[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 150 (2004), Part 1]
[Senate]
[Pages 716-721]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




          STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

      By Mr. DASCHLE (for Mr. Lieberman (for himself, Mr. McCain, Mr. 
        Daschle, Mr. Dorgan, Mr. Lautenberg, Mr. Corzine, Mr. Graham of 
        Florida, Mr. Durbin, Mr. Dodd, Ms. Collins, Mr. Lott, Mr. 
        Graham of South Carolina, and Mr. Hagel)):
  S. 2040. A bill to extend the date for the submittal of the final 
report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States, to provide additional funding for the Commission, and for other 
purposes; to the Select Committee on Intelligence.
  (At the request of Mr. Daschle, the following statement was ordered 
to be printed in the Record.)
 Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, today Senator McCain and I are 
introducing legislation to extend the life of the National Commission 
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States so that it can complete its 
critically important investigation into the causes of the September 
11th terrorist attacks, which claimed the lives of nearly 3,000 
innocent people.
  Under legislation Senator McCain and I authored in December 2001 to 
create the Commission, its final report was to have been completed by 
May 27, 2004. The Commission itself has asked for more time. So we are 
now proposing to extend that deadline until January 10, 2005 and to 
provide an additional $6 million for the Commission to complete its 
work. Senator McCain and I are grateful to the Minority Leader, Senator 
Daschle, for joining us in this effort. We are also happy to have the 
support of Senators Dorgan, Lautenberg, Corzine, Graham, Durbin, and 
Dodd. In the House, Representatives Fossella, Shays, Hinchey and 
Emanuel are expected to introduce companion legislation this week, and 
we welcome their support as well.
  We want the Commission's final report to be as searching and complete 
as possible. We owe that to the memories of the 3,000 victims and their 
families. And we owe it to the Nation as a whole. In fact, our future 
security depends upon it.
  George Washington once said we should look back ``to derive useful 
lessons from past errors, and for the purpose of profiting by dear-
bought experience.'' That is the precise mission of this Commission to 
better understand what went wrong so we can prevent such a catastrophic 
attack from ever happening again. The Commission simply needs more time 
to do that.
  From the beginning, Senator McCain and I have been motivated by the 
experience of the families of victims of September 11. Above and beyond 
the grief of their losses, they have endured terrible pain in not 
knowing the whole account of how something so horrific could have 
happened to them and those they loved. It was a tribute to the power of 
the families' message that our legislation creating the Commission 
passed the Senate on September 24, 2002, by a resounding vote of 90-8. 
And it is a tribute to the enduring power of their message that Senator 
McCain and I are seeking this extension.
  Last week, the Commission asked Congress for at least an additional 
60 days to finalize its interviews, hearings, and report. The families, 
however, expressed concern that two months may be an inadequate amount 
of time to accomplish all that must be done. They have called for a 
seven-and-a-half month extension so the Commission can conduct all the 
public hearings it had originally intended to hold, so that it can 
conduct thorough reviews of the President's daily intelligence 
briefings--a process barely underway--and so that it has the time to 
deal with the Administration's anticipated objections to declassifying 
material in the final report. Indeed, the Commissioners I asked have 
confirmed that they can benefit from more than the minimum two months 
requested.
  I have therefore been convinced by the families and the Commissioners 
that the extra time is necessary. But I would also warn the 
Administration that this extension is not an excuse to engage in 
additional dilatory tactics.
  I add this warning because the Bush Administration has a long record 
of opposing this Commission and an equally long record of making its 
work more difficult. Ever since Senator McCain and I first joined 
forces on this issue, we have faced White House intransigence. The 
President opposed the Commission for 10 months until the eve of a 
Senate vote he knew he would lose. During final negotiations over the 
details of the legislation, the White House negotiated to keep the 
Commission's duration as short as possible, rather than give it ample 
time to do a thorough job.
  Once the Commission got underway, the Administration hampered the 
Commission's progress through slow document production and other 
stalling tactics, limiting the Commission's ability to proceed 
expeditiously with its investigation. Even now, the Administration is 
refusing to give the full Commission notes, taken by members of the 
Commission, that describe key White House documents. When one considers 
the obstacles generated by the White House, it is not in the least bit 
surprising that the Commission now needs additional time to finish the 
job.
  I would note, however, that this extension does not preclude the 
Commission from releasing interim reports, as the original legislation 
establishing the Commission allows. Furthermore, the Commission is free 
to release its final report before the deadline, if it has completed 
its work. The Commission's hearings, questioning of witnesses, factual 
findings, and staff report issued last week proved exceptionally 
valuable in shedding light on some of the causes of the terrorist 
attacks. Future hearings and staff reports, no doubt, will continue to 
provide important new information about weaknesses in our defenses 
against terrorism.
  Therefore, we encourage the Commission to continue to release its 
findings and recommendations as they become available, so that we can 
learn from the mistakes of our past as quickly as possible, and work 
harder to shore up existing vulnerabilities. Congress and the relevant 
federal agencies have a duty to develop new strategies and capabilities 
to deter and prevent future terrorist attacks, and expeditious 
reporting by the Commission will help enormously.
  Major systemic problems have already surfaced, for example, that can 
point us in the right direction, or maybe even an entirely new 
direction, to address an array of vulnerabilities, particularly in our 
law enforcement and intelligence communities. Allow me to cite just a 
few examples from the Commission's work thus far to illustrate how many 
hands we will need, laboring in unison, to patch the breaches that 
remain in America's domestic security:
  1. An immigration official at Orlando International Airport, Mr. 
Melendez-Perez, testified that on August 4, 2001, he turned away and 
sent home a suspicious, unresponsive, and belligerent Saudi national 
holding a one-way ticket with no departure plans and insufficient funds 
to stay in the U.S. and purchase a ticket home. This individual claimed 
that he was to meet a friend at the airport but would not name the 
friend. It turned out that one of the 9/11 hijackers, Mohamed Atta, was 
at the airport on that day. Amazingly, neither the FBI nor anyone else 
from the intelligence community has ever debriefed Mr. Melendez-Perez, 
even though the immigration inspector informed the FBI of the incident 
immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
  2. The excellent performance of Mr. Melendez-Perez demonstrated that 
a

[[Page 717]]

vigilant and well-trained officer can spot suspicious behavior in the 
course of a routine interview. But the Commission's hearings and 
reports also revealed how infrequently that occurs. Government 
officials admitted in public testimony that consular employees are not 
expected to screen for possible terrorists during interviews of visa 
applicants, nor are they trained to do so. The Commission discovered 
that many of the hijackers had passports that were fraudulently altered 
or had other suspicious indicators, but between 1992 and September 11, 
2001, the federal government had not attempted to disseminate, to 
border security or other relevant employees, available information 
about the travel and passport practices of Al Qaeda or other terrorist 
groups. All of the hijackers' visa applications were incomplete, and 
several contained false statements that were easily identifiable. The 
hijackers entered the United States, often more than once, without 
incident, despite the fact that several of them had violated 
immigration law. Hijackers referred to secondary inspections for more 
detailed scrutiny were nevertheless admitted.
  3. New information has been revealed about the abundant knowledge the 
intelligence community had about three of the 19 hijackers, who held a 
strategy session in Malaysia and were extensively tracked by U.S. and 
foreign intelligence services. The story fleshed out by the Commission 
underscores the fact that not only did the government fail to share 
information that might have kept the terrorists out of the country, but 
they also failed to share information that might have exposed the 
terrorists' September 11th plot. That is why I have focused personal 
attention on the Terrorist Threat Integration Center and the 
Directorate for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection at 
DHS to make sure that these new centers are receiving all intelligence 
information, mixing it together with skilled and intense analysis, and 
warning the relevant state, local, and federal officials of emerging 
terrorist plots.
  4. All the evidence that consolidated watch lists might have 
prevented entry to some of the terrorists notwithstanding, the watch 
lists still haven't been consolidated despite numerous Administration 
promises to do so. The Commission learned from the Federal Aviation 
Administration that, prior to September 11th, the no-fly list created 
for the airlines had only 12-20 names on it, whereas the terrorist 
watch list at the State Department had tens of thousands of terrorists' 
names. We also learned that the no-fly list and the larger terrorist 
watch list are still not equal in numbers and that there are still 
terrorists on the larger list who might be permitted to fly if they 
evade other detection.
  These disclosures demonstrate the Commission is accomplishing its 
assignment, and so it must be allowed to complete its investigation. I 
am certain the Commission will use the extra months wisely to complete 
a thorough investigation, continue its public hearings, interview all 
relevant government officials and complete a comprehensive final report 
for release as soon as possible.
  It is a basic American principle that we must learn from the past in 
order to secure a better future. Our ability to counter, prevent, and 
defend against the next terrorist attack on our homeland depends in no 
small part on the Commission's ability to bring satisfactory closure to 
its work. If we only give the Commission the time, resources, and 
cooperation it deserves, the Commission's full, fair, and unflinching 
assessment of what went wrong will be of immediate value to our 
national security. And it will be of lasting value to the American 
people, who will finally discover the unvarnished truth.
  I urge the Senate to approve this legislation in a timely manner so 
that the victims' families and the rest of America may have some 
measure of peace.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 2040

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST 
                   ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES.

       (a) Extension.--Section 610(b) of the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 6 
     U.S.C. 101 note; 116 Stat. 2413) is amended by striking ``18 
     months after the date of the enactment of this Act'' and 
     inserting ``January 10, 2005''.
       (b) Additional Funding.--Section 611 of that Act (6 U.S.C. 
     101 note; 116 Stat. 2413) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c);
       (2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new 
     subsection (b):
       ``(b) Additional Funding From the National Foreign 
     Intelligence Program.--In addition to the amounts made 
     available to the Commission under subsection (a), of the 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated by the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177) 
     and available in the Department of Defense Appropriations 
     Act, 2004 (Public Law 108-87) for the National Foreign 
     Intelligence Program, not more than $6,000,000 shall be 
     available for transfer to the Commission for purposes of the 
     activities of the Commission under this title.''; and
       (3) in subsection (c), as so redesignated, by striking 
     ``subsection (a)'' and inserting ``this section''.

  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, the Democratic and Republican 
commissioners on the blue ribbon commission investigating the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks reached an important and bipartisan 
decision. They decided they needed more time--more time to get access 
to the documents and people that can help us understand what happened 
on that fateful day; more time to analyze this information so they can 
help us identify which corrective measures are needed to reduce the 
prospects for future 9/11s; in short, more time to do what they are 
required to do by law.
  I come to the floor today to talk briefly about my views on this 
commission and its work, and to explain why I have joined with Senators 
McCain and Lieberman to offer legislation to give the commission the 
time needed to complete its task and provide the families of the 
victims of 9/11 and all Americans with a complete and thorough report.
  The importance of this commission's work cannot be overstated. This 
independent commission represents the last and perhaps best hope for 
our Nation to understand how 19 individuals were able to execute the 
most deadly terrorist attack on American soil in this Nation's long 
history.
  How did these terrorists get into this country? What is the source of 
funding they used to carry out these activities? How did the hijackers 
get themselves, and apparently knives and mace, past airport security? 
How were they able to hijack four aircraft and drive them to such a 
deadly end? Why could our intelligence community and policymakers not 
do more to prevent these heinous acts? What can the Government and 
individual citizens do in the future to prevent similar attacks?
  These are but some of the difficult questions the commission has to 
address. Given the importance of their task, one would think that all 
parties--Democratic and Republican, Congress and the White House--would 
quickly agree to provide the commission whatever it needs.
  Unfortunately, in the days immediately after the commissioners made 
their request, it became evident some parties may not believe the 
commission should be provided the time it needs to do what is required 
by law.
  Quoting from the New York Times on January 28:

       The White House and Republican congressional leaders have 
     said they see no need to extend the congressionally mandated 
     deadline . . . and a spokesperson for Speaker J. Dennis 
     Hastert said . . . Mr. Hastert would oppose any legislation 
     to grant the extension.

  As unsettling as this position is, in hindsight, it should not be 
surprising to those who have followed the history of this commission. 
In the months immediately after the tragic events of September 11, 
2001, President Bush and Vice President Cheney personally appealed to 
me and to other Members of Congress not to establish a bipartisan blue 
ribbon commission.
  Vice President Cheney suggested to me that creating such an effort 
could

[[Page 718]]

detract from administration officials' efforts to get the terrorists 
responsible.
  Fortunately, neither the families of the victims of 9/11 nor the 
American people accepted this argument. They understood, and properly 
in my view, that an independent investigation would enhance our efforts 
on the war on terror.
  Far from endangering national security, an inquiry could actually 
help us pinpoint and correct flaws in our security and intelligence 
communities and identify the necessary corrective measures.
  Despite the fact that the idea of a commission enjoyed the 
overwhelming support of the families of the victims and of the American 
people, the administration, and the House Republican leadership 
persisted in their efforts to see that this idea never took flight--in 
some instances, at the same time they were publicly professing their 
support for the commission.
  For example, on the same day the White House spokesperson indicated 
President Bush supported the idea of a commission, his negotiators were 
on Capitol Hill vetoing a congressional agreement to establish one.
  In October of 2002, the House and Senate Intelligence Committees 
announced they had reached a deal to include language to establish the 
commission in the intelligence authorization bill. The next day, the 
deal collapsed and negotiators involved laid the blame at the doorstep 
of the White House and the House Republican leadership.
  According to the Washington Post, a senior Republican Senator said:

       The House Republican leadership weighed in against [the 
     deal] and the deal collapsed. . . . It is no secret that the 
     White House works through the House Republican leadership.

  Again, the families of the victims and supporters of the commission 
were not deterred. In fact, this commission would not exist were it not 
for the dedicated efforts of the families of the victims. They pressed 
on, and in November of 2002, they prevailed.
  Congress passed the legislation creating the commission and the 
President signed it into law. The commission was given until May of 
2004 to do its work. We all knew at the time that this deadline was 
both arbitrary and highly ambitious, given the scope of the work 
involved. Subsequent actions would make meeting this deadline 
impossible.
  The commission was immediately embroiled in controversy over the 
selection and subsequent resignation of Henry Kissinger, who the 
President selected to chair its work. But the obstacles placed in front 
of this commission were just the beginning. In light of the sensitive 
nature of much of the information the commission would be examining, 
getting the commission high-level security clearances was the first 
priority.
  However, for a variety of reasons, a process that could have taken 
weeks stretched into months, thereby preventing the commissioners from 
examining numerous important documents.
  Then came open resistance from the Bush administration to commission 
requests for access to documents and individuals the commissioners 
deemed vital to their inquiry. The commission quickly became bogged 
down in negotiations over which documents and individuals it would have 
access to and under what terms and conditions.
  Many agencies flat out refused to provide access. Others insisted the 
administration minders be present when the commission questioned 
Government employees.
  The commission was forced to resort to subpoenas to obtain 
information from several Federal agencies, and press reports is 
actively considering issuing others.
  As recently as this past week, it was reported that the 
administration is still placing roadblocks in front of the commission's 
vital work. Over the weekend, it was disclosed that the White House is 
refusing to allow the commission access to notes its own members have 
taken on briefings received by the President.
  As a result of the administration's repeated failure to cooperate 
fully and immediately with the commission and its important work, it 
has become increasingly clear that it cannot fulfill the immense task 
placed before it and comply with the deadline imposed on it.
  In order to meet this deadline, commissioners tell us they would have 
to cut corners. Scheduled hearings would have to be canceled. 
Interviews with key officials would have to be scrapped. Time to 
analyze their information and write their report would be short. All of 
these reasons led the commission, wisely in my view, to request 
additional time. All of these reasons led me to join the families of 
the victims, as well as Senators McCain and Lieberman, to conclude we 
must do everything possible to meet their requests.
  I hope those who have opposed the commission and its work in the past 
will step aside. I hope they will allow us to provide the commission 
with the time it needs to give the families and America the report it 
deserves.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. SPECTER (for himself and Mr. Santorum):
  S. 2043. A bill to designate a Federal building in Harrisburg, 
Pennsylvania, as the ``Ronald Reagan Federal Building''; to the 
Committee on Environment and Public Works.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition to introduce 
legislation, along with Senator Santorum, to honor former President 
Ronald Reagan by naming the Federal Building and Courthouse in 
Harrisburg, PA, in his name.
  President Ronald Reagan was a watershed force in 20th Century 
history. He was a master diplomat and statesman, largely responsible 
for winning the Cold War. His summits with former Soviet leader Mikhail 
Gorbachev were tours de force of negotiation and stagecraft. He was 
called ``the great communicator'' for good reason. He conveyed his 
message with power and precision, often convincing even his staunchest 
opponents to see things his way. His talents and his touch helped rally 
a Democrat-controlled Congress to support much of his legislative 
agenda, including bold fiscal reforms--defying conventional wisdom that 
predicted more partisan stalemate. He ran for President on the slogan 
``Morning in America''--and delivered.
  President Reagan also took bold steps on the social front. By 
transferring power from Washington to the States and cities, he showed 
that local governments can be laboratories for a wide range of public-
policy experiments--with greater flexibility and sensitivity. The 
approach was in line with his general push from big government toward 
individual liberty.
  To some, Ronald Reagan's greatest legacy was strengthening our 
national defense. The Berlin Wall toppled, it seemed, directly from his 
call, ``Mr. Gorbachev, Tear Down This Wall!'' The invasion of Grenada 
rescued American students and resulted in the overthrow of a Marxist 
government. His vision for a national missile defense system is leading 
to greater security for all of us.
  President Reagan showed courage and charisma, even in crisis. As he 
was about to undergo surgery to remove a bullet that lay an inch from 
his heart, he told his wife, ``Honey, I forgot to duck.'' The next 
morning, the President met with aides in his hospital room and signed a 
bill into law.
  For these reasons and many more, I urge my colleagues to join us in 
bestowing this honor upon this great American.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mrs. BOXER:
  S. 2045. A bill to amend the Help America Vote Act of 2002 to require 
a voter-verified permanent record or hardcopy under title III of such 
Act, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Rules and 
Administration.
  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, today I am introducing the Secure and 
Verifiable Electronic Voting Act of 2004.
  The 2000 presidential election exposed a number of serious problems 
with the accuracy and fairness of election procedures in this country, 
as well as the reliability of certain types of voting technology. As a 
result of these irregularities, many eligible voters

[[Page 719]]

were effectively disenfranchised and thus deprived of one of their most 
fundamental rights. This is not acceptable in a democracy such as ours.
  Our constituents demanded better and we responded.
  In 2002, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA). This 
important legislation sets Federal minimum standards for voting 
systems, including requiring that the equipment used is reliable, 
accurate, and accessible to all. It encourages the use of direct 
recording electronic voting systems to replace the outdated punch card 
and lever machines. It also requires that voting systems provide voters 
the opportunity to correct errors and that they produce a permanent 
record with a manual audit capacity.
  However, HAVA does not go far enough. As we move our voting systems 
into the 21st century, we need to ensure the greatest level of 
accountability possible. Voters need to have confidence in the 
technology that they're using, and they need to be assured that their 
votes will be counted exactly as they are cast. It is imperative that 
any voting system certified by the Federal Government provides these 
assurances.
  In my home State of California, we are already using touch-screen 
voting machines in some areas--28 percent of the precincts by the March 
primary. But, these machines currently do not leave any paper trail and 
cannot be verified for complete accuracy. We need an electronic voting 
system that is modern, secure, and verifiable. The State of California 
is taking these steps. Secretary of State Kevin Shelley has required 
the use of voter-verified paper audit trails and safety measures, such 
as manufacturer security, local testing of machines, and random audits 
of system software. These practices need to be in place nationwide.
  My bill, the Secure and Verifiable Electronic Voting Act--the SAVE 
Voting Act would require that a voter-verified paper trail for each 
vote cast be in place for the November 2004 elections. What that means 
is this: after an individual votes, he or she will have the opportunity 
to review the vote on a piece of paper, before it becomes part of the 
official record. If there is a discrepancy, the voter will have an 
opportunity to change his or her vote before it is recorded in the 
official record. This paper record will then be the official permanent 
record used for any recount or verification.
  The SAVE Voting Act would also create greater security standards by 
making sure that access to the software is limited to approved 
personnel who have had background checks. It would require that any 
software used is not transmitted over the Internet, that the Election 
Assistance Commission certifies any and all software used in voting 
systems, and that the certified code be made available to the public 
for review. These security measures help to ensure, up front, that the 
electronic voting systems we use are safeguarded.
  The SAVE Voting Act would ensure that a permanent paper record is 
truly, a permanent paper record by banning the use of thermal paper. 
Thermal paper has many flaws, including the potential to fade or 
receive unintended marks, making the vote illegible.
  Finally, recognizing the current cashed-strapped plight of the 
States, my legislation would provide immediate financial assistance to 
States to help cover the cost of adding printers to electronic voting 
systems.
  In a democracy, the vote of every citizen counts. We must make sure 
that every citizen's vote is counted--and counted accurately and fairly 
so that the American people have confidence in the results. HAVA was a 
good first step. The SAVE Voting Act is the next step, and I encourage 
my colleagues to join me in this effort.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. GRAHAM of Florida (for himself and Mr. Nelson of Florida):
  S. 2046. A bill to authorize the exchange of certain land in 
Everglades National Park; to the Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce a bill with my 
colleague from Florida, Senator Nelson. Our bill is non-controversial 
and will allow the Department of the Interior and the South Florida 
Water Management District to perform a land exchange for the purpose of 
constructing the C-111 Spreader Canal Project under the Comprehensive 
Everglades Restoration Plan, known as CERP. Both the Department of the 
Interior and the State of Florida have approved the language of the 
bill, and Senator Nelson and I hope to expedite passage of the bill 
through the Energy and Natural Resources Committee and the full Senate.
  CERP, which was authorized in the Water Resources Development Act of 
2000, is the framework that guides our efforts to restore America's 
Everglades. It consists of over 60 major projects that will restore 
Everglades National Park and other areas of the greater Everglades 
ecosystem. The C-111 Spreader Canal Project is just one of the 60 
component projects of CERP. The C-111 project will provide important 
environmental benefits to the Southern Glades and Model Lands and more 
natural sheet flow to Florida Bay while maintaining flood protection 
for surrounding agricultural and urban areas.
  I am also pleased to report that Congressman Mario Diaz-Balart, who 
represents the relevant congressional district, and Congressman Jim 
Davis will introduce a companion bill in the House of Representatives.
  2004 marks the beginning of the fourth year of CERP implementation 
and Everglades restoration. We have been hard at work getting through 
phase one--the planning and organizational phase of such an historic 
and monumental restoration project. We have now entered into phase 
two--building the projects that will deliver water to the Everglades 
and revive the dying ecosystem. As we continue to make progress on what 
has always been a bipartisan and bicameral project, I want to thank my 
colleagues for their support for the restoration of America's 
Everglades. I look forward to our continued work together to bring the 
River of Grass back to its former glory as the crown jewel of the 
national parks system.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. BOND:
  S. 2047. A bill to amend the Energy Employees Occupational Illness 
Compensation Program Act of 2000 to include certain former nuclear 
weapons program workers in the Special Exposure Cohort under the 
compensation program established by that Act; to the Committee on 
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.
  Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce legislation that 
will designate the former Mallinkrodt Nuclear Production Facilities in 
Missouri as a Special Exposure Cohort (SEC) under the Energy Employees 
Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act (EEOICPA) of 2000. These 
facilities, which handled and processed highly radioactive materials 
during the Cold War, are located in Downtown St. Louis, Weldon Springs 
in St. Charles County, and Hematite in Jefferson County, MO 
respectively.
  Energy workers at these sites handled and processed highly 
radioactive materials during the Cold War as part of the Manhattan 
Project and our nation's ongoing Atomic Weapons Program. The St. Louis 
Downtown or ``Destrahan'' Site operated from 1942 through 1958. From 
there, operations and most Mallinkrodt workers were moved out to the 
Weldon Springs Facility which operated until 1958. After that, work 
continued at the Hematite Facility in Jefferson County until 1969.
  This legislation would add these facilities to the four existing 
Special Exposure Cohort (SEC) Sites across the country, which were 
written into the original EEOICPA. In addition to designating the 
existing SEC sites, the EEOICPA set up a process to add additional 
sites to the SEC list provided those sites meet certain criteria.
  A Special Exposure Cohort (SEC) is comprised of a group of employees 
with specific cancers who worked at four specific nuclear facilities or 
participated in certain nuclear weapons tests, and who met other 
requirements under the EEOICPA. An SEC designation would provide former 
workers at these

[[Page 720]]

sites or their survivors with expedited compensation as opposed to 
requiring these workers to participate in the long, complex and 
cumbersome bureaucratic process known as dose reconstruction.
  According to the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH), there are two key statutory determinations required for adding 
a class of employees to the SEC. The first requirement is that it is 
not feasible to estimate with sufficient accuracy the radiation dose 
that the class of employees received. The second requirement is that 
there is a reasonable likelihood that such a radiation dose may have 
endangered the members of this class. After extensive research, which 
included several briefings with NIOSH, the Department of Energy, 
independent experts and former Mallinkrodt workers, I believe that 
there is strong evidence indicating that both statutory requirements 
for the SEC have been met with regard to the Mallinkrodt Sites.
  In mid 2001, the Department of Energy (DOE) released a report 
indicating for the first time that the highly radioactive material 
plutonium was processed at the Weldon Springs Site. The report also 
stated that recycled uranium, another highly radioactive material, was 
processed at the site. Furthermore, in its recently completed site 
profile for the St. Louis Downtown Site, NIOSH admits that they have 
virtually no records or monitoring data on the workers at the site 
prior to 1948. NIOSH also stated that this could be a problem in 
calculating individual dose, thus requiring some assumptions to be 
made.
  Both of the aforementioned issues, the presence of plutonium and the 
loss or destruction of individual monitoring records were reasons for 
writing the four existing SEC sites into the original EEOICPA.
  In addition to these issues, long sought after documents from the 
former Chief Safety Officer for the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) 
during the time described the Mallinkrodt St. Louis facility as one of 
the two worst plants with respect to worker exposures. Workers at this 
plant were exposed to excessive levels of airborne uranium dust 
relative to the standards in effect during the time, and many workers 
were exposed to as much as 200 times the preferred levels of exposure. 
NIOSH confirmed these intense levels at a recent presentation on the 
Mallinkrodt-St. Louis Site Profile when it described the operations at 
this plant as a ``messy'' or ``dirty'' operation in terms of levels of 
radionuclides present.
  Finally, NIOSH has informed claimants who worked at these sites or 
their survivors that if they are not interviewed as a part of the dose 
reconstruction process, it would ``hinder'' NIOSH's ability to conduct 
dose reconstruction for the claimant and may result in a dose 
reconstruction that ``incompletely or inaccurately'' estimates the 
radiation dose to which the energy employee named in the claim was 
exposed. So NIOSH is basically saying that they are relying on a former 
worker's memory or any information a survivor might have. What if the 
former worker cannot remember what he was exposed to or was never told? 
What if the survivor has no idea as to what materials the claimant 
might have been exposed? Keep in mind. Most of this happened anywhere 
from 40-60 years ago.
  All of the previously mentioned points are evidence that the health 
of these workers was endangered and that an accurate dose 
reconstruction is not feasible. Therefore, I believe that the 
Mallinkrodt sites in Missouri should be designated as a Special 
Exposure Cohort.
  To make matters even worse, the Department of Health and Human 
Services first published the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) 
concerning the Special Exposure Cohort on June 25, 2002, and as of 
today, January 27, 2004, this rule has yet to be finalized. Many of 
these former Mallinkrodt workers have died while waiting for the 
proposed SEC rule to be finalized, including some claimants who were 
waiting for dose reconstruction to be started or completed.
  This is simply unacceptable! The EEOICPA was intended to provide long 
overdue compensation to these workers within a reasonable period of 
time. These brave workers answered the call and helped our nation win 
the Cold War. It is now time for our nation to help them and provide 
them with the immediate compensation that they deserve.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 2047

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. FINDINGS.

       Congress finds that--
       (1) energy workers at the former Mallinkrodt facilities 
     (including the St. Louis downtown facility, the Weldon 
     Springs facility, and the Hematite facility) were exposed to 
     levels of radio nuclides and radioactive materials that were 
     much greater than the current maximum allowable Federal 
     standards;
       (2) the Mallinkrodt workers at the St. Louis site were 
     exposed to excessive levels of airborne uranium dust relative 
     to the standards in effect during the time, and many workers 
     were exposed to 200 times the preferred levels of exposure;
       (3)(A) the chief safety officer for the Atomic Energy 
     Commission during the Mallinkrodt-St. Louis operations 
     described the facility as 1 of the 2 worst plants with 
     respect to worker exposures;
       (B) workers were excreting in excess of a milligram of 
     uranium per day causing kidney damage; and
       (C) a recent epidemiological study found excess levels of 
     nephritis and kidney cancer from inhalation of uranium dusts;
       (4) the Department of Energy has admitted that those 
     workers were subjected to risks and had their health 
     endangered as a result of working with these highly 
     radioactive materials;
       (5) the Department of Energy reported that workers at the 
     Weldon Springs feed materials plant handled plutonium and 
     recycled uranium, which are highly radioactive;
       (6) the National Institute of Occupational Safety and 
     Health admits that--
       (A) the operations at the St. Louis downtown site consisted 
     of intense periods of processing extremely high levels of 
     radio nuclides; and
       (B) the Institute has virtually no personal monitoring data 
     for workers prior to 1948;
       (7) the National Institute of Occupational Safety and 
     Health has informed claimants and their survivors at those 3 
     sites that if they are not interviewed as a part of the dose 
     reconstruction process, it--
       (A) would hinder the ability of the Institute to conduct 
     dose reconstruction for the claimant; and
       (B) may result in a dose reconstruction that incompletely 
     or inaccurately estimates the radiation dose to which the 
     energy employee named in the claim had been exposed;
       (8) the Department of Health and Human Services published 
     the first notice of proposed rulemaking concerning the 
     Special Exposure Cohort on June 25, 2002, and as of January 
     27, 2004, the rule has yet to be finalized; and
       (9) many of those former workers have died while waiting 
     for the proposed rule to be finalized, including some 
     claimants who were waiting for dose reconstruction to be 
     completed.

     SEC. 2. DEFINITION OF MEMBER OF THE SPECIAL EXPOSURE COHORT.

       Section 3621(14) of the Energy Employees Occupational 
     Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000 (42 U.S.C. 
     7384l(14)) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph (D); 
     and
       (2) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following:
       ``(C) The employee was so employed for a number of work 
     days aggregating at least 45 workdays at a facility operated 
     under contract to the Department of Energy by Mallinkrodt 
     Incorporated or its successors (including the St. Louis 
     downtown or `Destrahan' facility during any of calendar years 
     1942 through 1958, the Weldon Springs feed materials plant 
     facility during any of calendar years 1958 through 1966, and 
     the Hematite facility during any of calendar years 1958 
     through 1969), and during the employment--
       ``(i)(I) was monitored through the use of dosimetry badges 
     for exposure at the plant of the external parts of an 
     employee's body to radiation; or
       ``(II) was monitored through the use of bioassays, in vivo 
     monitoring, or breath samples for exposure at the plant to 
     traternal radiation; or
       ``(ii) worked in a job that had exposures comparable to a 
     job that is monitored, or should have been monitored, under 
     standards of the Department of Energy in effect on the date 
     of enactment of this subparagraph through the use of 
     dosimetry badges for

[[Page 721]]

     monitoring external radiation exposures, or bioassays, in 
     vivo monitoring, or breath samples for internal radiation 
     exposures, at a facility.''.

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