on the data or prior approval for the drug produced 
     under the compulsory license?
       As explained above, if the measure described in the 
     question is necessary to protect public health, then, as 
     explained in the side letter, the FTA would not stand in the 
     way.
       9. If the patent and test-data were owned by different 
     entities, does a compulsory license result in legal 
     ``consent'' by both the patent holder and the data owner for 
     use of the patented material and the test data?
       See previous response.
       10. When the drug is off patent, and a Party wishes to 
     permit marketing for a second entrant, what mechanism exists 
     in the FTA to allow for an exception to the provisions on 
     market exclusivity?
       A patent is designed to protect one type of intellectual 
     property work, i.e., an invention. Protection of data is 
     intended to protect a different type of work, i.e., 
     undisclosed test data that required significant time and 
     effort to compile. The fact that one type of intellectual 
     property protection for a product has expired, should not 
     lead as a matter of course to the conclusion that all other 
     intellectual property rights attached to the same product 
     should also expire. The same is true in other areas of 
     intellectual property. For example, a single CD may encompass 
     several intellectual property rights related to the music, 
     the performer and the record company. These rights may expire 
     at different times. The fact that the copyright attached to 
     the sound recording has expired, should not mean that the 
     composer or performer loses the copyright it has. As you 
     know, this principle is important to a broad range of U.S. 
     creative and innovative industries, including the 
     entertainment sector, America's second largest export 
     business.
       However, as indicated in the side letter, if a circumstance 
     arose, such as an epidemic or national emergency, that could 
     only be addressed by granting a second entrant marketing 
     approval notwithstanding the data protection rights of the 
     originator of the data, the FTA would not stand in the way.
       11. Is a grant of market exclusivity pursuant to Articles 
     15.10.1 and 15.10.2 considered an ``investment'' with respect 
     to Chapter 10 of the Agreement? If so, would an abridgement 
     of the period of market exclusivity constitute a compensable 
     expropriation under Chapter 10?
       The definition of an ``investment'' in the FTA includes, 
     inter alia, ``intellectual property rights.'' Whether an 
     abridgement of the data protection obligation gives rise to a 
     compensable expropriation of an ``investment'' under Chapter 
     Ten is a fact-specific issue that would have to be resolved 
     on the merits of a particular case. It is worth noting, 
     however, that Article 10.6.5 provides that the expropriation 
     provision of Chapter Ten does not apply to the issuance of 
     compulsory licenses or to the limitation of intellectual 
     property rights to the extent that such action is consistent 
     with the intellectual property chapter (Chapter Fifteen). A 
     determination concerning the consistency of an action with 
     Chapter Fifteen would be informed by the side letter.
       12. Article 10.6.5 of the FTA appears to clarify that any 
     act of patent infringement carried out by a Party in the 
     issuance of a compulsory license in accordance with the TRIPS 
     does not constitute a compensable expropriation. Issuance of 
     a compulsory license, however, is only one aspect of the 
     process of getting a drug to market. Does the clarification 
     in Article 10.6.5 also ensure that other measures taken by a 
     government to ensure that a drug on which a compulsory 
     license has been issued can be lawfully marketed (e.g., a 
     grant of marketing approval to a generic or second producer 
     before the period of marketing exclusivity has expired) will 
     not constitute compensable expropriations? If not, is there 
     another provision in the agreement that would ensure that 
     such measures do not constitute expropriations?
       See response to Question 11.
       13. Article 15.10.3 requires that a patent term be extended 
     where there is a delay in the regulatory approval process. 
     The provision does not state whether delays attributable to 
     the applicant (e.g., failure to provide adequate data) 
     mitigate against extension. Article 15.9., the comparable 
     provision for extension of a patent term because of a delay 
     in the patent approval process, makes clear that delays 
     attributable to the patent applicant should not be considered 
     in determining whether there is a delay that gives rise to 
     the need for an extension. Why was similar language not 
     included in Article 15.10.3?
       The Parties did not find it necessary to specifically 
     address the issue of how to handle delays attributable to an 
     applicant for marketing approval in the context of data 
     protection. As with numerous other provisions, the Parties 
     retain the flexibility to address such details in their 
     implementation of the FTA, provided that they comply with the 
     basic obligation.
       14. Is Morocco, or for that matter the United States, 
     required by the FTA to extend a patent term where there is a 
     delay in the regulatory approval that is attributable to the 
     applicant?
       The FTA preserves flexibility for the Parties to address 
     the issue of delays attributable to an applicant for 
     marketing approval through their domestic laws and 
     regulations.


                            bolar provisions

       15. Please explain whether this Article prohibits Morocco 
     from allowing the export of generic versions of patented 
     pharmaceutical products for purposes other than ``meeting 
     marketing approval requirements.'' If it does not, please 
     explain in detail how you came to that conclusion.
       No, it does not. The Article dealing with the ``Bolar'' 
     exception to patent rights only deals with one specific 
     exception. It does not occupy the field of possible 
     exceptions, and thus does not prevent Morocco from allowing 
     the export of generic versions of patented pharmaceutical 
     products for purposes other than ``meeting marketing approval 
     requirements'' when permitted by other exceptions. For 
     example, Morocco has the right to allow exports where 
     consistent with TRIPS Article 30 and WTO rules on compulsory 
     licensing. Morocco may, for example, allow export of generic 
     versions of patented drugs by issuing a compulsory license in 
     accordance with the TRIPS/health solution agreed last August 
     in the WTO.
       16. If this provision does in fact limit Morocco's ability 
     to allow the export of generic versions of patented 
     pharmaceutical products, please explain how Morocco could 
     serve as an exporting country to help least-developed and 
     other countries address public health needs under the 
     Paragraph 6 Decision. (Exporters under the Paragraph 6 
     Decision are exporting to meet the health needs of an 
     importing country, not merely to obtain marketing approval).
       As noted in the response to Question 15, the FTA does not 
     limit Morocco's ability to make use of the TRIPS/health 
     solution agreed last August to export drugs under a 
     compulsory license to developing countries that cannot 
     produce drugs for themselves.
       17. Does Article 15.9.6 allow export of a generic version 
     of a patented drug to get marketing approval in a third 
     country (i.e., other than the United States or Morocco)? 
     (Article 15.9.6 states that ``the Party shall provide that 
     the product shall only be exported outside its territory for 
     purposes of meeting marketing approval requirements of that 
     Party.'')
       Morocco can get marketing approval in a third country to 
     allow export of a generic version through the issuance of a 
     compulsory license for export, consistent with WTO rules. 
     Article 15.9.6 does not interfere with that result.


                              side letter

       18. On the Paragraph 6 Decision, please explain how the 
     statement that the FTA does not ``prevent the effective 
     utilization'' is not merely rhetorical. Please be specific as 
     to why you believe the provisions in the FTA do not preclude 
     Morocco from acting as an importer or exporter of drugs under 
     the Paragraph 6 Decision, including how the FTA's provisions 
     related to market exclusivity can be waived if Morocco acts 
     in either capacity.
       There are no provisions in the FTA related to compulsory 
     licensing, which means that it does not limit in any way 
     Morocco's ability to issue compulsory licenses in accordance 
     with WTO rules, including TRIPS Article 31 and the TRIPS/
     health solution. With respect to other rules included in 
     Chapter 15, including data protection, the side letter states 
     that the FTA does not ``prevent the effective utilization of 
     the TRIPS/health solution.'' As stated in the side letter, 
     the letter constitutes a formal agreement between the

[[Page 17223]]

     Parties. It is, thus, a significant part of the interpretive 
     context for this agreement and not merely rhetorical. 
     According to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
     of Treaties, which reflects customary rules of treaty 
     interpretation in international law, the terms of a treaty 
     must be interpreted ``in their context,'' and that 
     ``context'' includes ``any agreement relating to the treaty 
     which was made between all the parties in connection with the 
     conclusion of the treaty.''
       19. On the issue of consultation, do the letters mean that 
     both Parties agree to amend the FTA as soon as possible to 
     reflect access to medicines amendments to the TRIPS 
     Agreement? Will the United States refrain from enforcing 
     provisions of the FTA that contravene the TRIPS Agreement 
     amendments while the FTA is being amended? Is USTR willing to 
     engage in an exchange of letter with the Government of 
     Morocco memorializing such an understanding?
       The United States would, of course, work with Morocco to 
     ensure that the FTA is adapted as appropriate if an amendment 
     to the TRIPS Agreement were adopted to ensure access to 
     medicines. The only amendment currently being contemplated 
     with respect to TRIPS involves translating the TRIPS/health 
     solution from last August into a formal amendment. The United 
     States has no intention of using dispute settlement to 
     challenge any country's actions that are in accordance with 
     that solution. In fact, Canada passed legislation recently 
     that would allow it to export drugs in accordance with the 
     TRIPS/health solution. The United States reached an agreement 
     with Canada just last Friday, July 16, to suspend parts of 
     NAFTA to ensure that Canada could implement the solution 
     without running afoul of NAFTA rules.
       In closing, let me emphasize that we appreciate the 
     importance of the U.S. commitment to the Doha Declaration on 
     the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health and the global effort 
     to ensure access to medicines in developing countries to 
     address acute public health problems, such as AIDS, malaria 
     and tuberculosis. The United States played a leading role in 
     developing these provisions, including enabling poor 
     countries without domestic production capacity to import 
     drugs under compulsory licenses. We also successfully called 
     for giving Least Developed Countries an additional ten years, 
     from 2006 until 2016, to implement TRIPS rules related to 
     pharmaceuticals. These accomplishments offer a significant 
     solution to the conflicts we encountered on taking office in 
     2001.
       At the same time, as Congress has directed us, the 
     Administration has worked on multiple fronts to strengthen 
     the value internationally of America's innovation economy. 
     These efforts have included stronger intellectual property 
     protection rules and enforcement so as to assist U.S. 
     businesses and workers, and encourage ongoing innovation that 
     benefits U.S. consumers.
       Our FTAs are but one component of the Administration's 
     broader efforts to achieve these objectives, and complement 
     efforts undertaken in other fora. Our FTAs not only do not 
     conflict with the objectives expressed in the Doha 
     Declaration but reinforce those objectives and facilitate 
     efforts to address public health problems.
           Sincerely,
                                                 John K. Veroneau,
                                                  General Counsel.

  Mr. LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the 
balance of my time.
  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Moran).
  Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from 
Rochester, New York for yielding me this time.
  I rise today in support of the Moroccan Free Trade Agreement because 
it is an important agreement with a moderate Muslim country and it 
represents a vital step towards establishing broader free trade in the 
Middle East.
  Former Clinton administration U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor 
said, ``Closer and mutually beneficial ties between Morocco and the 
United States will bolster a country that has for several centuries 
earned a reputation for moderation, tolerance, and stability. The 
Moroccans have democratized their political structures. They recently 
made historic reforms to improve women's rights, and codified new labor 
rights and protections based upon key International Labor Organization 
conventions.
  Mr. Speaker, the Moroccan Free Trade Agreement is the first trade 
pact to be negotiated with an Arab and Muslim country since September 
11, and it would permit Morocco to join Jordan in the ranks of 
countries that have entered into an enhanced partnership with the 
United States.

                              {time}  1215

  This agreement will enhance our foreign policy and diplomatic efforts 
to bridge greater understanding and cooperation with moderate Arab 
nations.
  This FTA is going to ensure that U.S. businesses and workers have 
greater access to the Moroccan market by further eliminating trade 
barriers. It will deepen and expand bilateral commercial ties beyond 
the average level of $1 billion in current annual two-way trade flows. 
In fact, the United States enjoyed a surplus of $2 billion between 1999 
and 2003. So they are buying more from us than we are buying from them. 
This is creating more jobs in the United States.
  More than 95 percent of bilateral trade in consumer and industrial 
products will become duty free immediately upon entry into this 
agreement, with all remaining tariffs to be eliminated within 9 years. 
It is the best markets access package of any U.S. free trade agreement 
with a developing country.
  It is going to create new opportunities for U.S. banks, insurance, 
securities and related services and telecommunications. Key U.S. export 
sectors gain immediate duty-free access to Morocco, such as information 
technology, machinery, construction equipment, and chemicals. Morocco 
is going to accord substantial market access across its entire services 
regime and adhere to strong and detailed disciplines on regulatory 
transparency, a key factor.
  Additionally, Morocco has agreed to strengthen its intellectual 
property laws, and the agreement is going to help Morocco to further 
expand its economic and labor reform efforts.
  Mr. Speaker, this FTA will expand trade and bring greater economic 
opportunities for U.S. workers, farmers and businesses, and is going to 
promote economic development in other nations.
  Through this type of economic engagement, we can forge stronger ties 
with our allies around the world and promote democracy, free markets, 
and improved labor standards. That is why I support this agreement. I 
urge my very good friends, particularly on this side of the aisle, to 
vote in favor of this implementing legislation.
  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and 
I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such 
time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I think the gentleman from Virginia brought up some very 
important points, and I think they are important to emphasize and not 
only take note of. This agreement, in addition to the many, many 
important aspects that it contains for the economy, obviously, of 
Morocco, and the United States, is a very important agreement 
politically; and it encourages the extraordinary progress that Morocco 
has made in the area of labor rights, in the area of a free press, and 
in the area of democratization.
  Morocco has multiple political parties, espousing all conceivable 
viewpoints. It has an elected parliament and an elected prime minister. 
It has made commendable progress. It is a great friend and ally of the 
United States.
  For so many reasons, Mr. Speaker, it is important and appropriate for 
this Congress to be moving forward today passing this implementing 
legislation for the United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the 
previous question on the resolution.
  The previous question was ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Boozman). The question is on the 
resolution.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a 
quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not 
present.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
  The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clauses 8 and 9 of rule XX, this 
15-minute vote on adopting House Resolution 738 will be followed by 5-
minute

[[Page 17224]]

votes, as ordered, on suspending the rules and passing H.R. 4175; and 
suspending the rules and adopting H. Res. 728.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 345, 
nays 76, not voting 13, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 407]

                               YEAS--345

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Akin
     Allen
     Andrews
     Bachus
     Baird
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barrett (SC)
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Beauprez
     Bell
     Bereuter
     Berkley
     Berman
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blumenauer
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boswell
     Boyd
     Bradley (NH)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown, Corrine
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Burgess
     Burns
     Burr
     Burton (IN)
     Butterfield
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Capps
     Cardin
     Cardoza
     Carson (OK)
     Carter
     Case
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chandler
     Chocola
     Clay
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Cole
     Cooper
     Cox
     Crane
     Crenshaw
     Crowley
     Cubin
     Culberson
     Cunningham
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis (TN)
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Davis, Tom
     Deal (GA)
     DeGette
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Dooley (CA)
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Emanuel
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Everett
     Farr
     Fattah
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Foley
     Forbes
     Ford
     Fossella
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gingrey
     Gonzalez
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Goss
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (WI)
     Gutierrez
     Gutknecht
     Hall
     Harman
     Harris
     Hart
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Herseth
     Hill
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Hoeffel
     Hoekstra
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley (OR)
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Inslee
     Isakson
     Israel
     Issa
     Istook
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Jones (OH)
     Kaptur
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kilpatrick
     Kind
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kline
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Leach
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Lynch
     Maloney
     Manzullo
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McDermott
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Mica
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Miller, George
     Moore
     Moran (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Murphy
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Neal (MA)
     Nethercutt
     Neugebauer
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nunes
     Nussle
     Ortiz
     Osborne
     Ose
     Otter
     Oxley
     Pearce
     Pelosi
     Pence
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Renzi
     Reyes
     Reynolds
     Rodriguez
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Ross
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sandlin
     Saxton
     Schiff
     Schrock
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Souder
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Tauzin
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Toomey
     Towns
     Turner (OH)
     Turner (TX)
     Upton
     Van Hollen
     Vitter
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watson
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Wexler
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Wynn
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                                NAYS--76

     Alexander
     Baca
     Baldwin
     Becerra
     Berry
     Boucher
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (OH)
     Capuano
     Conyers
     Costello
     Cramer
     Cummings
     DeFazio
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Doyle
     Evans
     Filner
     Green (TX)
     Grijalva
     Hastings (FL)
     Hinchey
     Holden
     Jackson (IL)
     Kanjorski
     Kildee
     Kleczka
     Larson (CT)
     Lee
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Markey
     Marshall
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McNulty
     Michaud
     Miller (NC)
     Mollohan
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Peterson (MN)
     Rahall
     Rothman
     Ryan (OH)
     Sabo
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanders
     Schakowsky
     Sherman
     Slaughter
     Solis
     Spratt
     Stark
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Taylor (MS)
     Tierney
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watt
     Woolsey
     Wu

                             NOT VOTING--13

     Bass
     Carson (IN)
     Collins
     Gephardt
     Greenwood
     Kirk
     Kucinich
     Lowey
     Majette
     Paul
     Quinn
     Simmons
     Sullivan


                Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Boozman) (during the vote). Members are 
advised there are 2 minutes remaining in this vote.

                              {time}  1244

  Mrs. NAPOLITANO, Mr. BECERRA, Ms. BALDWIN, and Mr. McGOVERN changed 
their vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
  Mr. GUTIERREZ and Mr. WELDON of Florida changed their vote from 
``nay'' to ``yea.''
  So the resolution was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________