[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 150 (2004), Part 12]
[Senate]
[Pages 16784-16785]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




    U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE 2004 NATIONAL PEACE ESSAY CONTEST WINNER

 Mrs. CLINTON. Madam President, I would like to bring to my 
colleagues' attention the nationally recognized essay of one of my 
constituents, Vivek Viswanathan, a junior at Herricks High School in 
New Hyde Park, NY. I had the pleasure of meeting Mr. Viswanathan on 
June 23, 2004, when he visited my office during the United States 
Institute of Peace 2004 National Peace Essay Contest, NPEC Awards Week 
in Washington. The mandate of the United States Institute of Peace, as 
established by Congress, is to support the development, transmission, 
and use of knowledge to promote peace and curb violent international 
conflict. The Institute's annual NPEC, one of its oldest programs, is 
based on the belief that expanding the study of peace, justice, freedom 
and security is vital to civic education.
  Mr. Viswanathan's essay, ``Establishing Peaceful and Stable Postwar 
Societies Through Effective Rebuilding Strategy'' was awarded first-
place among the essays of his peers representing all 50 States, U.S. 
territories and overseas schools. In his essay, Mr. Viswanathan argues 
that to be effective, reconstruction efforts should be tailored to the 
specific post-war situation, obtain a large commitment of resources and 
assistance from the international community, and involve ``a nation's 
own people in a way that allows them to ultimately control their 
destiny and that eventually provides a clear exit strategy for 
international actors.'' I am proud of Mr. Viswanathan's commendable 
essay and congratulate him and his teachers at Herricks High School. 
Mr. Viswanathan is a bright and energetic student who will be a leader 
in his future endeavors. I would like to share with my colleagues a 
copy of Mr. Viswanathan's first-place essay. I ask unanimous consent 
that it be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

 Establishing Peaceful and Stable Postwar Societies Through Effective 
                          Rebuilding Strategy

       While the resolution of armed conflict may bring initial 
     order within a war-torn nation, it does not guarantee long-
     term peace and stability. Establishing an orderly society 
     from the ruins of war--enacting a workable political, 
     economic, and social structure in a place where violence and 
     instability have been the rule--is an undertaking that is 
     necessarily complex. Moreover, the discontinuation of armed 
     conflict does not imply resolution of the underlying concerns 
     that

[[Page 16785]]

     caused the conflict. Humanitarian crises can compound 
     problems. An inability to deal with these factors 
     intelligently and effectively can cripple the rebuilding 
     process and lead to renewed strife.
       History has shown that the most effective rebuilding 
     efforts integrate three important strategies. Firstly, they 
     are tailored to the postwar situation with which they are 
     dealing. An assessment of which factors-pose the gravest 
     challenges to rebuilding in each post-conflict situation is 
     absolutely necessary. Factors that destabilize rebuilding 
     must not be addressed haphazardly but rather at their roots. 
     Secondly, successful rebuilding involves a vast commitment of 
     resources and assistance on the part of the international 
     community. Piecemeal efforts will not suffice. Finally, 
     rebuilding efforts must involve a nation's own people in a 
     way that allows them to ultimately control their destiny and 
     that eventually provides a clear exit strategy for 
     international actors.
       Case studies of the Marshall Plan in Western Europe and the 
     U.N. and U.S.'s rebuilding efforts in Somalia in the early 
     1990s demonstrate the necessity of correctly identifying the 
     most fundamental and pressing challenges of rebuilding, 
     dealing with them in a powerful and forceful way, and 
     involving a nation's people in rebuilding efforts in order to 
     build a strong, self-sustaining society.
       The Marshall Plan is a study in successful rebuilding. When 
     World War II ended in 1945, the European continent was in 
     tatters. America initially believed that limited aid and 
     relaxed trade barriers would be enough to spur Europe to 
     economic recovery. But by 1947, the economic situation was 
     dire. The UN reported that postwar labor productivity in 
     Europe was 40-50% of prewar levels, and low wages and food 
     shortages compounded the problems. As the economy tanked, 
     support for the Communist party in various countries began to 
     grow. The U.S. began to fear Soviet domination of Western 
     Europe.
       By 1947, Secretary of State George Marshall understood the 
     plight of the European continent and the danger it faced. 
     ``The patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate,'' he 
     told the American people. In a now-famous speech that year at 
     Harvard University, Marshall laid out the European Recovery 
     Program--the Marshall Plan--and brilliantly addressed the 
     three important strategies of rebuilding. Firstly, he 
     correctly assessed the situation in Europe. Marshall realized 
     that the root problem that afflicted rebuilding efforts was 
     economic and not political in nature. He emphasized that the 
     effective way to stifle Communism was to address Europe's 
     economic troubles. ``Our policy is directed not against any 
     country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, 
     and chaos,'' Marshall said. ``Its purpose should be the 
     revival of a working economy . . . to permit the emergence of 
     political and social conditions in which free institutions 
     can exist.''
       Secondly, Marshall understood that for rebuilding to 
     succeed, a massive investment of resources into Europe on the 
     part of the U.S. was necessary. ``Assistance . . . must not 
     be on a piecemeal basis . . . [it] should provide a cure 
     rather than a mere palliative,'' he said.
       Finally, Marshall understood that the chances of a rational 
     and cohesive rebuilding effort would be greatly increased by 
     allowing Europeans to retain much control over the rebuilding 
     program. The U.S., he said, should limit itself to ``friendly 
     aid'' and advice. The Marshall Plan's four-year timetable 
     also provided a framework for success.
       Eventually, between 1948 and 1952, the U.S. appropriated 
     $13.3 billion dollars--a staggering sum in that day--for the 
     Marshall Plan. The money was spent toward greatly increasing 
     European productivity and modernizing factory and transport 
     systems. And the Europeans had a hand in formulating a 
     workable rebuilding policy.
       The Plan was incredibly successful. Western Europe's gross 
     national product climbed 32 percent during the Marshall Plan, 
     and by 1952 agricultural production and industrial output 
     exceeded prewar levels by 11 and 40 percent, respectively. 
     Through the revived economy, Western Europe had been re-
     integrated into the free world; even as the U.S.S.R. 
     dominated Eastern Europe, Western Europe would stand for four 
     decades as a bulwark against Soviet expansion. Calling him a 
     man who ``offered hope to those who desperately needed it,'' 
     TIME named him its 1947 Man of the Year. And in 1953, 
     Marshall was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
       In contrast, the U.N. and U.S.'s post-conflict 
     reconstruction experience in Somalia in the early 1990s 
     demonstrates the consequences of an incompetent and 
     halfhearted approach to nation-building. With the collapse of 
     Mohamed Siad Barre's regime in 1991, Somalia plunged into 
     civil war as various Somali clans engaged in a power 
     struggle. The chaos triggered a great humanitarian crisis. 
     Finally, after thousands were killed in intense fighting in 
     Mogadishu, a U.N.-brokered cease-fire between rival clan 
     leaders Mohamed Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi Mohamed was 
     achieved in March of 1992.
       However, the U.N. and U.S.'s response afterward showed a 
     disregard for the three important strategies of rebuilding. 
     Firstly, the U.N. and the U.S. did not accurately assess the 
     Somali situation. The immense humanitarian crisis blinded the 
     international actors to the fact that the root problem that 
     was afflicting reconciliation was political in nature. The 
     initial U.N. and U.S. response in Operation Restore Hope 
     sought to be purely hunianitarian in nature, when in fact the 
     humanitarian and political situations were intertwined. The 
     U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission to Somalia later wrote, ``The 
     country's entire political and economic systems essentially 
     revolved around plundered food'' that was stolen from the 
     relief effort. Eventually, confronted with the deteriorating 
     political situation, the U.N. Security Council authorized 
     Resolution 794 in December of 1992, which allowed U.S. and 
     international troops to use ```all necessary means'' to 
     establish ``a secure environment for humanitarian relief 
     operations in Somalia.'' Even at this point, guaranteeing 
     political stability was seen as only a means for providing 
     humanitarian relief, rather than an end in itself. This is a 
     fine strategy for saving people's lives in the short-term--in 
     fact, the intervention in Somalia saved tens of thousands of 
     lives--but it is a poor strategy for rebuilding the fabric of 
     a nation.
       Secondly, the international community was not eager to put 
     forth the significant monetary and troop commitment that 
     successful nation-building entails. However, reductions in 
     the troop force--from 25,000 to 4,200 by June of 1993--
     ultimately proved counterproductive. As James Dobbins, who 
     oversaw various postwar reconstruction efforts (including 
     Somalia) while serving Bush and Clinton, put it, ``Only when 
     the number of stabilization troops has been low in comparison 
     to the population have U.S forces suffered or inflicted 
     significant casualties.'' The international effort in Somalia 
     was strikingly deficient.
       Finally, the Somali mission failed to include many of the 
     Somali people in rebuilding efforts. The cease-fire efforts 
     attempted to treat the conflict as one between two major 
     warlords, when there were actually many other disaffected 
     people who went uninvited to peace talks. In fact, warlord 
     Ali Mahdi Mohamed, given stature by his inclusion in the 
     talks, attacked smaller clans the day after the U.N. 
     invitation to talks. One U.N. advisor wrote that the 
     international community's inability to recognize the 
     importance of representation in Somali politics was ``central 
     to nearly every failed peace conference.'' In the end, the 
     concept of an effective exit strategy for international 
     actors, which is designed to focus efforts on goals and 
     results, instead degenerated in Somalia into a rationale for 
     getting out.
       After a clash between warlord Mohamed Farah Aidid and a 
     U.N. force on June 5, 1993, and the battle between Aidid and 
     U.S. forces on October 3, 1993 that left eighteen soldiers 
     dead, Clinton ordered a withdrawal of American troops that 
     was completed by March of 1994. The final U.N. troops left in 
     February of 1995 as rival clans continued to fight. As his 
     troops prepared to leave Somalia, Pakistani brigadier general 
     Saulat Abbas lamented, ``We've been able to save a lot of 
     people from hunger, disease. But we've not been able to 
     contribute anything politically.'' The nation-building effort 
     had failed.
       The lessons of the Marshall Plan and international efforts 
     in Somalia are clear. For those nations overrun by war, the 
     cessation of violence is only a beginning. A careful and 
     well-reasoned rebuilding and reconciliation effort that is 
     uniquely relevant to the intricacies of each situation is 
     necessary for the re-emergence of a strong society that can 
     endure. In addition, international actors such as the U.N. 
     and U.S. must truly be committed to investing all the 
     resources necessary to build an orderly environment. This 
     often means going against the prevailing political winds. 
     Finally, the rebuilding of a nation must involve that 
     nation's own people and provide for their society to 
     eventually prosper on its own. With the proper approach and 
     commitment in place, post-conflict rebuilding efforts can 
     lead to societies that are peaceful, stable, and 
     secure.

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