[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 9]
[Senate]
[Pages 11864-11866]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                         SUBMITTED RESOLUTIONS

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  SENATE RESOLUTION 144--EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE THAT THE 
UNITED STATES SHOULD DECLARE ITS SUPPORT FOR THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE OF 
    KOSOVA TO DETERMINE THEIR POLITICAL FUTURE ONCE KOSOVA HAS MADE 
    REQUISITE PROGRESS, AS DEFINED BY UNITED NATIONS BENCHMARKS, IN 
    DEVELOPING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTIONS

  Mr. BIDEN submitted the following resolution; which was referred to 
the Committee on Foreign Relations:

                              S. Res. 144

       Whereas paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the International 
     Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the United 
     States is a party, recognizes that all peoples have the right 
     of self-determination;
       Whereas Kosova was constitutionally defined as an 
     autonomous region in the First National Liberation Conference 
     for Kosova on January 2, 1944, this status was confirmed in 
     the Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
     Yugoslavia adopted in 1946, and the autonomous status of 
     Kosova was preserved in the amended Yugoslav Constitution 
     adopted in 1974;
       Whereas prior to the disintegration of the former 
     Yugoslavia, the autonomous region of Kosova constituted a 
     political and legal entity with its own distinct financial 
     institutions, police force, municipal government, school 
     system, judicial and legal system, hospitals, and other 
     organizations;
       Whereas, in 1987, Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic rose 
     to power in Yugoslavia on a platform of ultranationalism and 
     anti-Albanian racism, advocating violence and hatred against 
     all non-Slavic peoples and specifically targeting the ethnic 
     Albanians of Kosova;
       Whereas Slobodan Milosevic subsequently stripped Kosova of 
     its political autonomy without the consent of the people of 
     Kosova;
       Whereas the elected Assembly of Kosova, faced with this 
     illegal act, adopted a Declaration of Independence on July 2, 
     1990, proclaimed a Republic of Kosova, and adopted a 
     constitution on September 7, 1990, based on the 
     internationally accepted principles of self-determination, 
     equality, and sovereignty;
       Whereas in recognition of the de facto dissolution of the 
     Yugoslav federation, the European Community established 
     principles for the recognition of the independence and 
     sovereignty of the republics of the former Socialist Federal 
     Republic of Yugoslavia;
       Whereas a popular referendum was held in Kosova from 
     September 26 to 30, 1991, in which 87 percent of all eligible 
     voters cast ballots and 99.87 percent voted in favor of 
     declaring Kosova independent of the Socialist Federal 
     Republic of Yugoslavia;
       Whereas, during the occupation of Kosova, which began in 
     1989 and ended with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
     (NATO) military action against the regime of Slobodan 
     Milosevic in 1999, the ethnic Albanians of Kosova were 
     subjected to brutal treatment by the occupying forces, and 
     approximately 400,000 ethnic Albanians were forced to flee to 
     Western Europe and the United States;
       Whereas in the spring of 1999 almost 1,000,000 ethnic 
     Albanians were driven out of Kosova and at least 10,000 were 
     murdered by Serbian paramilitary and military forces;
       Whereas Slobodan Milosevic was indicted by the 
     International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and 
     extradited to The Hague in June 2001, to stand trial for war 
     crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Kosova, 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia;
       Whereas on June 10, 1999, United Nations Security Council 
     Resolution 1244 mandated an international civil presence in 
     Kosova, ending the decade-long Serbian occupation of Kosova 
     and Milosevic's genocidal war there;
       Whereas the people of Kosova, including ethnic Albanians, 
     Serbs, Turks, Roma, Bosniaks, Goranis, and Ashkalis, held 
     free and fair municipal elections in 2000 and 2002 and a 
     general election in 2001 to elect a Parliament, which in turn 
     selected a President and Prime Minister in 2002;
       Whereas, with 50 percent of the population in Kosova being 
     under the age of 25, and the unemployment rate currently 
     being between 60 and 70 percent, there is an increasing 
     likelihood of young people entering criminal networks, or 
     working abroad in order to survive unless massive job 
     creation is facilitated by guaranteeing the security of 
     foreign investments through the establishment of the rule of 
     law and functioning institutions in Kosova;
       Whereas for the first time since the end of the conflict, 
     refugees from ethnic minority communities in Kosova have 
     started to return to their homes in substantial numbers, 
     although those refugees are still a small fraction of the 
     number of people that left in 1999;
       Whereas most ethnic Albanian elected authorities in Kosova 
     recognize that substantial efforts toward reconciliation with 
     ethnic minorities are needed for the long-term security and 
     participation in government institutions of all citizens of 
     Kosova;
       Whereas leaders of the Kosova Parliament have publicly 
     committed to developing a western-style democracy in which 
     all citizens, regardless of ethnicity, are granted full human 
     and civil rights and are committed to the return of all 
     refugees, whatever their ethnicity, who fled Kosova during 
     and after the conflict;
       Whereas Deputy Prime Minister Nebojsa Covic of Serbia 
     called for the return of Serbian forces to Kosova and for 
     talks on the status of the province;
       Whereas, on February 25, 2003, representatives of a Serbian 
     minority coalition in the Kosova Parliament called for the 
     establishment of a Serbian Union in northern Kosova;
       Whereas the international community has made clear that it 
     will support neither monoethnic government institutions, nor 
     the partition of Kosova;
       Whereas the tragic assassination in Belgrade of Serbian 
     Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic on March 12, 2003, underscored 
     that criminal nationalist elements remain a destabilizing 
     factor in the region and an obstacle to reform efforts;
       Whereas the Special Representative of the United Nations 
     Secretary General in Kosova has initiated a dialogue between 
     the authorities in Belgrade and in Pristina on issues of 
     practical concern;
       Whereas the Serbian Government on April 17, 2003, declared 
     as ``unacceptable'' the plan put forward by the Special 
     Representative to devolve powers to the elected officials in 
     Kosova;
       Whereas following his address to the Organization for 
     Security and Cooperation in Europe Permanent Council on May 
     8, 2003, the Special Representative of the United Nations 
     Secretary General stated that ``Kosovo Albanians are being 
     more assertive about competencies and status issues while at 
     the same time Kosovo Serbs are concentrating on developing 
     monoethnic structures'';
       Whereas Deputy Prime Minister Covic on May 9, 2003, again 
     dismissed the assessment that the time has come to begin to 
     discuss the final status of Kosova;
       Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 
     stated that the main responsibilities of the international 
     civil presence in Kosova include facilitating a political 
     process designed to determine Kosova's future status and, in 
     the final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from 
     Kosova's provisional institutions to institutions established 
     under a political settlement; and
       Whereas the only viable option for the future of Kosova is 
     one that reflects both the needs and aspirations of its 
     entire population: Now, therefore, be it
       Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the 
     United States should--
       (1) recognize the danger that an unnecessary delay in the 
     resolution of Kosova's final status would pose for the 
     political and economic viability of Kosova and the stability 
     of Southeast Europe;
       (2) publicly support the goal of a democratic government in 
     Kosova in which human rights, including the rights of ethnic 
     and religious minorities, are respected;
       (3) to achieve that goal, call for holding a referendum, 
     under international supervision, on the future status of 
     Kosova, once Kosova has made further progress in developing 
     institutions of democratic self-government, establishing the 
     rule of law, facilitating the return and reintegration of 
     refugees into local communities, and protecting ethnic 
     minorities, in accordance with the benchmarks established by 
     the United Nations;
       (4) work in conjunction with the United Nations, the North 
     Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, the 
     Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and 
     other international organizations to assist Kosova to meet 
     the United Nations benchmarks that are the necessary 
     conditions for holding a referendum on the future status of 
     Kosova and to facilitate the implementation of the form of 
     government determined by the people of Kosova; and
       (5) continue to provide assistance, trade, and other 
     programs to encourage the further development of democracy 
     and a free market economic system in Kosova.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce a Resolution 
expressing the sense of the Senate that the United States should 
declare its support for the right of the people of Kosova to determine 
their political future, once Kosova has made requisite progress, as 
defined by United Nations benchmarks, in developing democratic 
institutions and human rights protections.
  In order to put my Resolution into the proper context, I would like 
briefly to discuss current conditions in the successor states of the 
former Yugoslavia, an area which has consumed a great deal of my 
attention for the last decade.
  Much progress has been made in this former region of conflict since 
the fall

[[Page 11865]]

of Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic in 2001 and the subsequent 
final dissolution of the Yugoslav federation. Slovenia has been invited 
to join NATO, and last week this body unanimously ratified the 
accession to NATO of Slovenia and six other candidate countries. 
Slovenia has also been invited to join the European Union next year.
  Two other Yugoslav successor states--Croatia and the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia--have joined Albania in signing the U.S.-Adriatic 
Charter to cooperatively advance their candidacies for NATO membership. 
Both Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia have also 
signed EU Stabilization and Association agreements.
  In Macedonia, although tensions that threatened full-scale conflict 
just two years ago remain, the newly elected coalition government is 
working to implement fully the Ohrid Framework Agreement of 2001, and 
the European Union assumed command of peacekeeping operations from NATO 
on March 31, 2003.
  SFOR, the NATO-led international force, continues to maintain 
stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina in significantly smaller numbers 
than its original contingent. There is serious discussion about turning 
over command of the operation to the European Union, a move about which 
I have some reservations. The European Union Police Mission assumed 
international police monitoring duties in Bosnia and Herze-
govina from the UN on January 1, 2003. The High Representative in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Paddy Ashdown, continues to oversee reform 
efforts and has rightly placed special emphasis on strengthening the 
rule of law.
  Serbia and Montenegro, under pressure from the EU, agreed to a 
constitutional charter that would keep them loosely united for the next 
three years, formally ending the entity of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and setting them on a long-term path toward EU membership. 
Nonetheless, last week Filip Vujanovic, an advocate of Montenegrin 
independence, won a sweeping victory in the presidential elections. The 
runner-up candidate also advocated independence, as does Montene-
gro's prime minister Milo Djukanovic.
  Despite this considerable progress, as a distinguished task force 
assembled by the Council on Foreign Relations noted in its ``Balkans 
2010'' report of December 2002, the goal of regional stability and the 
promises of democratic transition are not yet fulfilled.
  ``There is still a risk of backsliding in the region: the security 
situation in Macedonia remains tenuous; the coalition government in 
Serbia is irretriev-
ably splintered; and in Kosovo all the political parties are organized 
around ethnic objectives and pander to nationalist sentiment. In Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, meanwhile, the elections in October 2002--which 
resulted in presidential victories for the three main nationalist 
parties at the expense of their moderate competitors--demonstrated that 
nationalist feelings remain potent. One reason for these trends is the 
increasing discontent of local populations whose embrace of the West 
has failed to bring immediate improvements in their standard of living 
. . . Irredentist, criminal and anti-democratic forces will try to 
exploit people's frustration brought on by the difficulties inherent in 
transitions.''
  Following the tragic assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindic on 
March 12, 2003, the government of Serbia launched a major crackdown on 
criminal elements and initiated much-needed defense reforms to enhance 
civilian control over the military. Serbian officials took an important 
and overdue step by handing over to UN representative in Kosova the 
remains of 37 ethnic Albanians believed to have been killed during 
Milosevic's 1998-1999 campaign.
  Serbia must continue to step up its cooperation with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, ICTY. The 
single most significant move the Serbian government could make to prove 
its commitment to joining the West is to arrest former Bosnian Serb 
General Ratko Mladic and send him to The Hague. But there are other 
important measures, such as opening archives and turning over requested 
documents to the prosecution, that Serbia must take in order to meet 
its international obligations.
  Now, I would like to turn to Kosova, the subject of my resolution. 
Since the end of hostilities four years ago, the peace has been kept by 
KFOR, an international peacekeeping force in which United States forces 
play a kept role and have responsibility for the southeastern sector of 
the province.
  Last year for the first time since the 1999 conflict, refugee returns 
outnumbered departures, with around 2,700 refugees returning to the 
province. UN officials predict that the numbers will increase in 2003, 
and the United States has committed more than $14 million this fiscal 
year to that end. The Housing and Property Directorate has resolved 
nearly 2,000 property claims to date and estimates that it will have 
resolved 9,000 cases by the end of 2003--about one-third of all claims 
filed.
  The Kosovo Protection Corps, the local gendarmerie, is gradually 
becoming more representative of the ethics diversity in Kosova and more 
skillful in its policing operations. Crime, and particularly inter-
ethnic crime, has been significant reduced, and murders decreased in 
2002 by 50 percent over the previous year. The province held elections 
three times in the past three years, twice for municipal seats and once 
to select assembly representatives, and in each case OSCE monitors 
deemed the elections generally free and fair.
  Yet much remains to be done. The refugee returns of last year 
represent only a small fraction of the approximately 237,000 Kosova 
refugees currently in Serbia, Macedonia, and Albania. Moreover, there 
are 22,500 internally displaced persons within Kosova who, for various 
reasons, including loss of property, economic shortage, and fear of 
retribution or persecution, have been unable or unwilling to return to 
their homes. Many who have returned also fear for their security, are 
unable to secure employment, and have little or no access to social and 
economic opportunities. Formal unemployment hovers around 50 percent. 
Without the ability to sustain themselves and provide for their 
families, many young Kosovars have turned to criminal activity. And 
Kosova continues to provide a haven for traffickers and other criminals 
active throughout the Balkans.
  The head of the UN administration, UNMIK, an experienced German 
diplomat named Michael Steiner, has established ``benchmarks'' to focus 
the agenda of Kosova's elected officials pursuant to fulfilling the 
mandate of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 for progress toward 
self-administration. These benchmarks include: the existence of 
effective, representative, and functioning institutions; the 
enforcement of the rule of law; freedom of movement; respect for the 
right of all Kosovars to remain and return; the development of a sound 
basis for a market economy; clarity of property title; normalized 
dialogue with Belgrade; and reduction and transformation of the Kosovo 
Protection Corps in line with its mandate.
  The UN policy of ``standards before status'' is conceptually sound. 
Of course, real progress requires resources, and, unfortunately, the 
international community has not met all of its pledge commitments, and 
private investment until now has been sparse.
  Some argue that foreign capital is hesitant to invest in Kosova as 
long as its future political status remains undefined. This line, 
however, confuses cause and effect. The reason that Kosova's final 
status remains in limbo is because conditions on the ground there do 
not yet allow the international community to allow a final status to be 
chosen.
  To be sure, there have been serious attempts to move the process 
along. Mr. Steiner has initiated a dialogue between Pristina and 
Belgrade on technical issues and has begun the process of devolving 
many responsibilities onto Kosova's elected Assembly.
  Sad to say, both ethnic Albanians and Serbs have undercut these 
efforts by focusing on final status, rather than on practical progress. 
Ethnic Albanian

[[Page 11866]]

representatives in the Kosova Assembly have twice tried to pass a 
resolution calling for independence but were dissuaded by officials 
from the UN and the international community who rightly fear that such 
a move would only increase tensions in the region. Kosovar President 
Ibrahim Rugova has publicly ruled out any dialogue with Belgrade 
officials on future status.
  The Serbs for their part, have been equally obdurate. Earlier this 
year, leading Serbian officials made aggressive statements regarding 
Kosova, including calling on the international community to take up the 
final status issue and demanding that Serb army forces be allowed to 
return there. I scarcely need comment that the latter demand is a total 
non-starter.
  The UN Secretary General's report of April 14, 2003, noted that 
Belgrade continues to support parallel administrative structures in 
virtually all of municipalities that have a considerable Serb 
population in direct violation of UN Security Council 1244. Following a 
meeting with Kosovar Serb leaders on April 16, 2003, Serbian Prime 
Minister Zivkovic and Deputy Prime Minister Covic issued a statement 
calling the UN plan to devolve considerable powers to the 
democratically elected officials in Kosova ``unacceptable,'' and the 
government in Belgrade is reportedly setting up a Serbian state council 
to deal with administrative issues in the ethnic Serb communities in 
Kosova.
  So what should we do? there are some who believe we should throw in 
the towel and declare support for one side or the other. I believe that 
those who would call for the United States to support either 
independence for Kosova, or reintegration of Kosova with Serbia, are 
prescribing a cure worse that the disease, however noble their 
intentions.
  When in doubt it is always wise to fall back upon basic principles. 
In this case, the basic principle of democracy is self-determination. 
And self-determination can best be expressed through a referendum, but 
only after the local Kosova authorities, with the help of the 
international community, fulfill the United Nations benchmarks.
  Let me be perfectly clear about the practical side of the issue. The 
demographics of Kosova, and the pro-independence stand of all the 
ethnic Albanian political leaders and parties there, make a future vote 
for independence nearly inevitable. If that is the will of the people 
of Kosova when conditions warrant their making a choice, then I will 
wholeheartedly support it.
  But no rationale of catering to immediate economic expediency 
outweighs the damage a unilateral declaration of independence, or 
Congressional support thereof, would do to the international regime in 
Kosova--especially to the credibility of the United Nations Mission 
there--or to the promising, but fragile crackdown on criminal elements 
by the new Zivkovic government in Serbia.
  The stakes of Balkan stability are simple too high to put the cart 
before the horse.
  In order to meet the UN benchmarks, the leaders of Kosova from all 
ethnic communities must accelerate the process of building a fully 
functioning democracy that respects human rights and the rule of law. 
Agreeing to a process for settling the status issue will give them the 
political incentive and procedural basis to do so.
  The Sense of the Senate resolution I have proposed recognizes the 
danger that an unnecessary delay in resolution of Kosova's final status 
would pose. But it also recognizes that the precondition for resolving 
the final status issue through self-determination is a democratic 
government in Kosova in which human rights, including the rights of 
religious and ethnic minorities, are respected.
  Therefore, the Resolution calls for holding a referendum on final 
status, once requisite progress has been made toward meeting the UN 
benchmarks, endorses continued cooperation with other international 
organizations, and supports continued U.S. economic assistance to 
encourage further development.
  Rebuilding a society shattered by a vicious war is a frustrating, 
time-consuming effort. There is an undeniable temptation to heed the 
siren song of a declaration of independence. But short-term 
gratification usually leads to more severe long-term problems, and the 
case of Kosova is no exception. The international cooperative efforts 
of KFOR, the UN, the OSCE, and various other governmental and non-
governmental bodies are making slow but steady progress. We should 
continue down this path, which is precisely what my Resolution 
advocates.
  I hope other members will join me in supporting the people of Kosova 
in their efforts, through concrete political and social progress, to 
advance a decision on their final political status.

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