[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 150 (2004), Part 13]
[Senate]
[Pages 17036-17037]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                      TIME FOR IRAN TO COME CLEAN

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, when historians look back on American 
foreign policy in the early 21st century, they will ask a few basic 
questions. One will be whether we used our immense military strength 
wisely. Another will be whether we took effective action to avert 
genocide in the world. But the biggest question will be whether we did 
all we could to avert the use of weapons of mass destruction, and 
especially a nuclear catastrophe.
  The resolution before us addresses one of the most sensitive nuclear 
non-proliferation issues of our day, that of Iran. Over the last 2 
years, public allegations and International Atomic Energy Agency 
inspections have uncovered nearly two decades of covert nuclear 
programs that Iran has pursued in violation of its obligations under 
safeguards agreements with the IAEA. While Iran insists publicly that 
these programs are all peaceful, all the signs and much of the 
political rhetoric in Iran point to a nuclear weapons program that has 
been conducted under the cover of peaceful nuclear activities.
  Nearly a year ago, Iran promised to come clean on its nuclear 
programs and to suspend all its uranium enrichment and reprocessing 
activities. But Iran has yet to comply fully with its commitment. 
Instead, it has hidden some of its activities and forced IAEA 
inspectors to pull teeth in order to get information about its 
programs; it has delayed inspections and, at times, suspended all 
cooperation; it has continued production of components for uranium 
enrichment centrifuges; and it has announced an intent to test its 
uranium conversion facility in a manner that will produce feed material 
for uranium enrichment centrifuges. All those actions are violations of 
Iran's legal and political commitments.
  More importantly, those actions suggest that Iran still has something 
to hide. They relate to nuclear activities that are difficult to 
explain as peaceful programs. Some of those actions relate to programs 
involving the same criminal network that aided Libya and provided it 
with a nuclear weapon design. And they are accompanied by political 
statements that suggest Iran may well want to develop nuclear weapons. 
If Iran wants to gain the confidence of the international community, 
that is certainly not the way to go about it.
  I do not believe that Iran poses an imminent threat of testing or 
deploying nuclear weapons. There is hence no need at this time to 
threaten or undertake military action, and the resolution before us 
does not threaten, encourage or authorize such action.
  Some journalists interpreted a similar resolution in the House of 
Representatives as authorizing military action, despite the denials of 
those who supported that resolution, including its co-author, 
Representative Lantos of California. That is because the House 
resolution used the words ``all appropriate means,'' which sounded too 
similar to previous resolutions on other issues that did authorize the 
use of force. To make it absolutely clear that the resolution before us 
does not do that, the authors of the substitute amendment have deleted 
the word ``all'' from that phrase. We do not intend this resolution to 
encourage the use of military force by any country.
  Neither can any concurrent resolution authorize the use of force by 
the United States. Under our Constitution and under the War Powers 
Resolution, only legislation signed by the President can do that. A 
concurrent resolution has no legal effect and cannot do so.
  What we do intend by this resolution is to encourage all countries to 
help convince Iran that its national security is best served by giving 
up the urge to develop a nuclear weapons capability. An Iran with 
nuclear weapons--or with the ability to produce such weapons--will not 
be a more secure Iran. Rather, it will only prompt great concern among 
its neighbors and risk their developing nuclear weapons as well; and it 
will estrange itself from all countries that support the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty or that believe in keeping one's international 
obligations.
  If Iran wants to understand what nuclear weapons will bring about, it 
can look to North Korea, which is reduced to begging and threatening 
the international community in order to feed its people and to provide 
even minimal energy resources. Those are the wages of proliferation: 
not security, but insecurity; not acclaim, but ostracism.
  If the nations of the world--and especially the industrialized 
countries in Europe and elsewhere that have important trade relations 
with Iran--will band together to deliver this message, I believe that 
Iran will hear it and heed it. But the message may well have to be 
delivered with more than words. Countries may have to take forceful 
diplomatic and economic actions in order to demonstrate to Iran the 
risks that it runs if it insists upon building a nuclear weapons 
capability. The IAEA Board of Governors may well have to report Iran's 
noncompliance to the United Nations Security Council, and the Security 
Council may have to take action under Articles 39 through 41 of the 
United Nations Charter to encourage or order Iran to cease its programs 
that would contribute to building that nuclear weapons capability.
  Countries can also remind Iran that concerns which may have prompted 
its covert nuclear programs are now largely dissipated. The Soviet 
Union is gone, and Russia does not threaten Iranian sovereignty. Saddam 
Hussein is now a criminal in the dock, rather than a dictator with 
imperial ambitions. And the case of Libya demonstrates that the United 
States will readily adjust its policy toward a country that renounces 
weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism. Iran's 
security concerns can be met--indeed, can best be met--without its 
developing or producing any weapons of mass destruction.
  It is time that we have a serious discussion with Europe about 
harmonizing our policies toward Iran. Europe has pursued a strategy of 
offering positive incentives for Iran to change its behavior, but no 
penalties if it does not--effectively the reverse of U.S. policy. By 
coordinating more closely, the United States and Europe are more likely 
to affect Iran's actions. We should clearly state that if Iran ends its 
pursuit of a nuclear weapons program and gets out of the terrorism 
business, then we would be willing to change our policy of isolating 
and sanctioning Iran.
  I hope that enactment of the resolution before us will help galvanize 
world attention to the threat of nuclear proliferation in Iran and to 
the need to

[[Page 17037]]

convince Iran to change its ways. I hope that it will also encourage 
Iran to choose the path of non-proliferation and base its future on 
engagement with the world, rather than increasing, self-imposed 
isolation.
  I want to thank the original sponsors of S. Con. Res. 81, Senators 
Feinstein and Kyl, for their cooperation in developing a substitute 
text that we can all support. I believe that Representatives Hyde and 
Lantos, whose H. Con. Res. 398 provided much guidance to us, will also 
find this text something that they can accept so as to achieve 
enactment of this important resolution. And I appreciate the work of 
their staffs over the past several weeks. My own staff and Chairman 
Lugar's staff were also instrumental in bringing this work to what I 
believe will be a successful conclusion.
  We have all been guided not by politics, but by the importance of the 
matter before us. When the issue is nuclear proliferation, uncountable 
innocent lives hang in the balance. On such an issue, the world must 
act as one.

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