[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 8]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 10392-10394]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]


                 APPOINTING A SPECIAL ENVOY FOR HUNGER

                                 ______
                                 

                               speech of

                           HON. FRANK R. WOLF

                              of virginia

                    in the house of representatives

                        Tuesday, April 29, 2003

  Mr. WOLF. Mr. Speaker, Africa is on the brink of a crisis of biblical 
proportions. I traveled to Ethiopia and Eritrea earlier this year to 
see the famine conditions, and never imagined that I'd see conditions 
as bad as I saw in 1984.
  In 1984, 8 million were in need of food aid. In January, more than 11 
million people struggled for their next meal. I saw women and children 
that were too weak to feed themselves. This is absolutely tragic in a 
world with food as plentiful as ours.
  Today, the situation is even more distressing. I recently read a 
cable from the American ambassador in Ethiopia describing a grimmer 
outlook for the coming months than had previously been expected. I will 
be submitting into the Record the cable and the latest NOAA weather 
forecast, which revises expectations for crop viability downward. This 
paints a bleak outlook for millions more Ethiopians for months to come.
  In March, I wrote U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan urging him to 
appoint a special envoy for hunger. Many European news outlets have run 
stories in recent days on the growing number of Africans, whose lives 
are now in jeopardy. The Ethiopian Government is planning another 
``Live-Aid'' concert to re-energize the donor community and draw 
international attention to the situation. The momentum of this concert, 
coupled with the appointment of a U.N. special envoy, may help draw 
enough attention and resources to the continent and save the lives of 
millions of women and children.
  In Matthew 25, Jesus talks about the obligation to feed the hungry. 
The United States has responded to this crisis with an enormous amount 
of compassion. Many countries have the ability to give more, and may 
just be waiting to be asked. Time, resources and attention must be 
devoted to mobilizing and coordinating the resources required. This is 
a crisis that will require enormous coordination between international 
aid agencies, religious leaders and governments from every corner of 
the globe.
  The war in Iraq has demanded our attention, but we can not allow this 
silent emergency to grow worse. The lives of millions of women and 
children depend on this story being shared loudly and boldly. I hope 
you'll do your part.

     FROM  AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
     TO  SECSTATE WASHDC 1559


                                SUMMARY

       1. The mission believes that the number of people in need 
     of emergency assistance will continue to increase from 
     current levels of 11.3 million to 14 million people over the 
     course of the year, forcing a deliberate shift from the mid-
     case to the worst-case scenario as described in the October 
     2002 USAID/Ethiopia Contingency Plan.
       2. Life-saving interventions are ongoing throughout 
     Ethiopia, with special attention to pocket areas with high 
     malnutrition. However, poor belg rains to date continue to 
     raise vulnerability and needs and potentially threaten grave 
     consequences, including increased mortality.
       3. The sheer magnitude, severity and duration of Ethiopia's 
     food security emergency has left people in an extreme state 
     of vulnerability where coping strategies have been exhausted 
     and livelihoods destroyed leading to widespread destitution. 
     Increased destitution and continued shocks threaten a sharp 
     increase in mortality levels as any possible harvest is still 
     months away and health status of the most affected continues 
     to decline.
       4. Pre-famine indicators are present in Ethiopia for a 
     significant portion of the at-need population and support the 
     movement of contingency planning efforts to a worst-case 
     scenario.


                               BACKGROUND

       5. As per Reftel (A), USAID/Ethiopia issued a contingency 
     plan (October 2002) to the horn response working group in 
     USAID/W outlining a mid-case and two worst-case scenarios as 
     well as a mitigation and response plan.
       6. The mission believes that the response to date, 
     particularly led by the GFDRE and the USG, has provided the 
     necessary resources to mitigate against the absolute worst-
     case scenario (Worst-Case Scenario Two as per the plan). 
     However, current rains are again inadequate and NOAA 
     projections indicate ``normal to below normal'' rainfall is 
     anticipated.
       7. Continued drought can be expected to increase the 
     beneficiary caseload beyond current levels of 11.3 million 
     people to 14 million or more over a wider geographic area. 
     Thus, we can expect to meet criteria for the plan's Worst-
     Case Scenario One.
       8. A worst-case scenario will result in unacceptable levels 
     of mortality over a wide area and further breakdowns of long-
     term livelihood and coping strategies. In addition, one can 
     anticipate further depletion of productive assets 
     (destitution), distress migration, increased rural and urban 
     vulnerability, malnutrition, and mortality will occur over 
     the coming months based on current indicators. The pre-famine 
     indicators will only worsen if rains continue to be much 
     below average.
       9. The current crisis is not likely to result in the 
     mortality levels of the 1980's, in large part due to an early 
     response by the GFDRE, donors, and institutions such as the 
     Emergency Food Security Reserve, and early warning systems. 
     In the likely event of pipeline breaks and/or epidemic 
     outbreaks, the worst-case scenario could result in a 
     significant spike in mortality.


                factors leading to a worst-case scenario

         a. massive crop failure and numbers of people in need

       10. Following the December 2002 crop assessment (estimated 
     25 percent decrease from the 2001/2002 harvest and 21 percent 
     decrease from the last five-year average (FAO) production 
     decline), DPPC and multi-agency teams concluded that 11.3 
     million people would require emergency assistance. a further 
     2.9 million people were identified as being under close 
     monitoring.
       11. A March 14 addendum to the appeal (SEPTEL C) increased 
     needs slightly from 1.44 to 1.46 million metric tons and 
     those under close monitoring from 2.9 to 3.1 million.
       12. Production is most severely affected in Eastern 
     Ethiopia, particularly in lowland areas, where losses range 
     from 70 to 100 percent. However, food production is also down 
     in surplus areas in the west. Reduction in food production in 
     surplus areas will limit timely local purchase of food aid 
     and cereal prices will increase further through the hungry 
     season (July-September) when more than 90 percent of farmers' 
     cereal holdings will be depleted.
       13. Note: The 1999-2000 food shortage emergency (labeled as 
     localized famine retrospectively by CDC with respect to 
     excess mortality in the Gode Zone of Somali Region and low-
     level famine in the Ethiopian highlands by experts such as 
     Stephen Devereaux) was largely limited to belg producing and 
     pastoral areas. This is not true in 2003. Current pre-famine 
     indicators are found in many areas that are main meher-season 
     producers. In the 1999 and 2000 contingency plans, the 
     mission warned that a true worst-case scenario would be a 
     failure of production in main season agricultural areas. This 
     is in fact the situation that we now face in Ethiopia.


                     b. changed disease environment

       14. As per Reftels B and E, mortality and morbidity 
     indicators are deteriorating. Of the 130 worst drought-
     affected districts, surveys with mortality data are now 
     available for 30. Of these, 18 districts with a total 
     surveyed population of 2.1 million report mortality rates at 
     or above emergency thresholds of 1 per 10,000 per day for 
     crude mortality or 2 per 10,000 children under five years of 
     age per day.
       15. Recent nutrition surveys in areas where interventions 
     are ongoing suggest that nutritional status has stabilized or 
     improving in a number of districts. Other areas, particularly 
     those in the southern nations, nationalities and peoples 
     region (SNNPR) and other pocket areas in the north-central 
     highlands, However, are now deteriorating (including the 
     development of pellagra).
       16. Of particular concern are reports of pellagra and other 
     micronutrient deficiencies from UNICEF nutrition experts 
     traveling in North Wello. Pellagra results from a lack of 
     niacin, often occurring in populations reliant on a 
     homogenous diet of corn. After several months of dependency 
     upon relief food comprised of corn or wheat only, (blended 
     foods and pulses are in short supply), micronutrient 
     deficiencies such as pellagra are not surprising. UNICEF 
     nutrition experts reported seeing cases in most villages they 
     visited. As the rash-like symptoms of pellagra are only 
     visible at advanced stages of the micronutrient deficiency, 
     pellagra is very likely to be affecting a much larger 
     proportion of the population than was observed.

[[Page 10393]]


       17. Since early February, measles outbreaks have been 
     reported in Bale Zone in Oromiya, Silti Zone in SNNPR and the 
     WAG HAMRA Zone in Amhara.
       18. Cases of meningitis have been reported in Tigray, 
     SNNPR, Afar, Benishangul and Amhara. The ministry of health 
     is making aggressive efforts to determine the strain. The 
     threat of cholera increases with the advent of rain in the 
     northern part of the country. Malaria cases are increasing 
     and will likely increase further as people move to lowlands


         c. a deepening crisis, coupled with poor rains in 2003

       19. On March 25, 2003, the Disaster Prevention and 
     Preparedness Commission (DPPC) launched a multi-agency 
     assessment team to Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya and Southern 
     Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regions (SNNPR). The 
     assessments will revise the status of 3.1 million people 
     under the ``close-monitoring'' category and verify any 
     additional need. Early indications point to an increase in 
     needs beginning May 1, 2003, of 1.5 million people as a 
     result of the emerging and deepening crisis and the lack of 
     relief provided by the current belg season. Assessment 
     results will be known on April 25, 2003.
       20. On April 9, the DPPC Commissioner commented that he 
     believes the assessment would show significant movement of 
     those under ``close-monitoring'' to the beneficiary group 
     requiring immediate assistance.
       21. Fews net assessments of the rains to date indicate that 
     although there are sporadic intensive rains in a few pocket 
     areas, the belg is below-average to much below-average in the 
     eastern portion of Ethiopia generally, and specifically in 
     the Afar, Somali, West Hararghe and SNNPR regions. Given that 
     a good belg season in recent years is more the exception than 
     the rule, we anticipate, based on experience, that the 
     outcome this year will likely be much below-average. A 
     significant reduction in area-planted for belg producers are 
     already being reported over a widespread area.


                 D. INCREASING NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN NEED

       22. To date, the effect of the much below-average belg is a 
     deepening of the severity of the drought in already affected 
     food deficit areas, pastoral areas, and newly emerging areas 
     (SNNPR and some parts of the Oromiya Region). Assuming at 
     this time, a much below-average belg performance (and poor 
     pastoral rains), but not a total failure, we expect an 
     increase of an additional 1 million people in need of 
     assistance over a widespread area beginning in July or a 
     revised total beneficiary caseload of 13.8 million (initial 
     caseload of 11.3 million beneficiaries, projected may 
     increase of 1.5 million people, and July increase of 1 
     million).
       23. Based on this estimate, the following can be expected:
       --Rather than needs peaking between April and June and 
     declining in July, the mission believes that overall needs 
     will increase initially in May and then remain at peak levels 
     for the period June, July and August, and possibly through 
     September.
       --The overall increase in beneficiaries by 2.5 million 
     people will result in increased cereal needs by some 170,000 
     mt (using 12.5 kg/person) and blended food requirements of 
     39,375 mt between May and September. This will increase 
     overall needs during the appeal period from 1.46 mt to 1.66 
     mt (or an increase of about 210,000 mt overall (cereals and 
     blended food) for the five month period).


             E. PIPELINE BREAK FOR CEREALS AND BLENDED FOOD

       24. The most recent USG contribution totaling 186,500 mt, 
     as well as new contributions from other donors, brings the 
     total pledges against CY 2003 to more than 1 million mt 
     including 939,252 mt of cereals, 65,685 mt of blended food 
     and 15,267 mt of vegetable oil. This represents some 70 
     percent of the estimated needs for 2003.
       25. However, it should be noted that these are pledges, not 
     deliveries and continued coordination and robust deliveries 
     are necessary to avert a pipeline break. Any delay could 
     result in a pipeline break, which will have lasting 
     repercussions for relief deliveries for the rest of the year, 
     and could cause all major indicators to spike (morbidity, 
     malnutrition, mortality, migration, etc.)
       26. Actual deliveries are lagging. For example, the USG has 
     pledged some 535,000 mt in CY 2003, but over 250,000 mt has 
     not yet been purchased or shipped from the US and remains 
     unscheduled in terms of delivery to Ethiopia. Consequences of 
     a prolonged pipeline break include:
       --Sharp increase of severe malnutrition and mortality;
       --Ration reductions further compounding high levels of 
     malnutrition;
       --Limited pre-positioning of food to inaccessible areas;
       --Reduction in distributions, requiring parallel import 
     measures to the distribution sites and the emergency food 
     security reserve, or partner warehouse;
       --Mass migration during the agricultural season will affect 
     this year's overall production and next years' assistance 
     requirements; and
       --Mass displacement and rural to urban migration.
       27. With the addition of some 2.5 million people in need, 
     it is expected that current pledges and delivery schedules 
     for cereals will fall short of needs beginning in late-July 
     with delivery lulls and gaps as early as May.
       28. The blended food availability remains dangerously low 
     with only 50 percent of the supplementary food needs pledged. 
     Current available information points to a break of 
     supplementary food availability in the middle of June.
       29. Maintaining a pipeline at a minimum of 83 percent 
     (representing the reduced ration of 12.5 kg-per person) of 
     needs is necessary, not just to meet less-than-minimal 
     nutritional requirements and limit spontaneous migration in 
     search of food, but also to ensure that stability is 
     maintained.
       30. The mission is concerned about continued targeting 
     difficulties and dilution of rations from the reduced level 
     of 12.5 kg per person-per month, to even lower-levels as 
     local officials stretch food available for an increasing 
     number of people in need. The long-term impact on health 
     status of keeping people barely within nutritional 
     requirements is a serious concern.
       31. The mission continues to stress the importance of 
     improved targeting to increase the effectiveness of the 
     emergency aid and in particular the present supplementary 
     distributions. However, this often falls on deaf ears at the 
     local level where absolute numbers in need are immediately 
     apparent.


                     PLAN TO MEET INCREASING NEEDS

       32. To date, the major stabilizing factor has been the USG 
     contribution of 712,000 mt ($319 million) of emergency food 
     aid since the crisis emerged in July 2002. Non-food 
     contributions include ofda grants ($7.2 million with 
     additional grants expected in the coming weeks), and USAID/
     Ethiopia grants totaling $17 million. Accordingly, the USG 
     has played the leading role to meet critical needs.
       33. Recently signed grants will complement and increase the 
     immediate health response, including increasing the number of 
     nutritional surveys, health services and measles campaigns in 
     the worst affected areas. Funds will also support services to 
     emerging hotspots, increase potable water and expand the 
     school-feeding program through the summer and fall.
       A. Health and Non-Food Interventions:
       34. But more is needed. One of the most significant and 
     damning criticisms of the 1999-2000 response in the Somali 
     Region of Ethiopia, was the inability of the UN Agencies and 
     non-government organizations to undertake a timely measles 
     immunization campaign and appropriately link food and health 
     interventions to minimize excess mortality. The following 
     critical actions need to be undertaken by the GFDRE, DONORS, 
     NGOS, etc. In the next ninety days in order to avoid further 
     excess deaths:
       --Implement mass measles immunization campaigns (currently 
     underway). In all, 16.2 million people under the age of 15 
     will be reached by June.
       --Provide basic health, water and sanitation services at 
     food distribution and supplementary feeding sites.
       --Provide food and basic health services to displaced, 
     mobile and other difficult to reach populations, including 
     out-reach services;
       --Improve targeting and ensure that food distributions are 
     integrated generally with an overall health response;
       --Increase availability and improve targeting of CSB;
       --Implement an aggressive outbreak investigation and 
     response to diseases of epidemic potential (e.g., 
     meningitis);
       --Implement a nutrition and mortality survey to cover the 
     worst drought affected districts in order to obtain a better 
     estimate of the overall magnitude of the problem (this is a 
     follow-on to previous Center for Disease Control (CDC) 
     support. USAID/Ethiopia is working with OFDA to identify 
     appropriate assistance.); and
       --Increase preparedness for therapeutic feeding by creating 
     mobile teams of trained medical personnel that can move to 
     sites where malnutrition rates rise to require specialized 
     therapeutic feeding.
       B. Support a Livelihoods Approach To Meeting Needs:
       35. It is critical that the USG look to an increasing broad 
     pool of implementing agencies to meet the widening 
     humanitarian needs in Ethiopia. A significant surge-capacity 
     is required to integrate food, non-food, livelihood and 
     counter-famine responses to address the depth of the crisis.
       36. Millions of families have lost their assets and require 
     protection from further asset losses. Households also require 
     access to a safety net and other opportunities for asset 
     building. Provision of drought and disease resistant crops 
     and pastoral interventions to assist in the recovery of 
     populations in need, is critical prior to the onset on the 
     main rains and the hunger-season in June.
       C. Support Counter-Famine Measures:
       37. Counter-famine measures such as the introduction of 
     marketing interventions to improve access to grains and 
     support the stabilization of, and access to, food and seeds, 
     must be identified and funded now to ensure a continuation of 
     the proactive and robust emergency response.
       38. In support of USG efforts to minimize the effects of 
     the food crisis in Ethiopia, the mission began receiving 
     technical assistance from the Feinstein International Famine 
     Center (FIFC) At Tufts University, through joint funding from 
     OFDA and USAID/Ethiopia. The assistance will project the 
     wide-

[[Page 10394]]

     spread nature of the current crisis, identify pre-famine 
     level indicators in Ethiopia, AND assist in the 
     identification and design of strategies to support livelihood 
     and counter-famine measures and interventions that directly 
     mitigate and minimize outcomes such as malnutrition, 
     destitution and mortality.
       39. Comment. The characteristics of the current crisis 
     depict one of widespread and severe-hunger where 20 percent 
     of Ethiopian households are dependent on relief 
     distributions. This is a crisis that could be exacerbated 
     immensely with a pipeline break, an epidemic outbreak or 
     continued under-response relative to needs. Pre-famine 
     indicators are in place in Ethiopia, including: 
     irreversibility, increased morbidity and mortality beyond 
     acceptable levels and migration.


                            recommendations

       40. Given the continued deterioration of the situation, and 
     the likelihood of increased needs and a wider affected 
     population experiencing irreversible outcomes of the crisis, 
     the mission recommends the following:
       A. Issue demarche to other donor countries and request 
     further assistance (see Reftel F).
       B. Establish a reserve allocation of 150,000 MT from the 
     Emerson Trust that can be used to respond to needs at the 
     height of the hungry-season (July-September). Food would be 
     distributed through NGOS and the World Food Program.
       C. Continue CSB contributions and deliveries through NGOS 
     and the World Food Program to meet the deterioration of 
     nutritional status in developing hot-spots. Based upon needs, 
     up to 25,000 MT of CSB should be made available for delivery 
     in July and August 2003.
       D. Use additional agency funding to meet immediate needs 
     and put in place livelihood interventions and counter-famine 
     measures particularly through U.S. non-governmental 
     organizations now implementing the joint emergency operation.
       E. Broaden the normal pool of implementing agencies and the 
     tools to meet needs (i.e., beyond traditional food and non-
     food programs). It has become clear over the last several 
     months that our NGO partners are quickly coming to a 
     saturation point regarding their capacity and additional 
     surge capacity is needed.
       F. Provide follow-up CDC assistance to track epidemic 
     outbreaks and implement appropriate nutritional and mortality 
     surveys to deepen the understanding of the overall magnitude 
     of the crisis.
       G. Press the United Nations for the appointment of a 
     special envoy and/or a senior operational humanitarian 
     coordinator to establish an effective and credible emergency 
     response across UN agencies. This point cannot be over-
     stated. Brazeal.

                          ____________________