[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 150 (2004), Part 1]
[Senate]
[Pages 511-512]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                          DAVID KAY INTERVIEW

  Mr. VOINOVICH. Mr. President, during the past several days, there has 
been a great deal of discussion regarding comments made by David Kay, 
who until just recently led our search for weapons of mass destruction 
in Iraq.
  There are some who have said that statements made by Mr. Kay indicate 
that there was no reason to take military action to address the threat 
posed by Saddam Hussein. I believe this is, at best, a misunderstanding 
of his statements. Mr. Kay clearly believes that removing Saddam 
Hussein from power was the right thing to do.
  It is in this context that I would like to take this opportunity to 
share with my colleagues an interview that Mr. Kay gave yesterday 
morning, in which he outlines his thoughts on the dangers presented by 
Saddam Hussein.
  When asked whether it was prudent to go to war, Mr. Kay responded:

       I think it was absolutely prudent. In fact, I think at the 
     end of the inspection process we'll paint a picture of Iraq 
     that was far more dangerous than even we thought it was 
     before the war. It was of a system collapsing. It was a 
     country that had the capability in weapons of mass 
     destruction areas and in which terrorists, like ants to 
     honey, were going after it.

  I believe it is helpful to review his comments in their entirety, and 
as such, I ask unanimous consent that the following interview be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                [From the NBC Today Show, Jan. 27, 2004]

       Anchor: Matt Lauer
       David Kay, former head of Iraq survey group, discusses 
     searching for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

       MATT LAUER, co-host. The Bush administration now says it 
     needs more to determine if Iraq had weapons of mass 
     destruction; this after retired U.S. weapons inspector David 
     Kay concluded that Saddam Hussein had no such weapons.
       David Kay, good morning. Good to have you here.
       Mr. DAVID KAY (Former Head Of Iraq Survey Group). Good 
     morning, Matt.
       LAUER. There are some people who say you spent eight months 
     scouring the country of Iraq for stockpiles of weapons of 
     mass destruction, chemical, biological, nuclear, and because 
     you didn't find them, they make a blanket statement. And that 
     is there US administration misled the American people 
     building a case for war. Is that a fair statement?
       Mr. KAY. I think it's not fair, and it also trivializes 
     what we did find and the problem we face. The problem we face 
     is that before the war not only the US administration and US 
     intelligence, but the French, British, Germans, the UN, all 
     thought Saddam had weapons of mass destruction. Not 
     discovering them tells us we've got a more fundamental 
     problem.
       LAUER. But if you didn't find stockpiles of chemical, 
     biological or nucear weapons, does that mean they never 
     existed, or does it mean they may have been moved out of Iraq 
     prior to the war?
       Mr. KAY. Well, we've certainly dealt with the possibility 
     of moving, and we did that by trying to look to see if there 
     was any signs of their actual production in the period after 
     '98. And we really haven't found that. I think they were--
     there's a little evidence that large weapon stockpiles were 
     moved. A lot of other stuff may well have been moved.
       LAUER. So when you heard reports leading up to the war, and 
     it's a--unclear where the--where the source of these reports 
     came from, but that Iraqi troops had been given chemical and 
     biological weapons. And they were prepared to use them 
     against advancing US forces. And they could deploy them 
     within 45 minutes, untrue in your opinion?
       Mr. KAY. There's no evidence that they are true at this 
     point in time.
       LAUER. Let me play you a clip from the president's State of 
     the Union address a year ago.
       President George W. Bush (from file footage): ``Year after 
     year, Saddam Hussein has gone to elaborate lengths, spent 
     enormous sums, taken great risks to build and keep weapons of 
     mass destruction.''
       LAUER. In technical terms, was that an inaccurate 
     statement?
       Mr. KAY. Inaccurate in terms of the reality we found on the 
     ground now. I think it was an accurate statement, given the 
     intelligence the president and others were begin given then.
       LAUER. But also accurate in your opinion because in truth 
     Saddam Hussein did spend enormous amounts of money to develop 
     chemical and biological weapons, but according to your report 
     he just didn't get what he paid for.
       Mr. KAY. Well, that was in part the--true. There are a 
     tremendous amount of con--corruption there and lying that 
     went on there. Saddam spent huge efforts at these weapons 
     programs, no doubt about that.
       LAUER. So when you say lying, his scientists, or people 
     were coming to him saying, ``I can develop chemical and 
     biological weapons for you for the right amount of money.'' 
     They were taking the money, in your opinion, and not 
     delivering?
       Mr. KAY. And not delivering, and reporting back successes 
     that they were not having. That was quite common down there.
       LAUER. So when you spoke to Iraqi scientists, what did they 
     tell you about the active weapons program in the year leading 
     up to the war?
       Mr. KAY. They describe from 1998 on a Iraq that was 
     descending into the utter inability to do anything organized. 
     Corruption was there. They couldn't get the equipment. Money 
     was wasted. People weren't really concerned about working, 
     they were concerned about money.
       LAUER. But the intent was there?
       Mr. KAY. Absolutely. And the intent at the top, of Saddam 
     to acquire those weapons and to continue to attempt to 
     acquire those was absolutely there.
       LAUER. Almost a year ago Secretary of State Colin Powell 
     addressed the United Nations. Here's what he had to say.
       Secretary of State Colin Powell (from file footage): 
     ``Conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a stockpile of 
     between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons agent.''
       LAUER. Conservative, or just plain wrong?
       Mr. KAY. No, I think that was the estimate based on 
     information and intelligence before the war. It turns out to 
     be wrong.
       LAUER. So what--what was the problem with the intelligence? 
     Why were we so wrong?
       Mr. KAY. Well, Matt, I think that is the challenge now. And 
     I think the tendency to say, ``Well, it must have been 
     pressure from the White House is absolutely wrong.'' In some 
     ways I wish it had been pressure. It would be easier to solve 
     the problem. We now have to look--and people forget, Iraq is 
     not the only place we've been wrong recently. We've been 
     wrong about Iran, and we've been wrong about Libya's program 
     there. We clearly need a renovation of our ability to collect 
     intelligence.
       LAUER. Here's what you said to Tom Brokaw. ``Clearly the 
     intelligence that we went to war on was inaccurate, wrong. We 
     need to understand why that was.'' But you went on to say, 
     ``I think if anyone was abused by the intelligence, it was 
     the president of the United States, rather than the other way 
     around.''
       Mr. KAY. That's abso--absolutely my belief. I think, in 
     fact, the president and all of us were reacting on the basis 
     of an intelligence product that painted a picture of Iraq 
     that turned out not to be accurate once we got on the ground.
       LAUER. You find--you found that in--in 2000 and 2001 Saddam 
     Hussein did actively try to develop and start a nuclear 
     program?
       Mr. KAY. He was putting more money into his nuclear 
     program. He was pushing ahead his long-range missile program 
     as hard as he could. Look, the man had the intent to acquire 
     these weapons. He invested huge amounts of money in them. The 
     fact is, he wasn't successful.
       LAUER. In terms of the missile program alone, you feel that 
     it's obvious and--and undisputable that he violated UN 
     resolutions by developing weapons, missiles, that had a range 
     outside of those UN resolutions?
       Mr. KAY. Absolutely, Matt. We--we have collected dozens of 
     examples of where he lied to the UN, violated Resolution 
     1441, and was in material breach.
       LAUER. So based on the information that you have, David, 
     not what we had prior to the war, but you have, in your 
     opinion, was it prudent to go to war? Was there an imminent 
     threat?
       Mr. KAY. I think it was absolutely prudent. In fact, I 
     think at the end of the inspection process we'll paint a 
     picture of Iraq that was far more dangerous than even we 
     thought it was before the war. It was of a system collapsing. 
     It was a country that had the capability in weapons of mass 
     destruction areas and in which terrorists, like ants to 
     honey, were going after it.
       LAUER. Do--do you feel that--you know, you've come out and 
     started saying these things in the last couple of days, do 
     you feel your words are being misused and misinterpreted in 
     the political atmosphere that exists today?

[[Page 512]]


       Mr. KAY. I think there is a tendency, at this time to say, 
     ``Got you!'' and try to do politics. It think this is 
     national security, and far more important than momentary 
     political gain. I hope that's now what's happening.
       LAUER. If you spend eight months looking and didn't find 
     anything, Dick Cheney says, ``In time we could probably find 
     it.'' You still think we should continue to search?
       Mr. KAY. Absolutely. I think the inspection should continue 
     because among things we don't know enough about are the 
     foreign countries that helped the Iraqis throughout this 
     period to acquire the missiles, to develop the nukes, to 
     develop the chemical and biological. We need that for no 
     other reason. And sure, we should keep looking.
       LAUER. And as we move forward and we look at countries like 
     Iran, which you brought up, and North Korea, how well suited 
     do you think we are by our intelligence in those areas at 
     this date?
       Mr. KAY. I think based on the evidence we have now, we are 
     not as suited as well as we need to be. And I think that is 
     the challenge, not the political `Gotcha!' contest.
       LAUER. David Kay.
       David, good to have you here.
       Mr. KAY. Good to be here.

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