[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 8]
[Senate]
[Pages 10688-10712]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                           EXECUTIVE SESSION

                                 ______
                                 

                         NATO EXPANSION TREATY

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the hour of 12 noon 
having arrived, the Senate will proceed to executive session to 
consider Executive Calendar No. 6, which the clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       Resolution of Ratification to Accompany Treaty Document No. 
     108-4, Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on 
     Accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
     Slovakia, and Slovenia.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there are 4 hours of 
debate on the treaty.
  The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, we now commence a very important debate on 
the NATO treaty.
  On behalf of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I am pleased to 
bring the protocols of accession to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 
to the floor for the Senate's consideration and ratification. The 
protocols extending membership to Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia were signed on March 26, 2003, and were 
transmitted by President Bush to the Senate on April 10, 2003. The 
accession of these countries to the NATO Alliance is a tremendous 
accomplishment. It deserves the full support of the Senate and the 
governments of the other 18 NATO members.
  The Foreign Relations Committee has held 10 hearings on NATO since 
1999. Five of these hearings were held during the last 2 months, as we 
prepared for this debate on the Senate floor. The Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee gave its unanimous approval to the resolution of 
ratification.
  I especially thank Senator Joseph Biden for his assistance in moving 
NATO expansion forward and for his insightful participation in the 
wider debate on NATO policy. The resolution of ratification before us 
today reflects our mutual efforts to construct a bipartisan resolution 
that could be broadly supported by the Senate.
  During the course of the committee's consideration of the Protocols 
of Accession for these seven nations to join NATO, we received 
testimony from Secretary of State Colin Powell, Under Secretary of 
State Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of Defense Doug Feith, and United 
States Ambassador to NATO Nick Burns. Each expressed strong support for 
NATO expansion. In addition to efforts undertaken in the Foreign 
Relations Committee, Senators Levin and Warner and the Committee on 
Armed Services conducted two hearings examining the military 
implications of the treaty and shared an analysis of their findings 
with us. This letter has been made a part of the Record and our 
committee report.
  When NATO was founded in 1949, its purpose was to defend Western 
democracies against the Soviet Union. But the demise of the Soviet 
Union diminished the significance of NATO's mission. We began to debate 
where NATO should go and what NATO should do. In early 1993, I 
delivered a speech calling for NATO not only to enlarge, but also to 
prepare to go ``out of area.'' At that time, many people were skeptical 
about enlarging NATO's size and mission. Those of us who believed in 
NATO enlargement prevailed in that debate. And I believe that events 
have proven us right.
  As we consider this new enlargement, it is clear that the last round 
has been highly beneficial. Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic are 
among the most dynamic countries in Europe. They are deeply interested 
in alliance matters, and they have sought to maximize their 
contribution to collective security. The prospect of NATO membership 
gave these countries the incentive to accelerate reforms, to settle 
disputes, and cooperate with their neighbors. Their success, in turn, 
has been a strong incentive for democratization and peace among 
Europe's other aspiring countries.
  Many observers will point to the split over Iraq as a sign that NATO 
is failing or irrelevant. I disagree. Any alliance requires constant 
maintenance and adjustment, and NATO is no exception. The United States 
has more at stake and more in common with Europe than with any other 
part of the world. These common interests and shared values will 
sustain the alliance if governments realize the incredible resource 
that NATO represents. As the leader of NATO, we have no intention of 
shirking our commitment to Europe.
  But as we attempt to mend the alliance's political divisions over 
Iraq, we must go one step further and ask, if NATO had been united on 
Iraq, could it have provided an effective command

[[Page 10689]]

structure for the military operation that is underway now? And would 
allies, beyond those currently engaged in Iraq, have been willing and 
able to field forces that would have been significant to the outcome of 
the war? In other words, achieving political unity within the alliance, 
while important to international opinion, does not guarantee that NATO 
will be meaningful as a fighting alliance in the war on terror.
  In the coming years, NATO will have a decide if it wants to 
participate in the security challenge of our time. If we do not prevent 
major terrorist attacks involving weapons of mass destruction, the 
alliance will have failed in the most fundamental sense of defending 
our nations and our way of life.
  This reality demands that as we depend NATO, we also retool NATO, so 
that it can be a mechanism of burden sharing and mutual security in the 
war on terrorism. America is at war, and we feel more vulnerable than 
at any time since the end of the cold war and perhaps since World War 
II. We need allies to confront this threat effectively, and those 
alliances cannot be circumscribed by geographic boundaries.
  In our committee hearings on NATO, we have heard encouraging 
testimony that our allies are taking promised steps to strengthen their 
capabilities in such areas as heavy airlift and sealift and precision-
guided munitions. We also have heard that the seven candidates for 
membership are developing niche military capabilities that would be 
useful in meeting NATO's new military demands. But clearly, much work 
is left to be done to transform NATO into a bulwark against terrorism. 
An early test will be NATO's contribution to peacekeeping and 
humanitarian duties in the aftermath of combat in Iraq. A strong 
commitment by NATO nations to this role would be an important step in 
healing the alliance divisions and reaffirming its relevance for the 
long run.
  The Resolution of Ratification we are considering today includes nine 
declarations and three conditions. I will review each of these 
provisions for the benefit of the Senate:
  Declaration 1 reaffirms that membership in NATO remains a vital 
national security interest of the United States.
  Declaration 2 lays out the strategic rationale for NATO enlargement.
  Declaration 3 emphasizes that upon completion of the accession 
process, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia will have all the rights, privileges, obligations, 
responsibilities, and protections of full NATO members.
  Declaration 4 emphasizes the importance of European integration.
  Declaration 5 reiterates NATO's ``open door'' policy, and declares 
that the seven new countries will not be the last invited to join the 
alliance.
  Declaration 6 expresses the Senate's support for the Partnership for 
Peace.
  Declaration 7 expresses support for the NATO-Russia Council 
established at the Prague Summit, but reinforces the Senate's view that 
Russia does not have a veto or vote on NATO policy.
  Declaration 8 declares that the seven candidate countries have 
implemented mechanisms for the compensation of victims of the Holocaust 
and of Communism.
  Declaration 9 states that the committee has maintained the 
constitutional role of the U.S. Senate in the treaty-making process.
  Condition 1 requires the President to reaffirm understandings on the 
costs, benefits, and military implications of NATO enlargement.
  Condition 2 requires the President to submit a report to the 
Congressional Intelligence Committees on the progress of Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia in meeting 
NATO security sector and security vetting standards.
  Finally, Condition 3 requires the President to certify to Congress 
that each of the governments of the seven candidate countries is fully 
cooperating with the U.S. efforts to obtain the fullest accounting of 
captured and missing U.S. personnel from previous conflicts and the 
Cold War.
  When President Bush made his first trip to Europe 2 years ago, he 
strongly voiced the U.S. commitment to Europe generally and to NATO in 
particular. Now at a moment when relations with some of our European 
allies are strained, a clear showing of bipartisan support for NATO 
enlargement takes on added importance. The affirming message of the 
first round of enlargement led to improved capabilities and 
strengthened transatlantic ties. I am confident that this second round 
will do the same. I ask my colleagues to join me in voting for this 
resolution of ratification.
  I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will proceed with an opening statement 
relative to the matter before us, and that is expansion of NATO.
  Mr. President, today we begin consideration of an amendment to the 
North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 to admit to NATO seven new members--
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
  If we approve this legislation, as I hope we will, it will mark an 
important step in the strategic transformation of the Alliance to 
respond to a new security environment.
  I would like to discuss the history of this strategic transformation 
and then to examine the qualifications of each of the seven candidate 
countries.
  The process of transforming the Alliance actually began shortly after 
the collapse of communism in Europe in 1989.
  The first major change in the post-Cold War NATO was an absolutely 
critical event that is all-but-forgotten today: the accession to NATO, 
without fanfare, of the former East Germany when it reunited with the 
Federal Republic of Germany on October 3, 1990.
  We talk about the expansion of NATO and we never really mention that. 
Again, the first significant thing that happened in transforming the 
alliance in the new security environment was that East Germany, a 
former Warsaw Pact member, was accepted and subsumed into and became 
part of Germany again, but also became part of NATO as a consequence of 
that.
  The following year, in June 1991, the Warsaw Pact disbanded, and in 
December 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved.
  At the Madrid Summit in July 1997, NATO invited three countries from 
the former Warsaw Pact--Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary--to 
enter into final accession negotiations with the Alliance.
  I might say a word about the care with which this body scrutinized 
that round of NATO enlargement.
  The Committee on Foreign Relations alone held a dozen detailed 
hearings and published a 550-page book containing hearing transcripts, 
policy analyses, a detailed trip report, and other documents. Other 
committees also held hearings on enlargement.
  Then, during March and April of 1998, came seven full days of intense 
debate on ratification here on the floor. I had the privilege of being 
floor manager for the ratification, which was approved by a 80-19 vote 
on the evening of April 30, 1998.
  Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic formally joined NATO on March 
12, 1999. Less than 2 weeks later, the Allied air war was launched 
against Serbian aggression in Kosovo.
  The events of the 1990s, and the increasing instability in the Middle 
East and Central Asia, led my farsighted colleagues--Senator Lugar and 
former Senator Nunn, to the memorable conclusion that the NATO Alliance 
had to ``go out of area, or out of business.''
  Still, most analysts remained skeptical. The terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, dispatched any remaining doubts about the nature of 
the threats we now face. The unanimous decision on the following day by 
the NATO Allies to invoke Article 5 for the first time in NATO's 
history confirmed the vitality of NATO's collective defense principle.
  At the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Reykjavik in May 2002, the Allies

[[Page 10690]]

agreed that in order to meet security threats, NATO needed forces that 
could be deployed quickly to wherever they are needed and sustained 
over time to complete their mission. This agreement effectively 
settled, at least conceptually, the ``out-of-area'' debate.
  Meanwhile, in Brussels and among NATO members a discussion had begun 
on the merits of a so-called ``Big Bang'' next round of enlargement to 
give meaning and force to the new missions ahead.
  Recognizing that potential members in Central and Eastern Europe 
would individually require years to reach all of the military standards 
of NATO, members began to view their entrance as a regional grouping as 
politically and geographically strategic.
  Initially, I personally had some skepticism of this perspective and 
was concerned about the abilities of these countries to contribute to 
the alliance. But the determined response of these countries to the war 
against terrorism, their participation in SFOR and KFOR peacekeeping in 
the Balkans, their participation in Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan, and the progress they have made on their NATO membership 
action plans, so-called MAPs, convinced me all seven of these countries 
would serve us well as formal allies. I declared my support for all 
seven of these countries in an article I wrote for the Los Angeles 
Times of September 1, 2002.
  The critical turning point in defining new tasks for NATO occurred at 
Prague in November 2002, at NATO's so-called ``Transformation Summit.''
  Prague crystallized the debate over NATO's new missions, new 
capabilities, and new members, and it afforded members opportunity to 
set forth a strategic agenda for a revitalized NATO.
  Among the accomplishments at Prague, the alliance agreed to the 
Prague Capabilities Commitment. NATO, because it is a military 
organization--I think it is beyond that and is a political organization 
as well--loves all these acronyms. It takes a while; I apologize for my 
colleagues who do not follow this closely. The PCC, the Prague 
Capabilities Commitment, replaced the overly ambitious and broad 
Defense Capabilities Initiative of 1999 with a more concrete framework 
for force modernization and adaptation, including acquisition of 
equipment and technology through consortia of members and the 
development by individual countries of so-called niche capabilities, 
which I will describe later. That is a new term that is formally being 
used.
  NATO also adopted an American proposal to develop a NATO response 
force, NRF, a high-readiness, mobile combat unit that would allow NATO 
to go out of area to meet threats where they arise.
  Finally, the alliance invited the seven countries whose 
qualifications we are considering today to begin final negotiations 
with the alliance on joining as full members.
  NATO issued the invitation knowing that the militaries in most of the 
seven countries would not greatly enhance the war-fighting ability of 
the alliance, at least in the short term. Taken together, however, they 
will measurably increase NATO's potential.
  The seven invited countries will add 220,000 active-duty troops to 
the alliance immediately, or about 175,000 by the end of the decade, 
once current reform and restructuring of forces are completed in 
Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. This represents a 6 percent 
overall increase in NATO military forces.
  This round of enlargement will also yield strategic infrastructure 
benefits. The membership of the seven countries will increase the 
number of airfields with long runways available to the alliance by 6 
percent and the number available in Europe by 13 percent.
  Airfields and ports in these countries also factor in to the 
Pentagon's initial plans to reshuffle its forces in Europe, including 
the possibility of building U.S. bases and airfields in Bulgaria and 
the nearby Black Sea port of Burgas, as well as at a Romania airbase 
and a Black Sea port of Constanta.
  In addition, Romania has unmanned aerial vehicles and a C-130 lift 
capability, while Slovakia has air-to-ground training ranges.
  Moreover, the enlargement will add so-called niche capabilities to 
NATO's array of professional forces, several of which could be directly 
applicable to future out-of-area missions. These specialized 
capabilities include Bulgarian and Slovak antinuclear, biological, and 
chemical weapons teams; Slovenian demining units; Romanian elite force 
and mountain troops; Lithuanian special forces and medics; Estonian 
explosive detection teams; Latvian explosive ordinance destruction 
specialists, including underwater demolition teams; and a joint Baltic 
Sea air surveillance network.
  While their forces may be small in number, the seven invited 
countries have shown no hesitancy in deploying their uniformed men and 
women in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and, in some cases, in the Middle 
East, as coalition operations have required.
  In February of this year, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined NATO candidates Albania, 
Croatia, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as the so-called 
Vilnius Ten in bravely standing with the United States and its 
coalition partners.
  They declared the importance of the transatlantic alliance and called 
for action by the international community in response to the clear and 
growing danger posed by Saddam Hussein in Iraq.
  Mr. President, a short excerpt from their declaration demonstrates 
the vigorous spirit these nations I believe will bring to NATO:

       Our countries understand the dangers posed by tyranny and 
     the special responsibility of democracies to defend our 
     shared values. The trans-Atlantic community, of which we are 
     a part, must stand together to face the threats posed by the 
     nexus of terrorism and dictators with weapons of mass 
     destruction.

  In word and in deed, these countries have already demonstrated their 
value as partners and de facto allies, and it is in the interest of the 
United States, in my view, to see this partnership be made formal by 
their acceptance into NATO.
  The governments of the seven involved countries have also taken 
tremendous steps and, in some cases, faced considerable political risk 
to align their institutions and policies in accordance with NATO's 
standards and values. Let me summarize their individual qualifications 
for NATO membership.
  Bulgaria: Bulgaria has committed to spend around 2.8 percent of GDP 
on defense in 2003, a higher percentage than that of several of our 
current allies, and to continue to downsize its armed forces by the 
thousands. On October 31, 2002, Bulgaria announced that it had 
destroyed all of its FROG, SCUD and SS-23 missiles, remnants of the old 
Soviet arsenal.
  To shut down any further proliferation of gray arms, Sofia has 
adopted a supplemental export control legislation, drafted a new border 
security act, and adopted new regulations on border checkpoints.
  Moreover, it took immediate and decisive action against those 
involved in the illegal shipment that occurred last year from the Terem 
military complex.
  Bulgaria, a rare country that protected its Jewish citizens during 
World War II, has generally been tolerant of all its religious, ethnic, 
and political minorities. An exception was the anti-Turkish campaign in 
the late eighties, the dying spasms of a discredited Communist regime. 
Today a largely ethnic Turkish party is a member of the governing 
coalition. Bulgaria is now moving to complete the process of property 
restitution to its Jewish community with only one property still under 
legal procedure.
  Estonia: Estonia leads the Baltic region in free market reforms, 
increased defense spending last year of 2 percent of GDP, and is 
developing a light infantry brigade, the first battalion of which 
should be equipped and trained by the end of this month. The 
organization, Transparency International, has rated Estonia the least 
corrupt country in central and Eastern Europe.
  Building on an already good record, last year, they adopted an action 
plan to improve the administration and judicial capacity in their 
country.

[[Page 10691]]

  Estonia has amended minimum language requirements in its laws on 
citizenship and employment to address needs particularly of its large 
Russian ethnic community. As a result, in the most recent national 
elections, the ethnic Russian parties failed to clear the 5 percent 
hurdle necessary to enter Parliament. In other words, the majority of 
Estonia's ethnic Russian citizens cast their vote for multinational 
parties on the basis of substantive issues, not ethnicity. I think that 
is remarkable.
  In August 2002, overcoming a few voices of intolerance, the Estonian 
Parliament voted to recognize January 27 as a day of remembrance for 
the Holocaust.
  I know the Presiding Officer is a student of that era, as well as my 
colleague from Indiana, the chairman.
  That is also a fairly remarkable undertaking. People in this country 
think it would be automatic, but that is a pretty big deal.
  Latvia has enacted a law to require 2 percent of its GDP to be spent 
on defense beginning this year. By the end of 2003, Latvia's first 
professional infantry battalion will be ready to participate in NATO-
led operations, with three additional mobile reserve battalions ready 
in 2004.
  Riga's economic reform efforts have been well funded and generally 
successful, and Latvia is now assisting other post-Communist countries 
such as Georgia and Ukraine with their own reform efforts.
  After a somewhat contentious start in the early 1990s, Latvia has had 
considerable success in integrating its large Russian-speaking minority 
by dismantling citizenship and bureaucratic restrictions to full social 
and political participation within Latvia.
  Lithuania has increased its spending on defense to 2 percent of GDP 
in 2002. By the end of 2004, Lithuania will be able to deploy and 
sustain a mobile, professional infantry battalion, and by 2006 a rapid 
reaction brigade.
  A small, elite unit of Lithuanian special operations forces is 
currently serving in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. 
Recently, this unit was involved in ground combat against al-Qaida 
forces during a strategic reconnaissance mission and together, with 
allied reinforcements, captured several of the enemy.
  Lithuania signed a border treaty with Russia in 1997, which the 
Russian Duma is expected to ratify later this month, and has reached an 
agreement to permit Russian military traffic to transit Lithuania on 
its way to Kaliningrad.
  In 2002, Vilnius launched a Program for Control and Prevention of 
Trafficking in Human Beings and Prostitution. The Government has 
established a public center for the Roma in Vilnius, launched a program 
to integrate Roma into Lithuanian society, and developed information 
campaigns to promote this tolerance.
  Conscripts in Lithuania's armed forces have a unit in their training 
on the history of World War II and the Holocaust in Lithuania, and the 
Government is working with international nongovernment organizations to 
establish legal procedures for Jewish communal property restitution.
  Quite frankly, in a sense, as I go through this, if we did nothing 
other than accomplish these changes in the countries I have mentioned 
so far, unrelated to the military, in order to get them to move toward 
NATO--not to get them to make it clear what they had to accommodate to 
move toward NATO--I would argue it would be a significant success, a 
singular success, but the story goes on.
  Romania, by far the largest of the seven candidate countries, spends 
$1 billion, or 2.38 percent of its GDP, on defense. Moreover, Romania 
is committed to being a net contributor to NATO and is upgrading its 21 
MiG-29 fighter aircraft, its navy ships, and its missile launching 
systems.
  An elite Romanian infantry battalion, the Red Scorpions, served in 
Afghanistan--that is how they are referred to, the ``Red Scorpions''--
and was replaced by the Carpathian Hawks that are currently there. I 
love these names. It is sort of part of the history of Romania, which 
is another question.
  I might add that Romania flew these units to Afghanistan on their own 
C-130s, a feat which many of our current NATO allies are unable to 
duplicate.
  The Romanian economy has grown substantially over the past 3 years, 
by 4 percent in 2002, and inflation, although it remains high, has been 
brought under the IMF target rate of 22 percent.
  Romania opened a National Anti-
corruption Prosecutor's Office in September 2002 and has begun a 
judicial reform effort that includes prosecuting judges for bribery and 
corruption, an act called ``unprecedented in the region.'' Romania's 
relations with Hungary have improved following the 2001 agreement on 
Hungarian ``status law'' for ethnic Hungarians outside Hungary's 
border. I might add, one of the major changes that took place when 
Hungary wished to come in was Hungary made similar reforms.
  These changes are consequential. As a student of European history, 
some of this is centuries in coming. The animosities and antagonisms 
have been real. This is a big deal. The reason I bother to point that 
out is that it all has a ripple effect, in my view.
  Hungary's admission to NATO began Hungary forming their policies that 
related to ethnicity. That, in turn, I believe, has made it easier for 
Romania--and necessary, by the way, to become part of NATO--to act in a 
similar way.
  Slovakia has made great progress in democratic reforms and is the 
first country to reelect a center-right reform government in Central 
and Eastern Europe since the end of the cold war.
  Under Prime Minister Dzurinda, Bratislava committed to raise its 
defense spending and maintain it at 2 percent of GDP in 2003 and 
beyond. A sweeping defense reform plan, known as the Slovak Republic 
Force 2010, will establish by 2010 a small, well-equipped interoperable 
armed force integrated into NATO military structures.
  In February 2003, Slovakia opened a new department to fight 
corruption, which is overseen by the Deputy Prime Minister and the 
Minister of Justice. Bratislava is preparing new laws to create an 
Office of the Special Prosecutor and to prevent corruption in public 
administration and the judiciary.
  I remember, after the Prague Spring was crushed back several decades 
ago, I went to Bratislava to meet the fellow who was responsible for 
the Prague Spring.
  To think that today this is all happening is, to me, amazing, just 
within the time that I have been in the Senate.
  Alone among the seven candidates, Slovenia comes out of a tradition 
of nonalignment as a part of the former Yugoslavia. It is the 
exception. Also alone among the candidates, it won its independence by 
force of arms in a short, successful war against the Federal Yugoslav 
forces in June of 1991.
  I might add, I pushed very hard in the first round for Slovenia to be 
added. I thought they were qualified then.
  Moreover, Slovenia has won widespread acclaim for aspects of 
peacekeeping activities. Its International Trust for Demining and War 
Victims Assistance is currently responsible for two-thirds of all the 
demining operations in southeastern Europe.
  Although the wealthiest in per capita terms of the candidate 
countries, Slovenia has lagged behind the other six in terms of defense 
spending as a percentage of GDP. Ljubljana has committed to reach 2 
percent GDP by 2008. Slovenia has focused on creating two battalions of 
rapid reaction forces for combat and peacekeeping operations.
  Freedom House gave Slovenia the highest rating of all the candidate 
countries with respect to rule of law and preventing and combating 
corruption. Slovenia is the only country among the seven candidates to 
have held a referendum on NATO membership. On March 23 of this year, 66 
percent of those participating voted in favor of membership, a 
considerable achievement during the first week of the highly televised 
military operations in Iraq, which I need not tell my colleagues was 
not particularly politic

[[Page 10692]]

or popular among most European voters.
  No society anywhere is perfect, and despite their outstanding record 
of accomplishment, significant challenges remain for each of the seven 
candidate countries. They include: permanently curtailing all gray arms 
sales in Bulgaria; implementing strict control over classified 
information in Bulgaria and Latvia; eliminating discrimination against 
ethnic minorities, especially Roma, in Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia; 
abolishing the remaining restrictions on the freedom of the news media 
in Romania; completing the restitution of religious and communal 
properties that had been seized by the Communists or by the Fascists 
during the Holocaust in all of the seven countries; educating the 
publics of all of these countries about the Holocaust and the poison of 
anti-Semitism; and fully implementing legislation designed to eradicate 
corruption in all seven countries.
  Membership in NATO, however, in my view, will reinforce the process 
of democratic and economic reforms ongoing in these countries.
  That is why I mentioned Hungary before. I think this is a process. I 
think they have all met the minimum standards required, both in terms 
of their militaries, at this point, and in terms of reforms necessary.
  I truly believe were we unwilling--and I don't believe we will be--to 
admit them, we would turn this progress in the wrong direction. As a 
member of NATO, what we have seen is that these countries will get 
better and better and better. At least that is my hope and expectation.
  Each country has worked with NATO under the Membership Action Plan 
process and has developed a subsequent Timetable for the Completion of 
Reforms to identify strategies to conclude and build on the steps 
necessary to assume the full responsibilities and obligations of NATO 
membership.
  As Ambassador Nick Burns, the United States Permanent Representative 
to the North Atlantic Council, recently told the Foreign Relations 
Committee, ``We have pushed these countries hard to be ready,'' and 
``they will be among our most committed allies when they walk through 
NATO's doors as full members.''
  The Resolution of Ratification before the Senate today is similar to 
the resolution approved during the last round of NATO enlargement. Let 
me briefly summarize it.
  The text reflects bipartisan agreement, in accord with the view of 
the administration, that U.S. membership in NATO remains a vital 
national security interest of the United States.
  The Resolution of Ratification makes clear that any threat to the 
stability of Europe would jeopardize vital U.S. interests.
  It reaffirms that the security and prosperity of the United States is 
enhanced by NATO's collective defense against aggression that may 
threaten the territory of NATO members.
  It affirms that all seven countries have democratic governments, have 
demonstrated a willingness to meet all requirements of membership, and 
are in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic 
Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.
  The resolution underscores the importance of European integration, 
mentioning the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe--
OSCE--and the European Union in that regard.
  The resolution also contains positive declarations on the alliance's 
``Open Door'' policy toward potential future members, on the alliance's 
successful Partnership for Peace program, on the NATO-Russia Council 
created last year, and on compensation for victims of the Holocaust and 
of communism.
  The resolution contains three substantive and sensible conditions 
relating to costs and burden-sharing, on intelligence matters, and on 
full cooperation with efforts to obtain full accounting of captured and 
missing U.S. personnel from past military conflicts or cold war 
incidents.
  In summary, I believe the Resolution of Ratification accomplishes the 
objective of providing the strategic rationale for the accession of 
these seven new members and preserving U.S. interests with respect to 
future enlargement.
  This round of enlargement isn't the end of the road. Rather, it is a 
historic milestone in a process that began with the end of the cold 
war.
  Thus, it is essential that the door to membership remain open for 
candidates states Albania, Croatia, and the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, as well as down the road for potential candidates like 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Ukraine, and perhaps 
other countries.
  By endorsing NATO enlargement, we recognize the soundness and 
relevance of the vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace.
  We acknowledge that a larger, stronger transatlantic relationship 
anchored in NATO will better serve us in confronting the transnational 
terrorist threats of the twenty-first century.
  We affirm that the United States will continue to play a leadership 
role in the security of the North Atlantic area, which I think is 
critical for us to reaffirm.
  I urge my Senate colleagues to vote in favor of the Resolution of 
Ratification and endorse the accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia as full members of the NATO 
Alliance.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. LUGAR. We are pleased to yield time to the distinguished Senator 
from Kansas, as much as he would require.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for 
admitting Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. As NATO's focus 
evolves to include transnational threats, it is important to have as 
many like-minded nations abroad as possible.
  At the same time Congress and the President must ensure NATO as a 
military alliance can act efficiently and with precision in the post 9/
11 world.
  These days I hear some pundits talk about rebuilding the alliance as 
if it is in the same shape as post-war Iraq or post-war Afghanistan. 
NATO is in no such condition. The inability to achieve North Atlantic 
Council approval for assistance to Turkey was damaging but not 
catastrophic. NATO is in good shape.
  Nonetheless, it would be productive for NATO to consider improvements 
that would streamline its decision-making process, increase operational 
planning for contingencies, and more appropriately respond to a member 
nation who refuses to uphold basic alliance mandates such as Article 
IV.
  Toward that end, I am pleased to join Chairman Warner and Senator 
Levin in offering an amendment to the Resolution of Ratification that 
adds a declaration concerning potential reforms to NATO internal 
processes.
  Specifically, the declaration includes a Sense of the Senate that the 
President should place on the agenda for discussion at the North 
Atlantic Council the consensus rule as well as a process for suspending 
a member nation that acts contrary to the provisions of the North 
Atlantic Treaty.
  Further, the Warner-Levin-Roberts amendment requires a report from 
the President regarding Alliance dialogue on these issues as well as 
methods to provide more flexibility to NATO's military leadership for 
operational planning prior to formal alliance approval.
  My primary focus is on the process of consensus and planning for new 
contingencies.
  The decision-making process of consensus within the NATO alliance 
served the organization and is purpose well in the 20th Century. While 
the bipolar security environment of the previous century shaped our 
command, and defined our mission, the 21st Century requires that we 
depart from the clearly defined role of territorial defense.
  NATO must recognize the need to change from the traditional terrain-
based military of a defensive alliance to an effects-based alliance in 
order to prepare for a new set of security challenges. Our adversaries 
do not recognize international law, sovereignty or accepted norms of or 
behavior.

[[Page 10693]]

  As we recognize the growing need to conduct operations outside the 
alliance's boundaries as we do in Afghanistan in order to protect our 
interests and enhance our security, we also need to acknowledge the 
inherent limitations of consensus voting by 26 nations.
  Issues of security and the need to take military action will likely 
not be perceived uniformly in an organization that spans a wide 
geographic area, encompassing different interests. Recognizing this 
reality and the need to adopt a different modality for decision making 
within the alliance is imperative.
  I would argue NATO needs to consider adopting--I emphasize needs to 
consider--a decision-making model that doesn't require a consensus vote 
to act. Nations that choose not to take military action would not be 
compelled to participate. However, they would not block the alliance 
and those nations that decide to act from carrying out military 
operations.
  That brings me to contingency planning. Currently, NATO's military 
leadership is forbidden to even conduct prudent planning for 
contingency operations until the matter is voted on in the North 
Atlantic Council.
  The difficulty in crafting viable plans to often complex military 
operations amongst nineteen separate nations is a daunting task. The 
measure of difficulty to conduct planning will be exacerbated with the 
addition of seven new members.
  Current planning processes may even prevent the full realization of 
the NATO Response Force, something that could be stood up at the June 
principal meeting. This capability is central to NATO's appropriate 
effort to develop an agile and responsive force that will enable the 
alliance to respond to terrorism and instability.
  To transform the military capability into a viable, very responsive 
force without the means to rapidly employ it, is counterproductive. It 
is time for NATO to consider developing a methodology by which the 
military leadership is permitted to conduct prudent planning for 
contingency operations.
  These are my concerns, as we vote--and I will vote--to approve 
further expansion of the alliance. I commend my colleagues, the chair 
and ranking member of the Committee on Armed Services, for sharing 
these concerns and for crafting a worthy amendment.
  I am a cosponsor, and I urge support for Warner-Levin-Roberts 
amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hagel). Who yields time?
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The senior assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I yield 20 minutes to the distinguished 
Senator from Ohio.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.
  Mr. VOINOVICH. Mr. President, I am so proud to stand on the floor of 
the Senate today as we consider the candidacy of seven new European 
democracies--Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia 
and Slovenia--for membership in the NATO Alliance.
  The question of NATO enlargement is one that has long been close to 
my heart. As Mayor of Cleveland and Governor of the State of Ohio, I 
worked closely with constituents in my State with ties to countries 
that were once subject to life behind the Iron Curtain.
  It is amazing to me to see how far many of these countries have come 
in such a short time, rising to embrace democratic reforms after so 
many years under communist rule. The fact that seven countries that 
were once part of the former Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact or Tito's 
Yugoslavia have been invited to join the NATO alliance is testament to 
how much has been achieved since the collapse of the Soviet Empire more 
than a decade ago.
  We owe so much to Pope John Paul II, President Reagan, President 
George H.W. Bush, and now President George W. Bush. As I said to the 
President in a letter prior to his trip to Poland in June 2001, when he 
clearly articulated his support for enlargement of the Alliance:

       During my entire life I have supported the Captive Nations 
     and yearned that someday they would have freedom, but I 
     doubted that would happen during my lifetime. However, it did 
     happen because of your dad and President Reagan, who said 
     ``Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall.''

  I also said:

       You, Mr. President, have the opportunity to guarantee the 
     freedom and security of those once subjected to life under 
     Communist control by making it clear that you will support 
     the expansion of NATO to include former territories of the 
     Soviet Union, Tito's Yugoslavia and the Warsaw Pact 
     regardless of Russia's opposition.

  And he did it.
  President Bush outlined his vision for enlargement in a landmark 
speech to the students and faculty at the University of Warsaw on June 
15, 2001, when he remarked that as we approach the NATO Summit in 
Prague:

       We should not calculate how little we can get away with, 
     but how much we can do to advance the cause of freedom.

  That speech was very strategic because at the time there were many 
people who were wondering whether or not the President would move away 
from the expansion of NATO in consideration of compromising with at 
that time President Putin in regard to the ABM Treaty--the ABM Treaty 
at the time looking like it would stand in the way of moving forward 
with the President's National Missile Defense Initiative.
  The President was true to his word, and it was extremely gratifying 
to see this vision begin to turn to reality when President Bush joined 
other NATO heads of state in Prague last November. I remain grateful to 
the President for inviting me to join him as a member of the 
Congressional delegation to the NATO Summit, along with Senator Bill 
Frist, Congressman Tom Lantos, Congressman Elton Gallegly and 
Congressman Doug Bereuter. The thrill of being in the room when NATO 
Secretary General Lord Robertson announced the decision to invite the 
three Baltic nations, as well as Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia, to join the Alliance, is something that I will always 
remember.
  On that historic day, I listened as heads of state from our allied 
nations including the Czech Republic, France, Spain, Great Britain, 
Poland, Canada, Turkey, and many others praised the work done by the 
seven candidate countries and expressed their strong support for 
enlargement to include these new European democracies.
  While there are disagreements within NATO that must be addressed, 
there is general consensus among the current members of the Alliance on 
the question of enlargement. It is acknowledged that in addition to 
shared values, the seven candidate countries bring defense capabilities 
that will enhance the overall security and stability of the NATO 
Alliance. President Bush, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, 
Secretary of State Colin Powell, and the highest-ranking member of the 
U.S. military, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard 
Myers, have all expressed this view. America's top leaders believe that 
in addition to niche military capabilities, these seven countries bring 
energy, freshness and enthusiasm to the Alliance.
  As Secretary Powell remarked in testimony before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee last week, enlargement of the NATO Alliance to 
include Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia is in the national security interest of the United States. It 
will, he said:

       Help to strengthen NATO's partnerships to promote 
     democracy, the rule of law, free markets and peace throughout 
     Eurasia. Moreover, it will better equip the Alliance to 
     respond collectively to the new dangers we face.

  NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, after working with the NATO 
aspirant countries on comprehensive domestic reforms in preparation for 
membership in the Alliance, has also

[[Page 10694]]

concluded that this round of enlargement will enhance the strength and 
vitality of NATO a view which he expressed at the Prague Summit and 
reiterated earlier this week during a meeting with members of the 
Foreign Relations Committee.
  I share this view, and I believe it is appropriate and timely that we 
now consider these candidates for membership in NATO. They have 
provided crucial support in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks 
against our country on 9/11, and continue to make significant 
contributions to the ongoing campaign against international terrorism. 
They have shown their solidarity in our efforts to disarm Saddam 
Hussein and liberate the Iraqi people, and have pledged to work with 
the international community to promote security and reconstruction in 
Iraq following the end of military action.
  The candidate countries have also moved forward with democratic 
reforms to promote the rule of law and respect for human rights. I am 
strongly concerned about the disturbing rise in anti-Semitic violence 
in Europe and other parts of the world. Several of the candidate 
countries, including Latvia, Bulgaria, and Romania, have joined with 
the United States, Poland and other countries to actively encourage the 
chair-in-office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe--OSCE--to mount a serious and credible OSCE conference on anti-
Semitism. Due in part to their efforts, the OSCE has agreed to conduct 
such a conference, and it is scheduled to take place in June. This is 
just one example, but it is indicative of important action that is 
taking place.
  As was highlighted during a series of hearings on NATO enlargement 
conducted by the Foreign Relations Committee, the seven candidate 
countries bring nearly 200,000 new troops to the alliance. They have 
also pledged to commit significant resources to national defense, with 
Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, and Lithuania all at or above 2 percent of 
the gross domestic product mark in 2002. Slovakia and Latvia were just 
under 2 percent, and Slovenia at 1.6 percent in 2002, and they have 
pledged and committed to reach the 2-percent mark by 2008.
  The average defense spending among candidate countries was 2.1 
percent for 2002, which is equal to the average spent by the current 
NATO members for the same period. It is interesting to note that 11 of 
the 19 members of the alliance did not reach the 2-percent mark for 
defense spending in 2002, which we should all be concerned about. 
Clearly, there is room for improvement in this regard for current 
members of the alliance.
  On March 27, 2003, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs 
Marc Grossman testified before the Armed Services Committee regarding 
the future of NATO. When asked about the benefits of enlargement, he 
said:

       I believe, Senators, that the accession of these countries 
     are about the future of NATO, and will be good and directly 
     benefit U.S. interests. Why? They're strong Atlanticists. 
     They're allies in the war on terror. They've already 
     contributed to Operation Enduring Freedom and the 
     International Security Assistance Force in Kabul.

  The list goes on. I agree with Secretary Grossman's assessment. These 
countries already make significant contributions that strengthen the 
transatlantic relationship.
  They have acted as de facto Allies. In fact, they have acted as 
better Allies than some of the members that are currently in NATO. And 
I believe they will make important contributions, as members, to the 
NATO alliance.
  While much has been achieved, there is still work to be done as the 
candidate countries continue to work on their membership action plans. 
As was said in Prague, Prague should be viewed as the starting line, 
not the finishing line. There is still a lot more that has to be done 
on those maps.
  Efforts have continued since the Prague summit. I was very pleased to 
learn that the people of Slovenia--who have been engaged in a 
discussion about NATO membership for many years now--voted 
overwhelmingly in support of Slovenia's membership in NATO during a 
national referendum on March 23, with roughly two-thirds of the voters 
favoring accession to the alliance. This was a crucial step for the 
country that was the birthplace of my maternal grandparents. Hooray for 
Slovenia. I am glad they understood.
  It is imperative that the candidates continue to address the 
outstanding issues that require attention, including military reform, 
respect for human rights, and efforts to combat organized crime and 
corruption. It is this last piece, perhaps, that concerns me the most. 
These problems have the potential to undermine democratic reforms, 
respect for the rule of law, and other core NATO values, and I believe 
they could be very dangerous if left unchecked.
  I was glad to hear from Secretary Powell, during his testimony before 
the Foreign Relations Committee last week, that there are, in fact--
this is wonderful--significant steps that have taken place on behalf of 
the NATO aspirants to combat corruption and organized crime. With 
regard to Bulgaria, for example, the Secretary of State remarked that 
the Bulgarian Government recently created an interagency anticorruption 
commission to be led by the Minister of Justice. The Bulgarian 
Parliament also passed anticorruption legislation and antibribery 
legislation.
  Secretary Powell noted that the Romanian Government is now working on 
legislation to reform its judiciary, civil service, and political party 
financing activities. I am also hopeful that Romania will move forward 
with steps to ensure progress on outstanding property restitution 
issues, including those of significance to Hungarian and other minority 
groups in Romania.
  So while I still think there is work to be done, I am satisfied that 
things are moving in the right direction.
  After meeting with leaders from these seven countries and spending 
time in each country that has been invited to join NATO--I have been in 
all of them and have met with all of their leaders--I am confident that 
reforms will continue. I sincerely believe reforms will be swifter and 
more complete as these countries are brought into the alliance rather 
than left out. History tells us this has been the case with other 
countries that have been part of the alliance. NATO has a way of 
asserting pressure and, as General Lord Robertson said during our 
meeting Monday, squeezing those who need to shape up.
  As we consider enlargement today, it is clear that the world is a 
different place than it was when Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic were brought into NATO. The world's democracies and 
multilateral institutions, including the NATO alliance, face new 
threats to freedom, marked not by Communist aggression but, instead, by 
the dangerous nexus between weapons of mass destruction, rogue nations, 
and terrorists who have shown their willingness to use chemical, 
biological, or nuclear weapons against those who value freedom and 
democracy, if given the chance.
  NATO's decision to invoke article 5 in the aftermath of the tragic 
events of September 11 signifies that an attack on one is an attack on 
all, and that sent a strong message of solidarity to the people of the 
United States and the world at large. I suspect that when the 
resolution was put together in regard to article 5, we were very 
careful to make sure we did not get ourselves in entangling alliances. 
Never did we ever believe we would be calling on the other nations in 
NATO to come to our assistance as they did.
  NATO's mission to transform to meet these growing threats does not 
make the alliance irrelevant; rather, it means we need the shared 
commitment to freedom, democracy, and security embodied by the NATO 
alliance now more than ever before. A NATO alliance enlarged to include 
seven new democracies that have embraced these values will enhance our 
ability to meet new challenges for peace in the world.
  At the Prague summit, NATO heads of state embarked upon a course to 
identify the capabilities needed to confront new challenges to 
international security. They agreed that new challenges would require 
the alliance to operate beyond Europe's borders. The Prague Declaration 
noted:

       In order to carry out the full range of its missions, NATO 
     must be able to field forces

[[Page 10695]]

     that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, upon 
     decision by the North Atlantic Council, to sustain operations 
     over distance and time, including in an environment where 
     they might be faced with nuclear, biological and chemical 
     threats, and to achieve their objectives.

  As Secretary General Lord Robertson has said, NATO must either go out 
of area, or go out of business.
  This will become crucial as NATO prepares to assume new 
responsibilities in Afghanistan this August, moving forward on the 
North Atlantic Council's decision on April 16 to provide enhanced 
support to the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul. NATO's 
new ISAF role is perhaps indicative of the types of missions the 
alliance could take on in years to come. As Secretary Powell indicated 
last week, this is the largest step to date that the alliance has taken 
outside its traditional area of responsibility. And, as you know, Mr. 
President, they are now talking about the possibility of NATO being 
involved in security forces in Iraq.
  As the alliance prepares for its role in Afghanistan, it does so at a 
time when current members of NATO and other countries in Europe have 
considerable experience working together, due to operations in Kosovo, 
Bosnia, and Macedonia. As former Supreme Allied Commander Joe Ralston 
noted in remarks before the Atlantic Council on Monday evening, this is 
in stark contrast to the past, when members of the alliance depended on 
annual training exercises.
  I think that is really something we should emphasize, that these 
nations have been working militarily together since Bosnia. They are in 
Kosovo today. They will be in Afghanistan. It is amazing how well the 
NATO command has worked in Kosovo. And I am confident it will work as 
well in Afghanistan.
  But new missions will demand that NATO step up efforts to improve its 
military capabilities. This was a major theme at the Prague summit last 
November, where NATO heads of state approved the creation of a NATO 
response force, which is envisioned to consist of approximately 25,000 
troops who are ready and able to deploy anywhere in the world within 30 
days. The goal is to have the force operational by 2006. While work has 
been ongoing to flesh out the details of the NATO response force, this 
is still a paper concept, and we look forward to learning more about 
efforts to turn this into a viable force at the June ministerial 
meeting in Madrid.
  The NATO response force goes hand in glove with the Prague 
Capabilities Commitment, which replaces the Defense Capabilities 
Initiative, or DCI, that was initiated at the 1999 Washington summit. 
As many of us know, very little progress was made on that 1999 Defense 
Capabilities Initiative.
  The Prague Capabilities Commitment, though, calls on Allies to 
improve and develop military capabilities, focusing on defense against 
weapons of mass destruction, intelligence, command, control and 
communications, and strategic air and sea lift, among other things.
  This initiative focuses on pooling resources and identifying niche 
capabilities that certain countries can bring to the table in order to 
strengthen NATO's military reach. I have been pleased to hear from 
Secretary Powell, Lord Robertson, and General Ralston that the alliance 
has begun to identify niche contributions that the seven candidates can 
make to future operations.
  They are willing and able. They have, in fact, already demonstrated 
their willingness to use them in NATO operations in the Balkans as well 
as military efforts to combat international terrorism.
  For example, Bulgaria contributes troops to NATO operations in the 
Balkans, with military personnel in both Bosnia and Kosovo. Bulgaria 
has also contributed to Operation Enduring Freedom, allowing for 
coalition aircraft to refuel at Burgas, and sending a nuclear, 
biological and chemical decontamination unit to Afghanistan. Bulgaria 
has also deployed a NBC unit to the Iraqi theater of operations at the 
request of U.S. Central Command.
  Estonia also supports NATO missions in southeast Europe, and has 
approved the deployment of troops to assist in the reconstruction of 
Iraq.
  Latvia has deployed medical teams to Afghanistan, and in April the 
Latvian Parliament approved the deployment of troops to Iraq for peace 
enforcement and humanitarian operations.
  Lithuania has deployed a medical team and a Special Operations Unit 
to Afghanistan. Lithuania has also deployed troops to support Operation 
Iraqi Freedom.
  Romania sent a military police platoon to support the International 
Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Romania has also provided an 
NBC unit in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
  Slovakia has deployed an engineering unit to Afghanistan, and was the 
first NATO candidate country to deploy troops--an NBC unit--in support 
of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
  Slovenia provides troops and equipment to NATO operations in the 
Balkans, and has also provided crucial assistance in de-mining and mine 
victims assistance, running the International Trust Fund for De-mining. 
Additionally, Slovenia has provided humanitarian and de-mining 
assistance to Afghanistan.
  They are all doing a job right now and will do more once they are 
brought into NATO formally.
  While there is still work to be done, these contributions are 
encouraging. If NATO is to meet future challenges, it is imperative 
that the capabilities gap between the U.S. and our European allies be 
addressed. The Prague Capabilities Commitment highlights critical needs 
within the alliance. This is a good place to start, and I am hopeful 
that it will succeed in producing tangible results. Without adequate 
capabilities, NATO's ability to respond to future security challenges 
will be seriously undermined.
  As NATO looks to the future, there will be other challenges. Bringing 
in seven members will, I believe, strengthen the alliance; at the same 
time, there will be adjustments as NATO adapts to membership at 26 
rather than the current 19. I share the sentiments expressed by 
Secretary of State Colin Powell and NATO Secretary General Lord 
Robertson that the alliance will adapt, as it always has.
  I disagree with some of my colleagues, who may argue that significant 
changes should be made to the NATO decision-making process. The 
alliance has always been based on consensus, protecting the view of 
each member. As Secretary Powell remarked in testimony before the 
Foreign Relations Committee last week, NATO is not a committee or a 
council. It is an Alliance that has traditionally--and successfully--
been based on the rule of consensus.
  I was interested when Lord Robertson spoke to us on Monday. We were 
talking about this issue. He said somehow we worked it out. We had the 
problem with Turkey, and there was a question of how that would all be 
worked out. The alliance had the flexibility to move forward and take 
care of that problem.
  He specifically said that they need the flexibility, that somehow 
they will work it out. If we come in with some specific way of how we 
will do this, it will tie their hands and won't give them the 
flexibility to do what they have to do when the time comes. I am 
confident they will do that.
  It is my sincere belief that the European democracies of Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia will, as 
they have already demonstrated, contribute to NATO's proud tradition 
and serve to strengthen the alliance. I strongly support enlargement of 
the alliance to include these countries, and look forward to further 
expansion in the future to those countries who have demonstrated the 
ability to accept the responsibilities that come with membership in the 
NATO alliance. I never thought I would be here today on the Senate 
floor able to recommend this to my colleagues. It is a wonderful day.
  I rise today in strong support of the Resolution on Ratification 
before us today, which will extend U.S. support to make NATO membership 
a reality for these new European democracies.

[[Page 10696]]

  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The senior assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LUGAR. I ask unanimous consent that the time be charged equally 
to both sides during the quorum call.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The senior assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, since the end of the cold war, the mission 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has changed from one of 
confronting the Soviet Union to one of securing democracy and stability 
in one undivided, free Europe.
  By passing the resolution of ratification of the Protocols to the 
North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, the Senate supports 
a giant step toward realizing that goal.
  I want to speak just for a moment about the recent disagreements 
among NATO countries regarding Iraq. After many years of supporting 
NATO enlargement, and my particular interest in Baltic membership in 
NATO--which I will speak about--I confess that I am concerned that now 
that my dream is on the cusp of reality, NATO is divided and torn.
  I was one who thought the United States should have taken a longer 
diplomatic path before resorting to war with Iraq and I am particularly 
concerned about the impression expressed by many of our allies that 
there is no room for disagreement with U.S. policy.
  I believe that our relations with our NATO allies can and must be 
repaired. But I also want to remind my colleagues that NATO is an 
alliance of democratic countries whose populations were overwhelmingly 
opposed to the U.S. going to war with Iraq.
  If our goal is to support an undivided, democratic, and free Europe, 
we must accept and welcome debate within the NATO alliance and work 
harder to hear and accommodate the views of our allies. It would be the 
height of irony if the organization originally formed to confront 
totalitarian communism would disintegrate because of a lack of 
tolerance for disagreements with United States policy.
  I want to focus my remarks today on this resolution on the Baltic 
states, not because I oppose the membership of Bulgaria, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. On the contrary, I supported the policy of 
seeking the largest possible enlargement of NATO in this round. I 
always confess my prejudice when I speak about the Baltic states. My 
mother was born in Lithuania. So when I speak of the Baltic countries, 
it is with particular personal feeling.
  I could not have predicted a few years ago that we would not have to 
fight, and fight hard, to get Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia into NATO.
  Even as recently as three years ago, Russian President Vladimir Putin 
claimed the NATO membership for the Baltic States would be a ``reckless 
act'' that removed a key buffer zone and posed a major strategic 
challenge to Moscow that could ``destabilize'' Europe.
  Russian objections to Baltic membership in NATO had no credibility. 
Russia has nothing to fear from NATO and nothing to fear from Baltic 
membership in NATO. The tiny Baltic States are no military challenge to 
Russia, and certainly a democratic Russia does not threaten Europe.
  I give credit where it is due, and I believe President Bush's strong 
leadership in supporting NATO enlargement and his firm rejection of 
Russian objections to Baltic membership were key to securing broad 
support, both here and in Europe, for this round of NATO enlargement.
  A quick review of history is called for to help appreciate just how 
remarkable it is that Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are on the verge 
of membership.
  In June 1940, the Soviet Union occupied the Baltic countries of 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and forcibly incorporated them into the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
  Throughout the occupation, the United States maintained that the 
acquisition of Baltic territory by force was not permissible under 
international law and was unjust. We refused to recognize Soviet 
sovereignty over these Baltic States.
  On July 15, 1940, President Franklin Roosevelt issued an Executive 
order freezing Baltic assets in the United States to prevent them from 
falling into Soviet hands. On July 23, 1940, Secretary of State Sumner 
Welles issued the first public statement of such policy of 
nonrecognition of the Soviet takeover of the Baltic countries. The 
United States took steps to allow the diplomatic representatives of 
those countries to continue to represent them in Washington despite the 
Soviet occupation.
  In 1959, Congress designated the third week in July as ``Captive 
Nations Week,'' and time after time, year after year, I would gather in 
Daley Plaza in Chicago with those from Baltic States and other occupied 
countries to wonder and pray if there would ever be freedom in those 
countries again.
  The good news about Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia's membership in 
NATO is it did not come about by accident. The people of the Baltics 
never let go of their dreams of freedom. They never let our Government 
forget that they were going to live by those dreams. The official U.S. 
policy of nonrecognition of Soviet takeover of the Baltics gave them 
hope.
  I went to Lithuania a few years ago with my late brother, Bill. We 
went to the tiny town where my mother was born, Jurbarkas. When we were 
there, we found we had relatives, cousins, that we never knew we had, 
family separated by the Iron Curtain.
  I did not believe in my lifetime that I would see the changes come to 
pass in the Baltic States. When I visited Lithuania the first time in 
1979, it was under Soviet domination. Freedom was at a premium, and the 
poor people of that country slogged by day after day wondering if they 
would ever have another chance at self-governance.
  Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia asserted their independence from the 
domination of the Soviet Union, but at a great cost. Soviet 
paratroopers stormed the Press House in Vilnius, injuring four people. 
Barricades were set up in front of the Lithuania Parliament, the 
Seimas. On January 13, 1991, Soviet forces attacked the television 
station and tower in Vilnius, killing 14 Lithuanians. I was there 
shortly thereafter. Today, one can see how it is a standing memorial to 
those who died in the latest fight for freedom in the Baltics.
  Images of crowds of unarmed civilians facing down Soviet tanks in the 
Baltics to protect their parliaments were a powerful message of 
resistance. It created hope across the world.
  The Baltic countries have nurtured their relations with the West, but 
they have also worked to have a good relationship with Russia. Despite 
the bitter experience of years of Soviet occupation, each Baltic 
country has tried to establish a good working relationship so that 
citizenship and language laws conform to European standards, taking 
care not to discriminate against ethnic Russians still living in their 
borders. As a result of these steps, and because of U.S. and NATO's 
efforts to engage Russia in a positive relationship, Russia's 
opposition to Baltic membership has disappeared.
  The Baltic countries, I wish to add, have also taken an extraordinary 
and historic step to face up to the bitter legacy of the Holocaust, 
when hundreds of thousands of Lithuanian, Estonian, and Latvian Jews 
perished, by setting up a Holocaust museum, teaching about the history 
of the Holocaust in school, returning the Torah scrolls taken from 
synagogues and destroyed

[[Page 10697]]

during that sad period, and working to restore Jewish property rights.
  Some people question whether these tiny countries bring anything to 
NATO. NATO is not a country club; it is a military alliance. When the 
Soviet troops finally left the Baltic countries, they took almost 
everything, and these tiny countries started to rebuild their economy 
and rebuild their power to defend themselves.
  The old Soviet ways disappeared, and new thinking, new leaders 
appeared. Western ways of thinking about military organization, whether 
civilian control of the military, took their place. To be sure, these 
are small countries, but they have been helpful countries. They will 
make a positive contribution to NATO. They already have in Bosnia, 
Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
  When we ratified the membership of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic, some in the Senate doubted their contributions and worried 
about the cost burdens. I think they realize today that those worries 
have not materialized into anything serious. Poland, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic have been great allies of NATO.
  Let me conclude by saying this. Today, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia 
have worked hard to become market economies, to watch their democracies 
flourish. The fact they want so much to be part of NATO is an 
affirmation of great hope and great optimism for Europe. I am glad we 
stood by these countries during the dark hours of Soviet occupation.
  I am sorry my mother did not live long enough to see this day, but 
she did live long enough for two of her three sons to return to the 
tiny village in Lithuania that she never saw after leaving in 1911. Our 
return trip to Lithuania was part of closing a loop in our own family 
history, but it also established a bond, a uniting, a tie between the 
United States and a small Baltic nation.
  By the action of the Senate today in expanding NATO for these new 
countries, and particularly to expand them to include all of the Baltic 
countries and my mother's home nation of Lithuania, I believe we are 
completing the job which was started in 1999: to expand NATO and cement 
a stable democratic and free Europe.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. HAGEL. Mr. President, I rise today to support the resolution 
ratifying the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
NATO, to include Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Romania, and Bulgaria.
  NATO has been the bedrock of international security since its 
establishment 54 years ago. Although the military dimension of the 
alliance was instrumental in containing the Soviet Union, NATO was 
always about more than military security. America's relationship with 
our NATO allies has symbolized the common values, as well as the common 
interests, of democracies united against those international actors who 
represent tyranny and aggression.
  We live at a time of danger, unpredictability, and potential global 
instability. But we also live in a time of historic opportunity. 
Alliances are not absolved from the forces of change in world affairs. 
The ability to adapt to the challenges of this new era in world 
affairs--challenges from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction--
speak to the importance of NATO and other international institutions, 
including the United Nations, that have played such key roles in 
promoting and protecting our common interests since World War II.
  NATO's decision in November 2002 to expand its current membership of 
19 by inviting Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, 
and Bulgaria to begin accession negotiations acknowledges the 
imperatives of change. I strongly endorse this action. Today, member 
and candidate countries are expected to do what they can to modernize 
their forces, including development of niche capabilities and the 
establishment of a NATO response force. But we know that the 
contributions of an enlarged NATO will not be defined solely by 
military capabilities. Expanding NATO also encourages a process of 
political and economic reform in candidate states.
  There is a deep security dimension to an expanded NATO. The threats 
from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction cannot be handled by the 
United States or any country alone. Defeating terrorism requires 
unprecedented international cooperation in the diplomatic, military, 
law enforcement, intelligence, and economic areas. If our purpose in an 
expanded NATO is about defeating these threats to our common security, 
than bringing these seven new members into NATO is critical to our 
national security.
  Although America's military power may be unprecedented in world 
history, NATO will continue to play a vital role in American and global 
security. In Afghanistan, the German proposal for NATO to take charge 
of the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF, represents a new 
and significant turn in NATO's mission. NATO may well play a role in 
maintaining security in postwar Iraq. At some point, when there is an 
Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, NATO troops may be called upon to 
help guarantee that peace.
  I believe NATO's next 50 years will be just as important for world 
peace as its first 50 years.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise to urge the ratification of Treaty 
Document 108-14, allowing for the accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia to the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, NATO.
  I wish to commend the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, Senator Lugar, as well as the ranking minority member, 
Senator Biden, for the work their committee has done to prepare for 
this historic vote. Since the first accession to the original 
membership of NATO, when Greece and Turkey were admitted, the Senate 
has preserved its role of advice and consent on amending this treaty. 
Senators Lugar and Biden, who have made the advancement of the Atlantic 
alliance a central concern in their respected careers as two of the 
Senate's most thoughtful members on foreign policy, have maintained the 
Senate's critical function, and have, through hearings and statements 
through the years, provided many opportunities to study the policies 
and the evolution of the U.S. national interest within the Atlantic 
alliance.
  This is the second time we have voted to ratify the North Atlantic 
treaty since the end of the cold war. President Clinton supported the 
first group of new entrants in 1998, and at that time I joined 79 of my 
colleagues in support of membership for Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary. When I took to this floor to urge ratification, I said: ``I 
hope this is not the last enlargement, although I am confident that 
future enlargements, if they occur, will occur with the same detailed, 
painstaking consideration as we have conducted over the past 4 years.'' 
Senators Lugar and Biden have given this accession treaty that 
consideration, and their committee has unanimously recommended passage. 
In so doing, the committee has concluded its work to achieve a major 
platform in President Bush's foreign policy: the admittance to this 
alliance of the latest group of nations willing and capable to advance 
the mission of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
  We will all note that the debate today will be shorter than it was in 
1998. And I predict that the vote for passage will be at least as 
strong, although it is worthwhile noting that every vote this Senate 
has had since 1955 on all of the new entrants to NATO has been with 
strong majorities. The reason the debate will be shorter today reflects 
the consensus that has formed on the subject we address today:
  The enlargement of NATO, Mr. President, is good foreign policy for 
the United States.
  Of course it is also good for the candidate countries. Working 
through our detailed membership action plans, these nations have 
transformed their militaries, improving interoperability and--this is 
equally important--developing complementarities of missions. They have 
had to accept goals for defense expenditures, exceeding, in some

[[Page 10698]]

cases, the percentage of GNPs dedicated to defense by some of NATO's 
older members.
  And the desire to join NATO has forced the applicant nations to 
promote and meet other conditions of open and democratic societies. 
These nations have had to resolve all border issues, establish 
political norms for the protection of minorities, open their historical 
archives and accept the responsibilities of their captive or 
totalitarian pasts, including the Holocaust era and the communist era, 
combat corruption and set standards of transparency, and educate their 
publics on the nature of the commitment to NATO. Throughout these years 
of preparation, we have seen, in varying strong and distinct measures, 
a host of nations enthusiastically embracing our values and earnestly 
accepting the responsibilities explicit in membership of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization.
  The core of that responsibility lies in article V of the North 
Atlantic treaty. That article states: ``The Parties (that is, the 
member states) agree that an armed attack against one or more of them 
shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they 
agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise 
of the right of individual and collective self-defense recognized by 
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party 
or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert 
with other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the 
use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North 
Atlantic area.''
  This is the commitment at the core of the NATO alliance. It is that 
commitment that served to deter a Soviet attack against Europe and 
North America for nearly 50 years. That was a deterrence that was 
backed up by an explicit understanding that, if deterrence failed, 
NATO's goal would be to predominate in victory. The deterrence worked, 
the peace was kept, and that is why NATO is rightly considered the most 
effective military alliance in modern history.
  The end of the cold war brought on a reevaluation of the role of 
NATO, with a few suggesting that NATO was no longer necessary without a 
Soviet threat. That misguided view--that mistook the end of the Soviet 
threat for an era of unprecedented peace and security--never took hold. 
More sober minds recognized that security and stability were not to be 
assumed as the status quo, and that conflict would take new forms, be 
it ethnic war from the dissolution of Yugoslavia to transnational 
threats emanating from other parts of the world and threatening the 
security of Europe and North America.
  As has already been mentioned in the debate, NATO has only invoked 
article V once in its history, and it was not during the cold war when, 
as I mentioned, the deterrence of the alliance always held. Article V 
was invoked after September 11, 2001, when the members of the alliance 
determined that the attacks by al-Qaida on the United States were to be 
considered an attack against the entire alliance. In the days after 
September 11, 2001, NATO aircraft flew patrols over U.S. airspace as 
the U.S. military prepared to deploy to Afghanistan in the first phase 
of our global war on terrorism.
  Under U.S. leadership, NATO has accepted that it will face new 
missions in the 21st century, and that many of those activities 
defending the members of the alliance will be out-of-area missions. A 
quick review of the contributions of the nations seeking membership in 
this latest treaty accession demonstrates, in my view, that they 
understand the new missions and are already contributing.
  Bulgaria was a member of President Bush's ``coalition of the 
willing,'' and granted use of its airspace as well as an airbase for 
our Iraq operations, and has offered infantry forces for peacekeeping. 
While Iraq was not a NATO operation, our ability to rely on Bulgaria, 
as well as other existing NATO members for equipment and support, made 
our victory in Iraq more easily attainable.
  Estonia has been contributing to NATO operations in the Balkans, 
providing forces to SFOR and KFOR. It was also a member of the 
``coalition of the willing,'' and has also offered soldiers for post-
conflict peacekeeping in Iraq. Similarly, Latvia has also contributed 
to SFOR and KFOR in the Balkans, supported U.S. policy in Iraq, and has 
sent medics to support our operations in Afghanistan. Lithuania has 
contributed to U.S. operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan, and was 
a vocal member of the ``coalition of the willing'' in Iraq.
  Romania has made significant contributions to U.S. operations, 
providing troops and transport aircraft to our mission in Afghanistan, 
and granting use of their territory during our operations in Iraq. One 
thousand American troops are currently stationed in Romania.
  These are just highlights of ways that these countries have directly 
contributed to the challenges we face today, and they do not include 
the specialties these various countries are developing to confront the 
challenges of tomorrow.
  I raise these highlights because I believe that ratifying this treaty 
is good foreign policy, Mr. President, in that it strengthens America's 
position in the world, and enhances our ability to achieve our goals 
when the defense of our national security requires us to go beyond our 
borders.
  This second wave of nations joining NATO since the end of the cold 
war brings political stability and expands security to most of Central 
and Eastern Europe, a geographic zone that brought us calamitous strife 
and bloodshed in the 20th century. We are referring to a region that 
Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, has felicitously termed the 
``New Europe.'' I have nothing against the Old Europe, and note that 
history shows a common bond with many of the nations of that ``Old'' 
Europe, a bond reaffirmed by our coalition partner, Great Britain, and 
currently and I hope temporarily denied by other members, such as 
France, Germany and Belgium.
  Today we vote for New Europe. In recognizing their contributions, we 
should not deny their enthusiastic embrace of America's role in the 
world. They were, after all, the captive nations of the Soviet era, and 
we were, after all, the leading light in the fight against communism. 
In their enthusiastic embrace of our values and our missions, I think 
of the line of Cicero, that ``Gratitude is not only the greatest of 
virtues, but the parent of all others.'' These nations have shown 
already that they are willing to defend freedom, and their membership 
in the Atlantic alliance will advance that defense.
  I will repeat again what I said in 1998, and say that I hope this is 
not the last enlargement. Croatia and Ukraine have indicated that they 
wish to join some day, and I would welcome them. The mission of NATO is 
to defend, not exclude.
  Today I urge my colleagues to join me in ratifying this latest round 
of accession to NATO, and in so doing, to add force and depth to an 
organization that has long served the security of this Nation.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I rise in support of the proposed North 
American Treaty Alliance expansion before the Senate today.
  When the NATO countries met in Prague last November, they agreed to 
invite seven new countries to join the Alliance as full members. These 
seven countries: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia have submitted their applications and proven 
their willingness and ability to respect the political and military 
obligations of NATO membership and to contribute to the Alliance's 
common-funded budgets and programs.
  The NATO Alliance has been enormously successful over the last 50 
years and will continue to do so for many to come. Too often some only 
see NATO as a coalition of nations organized for collective defense. It 
is so much more. NATO enhances the political and economic stability for 
all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area. By helping these new members 
as they strengthen good governance, rule of law, and human rights, NATO 
will also

[[Page 10699]]

facilitate a better long-term environment for American trade and 
investment as well as collective defense and security.
  In our war against terrorism, NATO serves a vital role. Strengthening 
the Alliance for this purpose is a positive development. From the 
conflicts in the Balkans, the war in Afghanistan or the most recent 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, the seven invitee nations have contributed, or 
have committed to contribute, critical support in the form of 
personnel, overflight or basing rights.
  As a matter of fact, in this most recent war with Iraq, we received 
greater support from these seven countries than some of our more 
historical European allies. The value of loyal allies committed to 
democracy and making the world free from tyranny, regardless of any 
business dealings, cannot be understated.
  These seven countries are committed to eliminating and addressing 
past wrongs. Whether it is the atrocities performed during the Second 
World War and the Holocaust to the proliferation of military weaponry 
known as Grey Arms, each of these countries has recognized the issues 
and is committed to correcting the wrongs done.
  Expansion of NATO is not a new or unusual event. Throughout its 
tenure, NATO has continually added new members. Turkey and Greece were 
the first new members to join in 1952, followed soon after by Germany, 
in 1955. Spain entered in 1982 and the first former Warsaw Pact 
countries, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined in 1999.
  It is also likely there will be another round of expansion, inviting 
such countries as Albania, Croatia and Macedonia. President Bush has 
espoused an ``open door'' policy to NATO membership.
  Today the door should not be held open for some and kept shut for 
others. The defined membership criteria encourages all that satisfy 
these requirements will be welcomed.
  NATO expansion will serve U.S. interests by strengthening both NATO 
and our bilateral ties with these new allies, who have already done a 
great deal to support our vision for NATO and collective security.
  I do have concerns regarding NATO and its future viability. We need 
to take a long look at the arbitrary and politically motivated, but 
indefensible use of the ``consensus rule'' NATO employs, and those 
nations who try to manipulate the path to peace for less than honorable 
purposes.
  I understand my good friend from Virginia, Senator Warner, and 
Senator Levin will offer an amendment related to the ``consensus 
rule.'' I think the amendment is a good idea and deserves the support 
of this body.
  Finally, the path to peace is broad enough to allow all those who 
wish to traverse it in good company. We should welcome them with open 
arms.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, I have enjoyed watching this debate 
with my colleagues on the topic of expanding the North Atlantic 
Alliance. This new round of expansion is one of the most significant 
events in the alliance's history and will have a profound impact on 
Trans-Atlantic relations for a long time. The message I bring and I 
think my colleagues bring is that the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, NATO, is still vital to our security and expansion will 
make it all the more stronger. Seven countries, Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, have made bids to join NATO.
  This debate has evolved in such a way as to recognize the strengths 
and weaknesses of the alliance in a sober way. The hyperbolic debate 
over burden-sharing and the contributions of some our allies, whether 
material or physical, has gone by the way-side with this new round of 
expansion. The contributions of alliance members is no less important--
in fact, it is a central tenet to the success of the alliance. Rather, 
by inviting these seven new members, we have focussed more attention on 
how better to integrate, and give opportunity and prominence to those 
states that wish to contribute more to the collective security of the 
alliance.
  At a hearing the Foreign Relations Committee held on the first of 
April, one of the witnesses, Bruce Jackson of the Project on 
Transitional Democracies made several excellent points about these new 
candidates, one of which I should emphasize for the sake of my 
colleagues who were not present.
  I will revert to the question of contributions and military power. 
Many critics have focussed on the current capabilities and potential 
contributions of these seven countries and questioned whether and what 
they will bring to the alliance. Mr. Jackson pointed to the fact that 
when West Germany was invited to join NATO, it had neither an army nor 
a defense budget.
  By contrast, the Baltic states have taken it upon themselves to 
orchestrate regional security agreements and contribute a rational 
portion of their budgets to national defense. The Balkan countries 
joining the alliance, Romania and Bulgaria, have militaries that can be 
immediately utilized for NATO operations. In fact, all of the seven 
countries, have themselves contributed to NATO missions in Europe, to 
Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF, in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, OIF.
  Romania pulled together 100 of its personnel for SFOR in Bosnia, 
contributed 200 to KFOR in Kosovo. Romania committed itself and 
contributed substantially to our efforts during Operation Enduring 
freedom, OEF, and the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF. 
For OEF, they sent a 400-person battalion to serve in Kandahar. For 
ISAF, they sent a military police platoon to Kabul to support securing 
the Afghan capital. In support for the security and revitalization of a 
post-conflict Afghanistan, Romania airlifted arms and munitions to be 
used by a newly reconstituted Afghan National Army. In Iraq, Romania 
has sent a WMD unit to assist in force protection and have committed to 
providing peacekeepers and police to assist in the security of that 
country.
  In 1997, during the debate to enlarge NATO for the Czech Republic, 
Poland and Hungary, the emphasis was and for President Bush especially, 
still is a unified and free Europe. Our mission then was to stand 
beside these democracies and direct them to a bright future of freedom, 
democracy and prosperity.
  The assumption of all the states woven into the North Atlantic Treaty 
is a common set of values among its members. These values, democracy 
and free markets, are the values in which this collective security 
agreement is defending. Ensconced in the treaty signed on April 4, 1949 
were the shared values of democracy, individual liberty, the rule of 
law, the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes, civilian control 
of the military, and central to the treaty's purpose, commitment to the 
stability and well-being of the countries party to the treaty.
  I have in my hands a copy of the Atlantic Charter, a document that 
very much predates the North Atlantic Alliance and was penned during 
the dark days of World War II by British Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill and US President Franklin Roosevelt. This document espoused 
the foundations on which NATO was born--liberty, self-determination, 
perpetuation of prosperity and collective security.
  Though not the axiom which keeps the alliance glued together, it is 
difficult to ignore that, as much as the territory, it is those 
principles that the alliance is fighting to protect.
  Here in this building we should think proud of our institutions and 
their triumph on the world's stage. Not for the hubris at the moment of 
victory, but for the better tomorrow which all our new European friends 
will enjoy after the half-century of abandonment behind the Berlin 
Wall.
  Our commitment should never waiver and our continuing mission should 
remain clear in our minds. We should have enough charity in our hearts 
to realize the world around us that does not enjoy the freedom we do, 
and be willing to push the borders of liberty beyond the comfortable 
world in which we occupy. Seven countries are now eagerly awaiting the 
advice and consent of this body.
  I ask unanimous consent to print the following document in the 
Record.

[[Page 10700]]

  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                          The Atlantic Charter

       The President of the United States of America and the Prime 
     Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's 
     Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it 
     right to make known certain common principles in the national 
     policies of their respective countries on which they base 
     their hopes for a better future for the world.
       First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial 
     or other;
       Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do 
     not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples 
     concerned;
       Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the 
     form of government under which they will live; and they wish 
     to see sovereign rights and self government restored to those 
     who have been forcibly deprived of them;
       Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their 
     existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, 
     great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal 
     terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world 
     which are needed for their economic prosperity;
       Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration 
     between all nations in the economic field with the object of 
     securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic 
     advancement and social security;
       Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, 
     they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all 
     nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own 
     boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men 
     in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from 
     fear and want;
       Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the 
     high seas and oceans without hindrance;
       Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, 
     for realistic as well as spiritual reasons must come to the 
     abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be 
     maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be 
     employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, 
     aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending 
     the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general 
     security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. 
     They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable 
     measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the 
     crushing burden of armaments.
       Franklin D. Roosevelt
       Winston S. Churchill
       Source: Samuel Rosenman, ed., Public Papers and Addresses 
     of Franklin D. Roosevelt, vol. 10 (1938-1950), 314.

  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a copy of a 
letter dated May 7, 2003, be printed in the Record in regard to the 
NATO enlargement protocol.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                             Select Committee on Intelligence,

                                      Washington, DC, May 7, 2003.
     Hon. Bill Frist,
     Hon. Tom Daschle,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Leader Frist and Minority Leader Daschle: As the full 
     Senate prepares to take up consideration for modifications to 
     the North Atlantic Treaty in order to accommodate new members 
     in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance, we 
     feel that it is fitting to make a number of observations 
     concerning this important step forward in trans-Atlantic 
     relations.
       We wish to express our satisfaction with those portions of 
     the draft resolution of ratification now before the Senate 
     which preserve intelligence equities.
       Draft Condition (3) has two parts. Subsection (A) would 
     require the President to submit a report, by January 1, 2004, 
     to the Congress intelligence committees on the progress of 
     the indicted accession countries in satisfying the security 
     sector and security vetting requirements for NATO membership. 
     We feel that this report is essential. Fitness for NATO 
     membership is a function not only of adequate general 
     security procedures, but also of the strength of national 
     structures ostensibly in place to ensure effective political 
     control over the activity of security services. We suggest 
     that the indicated report should cover the latter 
     consideration as well as the former.
       Subsection (B) of draft Condition (3) would require the 
     President to report, by January 1, 2004, to the Congressional 
     intelligence committees on the protection of intelligence 
     sources and methods by accession countries. The report would 
     identify the latest procedures and requirements established 
     by accession countries to protect intelligence sources and 
     methods. The report would also include an assessment of how 
     these countries' overall procedures and requirements for the 
     protection of intelligence sources and methods compare with 
     the same procedures and requirements of other NATO members.
       As the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence observed 
     during the last round of NATO expansion (see, Exec. Rpt. 105-
     14, 105th Congress, 2d Session, p. 56, 57, March 6, 1998), a 
     number of factors should be taken into account to assess the 
     reliability of accession countries to protect NATO sources 
     and methods, namely: The strength of democratic reforms, with 
     a focus on ministerial and legislative oversight of 
     intelligence services and activities; the degree to which 
     accession countries have succeeded in reforming their 
     civilian and military intelligence services, including the 
     ability of the services to hire and retain qualified Western-
     oriented officers, and the evolution of political and public 
     support for these services; Russian intelligence objectives 
     directed against these countries, including any 
     disinformation campaigns designed to derail, retard, or taint 
     their integration with the West; counterintelligence and 
     other security activities being pursued by the accession 
     countries and the adequacy of resources devoted to these 
     efforts; and the work underway between the [accession 
     countries] and NATO to ensure that security standards will be 
     met by the time [they] join the Alliance.
       The context for cooperation with NATO accession countries 
     has changed drastically since 1998, given Operation Iraqi 
     Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and other events which 
     have underscored the willingness of several accession 
     countries to cooperate with their former adversaries in the 
     West to fight terrorism and other critical threats. It is 
     also apparent that democratic reforms among the NATO 
     accession countries have taken strong root and are 
     irreversible.
       It is less clear that there has been similar progress in 
     other areas identified by the Senate Select Committee on 
     Intelligence in 1998 as critical indicators of likely 
     performance, such as counter-intelligence and resistance to 
     Russian attempts to influence policy. In short, security-
     related concerns about NATO expansion that concerned Senators 
     in 1998 remain valid, although the atmosphere for lasting and 
     positive change is vastly improved. We look forward to the 
     Administration's report on these indicators.
       On the whole, we feel that U.S. intelligence equities can 
     be safeguarded with this new round of NATO enlargement. We 
     look forward to continuing our work with the Administration 
     during the accession process.
           Sincerely,
     Pat Roberts,
       Chairman.
     John D. Rockefeller IV,
       Vice Chairman.

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of this resolution 
of ratification for the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization.
  The accession to NATO of these seven new democracies--Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and Slovenia--is an 
historic event that will have far-reaching and, in my view, very 
beneficial consequences.
  Just a dozen or so years ago, these countries were under the boot of 
Soviet domination and communist dictatorship. Against their will, they 
were arrayed against NATO as members of the now defunct Warsaw Pact. 
Today, they stand ready and willing to join forces with NATO, the 
organization that played such a major role in bringing freedom to their 
part of the world.
  We are striking a blow for freedom here today. Millions of people in 
eastern Europe live free today because of the commitment, patience and 
firmness of America and her allies during the cold war. And through 
their accession to NATO, those millions will now be able to live in 
greater security, as well as take part in the noble pursuit of 
defending the liberty of others.
  The expansion of NATO into eastern Europe will serve American 
interests in several ways. For starters, these seven nations, I 
believe, will help reinvigorate NATO's sense of purpose; which is, 
first and foremost, the defense of liberty.
  With memories of tyranny so fresh in their minds, the people of these 
nations no doubt have a deep appreciation for the freedom that is 
sometimes taken for granted in the West. Thus, they are apt to have 
fewer reservations than some of our other allies about confronting the 
aggression of those who are hostile to our way of life. This 
appreciation for freedom--and for those who helped them during the cold 
war--was unquestionably a factor in the strong support that each of 
these seven nations gave us in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
  Most of the prospective members have very limited military 
capabilities, and we will certainly expect them to invest properly in 
their armed forces in the coming years. But many of these countries 
already possess excellent specialized capabilities, such as the Polish

[[Page 10701]]

special forces who fought in Iraq or the Slovak WMD defense unit now 
serving in the Gulf. Over time, I am confident that each of these 
countries will find its own niche in NATO.
  Expansion of the NATO alliance to these countries will also offer us 
the opportunity to diversify and reorder our basing arrangements--the 
need for which, I believe, has been demonstrated by 9/11 and the runup 
to the Iraq War. In the future, it is clear that U.S. forces will need 
more flexibility--both geographic and political--than ever. It thus 
behooves us to review our basing structure in Europe with an eye toward 
relocating some--though certainly not all--of our forces.
  NATO expansion serves that end. Many of the prospective members--
Romania and Bulgaria in particular--are located closer to where U.S. 
forces are likely to see action in the future. Their governments are 
known to be actively interested in hosting U.S. forces. Polls indicate 
strong pro-American sentiment in these countries.
  Mr. President, 65 years ago, Eastern Europe began a horrific descent 
into darkness with the deal that was struck at Munich. Yalta then 
solidified what was to be another 45 years of communist tyranny for 
these nations. Those tragic mistakes are being rectified here today, 
and we should be proud.
  But make no mistake, the expansion of NATO is more than just a 
rearward-looking act of humanity. It is also a forward-looking act of 
statesmanship that will serve U.S. interests well in the future.
  Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I rise today to express my full support for 
the Treaty on NATO Expansion. As chairman of the Senate Delegation to 
the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, I cannot underscore strongly enough 
the value of including these seven nations in the NATO Alliance. I 
applaud and support the administration's leadership on bringing NATO 
enlargement to the Senate.
  These seven prospective member nations have made great strides in 
developing responsible democratic governments, free-market economies, 
civil society, and transparent and accountable armed forces. As their 
active support for the Global War on Terrorism and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom demonstrates, these nations share our values and are willing--
and able--to help promote democracy and freedom around the world.
  I believe that it is significant that each invitee has provided 
direct military support for the Global War on Terrorism, having 
contributed overflight rights, transit and basing privileges, military 
and police forces, medical units, or transport support to U.S.-led 
efforts. They have provided noteworthy support to the International 
Security Assistance Force, ISAF, in Afghanistan and NATO efforts to 
stabilize the Balkans. And, as has been mentioned many times today, 
these countries provided resounding support for U.S. policy on Iraq. I 
believe that these efforts merely herald the beginning of immense, 
enduring contributions to come from these nations.
  As cochair of the Senate Baltic Freedom Caucus, I would be remiss to 
not express particularly ardent support for the accession of Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania to NATO. Through working with groups like the 
Baltic American Freedom League, the U.S.-Baltic Foundation and the 
Joint Baltic American National Committee, I have first-hand knowledge 
of the large grassroots public support across the U.S. for inclusion of 
these noble nations in NATO. These organizations deserve recognition 
for their decades of work to help liberate and secure the future of the 
Baltics.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, as you know, I had originally intended to 
offer an amendment to the pending resolution adding an additional 
declaration to the nine that were added during the Foreign Relations 
Committee's consideration of this matter. My amendment would have dealt 
with a topic already covered by the Warner-Levin amendment, namely the 
relevancy of the consensus rule by which the North Atlantic Council has 
historically carried out its decision making. Now that the Senate has 
adopted the Warner-Levin amendment by voice vote, I do not see any need 
to proceed with my amendment.
  My amendment would not have answered the question of whether in fact 
the consensus rule is relevant now that the world has profoundly 
changed and the membership of the organization has greatly expanded. It 
would however have appropriately called upon the President to review 
this matter as we move forward to sign off on the accession of seven 
additional members to this important organization.
  We all know that the latest round of NATO expansion--Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia--will bring 
NATO membership up to 26 countries. And at least three more remain 
poised for admission in the coming years: Albania, Croatia, and 
Macedonia.
  Let me be clear. I am all for offering NATO membership to any 
democracy that wants to join and can contribute to our common security. 
But I am wondering how all this expansion will affect the decision-
making capabilities of NATO as an organization.
  For more than 50 years, NATO decisionmaking has been based on 
consensus--every member state must agree on every important course of 
action. When 16 NATO countries all faced a common Soviet threat, 
achieving consensus on major issues was not much of a problem.
  We may very soon--within a few years--have 29 members of NATO, from 
all across Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe. That is almost 
double the number we had not too many years ago. The idea that the 
alliance's decisions will soon be dependent on the unanimous consent of 
so many diverse nations, seems to me, potentially a recipe for 
stalemate in NATO decision-making.
  My personal view is that NATO should consider creating some form of 
``top-tier administrative council''--similar the U.N. Security 
Council--to prevent the diminution of NATO's power and effectiveness as 
a military alliance.
  At last year's NATO summit in Prague, President Bush pressed for 
``the most significant reforms in NATO since 1949.'' He was mainly 
referring to the creation of a rapid reaction force to deal swiftly and 
effectively with new and emerging threats.
  Last month, Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman reiterated this 
idea during his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. 
He rightly pointed out that NATO needs to be ``equipped with new 
capabilities and organized into highly ready land, air and sea forces 
able to carry out missions anywhere in the world.''
  Mr. Grossman was referring to the need for the creation of a ``NATO 
Response Force'' to handle serious global challenges, such as 
proliferation and terrorism. I agree with him that such a force would 
be beneficial. But I also believe that is only half of the story. It 
seems to be stating the obvious that each addition to NATO will 
logically affect in some way the organization, mission, and 
effectiveness of this proposed rapid response force.
  Just as I agree that NATO needs to tailor itself to future global 
challenges by standing up a NATO Response Force, I can foresee 
scenarios in which quick and decisive action will be needed in a very 
short amount of time--perhaps days.
  I think it is reasonable to ask whether it will always be necessary 
or desirable for all 26, or 29, members of NATO to be involved in every 
aspect of the deployment of this force?
  If the answer to that question is no, then shouldn't we at least ask 
the U.S. administration to study the question of whether NATO should 
consider a more streamlined decisionmaking structure for NATO to take 
into account both NATO's new missions, and the alliance's ever-
expanding membership. The Levin-Warner amendment should allow a serious 
review and discussion of that issue.
  As I have stated earlier, I am a strong supporter of the pending 
Protocol approving the new members to NATO. We all want a strong and 
vibrant NATO. I believe that the resolution of ratification, with the 
declarations and conditions that have been appended by the Senate will 
help to make that possible.

[[Page 10702]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.


                           Amendment No. 535

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry: It is my 
understanding that it is appropriate at this time to proceed to the 
Warner-Levin-Roberts-Sessions amendment. I send the amendment to the 
desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The senior assistant bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for himself, Mr. 
     Levin, Mr. Roberts, and Mr. Sessions, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 535.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

            (Purpose: To propose an additional declaration)

       At the end of section 2, add the following new declaration:
       (10) Consideration of certain issues with respect to nato 
     decision-making and membership.--
       (A) Sense of the senate.--It is the sense of the Senate 
     that, not later than the date that is eighteen months after 
     the date of the adoption of this resolution, the President 
     should place on the agenda for discussion at the North 
     Atlantic Council--
       (i) the NATO ``consensus rule''; and
       (ii) the merits of establishing a process for suspending 
     the membership in NATO of a member country that no longer 
     complies with the NATO principles of democracy, individual 
     liberty, and the rule of law set forth in the preamble to the 
     North Atlantic Treaty.
       (B) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the discussion at 
     the North Atlantic Council of each of the issues described in 
     clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (A), the President shall 
     submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
     that describes--
       (i) the steps the United States has taken to place these 
     issues on the agenda for discussion at the North Atlantic 
     Council;
       (ii) the views of the United States on these issues as 
     communicated to the North Atlantic Council by the 
     representatives of the United States to the Council;
       (iii) the discussions of these issues at the North Atlantic 
     Council, including any decision that has been reached with 
     respect to the issues;
       (iv) methods to provide more flexibility to the Supreme 
     Allied Commander Europe to plan potential contingency 
     operations before the formal approval of such planning by the 
     North Atlantic Council; and
       (v) methods to streamline the process by which NATO makes 
     decisions with respect to conducting military campaigns.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I, first, wish to thank the distinguished 
managers, my two colleagues and friends, with whom my friend and 
partner for 25 years, Senator Levin, and I have had the privilege of 
working these many years, over a quarter of a century in the Senate. We 
have, I think, reached a common understanding that I will proceed for 
several minutes, followed by my colleague from Michigan, and in such 
time the two managers will address their perspective on this particular 
amendment. I think they are generally in support; however, I shall let 
the managers speak for themselves.
  Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for the 
ratification of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on 
Accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia 
and Slovenia. The Protocols that we are considering today would allow 
those seven nations to become full members of the NATO alliance.
  My colleagues may recall that, in 1998, I did not vote in favor of 
the expansion of NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic. My opposition at that time was not directed at those three 
countries. Rather, I was concerned with the broader question of how the 
expansion of NATO to include newly democratizing countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe would affect NATO's future missions and its 
effectiveness as a military alliance.
  NATO's success in integrating the new members admitted in 1999, and 
NATO's commitment to enhancing its defense capabilities and those of 
its prospective new members, have helped persuade me to support the 
enlargement of NATO today. But I remain concerned that NATO's 
enlargement by seven additional nations--the largest enlargement in 
Alliance history--could have dramatic implications for NATO's ability 
to function as an effective military organization.
  Today, the threats to NATO member nations come from within and 
without NATO's periphery. Because of NATO' success, there is no Soviet 
Union or Warsaw Pact. The threats--such as terrorism and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction--are transnational in 
nature, and they emanate from regions outside of Europe. This was 
recognized in the Strategic Concept NATO adopted 1999, which envisioned 
NATO ``out of area'' operations to address new threats. To remain a 
viable military alliance, NATO must have both the military capability 
and the political will to respond to the new threats. NATO's recent 
decision to assume the lead of the International Security Assistance 
Force in Afghanistan, and its willingness to consider supporting a 
stabilization force in Iraq, are welcome examples of new NATO missions 
appropriate to today's threats.
  The Senate Armed Services Committee has a long tradition of strong 
support for the NATO alliance, and has played an important role in the 
Senate's consideration of the North Atlantic Treaty and its subsequent 
amendments. In March and April 2003, the committee conducted two 
hearings on the future of NATO and on NATO enlargement. The 
Administration witnesses at these hearings unanimously supported 
ratification of the NATO enlargement Protocols.
  One of the issues the committee examined in its NATO hearings was 
whether the prospective new members would enhance the military 
effectiveness of the alliance, and how their membership would affect 
the capabilities gap that currently exists between the United States 
and many other members of NATO.
  The witnesses who appeared before our committee testified that NATO 
was taking concerted efforts to address the ongoing problem of a 
capabilities and technology gap. They noted the decisions taken by 
NATO's leaders at the Prague Summit in November, 2002, to launch the 
Prague Capabilities Commitment and to create a NATO Response Force. 
Through the Prague Capabilities Commitment, NATO members agreed to 
spend smarter, pool their resources and pursue ``niche'' 
specializations such as lift capability, or precision-guided munitions. 
The NATO response force is envisioned to be a highly ready, rapid 
reaction force of approximately 25,000 troops with land, sea and air 
capability, deployable on short notice and able to carry out missions 
anywhere in the world. The response force will reinforce the need for 
individual alliance members to develop and contribute unique 
capabilities to this new force.
  Regarding the military capabilities of the prospective new members, I 
was impressed that each of them is similarly being encouraged to focus 
on specific ``niche'' capabilities where they can achieve a high level 
of expertise and procure high quality equipment to make a substantial 
contribution to NATO's military capabilities overall. Some of the 
invitees already possess specialized capabilities that have served the 
alliance in the Balkan operations and in the global war on terrorism, 
including: special forces, nuclear, biological, and chemical defense, 
mountain fighting, and demining.
  Equally persuasive was the testimony of our witnesses regarding the 
contributions of the nations admitted to NATO in 1989. Poland, Hungary, 
and the Czech Republic have proved to be steadfast allies and active 
force contributors to NATO operations in the Balkans, and in the war 
against terrorism.
  Mr. President, historically, I was among those who objected to the 
last enlargement of NATO. At this time, I very carefully considered the 
proposal by our distinguished President, President Bush, and other 
world leaders, that the time has come for new members to be brought in. 
I commend the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense for the 
careful procedures that led up to the nominations of these new 
countries to come into the membership of NATO.
  I am privileged to be on the floor now and to cast my vote in favor 
of these

[[Page 10703]]

protocols which will enable the seven countries to become members of 
NATO in due course.
  I have to say, I still have some of the concerns I had last time 
because NATO is such a magnificent organization. Over half a century it 
has proven its worth time and time again. The Warsaw Pact does not 
exist, the threats from the Soviet Union do not exist, largely because 
of the wisdom incorporated in this treaty, and the combination of the 
military commitments and the political will of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Alliance members over the years to have that alliance stand 
there as a deterrent. It has worked, and it has worked well.
  We cannot foresee the future and, therefore, we must be flexible 
because worldwide threats have gone through such a major 
transformation, from major nation-state-sponsored threats to worldwide 
terrorism, so much of it non-state sponsored. For that reason I want to 
support the admission of these new nations.
  Further, while so many of these newly democratic nations do not bring 
a large army, large navy, or a large air force, in due course their 
``niche'' military capabilities will add a very valuable dimension to 
NATO's ever expanding responsibilities.
  NATO is participating actively in Afghanistan, and contemplating 
participating actively in Iraq in peacekeeping and support roles. I 
shall not discuss this in detail. Nevertheless, that is a tribute to 
Lord Robertson and others who have recognized that the threat to NATO 
nations comes from beyond their periphery now, but could be brought 
within their periphery at any time by the threat of worldwide 
terrorism. Those are the reasons I support NATO's participation in 
``out of area'' operations in Afghanistan and post-conflict Iraq.
  I remember the words of Ben Franklin as he emerged from the 
Constitutional Convention and a reporter stopped and asked him: Mr. 
Franklin: What have you wrought? And his reply was very simple: A 
republic, if you can keep it.
  There is a challenge to these NATO nations, soon to be 26 in number. 
You have the heritage of this great treaty of over half a century, and 
the challenge is, can we keep it?
  I think we can. I think we will. Within the current thinking on NATO, 
Senator Levin, I, and others have identified two issues that dominated 
our committee's hearings on NATO: the so-called ``consensus rule'' by 
which NATO operates and the question of whether NATO should have a 
process for suspending the membership of a nation that is no longer 
committed to upholding NATO's basic democratic principles.
  With respect to the consensus rule, the recent divisive debate over 
planning for the defense of Turkey in the event of war with Iraq 
demonstrated that achieving consensus in NATO has become more 
difficult. How difficult will it be with 26 nations? A different 
manifestation of this problem occurred with respect to NATO operations 
in Kosovo when ``command by committee'' hampered NATO's leaders' 
ability to wage the most effective, rapidly responsive military 
campaign. Such difficulties in reaching consensus are occurring in part 
because respective NATO members have different views, as they should, 
about today's threats and how best to respond to them. Achieving 
consensus is likely to become even more complex as NATO enlarges its 
membership. That is why I believe--and my colleagues join me on this--
the consensus rule, and NATO's operating procedures more generally, 
should be periodically reexamined to ensure that NATO has procedures 
that allow it to plan, reach decisions, and act in a timely fashion.
  Regarding the issue of a suspension mechanism, some of our committee 
members have expressed concern about the lack of a mechanism for 
suspending a NATO member if that nation no longer complies with the 
fundamental tenets of NATO--democracy, individual liberty, and the rule 
of law.
  While it may well be true that NATO has ways other than suspension to 
deal with such a situation, it is prudent for NATO to consider the 
matter now, as a conceptual problem, and have some options in mind, 
rather than be confronted with a problem in the future, and be somewhat 
unprepared should it arise.
  Given the tremendous interest of the Armed Services Committee in 
these two subjects, I, along with Senators Levin, Roberts, and 
Sessions, am offering an amendment to the resolution of ratification 
for these protocols that would urge the President--I repeat, urge the 
President--of the United States to raise these subjects for discussion 
in the North Atlantic Council at NATO, and request that a report on 
these subjects be provided to the relevant committees of the Congress.
  I have consulted closely with administration officials, and 
negotiated the language in this amendment with administration officials 
way into last night, in order to receive their support, and they have 
no objections today. I hope we can achieve that because we have--
Senator Levin and I, speaking for our group--have made some concessions 
in order to have this matter treated in such a way that the whole 
Senate can be supportive.
  I conclude by saying, based on the hearings conducted by the Armed 
Services Committee and subsequent analysis, I am persuaded that the 
NATO enlargement protocols we are considering today will advance the 
national security interests of the United States and deserve the 
Senate's support.
  Lastly, on the assumption that NATO, I think very wisely, will take a 
role in Afghanistan, on the assumption again that NATO, again very 
wisely, will take a role in Iraq, which is a positive thing, I say this 
with respect to the coalition of forces: We will achieve the end result 
that is now unfolding in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is yet to be 
completed, but basically the desired result will have been achieved in 
Afghanistan and Iraq at some cost--with the bloodshed of Americans and 
other coalition partners, with enormous tax dollars. These are very 
significant contributions by the coalition of forces and this great 
United States of America.
  I think it is a minimal suggestion that NATO consider changing its 
procedures for deciding to undertake such operations in the future to 
avoid the problems we have recently witnessed.
  I urge my colleagues to support the amendment to the resolution of 
ratification I am proposing today, and to join me in giving our advice 
and consent to ratification of the protocols to the North Atlantic 
Treaty of 1949 on Accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, first let me thank my good friend from 
Virginia for his great work on this resolution. We have worked together 
not just in the Senate for all of these years but on this particular 
issue we have worked together for a long time. I also thank the 
managers of this bill, not just for working with us on this matter but 
also for their work generally on a host of issues which they struggle 
with to try to make our Nation a lot more secure. They work together 
magnificently. They are both essential for this country's security and 
strength and wisdom, which we surely need in these complicated days.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I thank him for 
the reference to our long-term working relationship. The Senator has 
really taken the lead for over 5 or 6 years. We have worked on this 
issue for a very long time. It is not something that has just suddenly 
come to mind.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank my friend from Virginia.
  First, I very much support the expansion of NATO to include these 
seven additional countries, just as I supported the expansion for the 
three that we approved a few years ago. I believe this expansion, like 
the last one, could lead to a safer, more united, more cohesive Europe 
and reduce the possibility that Europe would ever again be divided by 
war. I very much support the expansion.
  I have been troubled by one issue for many years--actually a number 
of

[[Page 10704]]

issues relative to NATO--that as we expand NATO, there is a greater 
likelihood, just statistically, that someday, some country is going to 
no longer live up to NATO's requirements that it be a democratic 
country with a free market. We hope that will never happen. We do not 
expect it to happen. But what happens, after these nations are added 
hopefully, if one day, one of the now 26 nations departs from the 
alliance's fundamental principles?
  As it now stands, there is no mechanism in the charter to suspend a 
country that no longer complies with NATO's fundamental principles. It 
is an unusual alliance in that regard that does not have a suspension 
mechanism, but it does not. We could actually, theoretically, see a 
country become a dictatorship and stop 25 democracies from acting in 
their own self-defense or in defense of a secure world. That is an 
unusual provision. It is one that was consciously adopted, but it is 
one that as we add more countries to NATO we have to think about, it 
seems to me.
  Our amendment is aimed at raising this issue. We do not direct that 
there be a solution to the problem. We simply believe that NATO 
countries, as NATO expands, should address the issue of a country in 
the future possibly departing from the fundamental principles that 
guide NATO.
  What happens, for instance, if one country becomes a dictatorship? 
That dictatorship could veto a decision that all the other NATO member 
nations wanted to take, perhaps to come to the aid of a people who were 
being ethnically cleansed on a scale perhaps approaching what happened 
in the genocide that occurred in Kosovo, or worse. That issue, as well 
as the consensus issue Chairman Warner has raised, should be raised at 
NATO. They should discuss it. They should decide whether or not they 
want to proceed on the current course.
  Again, I emphasize that our amendment, while expressing the sense of 
the Senate that the administration raised this issue at the North 
Atlantic Council, does not in any way indicate what the outcome of that 
discussion would be, nor, indeed, does it in any way suggest what the 
position of the United States should be during those deliberations. We 
simply want the issue of suspension and consensus and the other issues 
referred to in our resolution discussed at the highest level at NATO--
just discussed.
  There is a question raised: Is this aimed at any particular country? 
It is not. It is explicitly not aimed at any one of the 26 countries. 
We made it clear we amended our language to make it clear this would 
take effect 18 months after the resolution is adopted. We expect by 
then all the new countries will have been in long enough so there will 
be no sensitivity about that issue.
  We also make it clear this is not a condition in any way on the 
ratification of the NATO documents. It is drafted as a declaration of 
the intent of the Senate rather than as a condition of any type. That 
is, in essence, what we do.
  A final discussion item that is listed in the resolution would be 
methods to streamline the process by which NATO makes decisions with 
respect to conducting military campaigns. We believe this is essential 
because this refers to the actual conduct of military operations--not 
to the approval to conduct it but it seeks to address the problems that 
were experienced in the conduct of NATO operations in Kosovo where it 
was reported that General Wesley Clark, the then NATO commander, was 
restricted in his actions by a number of NATO countries that wanted to 
review each day's bombing targets. The planning should be allowed to 
proceed in advance in the event that the North Atlantic Council 
approves the operation. This simply would expedite and streamline the 
planning of military operations.
  Our amendment is not intended to interfere with the passage of our 
resolution of ratification. It would not cause any delay in the 
ascension of the seven new members into the NATO alliance. Again, it 
merely seeks to cause the alliance to consider some issues that could 
pose problems in the future, if not addressed in a calm, careful, and 
measured way before a crisis occurs.
  Discussion and report is what we are asking the administration to 
participate in and to initiate--again, not declaring what the position 
of this administration or any future administration will be and not in 
any way suggesting the outcome of those deliberations and discussions. 
It is a matter of prudence that this issue, which would have such huge 
ramifications down the road as to whether or not NATO can act, should 
be discussed in advance, whatever the outcome of that discussion.
  I thank Senators Lugar and Biden for working with us in a way so we 
now believe this matter can be resolved and adopted.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Dole). The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. I will respond briefly. Anyone who is a C-SPAN watcher 
will be a bit confused. We have Senator Warner talking about his 25-
year relationship with Senator Levin and I am about to talk about my 
28-year relationship with my friend, Senator Lugar. This is proof there 
is bipartisanship in this operation. We have a Democrat and a 
Republican opposing a Democrat and Republican on the principle here but 
not on whether or not this should be included and considered.
  This is basically a procedural judgment we are making. I have a few 
points notwithstanding the very well intended effort on the part of 
Senator Levin who has, for a number of years, been concerned about this 
issue and is concerned that, as he said, who knows, maybe some day we 
will end up with one of these member states no longer being a 
democracy. It is possible.
  What do we do? Let me suggest what Secretary Powell said before our 
committee when there was consideration, not by Senator Levin or Senator 
Warner, but there was discussion about having a condition attached to 
this treaty--which is not the case now. He said:

       NATO is not a committee; it's not a council; it is not a 
     group. It is an alliance. When you call something an 
     alliance, I think it means that everybody has to be together 
     for the alliance to take action.

  I am skipping ahead to make this short. Secretary-General Lord 
Robertson told the members of the Foreign Relations Committee:

       Even when times have been difficult, NATO has never failed 
     to get consensus or to find a way to work around the problem. 
     No country has ever used its national veto.

  As Secretary General Lord Robertson also said, ``NATO is an 
infinitely adaptable organization'' and has proven itself equal to all 
organizational challenges.
  Let me be more precise. When France pulled out of NATO's integrated 
command in 1967, the alliance decided it had a problem. Ordinarily, 
that would be enough to cripple NATO because it would effectively veto 
everything. What did we do? Then NATO came up with a Defense Planning 
Committee, the so-called DPC, which for years has done the bulk of 
NATO's work. When France refused to go along on the Turkey article 4 
request last winter, saying the decision in the NAC would be 
counterproductive to diplomatic discussions of the United Nations, what 
did we do? We went over to the DPC effortlessly. We did not have a 
great crisis in NATO.
  If that had not worked, Lord Robertson could have ordered the SACEUR 
to make the Patriots and AWACs available to Turkey, or he could have 
done what former Secretary General Luns once did. He could have simply 
declared his own decision was final unless there was unanimous 
opposition.
  I will not take more time, although there is much more to say. The 
reason I bring these things up, we have, in fact, dealt with very 
difficult crises in NATO, including member states not meeting the 
criteria of a democratic free market, respecting human rights, et 
cetera. We have had different countries who have been the odd man out 
on different occasions. Every time, instead of having to go through the 
process of a period of expulsion, we were able to weather the storm by 
dealing with it through other mechanisms.
  Here is the larger point I wish to make. I do not want to take too 
much

[[Page 10705]]

time, but it is a very important point to make, in my view.
  Especially troubling is the opinion of Lord Robertson that 
alternatives to the consensus principle would create more problems than 
they are intended to solve.
  Majority rule or a UN Security Council-type system would send members 
scurrying for votes in support of their positions, merely delaying 
action and reinforcing divisions among allies.
  The consensus rule is a fundamental part of NATO, an essential second 
element in the article 5 defense clause of NATO, requiring that any 
NATO action taken as a result of an attack on a NATO member be decided 
by consensus.
  My colleagues should note that this Article was crafted back in 1949, 
on American insistence, to prevent the U.S. from being pulled into wars 
by European countries.
  As Lord Robertson asked us, ``does the U.S. now really want to open 
the door to the possibility of being dragged into a war it does not 
want to participate in?''
  I might quote from a thoughtful letter to Senator Lugar and myself 
written by Bruce Jackson, president of the U.S. Committee on NATO:

       At present, the United States is the only country that can 
     consistently produce unanimous outcomes at the level of the 
     North Atlantic Council or, failing in that, at the Defense 
     Planning Committee. The process of achieving unanimity is 
     uniquely and, perhaps intentionally, to the advantage of the 
     United States.
       The countries whose ratification is before the Senate are 
     aghast that the Senate might consider weakening U.S. 
     leadership in NATO, which is the aspect of NATO they most 
     admire, just as their democracies reach the threshold of 
     membership. We share their concern.

  Five years ago when this was brought up in the last expansion, I 
said, ``Why would we indulge in unilateral disarmament and give up our 
veto over a NATO decision?''
  People wondered later, and asked me: What are you talking about? How 
is this giving up any veto?
  With regard to the mechanism to suspend a member that strays from 
NATO's principles, that too is unnecessary. Here are two examples: 
During the authoritarian rule of the Greek colonels from 1967 to 1973, 
Greece was frozen out of the key NATO decisions. When it appeared 
Portugal might go Communist in the summer of 1975, it, too, was frozen 
out.
  There would also be the temptation to play domestic politics with a 
suspension mechanism.
  We would not want NATO to be torn apart the way the European Union 
was three years ago when other countries isolated Austria because Mr. 
Haider's distasteful party had joined the governing coalition after a 
free election.
  For example one might envision a future scenario in which Turkey were 
threatened with military attack and some members would argue that 
Ankara's imperfect human rights record obviated the obligation of the 
NATO allies to honor their Article 5 commitments.
  This isn't far-fetched. In January 1991, Mr. Lambsdorff, then the 
leader of the Free Democrats in Germany's Bundestag, voiced similar 
sentiments.
  The reality is that once a suspension clause was introduced into the 
North Atlantic Treaty no country could fully rely upon Article 5.
  Lord Robertson's summary judgment on creating a suspension mechanism 
speaks volumes:

       The worst possible thing would be to legislate in advance 
     for all possible occasions and then be locked in.

  Our debate will be watched closely in the seven invited countries and 
throughout the rest of Europe. Attaching this declaration to the 
Senate's ratification would send an unsettling message through the 
Alliance.
  Lord Robertson gave us his bottom-line on Monday:

       Putting these issues on the agenda of the NAC would be 
     ``deeply unhelpful'' to him and would ``open a can of 
     worms.''

  The bottom line here, Madam President, is that I really think we 
should understand what is intended. The objective here to get NATO 
itself to adopt such a rule would be the single most serious thing we 
could do to U.S. leadership and U.S. de facto control of NATO.
  I urge my colleagues to vote down this amendment, which is both 
unnecessary and potentially disruptive to NATO as it is about to 
welcome seven new members.
  I thank my friend from Michigan and my friend from Virginia for being 
willing not to go with the original resolution they had, and seek this 
report from NATO within 18 months after the request being submitted by 
the Secretary of State. I think that is a more prudent way to proceed. 
But I hope when that is done, the NATO membership will uniformly reject 
any change in the process. But again I thank my colleagues and yield 
the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I agree with the analysis of history 
given by my colleague, the distinguished Senator from Delaware, with 
regard to the basic exclusion--or rather consensus and exclusion 
argument we are having today. He states correctly this arose the last 
time we discussed NATO accession. It is an important argument that has 
been propounded by the distinguished Senator from Michigan, the 
distinguished Senator from Virginia, and others. I simply rise to say 
the substance of the issue is different from the procedure. In this 
amendment offered by the distinguished Senators, we are discussing an 
amendment that says:

       It is the sense of the Senate that, not later than the date 
     that is eighteen months after the date of the adoption of 
     this resolution, the President should place on the agenda for 
     discussion at the North Atlantic Council--
       (i) the NATO ``consensus rule''; and
       (ii) the merits of establishing a process for suspending 
     the membership in NATO of a member country that no longer 
     complies with NATO's principles of democracy, individual 
     liberty, and the rule of law set forth in the preamble to the 
     North Atlantic Treaty.

  The amendment also calls for reports on the points of view raised by 
our Government and, likewise, its fulfillment, with the gist of this 
amendment.
  At the time we had Secretary Powell before the Foreign Relations 
Committee in one of the five hearings the committee has conducted on 
NATO, we requested his view on the subject of consensus and expulsion. 
In fact, I requested a letter from Secretary Powell, which he sent to 
me, and made clear as a matter of principle NATO's decisionmaking 
process in his judgment works well and serves the United States 
interests.
  The Secretary affirmed that for 50 years, from the cold war to Kosovo 
and now Afghanistan, NATO has been able to reach consensus on critical 
decisions. NATO is an alliance, and no NATO member, including the 
United States, would agree to allow alliance decisions to be made on 
defense commitments without its agreement.
  Regarding the suspension mechanism, the Secretary said NATO has been 
able to deal successfully with the rare cases in the past of problem 
countries, and NATO has dealt effectively with Allies that have 
experienced regimes that did not support NATO's democratic principles 
by isolating them or excluding them from sensitive discussions--just as 
the Senator from Delaware has illustrated.
  I would add that when, at Senator Levin's request, these issues were 
raised by Ambassador Burns in an informal discussion within the 
alliance, there was no support from other members for creating a 
suspension mechanism or for changing the consensus rule.
  Essentially, the administration preference, when we asked them with 
regard to this idea, is that these issues not be addressed in the 
resolution of ratification and certainly that they not be termed as a 
condition. The authors of the amendment today have not done so. This is 
not a condition. Therefore, there is not an argument with the 
administration.
  The Secretary believes the questions are worthy of further study, and 
so do I. My own view, having listened to the testimony by Secretary 
Powell and then as Senator Biden suggested more recently, a visit in 
the Foreign Relations Committee with Secretary General Robertson of 
NATO and with our Ambassador, Nick Burns, is that essentially, as the 
Secretary's letter has

[[Page 10706]]

pointed out, the decisionmaking process has worked well, has served the 
United States interests. As Senator Biden pointed out, as you look into 
the fine print, it might not serve our interests so well if in fact our 
effective veto was terminated.
  Having said all of that, none of us has wisdom that is all 
encompassing on these issues. Times change. Senator Levin in his 
comments has cited some reasons and these are important to consider.
  Therefore, I come out in this discussion on the side of thought that 
within 18 months the United States ought to think through these 
arguments, ought to put them on the agenda of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Council for discussion. In 18 months the world may have changed a lot. 
Even if a discussion of them in recent months led to apparently 
universally negative views of our NATO allies, plus apparently a 
negative viewpoint of our own Secretary of State, it is conceivable 
that on further study, intensive study in this area, there may be some 
other constructive results.
  I say this because I respect very deeply the distinguished chairman 
and ranking member of the Armed Services Committee. They, too, held 
hearings, as I cited in my opening statement, on the NATO accession 
issue. They are intensely interested, as we are in the Foreign 
Relations Committee, and as all Members of this body are, in what is in 
the best interests of our country, in our military alliances, in the 
prosecution of peace, in those horrible instances, and in the 
prosecution of war.
  These are serious issues, and this is perhaps an appropriate time as 
the body is focused on NATO to, once again, say these are discussions 
that have to take place from time to time. We in the United States 
ought to suggest that our Secretary of State take that initiative.
  For these reasons, I am going to support the amendment. I hope that, 
as a matter of fact, it will receive a unanimous verdict of support 
today on the procedural issues and issues that are out there, even if 
all of us have fairly strong views on the substance--and that would 
include the administration as well as colleagues.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I rise in support of the Warner/Levin/
Roberts amendment to the resolution of ratification on NATO 
Enlargement.
  Before I talk about our amendment, I want to take a few moments to 
express my strong support for the enlargement of the NATO Alliance to 
include Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia.
  A significant aspect of any enlargement of the Alliance to the United 
States, of course, is that it would represent a commitment by the 
United States to treat an armed attack on any of these seven nations as 
an armed attack on the United States. In 1998, when the Senate was 
considering the enlargement of NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic, the attitude of Russia to the inclusion of former 
members of the Warsaw Pact was a factor which was part of the debate. 
Such enlargement was not intended to be threatening and, appropriately, 
it was not perceived as a threat by Russia, which wanted to establish a 
constructive relationship with the United States and the other members 
of NATO. As a matter of fact, Russia's decision on that matter was so 
clear that its position relative to NATO membership for former Soviet 
Republics Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia is not even an issue today.
  One issue that I have wrestled with in 1998 and before was my belief 
that NATO should have a mechanism to suspend the membership of a NATO 
member, if that member no longer complies with the Alliance's 
fundamental principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of 
law. In the Armed Services Committee hearings that preceded the 1998 
Senate floor action, I put the issue to former Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger who said in part that ``I think in situations in which a 
government emerges incompatible with the common purpose of the 
Alliance, there ought to be some method, maybe along the lines you put 
forward.'' I also raised the issue with former Secretary of Defense 
William Perry who said in part that ``What you are describing is a 
problem--in fact, I would call it a flaw--in the original NATO 
structure, the NATO agreements. And, in my judgment, this is a problem 
which should be addressed.''
  I had a colloquy with the then Chairman of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, Senator Biden, who said in part that ``I agree with the 
Senator from Michigan that this is an important matter that raises 
fundamental issues for the United States and our allies. I believe that 
this is a matter that merits careful consideration within NATO 
councils. It would certainly be preferable for NATO to discuss this in 
a careful and measured way now, rather than be faced with the issue at 
some future time when an emergency situation exists.''
  That careful and measured consideration, however, has not been 
undertaken within NATO councils in the interviewing years.
  Just as I supported enlargement of the Alliance to a total of 
nineteen nations in 1998, so I support enlargement of the Alliance 
today to a total of 26. But I am mindful that the sheer number of 
nations that will soon make up the alliance increases the chance that 
one of them may some day depart from the alliance's fundamental 
principles. Having said that, I want to be perfectly clear--our 
amendment is not aimed at any of the seven nations whose accession is 
before us today--it is not aimed at the three most recent NATO member 
nations--it is not aimed at any of the long-term NATO member nations--
and it is not aimed at any potential future NATO member nation--it is 
not aimed at any nation.
  It is aimed at the possibility that a NATO member nation that, for 
example, was no longer democratic and was ruled by a dictator, would be 
in a position to veto a decision that all of the other NATO member 
nations wanted to take--perhaps to come to the aid of a people who were 
being ``ethnically cleansed'' on a scale that was approaching genocide 
such as happened in Kosovo. I believe that the United States should put 
the issue of whether a process should be established to suspend--
suspend, not expel--such a member nation so that it would not endanger 
NATO's decision making when all but an undemocratic member nation wants 
to act.
  The growth in the number of NATO member nations to 26 also increases, 
under the laws of mathematics, the potential that one NATO member 
nation, even a nation that conforms to the alliance's fundamental 
principles, could prevent the alliance from making a decision where all 
other countries want to act. The recent experience, wherein France 
prevented the North Atlantic Council from authorizing planning for the 
defense of Turkey to proceed and the Alliance had to go to the Defense 
Planning Council for that authorization, is a real-world example that 
demonstrates the need for the alliance to reconsider whether the 
consensus rule for NATO decisions should be changed.
  I want to emphasize very strongly at this point that our amendment 
doesn't mandate a particular outcome to the discussion of these issues 
by the North Atlantic Council. It doesn't prejudge the result of the 
discussion and it doesn't require the U.S. representative to take a 
particular position in the discussion. It merely seeks to have the 
issues placed on the North Atlantic Council's agenda, discussed in the 
council, and the results of that discussion be reported back to the 
U.S. Senate.
  Our amendment would require the President's report to discuss two 
other matters. The first would be methods to provide more flexibility 
to NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, who is presently U.S. 
General Jim Jones, to plan potential contingency operations before the 
formal approval of such operations by the North Atlantic Council. In 
the instance that I mentioned, wherein France blocked the planning for 
Turkey's defense, it would have been very useful if NATO's military 
planning staff could have been preparing contingency plans so that they 
would have been immediately available

[[Page 10707]]

once the civilian decision-makers had approved the defense of Turkey.
  A final discussion item would be methods to streamline the process by 
which NATO makes decisions with respect to conducting military 
campaigns. This refers to the actual conduct of the operation--not to 
the approval to conduct it--and seeks to address the problems that were 
experienced in the conduct of the NATO operations in Kosovo where it is 
reported that General Wes Clark, the then-NATO Commander, was 
restricted in his actions as a number of NATO capitals insisted on 
reviewing and approving each day's bombing targets.
  This amendment does not interfere with the passage of the resolution 
of ratification. It does not cause any delay in the accession of the 
seven new members into the NATO Alliance. It merely seeks to cause the 
Alliance to consider some issues that could pose serious problems in 
the future if not addressed in a calm, careful and measured way before 
a crisis occurs.
  I ask unanimous consent that the discussion between myself and former 
Secretary of Defense Perry be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate


  hearing to receive testimony on issues related to nato enlargement--
                thursday, March 19, 1998, Washington, DC

       We went into Bosnia, I understand, for legitimate reasons, 
     I think. But, still, it is not what NATO was invented for, 
     which was to reassure the Western Europeans that they would 
     not be attacked by the Russians. And if they were attacked by 
     the Russians, the United States would come to their defense.
       And I do not think the operation in Bosnia qualifies to 
     that standard. Which does not mean I am against it, but, 
     still, I do not think you can square it with the original 
     Treaty.
       Chairman Thurmond. My time is up.
       Senator Levin.
       Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
       Ms. Eisenhower, your sensitivity to the impact of this on 
     our relationship with Russia, it seems to me, is correct, in 
     terms of being aware of it. We should worry about it. We 
     should consider it.
       I reach a different conclusion than you do, but it is not 
     politically incorrect to factor into the deliberation what 
     the impact on that relationship is. I reach a different 
     conclusion than you do for a number of reasons. And, by the 
     way, I, too, have talked to dozens of parliamentarians in 
     Russia, both here and in Moscow, as well as their leadership, 
     their minister of Defense, their Foreign Minister, and so 
     forth.
       And I have heard their words. I have also seen their 
     actions, including the following actions: They entered into a 
     Founding Act with NATO after the decision to expand NATO was 
     made. And they have remained a member of that relationship. 
     And that Founding Act says--and this is between NATO, after 
     the announced expansion, and Russia--that Founding Act 
     reaffirms the determination of the parties, NATO and Russia, 
     to give concrete substance to our shared commitment to a 
     stable, peaceful and undivided Europe.
       So one of the actions which they have taken is to both join 
     a Founding Act with NATO after the announced expansion, and 
     to remain a member of that Founding Act. Secondly, recently 
     the Partnership for Peace was expanded. A more active 
     participation was recently agreed to by Russia with NATO. So 
     we have a more active participation in NATO's Partnership for 
     Peace recently, after the actual decision to have three 
     additional countries join NATO.
       Next, recently, their Prime Minister, Mr. Chernomyrdin, 
     publicly pledged, after meeting with our Vice President, that 
     the Russian Government will push hard for the Duma's 
     ratification of START II. This came within the last few 
     weeks.
       We have heard--and I have heard from parliamentarians--that 
     the expansion of NATO will hurt the chances for ratification. 
     We understand that. But, nonetheless, the action taken by the 
     Prime Minister is that he is going to push hard for that 
     ratification. And that is despite his clear awareness that 
     NATO is, with great likelihood, going to be expanded and that 
     this Senate will ratify that expansion. So we have that 
     action taken on the part of Mr. Chernomyrdin.
       We also have a recent--interestingly enough, we talked 
     about public opinion polls in here--we have a recent public 
     opinion poll by the Gallup people in Moscow, released last 
     Saturday, revealing that 57 percent of the people in Moscow 
     support the Czech Republic's bit to joint NATO; 54 percent 
     support Hungary's admission; 53 percent said Poland should 
     allowed to join NATO. And a quarter of those polled had no 
     views on the subject.
       Now, I do not know what their sample was and so forth, but, 
     nonetheless, I am not so sure public opinion in Russia is so 
     wholly as one-sided as you indicate. And, again, I have also 
     had similar meetings, as you have had, with their 
     parliamentarians.
       On the other hand, it is a very important factor to 
     consider. And I think we should all weigh that. We should not 
     give Russia a veto. That would be a very bad mistake, but we 
     surely should consider the impact of any expansion on our 
     relationship with Russia, and on the effort to bring Russia 
     into the democratic world and to keep them there, and to keep 
     them into the free market world. It is a very important 
     issue.
       You have raised another issue, however, which I find--and I 
     join with you in finding troubling. And that is the inability 
     of NATO to suspend a member, to remove a member who no longer 
     comports with NATO's principles of democracy and free market 
     orientation, and a dedication to freedom. This could happen 
     in the future. It could happen. And there is no mechanism 
     inside of NATO to suspend a member. Every member has a veto. 
     And that could create a problem with your strategic vision. I 
     think all of us hopefully view the world somewhat 
     strategically. That could create a problem down the road.
       And so I want to ask, Secretary Perry, about this issue. It 
     is something which has troubled me. I do not want to try to 
     condition the accession of these three new members on a 
     suspension agreement, because that would raise a false 
     implication that it has something to do with them--which it 
     does not. It is a general issue that I think we have to face 
     in NATO at some point, not related to these three particular 
     countries, or any other particular country.
       But what happens in the future if a member of NATO no 
     longer comports to the principles of NATO in terms of 
     commitment to democracy, freedom and free markets, and then 
     has a veto on NATO operations? And my question, Mr. Perry, is 
     this: Should we at some point raise within NATO, and satisfy 
     ourselves, on the question of the suspension of a member at 
     some point in the future and a mechanism to accomplish that 
     end? That is my question.
       Dr. Perry. That is a very good question, Senator Levin. 
     What you are describing is a problem--in fact, I would call 
     it a few--in the original NATO structure, the NATO 
     agreements. And, in my judgment, that is a problem which 
     should be addressed. It has been a problem for many, many 
     years. And therefore it is important, in addressing that 
     problem, to separate it from the issue of NATO accession. I 
     would not in any way want to tie that issue to the NATO 
     accession issue.
       We could have predicted several decades ago that that would 
     cause a problem, that there would be some major issue come up 
     on which we could not reach consensus, and that would bring 
     NATO to a halt, or that some member would depart from the 
     NATO values. Happily, that has not happened. But it is a 
     potential problem, and I think we ought to address it.
       Senator Levin. My time is up. I would appreciate, however, 
     for the record, if you or any other member here--my time is 
     up and the chairman here, I think, has got to stick to his 5-
     minute rule--but if you or any other panelist here would 
     submit for the record your ideas on that subject, it would be 
     very helpful to us.

  Mr. LEVIN. I thank my friends, the managers of this resolution, for 
their tremendous work on NATO expansion and other issues.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Madam President, since the original North Atlantic 
Treaty was signed in Washington in April 1949, the organization has 
expanded far beyond its original 12 members. The amendment to this 
treaty that I was proud to co-sponsor with my distinguished colleagues 
Senators Warner, Levin, and Roberts acknowledges that we have had 
recent difficulty with the consensus decision making methodology 
currently in force within NATO.
  Four more European nations later acceded to the Treaty between 1952 
and 1982. In 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were welcomed 
and possibly tomorrow we will add Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia bringing the number to 26 members.
  The following description of this consensus requirement is taken from 
the NATO web site, and it says:

       In making their joint decision-making process dependent on 
     consensus and common consent, the members of the Alliance 
     safeguard the role of each country's individual experience 
     and outlook while at the same time availing themselves of the 
     machinery and procedures which allow them jointly to act 
     rapidly and decisively if circumstances require them to do 
     so.

  It stands to reason that with the addition of more members, that 
consensus will be increasingly difficult to achieve.
  Our amendment simply asks that the President do two things: to 
examine

[[Page 10708]]

the consensus requirement so that we ensure that we preserve our 
sovereign right to act in our own national interest; and, examine a 
procedure by which we can take action against a member who fails to 
comply with the shared values upon which NATO was founded.
  Not everyone agrees with this request to have NATO address these two 
issues. I disagree.
  The strength of the NATO Alliance is based upon adaptiveness. Our 
recent experience with the UN, NATO and other formations clearly shows 
we must address the changes we perceive in alliances.
  Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I know I speak for all members of the 
Foreign Relations Committee in commending the Armed Services Committee 
for this discussion of these issues, and, most importantly, the comity 
between the committee members and leadership. I think that is 
demonstrated in our debate today on a serious issue but to one which we 
have come to a good conclusion.
  I know of no further debate. It would be a privilege if the Chair 
would put the issue to us.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is all time yielded?
  Mr. LUGAR. All on the amendment.
  Mr. LEVIN. I yield our time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 535) was agreed to.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. LUGAR. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. LUGAR. I yield as much time to the Senator from Texas as she may 
require.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Madam President, I was interested in the previous 
discussion because I think they were talking about going back to NATO 
to discuss some contingencies that might occur and how they would be 
addressed. That is the subject of my view on this issue.
  I support the entrance of these new countries, but I think we need to 
take a step back and make sure NATO is going to remain the greatest 
defense alliance that the world has ever known.
  In 1999, when the Senate voted to ratify the addition of Poland, the 
Czech Republic, and Hungary, I said at the time that we needed to 
reassess the mutual threat to NATO nations to assure the strength of 
our alliance in that agreement.
  Four years later, as we prepared for what became Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, we were disappointed, to say the least, to watch three NATO 
countries refuse to support the defense of our ally, Turkey. That was 
an initial signal that we have reached the point of stretching the 
alliance.
  That Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia are candidates for NATO is both a miracle and a testament to 
the effectiveness of NATO itself. They survived brutal totalitarian 
regimes during the cold war. Now they are free to fully join the world 
community as valued members of NATO.
  But what is the state of the alliance they seek to join? The world 
has seen three NATO members refuse to support disarming Iraq. In the 
view of the United States, this was the same as the failure to come to 
the aid of a member country that has been attacked, a renunciation of 
our mutual agreement.
  Now is the time to ask: What is the mission of NATO today? Is NATO 
going to protect the future or defend the past?
  For NATO to remain relevant, we must agree on its fundamental 
mission. Our alliance should recognize that the common threats of 
terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have 
replaced the common threat of Soviet imperialism. After the most recent 
break in our bonds, it is essential to establish a new mission to 
counter a new threat. NATO has always been unified around a common 
purpose, but if it becomes nothing more than a patchwork quilt, we will 
be wasting our money and endangering our own national security by 
continuing to pay its bills and diverting our attention.
  Fifty-four years ago this month, the United States pledged to protect 
Europe from the Warsaw Pact. We were steadfast in our commitment. We 
based 300,000 troops in Europe continuously throughout the cold war and 
keep 119,000 troops there now. We have paid a quarter of NATO's costs, 
even though we are only one of 19 nations belonging to the alliance. 
Clearly, our commitment played a vital role in NATO's victory in the 
cold war.
  After the cold war ended, we turned our attention to areas of the 
world that cried out for stability. We went to Somalia, Haiti and the 
Balkans, with varying degrees of success. We became central to peace 
negotiations in the Middle East. We focused more on our commitments 
abroad and less on our own national defense closer to home. All that 
changed on September 11, 2001, when terrorists and the countries 
supporting them tried to destroy the icons of democracy, capitalism and 
American power. Those attacks on our homeland marked the end of our 
policy of containment.
  The global war we are fighting against terrorism and our forceful 
disarming of Iraq has forged new alliances unthinkable before September 
11. Our relationship with Pakistan in the war on terrorism and 
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan is one example of this 
dynamic shift. But the war on terrorism has strained other 
longstanding, traditional alliances.
  Many of our friends in Europe do not comprehend the impact September 
11 had on America. They viewed what happened within our borders from 
arm's length, not acknowledging it as an attack on our country that 
required a firm response. This disconnect has caused a rift among NATO 
allies that would have been unthinkable before September 11. That split 
was manifested in the refusal to help disarm Iraq.
  As we prepared for Operation Iraqi Freedom, our long-time allies, 
France, Germany and Belgium, countries we have been committed to defend 
from attack for over half a century, opposed us at every turn. Even 
today, they are thwarting the rebuilding of Iraq by refusing to lift 
the U.N.-imposed sanctions that would allow oil to be sold to pay for 
new infrastructure in that country.
  A strong alliance cannot maintain its strength under such strain. It 
is imperative that NATO establishes a new, common mission or risk 
withering into irrelevance. If our purpose is a common defense, then we 
must form a consensus in defining our common threats. And those who 
agree should reconstitute a strong NATO.
  During Operation Iraqi Freedom, we created a valuable template for 
how the world community can bond in this era of reckoning. We now 
should lead the effort to reconfirm a coalition of the willing to stand 
together against the common threat of terrorism to our democracies.
  The seven invited countries have all demonstrated they are prepared 
to contribute if they join NATO. Every one of them supported the U.S.-
led coalition to disarm Iraq. As the United States develops plans for 
the reconstruction and administration of postwar Iraq, we are 
consulting with all seven of these nations to determine how best to 
proceed in this process and how they can contribute. All have indicated 
a willingness to consider the requests of the United States or other 
international organizations to help restore Iraq.
  Just this week, Bulgaria pledged to provide combat troops under 
international command. By doing so, Bulgaria has stepped forward--among 
the first of the world's nations--to internationalize the U.S.-led 
occupation. These seven countries are showing they are ready to do what 
it takes within their means to make the world more secure.
  Madam President, I am certainly going to vote to support this round 
of NATO expansion because I do believe all of these prospective members 
have a clear understanding that NATO has

[[Page 10709]]

new threats and new missions, and they will make a positive 
contribution to this alliance.
  But I do hope we will take the lead in bringing to NATO a clear 
focus, a clear focus on the common threats that we all face, and the 
methods for defending against those threats. That is what it will take 
to assure that this great alliance will be a great alliance in the 
future and not just something we talk about in the past with great 
regard.
  Madam President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I yield to the distinguished Senator from 
Virginia as much time as he might require.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Madam President. I thank the chairman of the 
Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Lugar, for his outstanding 
leadership on this issue. I also very much agree with the remarks made 
by Senator Hutchison of Texas.
  As far as an enlarged NATO, we have had hearings on the mending of 
fences and the moving forward that we will need to have as a country 
with our Allies with a new sense of realism insofar as NATO and certain 
alliances--who we can always count on and who we sometimes may not be 
able to count on in the future.
  I rise today to specifically address the issue of the enlargement of 
NATO. I offer my very strong support for the enlargement of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance. The NATO alliance, over the 
decades, has had a positive impact on the world.
  Since the days I was Governor of Virginia, I have been a long-time 
advocate of enlarging NATO, with new countries to contribute to 
security and also to advance individual liberty.
  I was an advocate of admitting Poland, the Czech Republic, and 
Hungary, and they have been good participatory members. You can see how 
the advancement of liberty has allowed the people of those countries to 
have greater freedoms and greater prosperity.
  I believe that enlarging the alliance will bring even greater peace 
and security to the world, as well as confirm the value of economic 
reforms that will offer all people greater individual freedoms and 
protection of their rights.
  The reforms and progress that have been made by Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania have transformed 
once communist, oppressive states into vibrant democracies that 
appreciate the newly reborn freedom to control their own destinies.
  These nations are ascending into NATO at a serious time for the NATO 
alliance. As these countries have made a positive transformation, so 
must NATO transform from the cold war deterrent it has so successfully 
been over the last 50 years into an alliance that is able to adapt to 
meet the new challenges facing the world and the partner nations of 
NATO.
  NATO and its members must now develop the ability to meet the threat 
of global terrorism wherever it may arise. This will no doubt be 
challenging, as the structure and strategy of the NATO alliance for 
decades has been to prepare for traditional conflict against the Soviet 
Union.
  To meet the defense needs of today, all NATO nations will need to 
make a commitment to the forces and the resources that are necessary to 
root out and defeat state-sponsored and itinerant terrorism beyond the 
shores of the United States and Europe.
  The seven nations that are poised to join NATO will be asked to take 
an immediate role in implementing this new mission. While it is 
unrealistic to ask these countries to meet the defense spending levels 
of the United States, the alliance should urge these new members to 
establish an expertise and an unmatched capability in a particular area 
of combating terrorism. NATO does not particularly need large, 
traditional forces or armaments. The alliance, rather, needs skilled 
units that can neutralize the devastating impacts of chemical or 
biological weapons, as well as seasoned intelligence organizations to 
ensure that NATO and its members are always able to thwart terrorist 
conspiracies or attacks before they are executed.
  The seven aspirant countries have had to overcome significant 
political and economic difficulties to reach the precipice of NATO 
membership. Transforming a socialist-focused economy to one that is 
market based requires tremendous perseverance and visionary leadership 
and also an appreciation of liberty on the part of the people of these 
countries.
  Indeed, the people of these nations have made their decisions and 
their choices. And now the economies of the aspirant countries are 
growing markets with potential for prosperous growth. These experiences 
will help these nations as they adjust to the burden of collective 
defense and make the responsible decisions that come with NATO 
membership.
  I am confident that these countries--whether they are in the Baltics 
or Central Europe or Southeastern Europe--will continue to meet their 
responsibilities. You may ask, why are you so confident? Look at what 
these aspirant countries are already doing, and have been doing, in the 
current year and recent years. One must look only at the peacekeeping 
missions currently, and those that have been going on for several years 
in the Balkans.
  You can look at the war in Afghanistan, and also the conflict in Iraq 
to conclude that not only will these nations be prepared to take the 
mantle of NATO membership--but are already contributing to the safety 
and security of all members. Their contributions and support have been 
substantive and significant in these current times of need.
  NATO will certainly become a stronger alliance, with the capabilities 
and the vitality these prospective new members bring to the 
partnership.
  I see these seven new members actually revitalizing NATO. There are 
concerns that have been expressed about the adherence and the unity of 
NATO. These seven countries will bring a revitalization, an 
appreciation for the importance of NATO and the freedoms and values we 
stand for.
  When you discuss the expansion of NATO, the benefits of membership 
are often the focus. However, it is important to understand the 
tremendous value the alliance, and especially the United States, gains 
when these seven countries are offered membership.
  We have seen the impact of these nations in the positions and actions 
taken during the recent military conflict in disarming Iraq. When the 
alliance first addressed the Iraq issue, it was these countries that 
immediately voiced their support for offering protection to an ally. 
Once the conflict began, these countries offered staging support as 
well as troops and chemical weapons teams which ensured Allied Forces 
were prepared to confront all possible battlefield scenarios. In 
particular, Bulgaria and Romania were helpful with their bases.
  The alliance experienced a disconcerting event earlier this year when 
a member nation, Turkey, requested defense assistance. Critics again 
questioned the value and importance of NATO. However, those trying days 
highlighted the importance of this alliance to the United States. And 
while there was a small number of members who disagreed with the United 
States, the vast majority were in agreement with our policy and were 
extremely helpful in moving the alliance to assist Turkey in their 
defense needs.
  Beyond the military conflict in Iraq, expanding the membership in 
NATO continues to be in the interest of this country. As the United 
States continues to confront terrorism on all fronts, we will need the 
continued support and intelligence assistance to make our efforts 
successful. Again, I feel confident these nations will take the lead in 
developing specialized programs that are needed within NATO.
  Again, the aspirant countries are being asked to put together quick 
response forces to deal with chemical or biological attacks, should one 
occur. These are the invaluable programs that NATO will need as it 
changes its focus to fighting terrorism.
  The United States will always need allies with which to partner to 
promote

[[Page 10710]]

democratic values and our principles. By offering NATO membership to 
these seven countries, our country is gaining valuable allies that are 
intimately familiar with the value of individual freedom and also the 
concept of representative government. They appreciate what a blessing 
that is for the people.
  The tremendous reforms and the progress that have been made by these 
aspirant nations is a testament to their commitment to the core values 
that have made NATO the strongest military alliance in history.
  I strongly urge my colleagues to vote favorably on this resolution of 
ratification and welcome Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia to our alliance of shared security but, more 
importantly, to our alliance of shared values, principles, and 
aspirations for free people.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum and ask 
unanimous consent that the time be charged equally to both sides.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sununu). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, it is a privilege to yield as much time as 
he requires to the distinguished Senator from Arizona.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. I thank the Chair. I suggest the absence of a quorum for 
1 minute.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator yield for that purpose?
  Mr. LUGAR. Yes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Indiana, the 
distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, for his work 
on this very important legislation, for his leadership and continued 
voice of maturity and reason that is often needed in our discussions 
and debates over issues of national security.
  The Senate's ratification of the NATO enlargement protocol before us 
represents the ultimate victory of freedom over the fear and terror 
that ruled Central and Eastern Europe from 1945 to 1989. The Berlin 
Wall came down in 1989. The Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. NATO 
expanded eastwards in 1999 and will do so again with the Senate's 
consent in 2003. History will judge NATO's historic move eastwards as a 
final chapter in a long struggle not simply to roll back oppression but 
to consolidate a Europe whole and free.
  The democracies of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia add a moral and strategic dimension to the 
alliance. The Baltics were captive nations during the cold war. 
Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia were subsumed into the Soviet empire, 
and Slovenia was a constituent part of Tito's Yugoslavia.
  These nations suffered over four decades of effective foreign control 
and occupation. In 1989 and 1991, we celebrated their independence. 
Today we celebrate their secure freedom, enshrined in our great Western 
alliance in defense of our common values.
  The Vilnius seven nations, as NATO's newest members are known, lent 
their moral voice to our campaign to liberate Iraq and end Saddam 
Hussein's tyranny. A February 5 letter from the V-7 nations, plus 
Albania, Macedonia, and Croatia, stated:

       The trans-Atlantic community, of which we are a part, must 
     stand together to face the threat posed by the nexus of 
     terrorism and dictators with weapons of mass destruction. . . 
     . The clear and present danger posed by Saddam Hussein's 
     regime requires a united response from the community of 
     democracies.

  These nations share our values because they understand oppression all 
too well. Their voices carry special weight.
  We received significant political and logistical support from the V-7 
nations during the war in Iraq. NATO's new democracies provided their 
airspace, airfields, ports, and military personnel in support of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Several of these nations deployed troops to 
the Iraq theater. Many of NATO's newest members more resolutely and 
more concretely supported the military campaign in Iraq than did some 
of NATO's founding members. These seven democracies have also served as 
de facto Allies in NATO operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.
  NATO's enlargement serves American leadership in Europe, anchoring 
our commitment to security and freedom there. It welcomes into the 
alliance a large group of nations that resolutely support American 
leadership and the principles that guide it in Europe and across the 
world.
  As we saw during the Iraq debate, a majority of Europe's leaders, 
including NATO's new members, supported America's determination to 
disarm Iraq. NATO's new members will be solid allies that will expand 
NATO's reach, amplify its voice, and enhance its moral authority to 
defend freedom, including against the threat of global terrorism.
  I have had the pleasure of traveling to each of the seven new member 
states to review their preparations to join NATO. Like my colleagues, I 
have been struck by these democracies' determination to rank among our 
closest allies, and to see NATO membership not only as a way to 
guarantee their security, but to contribute to the larger struggle for 
freedom the West once waged on their behalf.
  The success of the Prague Summit demonstrated the new NATO's shared 
history, shared values, shared sense of threat, and an agreed way 
forward in meeting those threats. This new NATO will provide a firmer 
foundation for peace and a more resolute defense of our values. Prague 
lent considerable momentum to the construction of an integrated and 
peaceful Europe and taught us much about our alliance.
  The decisions at Prague to invite seven new members to join the 
alliance, create a NATO rapid reaction force, enhance military 
modernization and interoperability, and streamline NATO's 
infrastructure were tangible accomplishments that should make the 
alliance more capable and flexible. Rather than debating out-of-area 
operations, NATO forces and assets are supporting the peacekeeping 
mission in Afghanistan. The NATO-Russia Council provides a forum for 
security cooperation with Moscow. NATO's peacekeeping missions in the 
Balkans have been a success. The United States is considering a new 
military basing concept on the territory of new NATO Allies in 
southeastern Europe. NATO remains central to American interests in 
Europe and beyond.
  This is not to suggest in any way that everything is going swimmingly 
within the alliance. NATO has been put at grave risk by hostile French 
obstructionism that is as dangerous as it is cynical.
  Let me be clear: I believe the French government is pursuing a 
systematic campaign to undermine American leadership in Europe and the 
world. I believe France would ultimately like to see America's 
withdrawal from Europe and the replacement of an American-led NATO with 
an all-European army. France's active opposition to the United States 
within the North Atlantic Council over a period of many years, and in 
the daily workings of the NATO bureaucracy, make clear the French 
agenda to weaken NATO's foundations and make the alliance less capable 
of effectively meeting challenges to international security.
  Officials at many levels of the French government, including 
President Chirac, boldly assert France's ambition to serve as a 
``counterweight'' to the United States. By definition, a country can be 
either a counterweight or an ally, but it cannot be both. Official 
pronouncements by the French

[[Page 10711]]

government, and the daily actions of France within NATO and at the 
Security Council, make clear that France is not an ally of the United 
States.
  France's decision in February to block a routine request for Turkey's 
defense--I emphasize ``defense''--in the event of war with Iraq created 
the most serious internal crisis the alliance has known in a 
generation. France's open rejection of its commitment to a fellow NATO 
ally required the decision on Turkey's reinforcement to be taken in the 
Defense Planning Committee, which excludes France.
  The Defense Planning Committee is the logical and appropriate venue 
for decisions relating to the defense of NATO members to be made. 
France does not contribute militarily to an alliance premised on the 
military defense of member democracies. France has a political voice 
but not a military stake in NATO decision-making. Decisions relating to 
the military interests and defense of member states--the core of NATO's 
mission, and the bulk of its agenda--fall under the authority of the 
Defense Planning Committee. The French dilute their own influence in 
NATO by not participating in its military arm, and the alliance should 
recognize that condition of French membership by making defense 
decisions in a forum that reflects France's absence from NATO's 
military mission.
  NATO did ultimately achieve a consensus in the DPC that met Turkey's 
defense requirements. Achieving consensus in an institutionalized forum 
that excludes France seems to me to have produced a better result than 
a divisive majority vote in the North Atlantic Council, had we shelved 
the consensus principle in favor of some other weighted voting 
mechanism, as some in the Senate have proposed.
  While I did not oppose the agreement reached today in the Senate 
creating a reporting requirement on the issues of consensus and 
suspension within NATO, I do not support overturning the consensus 
principle and creating a suspension clause because I believe it could 
weaken American leadership and interests in NATO while actually 
improving the position of France within the alliance. Replacing the 
consensus rule with a majority voting scheme would lead to factionalism 
and could result in scenarios in which the United States was outvoted, 
ceding our traditional leadership to others. Adopting a suspension 
clause would gut the heart of the alliance, the commitment to mutual 
defense, by introducing a reservation into the Alliance's commitment to 
defend an embattled democracy.
  Putting the issue of the consensus rule on the agenda of the North 
Atlantic Council would be seen by some of our best allies as divisive. 
It would create a debate within the Council not about the French fifth 
column, but about an American proposal that would dilute the influence 
of other NATO partners by weakening or negating their influence in a 
majority voting scheme. Replacing the consensus rule with some form of 
majority vote could threaten the supreme national interests of any NATO 
member, including the United States, that might at some point find 
itself dissenting from a majority of NATO members on a matter vital to 
that country's national security. The United States would never give up 
its effective veto over NATO military operations, and no country that 
contributes militarily to the alliance could be expected to do the same 
by endorsing a majority voting process.
  Under consensus, no vote counts more than any other, which is not 
true in a weighted majority voting system like that of the Security 
Council. Consensus helps pull allies together and gives each an equal 
stake in their outcomes. It prevents factionalism and the development 
of voting blocs that would only divide allies, not draw us together. 
Consensus prevents France from leading its own voting bloc in 
opposition to the United States. Historically, the United States has 
been the only NATO member whose initiatives regularly achieve 
consensus. Why throw away such an effective tool for U.S. leadership?
  Nor would I support conditioning NATO enlargement on developing a 
mechanism to suspend any NATO member that fails to uphold alliance 
principles. Advocating a kick-out clause suggests a lack of confidence 
in the democratic character and commitment of our new allies. It sends 
exactly the wrong message to these new members: that we fear they may 
regress from the democratic values we have certified that they share by 
inviting them to join NATO, values which NATO itself protects and 
strengthens. Conditioning their membership with the suggestion that we 
do not have confidence in the longevity of their democracies seems a 
strange way to welcome them into our alliance.
  A clause threatening any individual NATO member with expulsion would 
weaken the heart of the Washington Treaty by casting doubt on the 
commitment of the NATO Allies to come to the defense of any threatened 
member state. A suspension clause would effectively condition the 
mutual defense commitment that is at the heart of the alliance in a way 
that would breed insecurity and mistrust, not security and confidence, 
among member states. In the words of Bruce Jackson of the Project on 
Transitional Democracies:

       A provision to expel [NATO members] would introduce a 
     corrosive mental reservation into the commitment to defend an 
     embattled democracy and would, therefore, debilitate the most 
     powerful military alliance ever assembled.

  NATO works so well for many of the reasons the U.N. Security Council 
does not: it is a true community of values in which all members are 
democracies; consensus requires unanimity that gives all members a 
stake in decision-making and outcomes; the absence of majority voting 
or weighted voting like the Security Council does not create different 
classes of membership or hostile factions; and unlike the Security 
Council, NATO has proven time and again that it is able to effectively 
resist aggression and use its military and political power to expand 
freedom. The reason the seven new members of NATO are so keen to join 
the alliance underscores their clear belief it will protect their 
security and advance their interests. Can anyone hold the Security 
Council to the same standard?
  NATO's value to American interests and the progress of freedom 
endures. NATO enlargement serves American interests by delivering seven 
committed treaty allies who share our perspective on the world. 
Enlargement serves our common values by adding to our community of 
allied democracies the voices and the people of countries that were 
long denied their free destiny. NATO's expansion moves us decisively in 
the direction of a Europe whole and free, one that has exorcized the 
ghosts of a violent past and stands with us in its commitment to human 
freedom.
  As the leaders of Britain, Spain, Italy, Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, and Portugal have written, ``The real bond between 
the United States and Europe is the values we share. . . . These values 
crossed the Atlantic with those who sailed from Europe to help create 
the United States of America. Today they are under greater threat than 
ever. . . . Today more than ever, the transatlantic bond is a guarantee 
of our freedom.'' Let that continue to be our creed in the uncertain 
years ahead, confident that we are stronger together than apart, that 
our values ennoble our common defense of them, and that we can, 
together, make this a safer, freer, better world. It's worth fighting 
for.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I know of no Senators who wish to debate. I 
have consulted with the distinguished ranking member, Senator Biden. He 
knows of no Members on the Democratic side seeking time to debate and I 
know of no Republicans who seek further time in debate. Therefore, I 
ask unanimous consent all time be yielded back on both sides.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, my understanding, and I ask for guidance 
from the Chair, is that a vote on final passage of the NATO treaty will 
occur at 9:30 a.m. tomorrow.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

[[Page 10712]]


  Mr. LUGAR. I advise all Senators that the next action on the treaty 
will, in fact, be the final vote at 9:30 tomorrow. I also add as an 
announcement that the foreign ministers of the countries seeking 
ascension will be brought to the floor following the vote for 
presentation to Senators. That will be a prelude for a number of 
recognition ceremonies involving the President, the White House, and 
others.
  Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. LUGAR. I am happy to yield.
  Mr. SARBANES. I simply commend chairman Lugar and Senator Biden, 
ranking minority member, for their very effective leadership with 
respect to this NATO enlargement issue. I am pleased to join with them 
in supporting this very important step forward.
  I underscore how quickly the chairman moved with respect to this 
matter and how carefully it was done in the committee. Very extended 
consideration was given to this issue, which of course, comports with 
its importance. This is a major step we all need to recognize and the 
fact that it will happen without controversy, at least of any 
consequence, ought not to make us lose sight of the fact of the 
historic nature of what is being accomplished here--tomorrow, 
presumably.
  I thank the Senator for his skilled leadership on this issue.
  Mr. LUGAR. I thank the distinguished Senator from Maryland for his 
leadership in our committee throughout the years and, likewise, 
specifically, on the issue of NATO that has been before the Senate.

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