[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 7]
[Senate]
[Pages 9590-9591]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




         NUCLEAR EARTH PENETRATOR WEAPONS: THE MYTH AND DANGER

  Mr. AKAKA. Madam President, I rise today to discuss the myth and 
dangers posed by the nuclear earth penetrating weapons proposed by the 
Bush administration.
  The administration suggests that new nuclear weapons could be needed 
to destroy a growing number of hard and deeply buried targets, HDBT. 
The Intelligence Community has estimated that there are over 10,000 
potential HDBTs worldwide. Many of these are near the surface, serve 
tactical roles, and can be attacked with conventional weapons. But some 
hundreds of these targets have stronger concrete reenforcement, or are 
buried at great depths, or are in tunnels. They play a strategic role, 
protecting senior leaders, command and control centers, or stored 
weapons of mass destruction. Of particular concern are the very 
hardened or deeply buried HDBTs located in so-called rogue nations
  To attack the most deeply buried structures, the administration would 
like to have a nuclear weapon that could destroy a bunker some 300 
meters, or about 1,000 feet, underground without causing substantial 
``collateral damage.'' The administration is proposing to explore two 
new nuclear weapons for attacking this category of targets. The first 
is the so-called Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, or RNEP for short. 
The second is a new class of low-yield nuclear warheads.
  These two initiatives are often confused in the press or thought to 
be different versions of a mini-nuke bunker-busting nuclear weapon. The 
two candidates being considered by the administration for modification 
into a RNEP, the B61 and B83 bombs, have been in the U.S. arsenal for a 
number of years. They are not, however, low-yield weapons. In fact, 
they have yields in the tens of kilotons to megaton range.
  Due to congressional concerns, the fiscal year 2003 Defense 
authorization bill required the Department of Defense to deliver to the 
Armed Services Committees of both Chambers a report on the need for an 
RNEP before funds could be spent on the program. On March 19, 2003, the 
administration delivered the report. After a 30-day waiting period, the 
administration has said it will begin to study whether the B61 or B83 
bombs can be modified into a RNEP. The administration plans to spend 
some $15 million on this work in fiscal year 2004, and the study could 
cost as much as $46 million.
  As for low-yield nuclear weapons, these are nuclear weapons with an 
explosive yield of less than 5 kilotons. Ten years ago, Congress placed 
a prohibition on ``research and development'' that could lead to the 
production of a new low-yield nuclear weapon in the fiscal year 1994 
Defense Authorization Act. In the early 1990s, advocates of low-yield 
weapons claimed that precision strikes with such weapons could be used 
to attack weapons of mass destruction in third-world states that had 
acquired them. Congress was concerned that the development of such 
weapons would send the wrong message about the U.S. commitment to 
nonproliferation. In addition, there were fears that if such weapons 
were developed, the firewall between nuclear and conventional weapons 
would be removed.
  The administration now seeks to remove the prohibition on research on 
low-yield weapons research. The administration's Nuclear Posture Review 
calls for exploring new nuclear weapons ``concepts'' to be able to 
attack HDBTs with reduced collateral damage. According to the 
administration, the congressional restriction on research on low-yield 
nuclear weapons ``impedes this effort.''
  Ignoring the policy implications of making a nuclear weapon an 
acceptable tool to be used like a conventional weapon, there is still 
the critical question of whether such a weapon could destroy a deeply 
buried target without massive collateral damage. Could a weapon burrow 
so deep that its nuclear explosion could be safely contained within the 
Earth? The short answer to this question is no.
  To be a bunker buster, the weapon design must protect the warhead and 
associated electronics while it tunnels into the ground. This severely 
limits the missile to smaller impact velocities, which, in turn, 
severely limits how far down it can go. In fact, limits on material 
strengths make 50 feet about the maximum depth to which a missile could 
penetrate into dry rocky soil while maintaining its integrity until the 
warhead detonates.
  The radioactive fallout from a nuclear weapon detonated at a maximum 
depth of 50 feet could not be contained. Even a low-yield nuclear 
weapon of 0.1 kiloton, according to Princeton physicist Robert Nelson, 
must penetrate about 230 feet underground for the explosion to be fully 
contained. Based on the experience of U.S. underground tests at the 
Nevada Test Site, a 5-kiloton explosive has to be buried at least 650 
feet to be fully contained. A 100-kiloton explosive must be at least 
1,300 feet deep.
  To comprehend what would happen if a nuclear bunker-busting weapon 
were used, consider the damage that would result from the use of a 
``low-yield'' 1-kiloton warhead. Such a weapon would be one-thirteenth 
the size of the atomic bomb dropped over Hiroshima, and of a size that 
may be pursued if the congressional prohibition on research on low-
yield weapons is removed. At the maximum depth possible of 20 to 50 
feet, a 1-kiloton warhead would eject more than 1 million cubic feet of 
radioactive debris from a crater bigger than a football field. If such 
low-yield weapon were used to attack a HDBT in or near a city, it could 
devastate the area. There would be major collateral damage because the 
ejected radioactive debris would create a lethal gamma-radiation field 
over a large area.
  For the shock of a nuclear explosion to reach a hardened target at 
1,000 feet, a much larger warhead would be required, like the B61 and 
B83 bombs being considered for the RNEP. But the B61 and B83 bombs 
would dig a much larger crater and create a substantially larger amount 
of radioactive debris, causing that much more radioactive fallout and 
devastation.
  I also am concerned about the logistical problems of using nuclear 
weapons in a combat setting. Destroying bunkers requires knowing 
exactly where they are and delivering a weapon with precision and 
accuracy. During Operation Enduring Freedom, American Special Forces 
were used as spotters on the ground near the targets to provide the 
intelligence necessary to strike suspected al-Qaida command bunkers and 
weapon depots. Our Special Forces would be in great danger if on-the-
ground spotting were required for nuclear bunker busters.
  As we have seen in our efforts to target Saddam Hussein, his bunker 
complexes are often located inside Baghdad. Leaders of other ``rogue 
states'' can be expected to construct their command and control centers 
inside their capital cities too. The potential for collateral damage to 
our troops and the public our forces are liberating are obvious.
  Another consideration is battlefield assessment. Some bomb damage 
assessment can be done from the air, but if a closer look is needed, 
how soon could troops be sent in to determine if the strike was 
successful? The answer depends on the importance we place on the safety 
and health of our forces. If we use the underground Nevada Test Site as 
one real-world example, it will be a very long time. If battle planners 
need assessment more quickly, or we need to recover evidence of what 
was contained in a bunker, then American

[[Page 9591]]

soldiers and marines will be put at risk.
  This is not a theoretical consideration. We are discussing DNA 
testing of bodies found in Iraq to determine if they are in fact Saddam 
Hussein, his sons, or his closest associates. Had the administration 
used a nuclear weapon to destroy Saddam Hussein's command bunker, this 
task would be infinitely more difficult, and more dangerous.
  I appreciate the challenge that deeply hardened bunkers pose. I am 
not convinced that RNEP or low-yield nuclear weapons are the answer. 
Indeed, the Pentagon already has a number of conventional weapons 
capable of destroying hardened targets buried at 50 feet, or putting 
them out of action by blocking entrances and exits. Moreover, ADM James 
Ellis, Commander-in-Chief of U.S. STRATCOM, recently told Congress that 
he plans to emphasize conventional options in STRATCOM's new global 
strike mission in order to reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons. 
Research and development have improved the precision, penetrating 
capability, and explosive power of conventional weapons dramatically 
over the last decade. Further research and development on conventional 
weapons to attack buried and hardened targets are underway.
  Sometimes, the simplest solution is the correct one. We do not need a 
nuclear weapon to destroy a tunnel entrance or a mineshaft. The same 
research in material science and precision guidance that will allow a 
missile to aim and protect the warhead to penetrate farther should be 
applied to conventional bunker busters. Conventional bunker busters 
could meet the challenge of threatening the several hundred most 
hardened and deep targets in question. Conventional bunker busters 
would not place civilian populations or our forces at undue risk and 
harm, and would keep the barrier between nuclear and conventional 
weapons high and wide.
  Finally, we must keep in mind the serious international implications 
of the administration's pursuit of new nuclear weapons designs. Russian 
nuclear weapons designers have advocated new generations of more usable 
nuclear weapons. If the United States starts down this path, Russia 
will be encouraged to do the same. If Russia begins, maybe China will 
too. A new arms race in supposedly low-yield and ``usable'' nuclear 
weapons will result. If NATO forces move farther east, Russia may 
deploy such weapons opposite NATO forces. China may view them as usable 
in crisis with Taiwan. We should stop this new tactical nuclear arms 
race before it starts. We should not develop the RNEP. We should keep 
the prohibition on research on the low-yield nuclear weapons.

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