[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 7]
[Senate]
[Pages 9894-9895]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




             THE ACCESSION OF CYPRUS TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise today to commend the Republic of 
Cyprus on its April 16 signing of an accession agreement with the 
European Union, and also to bemoan the failure to reach an agreement to 
end the nearly three-decade-old division of the island.
  The achievement of accession to the European Union marks the last 
phase of a 30-year enterprise by the Government and people of the 
Republic of Cyprus, which began with an Association Agreement in 1973 
and will culminate in May 2004 with full membership.
  Celebration of this historic success, however, is tempered by the 
absence of a settlement that would have allowed the island as a whole 
to join the EU. The failure of the parties to reach an agreement 
through the United Nations process was both regrettable and avoidable.
  Although the Cyprus problem has been on the United Nations agenda for 
almost 40 years, it was the Clinton administration's decision in 1999 
to make finding a solution in Cyprus a high priority that brought the 
two sides of the island back to proximity talks under the good offices 
of the United Nations Secretary General.
  Since 1999, Secretary General Kofi Annan and his special 
representative Alvaro de Soto have engaged interested parties in an 
intensive peace effort with international support, including that of 
U.S. Special Coordinator for Cyprus Ambassador Tom Weston. They worked 
feverishly with leaders in Nicosia, Athens, Ankara, and Brussels to try 
to persuade the parties to agree to a draft plan prior to the European 
Union summit in Copenhagen last December, at which the EU invited 
Cyprus and nine other countries to join the Union. While that effort 
did not produce an equitable end to the tragic division of Cyprus, it 
did produce a realistic framework and concrete text on which to 
continue discussions to resolve the remaining issues.
  After years of frustration and disappointment, the people of Cyprus 
saw a fragile but real possibility for settlement, and the overwhelming 
majority of the population in both communities embraced the process.
  In the first months of 2003, with the clock running out to reach an 
agreement before the date for Cyprus to sign the EU accession 
agreement, the UN Secretary General asked Tassos Papadopoulos, the 
newly-elected President of the Republic of Cyprus, and Turkish Cypriot 
leader Rauf Denktash to submit the plan to a public referendum. On 
March 10, Mr. Papadopoulos in good faith conditionally agreed to do so. 
Mr. Denktash refused.
  In response, tens of thousands of Turkish Cypriots took to the 
streets to express their support for the UN plan and to entreat Mr. 
Denktash to participate in the process. But Mr. Denktash did not 
respond to these calls from the citizens whom he nominally represents. 
In denying his own people a democratic vote, he bears the primary 
responsibility for quashing the peace talks.
  Since then, Mr. Denktash has chosen to discredit the UN process 
though overheated rhetoric, calling the UN plan ``full of tricks'' and 
alleging that it did not take into account the non-negotiable 
requirements and ``realities'' of the Turkish Cypriot people. He did 
for the first time allow day-visits across the ``Green Line'' that 
divides the island, but this welcome conciliatory gesture appears to be 
more of a diversionary tactic than a return to the negotiating table.
  The Turkish Cypriots do have genuine concerns about their status and 
security, and these concerns must be reflected in any settlement 
decision. The Greek Cypriots need to acknowledge that before 1974 there 
was a Cyprus Problem and that members of both communities committed 
unpardonable violence and murder. Similarly, the Turkish Cypriots need 
to acknowledge that there has been a Cyprus Problem ever since the 
Turkish invasion of 1974, with mass human suffering. Both sides must 
recognize that this is 2003, not 1974 or 1964, and that only a reunited 
Cyprus as a member of the European Union would have ironclad, 
international security guarantees for all its citizens.
  Yet Mr. Denktash seems incapable of seizing the moment by recognizing 
that a negotiated settlement requires compromise. As Secretary General 
Annan stated in his report to the UN Security Council, however, 
``except for a very few instances, Mr. Denktash by and large declined 
to engage in negotiation on the basis of give and take,'' thereby 
complicating efforts ``to accommodate not only the legitimate concerns 
of principle, but also the concrete and practical interests of the 
Turkish Cypriots.''
  The window for achieving a settlement is not closed. Secretary 
General Annan's plan remains on the table as a basis for negotiation. 
The European Union has affirmed that there is a place in the EU for 
Turkish Cypriots. Upon the signing of the accession treaty, Cypriot 
President Papadopoulos restated his commitment to working toward a 
settlement. Greek Prime Minister and EU Council Term President Simitis 
invited Mr. Denktash and other Turkish Cypriot political leaders to 
Nicosia to continue discussions toward a settlement, an invitation 
which Mr. Denktash to date has rejected. Turkish Prime Minister 
Erdogan, with an eye toward his own country's future EU membership once 
Ankara has met the Copenhagen criteria, endorsed on April 17 the 
continuation of talks based on the UN plan. I hope that Prime Minister 
Erdogan, Foreign Minister Gul, and other distinguished leaders in 
Turkey will prevail on Mr. Denktash to do what is right for all in the 
region.
  EU leaders at the April 16 accession ceremony in Athens declared that 
the expanded EU represents a ``common determination to put an end to 
centuries of conflict and transcend former divisions.'' The people in 
northern Cyprus

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should not be barred from ``the closer ties of neighborhood'' described 
by European Commission President Prodi. Nor should they be excluded 
from the opportunity, now extended to their fellow-citizens in the 
south, to join the world's most powerful economic association.
  A lasting settlement would allow the Turkish Cypriot people to emerge 
from their isolation and become fully a part of Europe. It would bring 
opportunities for economic growth, for expanded trade, for travel and 
for broader educational and cross-cultural exchanges. And it would end 
the second-class citizenship of the Turkish Cypriot people in which 
their standard of living is at best one-third that of the people in the 
south.
  If Mr. Denktash does indeed have the interests of the people of 
northern Cyprus at heart, he should step aside and allow the Turkish 
Cypriot people to choose their own future. There is too much at stake 
to allow another opportunity to expire.

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