[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 6]
[Senate]
[Pages 7811-7817]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                        DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN

  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I came to the floor to say a few words 
about Senator Patrick Moynihan. Obviously, I didn't know him for all of 
his very successful and rather stupendous life, but I knew him rather 
well for that portion spent in the Senate. Even as to that portion, it 
was not my privilege to spend a great deal of time on the same 
committees with the Senator. But it was obvious to me he was a very big 
man, not big only in stature--he was very tall--but clearly he spoke 
eloquently and could grasp the situation with a demeanor and in a 
manner that was not very common and ordinary here.
  From my standpoint, we struck up a friendship principally based upon 
his asking me a lot of questions about the budget and about my work as 
chairman or ranking member on the Senate floor.
  Today it was my privilege to attend, with my wife Nancy, his funeral 
mass and some of the other ceremonial events that bid him goodbye. My 
wife Nancy and I got to share with his marvelous wife Elizabeth; 
everybody calls

[[Page 7812]]

her Liz. We had had on one occasion as couples an opportunity to travel 
with Senator Moynihan and his wife and others on a very lengthy trip 
that included China and other parts of the world, Japan. It was rather 
marvelous to have him regale us with stories and tales and history as 
we would be traveling from one country to another. When he was around 
on those kinds of events, you didn't have to have books to read. You 
would just get a seat close to him and ask questions, and he would tell 
you something significant, different, important, something you clearly 
never would read and never had heard.
  We all miss him. There is no doubt about it.
  One day I recall the close of a budget session, a long debate on the 
budget. Final passage came up. It had been a very arduous and difficult 
one, much like the last one we just experienced, but more so. I had 
counted votes and thought I would win. I thought I would get 51 votes, 
which is what I needed. I noted that during the time of the debate and 
in particular the closing, Senator Moynihan had listened a little more 
than I had expected. No reason for him to do that. Senators were in and 
out.
  I had also noticed during the course of events that he would stop by 
and talk with me and say something to me about what was going on.
  The vote occurred, and I was not paying attention to the vote. I knew 
I would get the votes necessary. But when the votes were counted, I had 
one more than expected. So I asked, who was that; what happened? 
Somebody on the other side of the aisle, without saying much and 
perhaps without talking to his own leadership, had voted for the 
resolution. Sure enough, it was Patrick Moynihan. I didn't have a 
chance then to say anything to him, but later on, I purposely found him 
and thanked him, and I asked him what was that all about.
  He said: Well, to tell you the truth, that Budget Act is too 
confusing and confounds everybody. You worked too hard to try to get it 
done, and you made an awful lot of sense. I just decided that 
regardless of the philosophy, that was enough for me to vote for the 
budget resolution, in the sense that I was just voting for you.
  Things like that don't happen very often. I am sure everybody has 
stories similar to that and more so. Today, as we attended the funeral 
mass, there were literally hundreds of people from all walks of life--
kind of befitting what he had done and the life he had lived. On one 
side I noticed the Secretary of Defense had kind of eased his way into 
the church and was kneeling on one side there in an inconspicuous way--
many ambassadors, a lot of Senators, a very large entourage of 
Senators. Perhaps as many as 10 former Senators from our day who now 
live somewhere else doing other things had found their way into 
Washington to be there.
  I choose today for these very few moments to say thank you to him for 
his great service in the Senate, to his family, and particularly to his 
wife, who obviously sacrificed greatly while he was being a Senator. 
She, too, has a profession of her own and was somewhat restrained and 
had to live more of a life in Washington, tied sort of to his career, 
than she had at other times in her life. But from what I have gathered, 
they were both great citizens and very pleased and proud to be part of 
this Senate.
  I thank him and bid him adieu.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that 
the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. Mr. President, I join my colleagues today in 
mourning the passing of a giant of the 20th century--our former 
colleague, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan. The list of his 
contributions to this Nation is long and impressive: from White House 
aide, to Ambassador to India and the United Nations, to Senator from 
the State of New York for 24 years. Pat Moynihan left an indelible mark 
on our Nation and the world.
  Senator Moynihan has been described as the best thinker among 
politicians since Woodrow Wilson and the best politician among thinkers 
since Thomas Jefferson. Few Senators in the 241-year history of this 
institution have had the intellectual impact on public policy as did 
Patrick Moynihan. From tax policy to environmental protection, he was 
an always constructive and frequently dominant advocate. He frequently 
converted a Senate committee hearing or floor debate into what was his 
first passion, a college classroom. Those of us who were fortunate to 
be his students are forever in his debt.
  Adele and I offer our condolences to Elizabeth and their family, and 
we will recognize in our prayers the loss that the Nation and each of 
us individually have suffered.
  Mr. President, I add that I consider it a terrible irony that on the 
eve of Senator Moynihan's death, March 26, the White House announced 
the signing of amended Executive Order 12,958. This Executive order 
delays the release of millions of long-classified Government documents 
and grants to Government bureaucrats new authority to reclassify 
information. The vast majority of these documents are more than 25 
years old and were to have been automatically declassified on April 17 
of this year.
  I consider this ironic because Senator Moynihan was a champion of 
open government. Among his many writings, including 18 books, was ``The 
Torment of Secrecy: The Background and Consequences of American 
Security Policy.'' Senator Moynihan concluded that book with these 
words:

       A case can be made that secrecy is for losers, for people 
     who don't know how important information really is. The 
     Soviet Union realized this too late. Openness is now a 
     singular and singularly American advantage. We put it in 
     peril by poking along in the mode of an age now past. It is 
     time to dismantle government secrecy, this most pervasive of 
     cold war era regulations. It is time to begin building the 
     supports for the era of openness, which is already upon us.

  Mr. President, we in the Senate and those in the White House should 
heed Pat Moynihan's wise words. As a former chairman of the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence, I can tell you that this 
administration is being excessively cautious in keeping information 
from the American people. Certainly, when we are at war and facing 
increased threats from international terrorist networks, we need to 
keep secret that information that could pose a threat to our security 
if it were to fall into the wrong hands. But that hardly seems to be 
the case with most of the information that is covered by this overly 
broad Executive order.
  Again, I emphasize that the overwhelming bulk of this material is 
more than 25 years old. Ultimately, excessive secrecy will undermine 
the public's confidence in our Government and its essential 
institutions. Excessive secrecy denies to the American people their 
full capability to participate, evaluate, and act as they determine to 
be in the national interest.
  By restricting access to crucial and often conflicting information, 
excessive secrecy creates the environment for what is known as 
incestuous amplification. This is a military term and is defined by 
Jane's Defense Weekly. Incestuous amplification is ``a condition in 
warfare where one only listens to those who are already in lockstep 
agreement, reinforcing set beliefs and creating a situation ripe for 
miscalculation.''
  Excessive secrecy undermines the classification value of information 
which is genuinely critical to our national security. Last year, I had 
the honor to cochair a joint House-Senate inquiry into the events of 
September 11, 2001. Our purpose was to help the American people 
understand what our Government knew about potential threats from al-
Qaida prior to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, 
and how our intelligence and law enforcement agencies responded. But 
even more important, our responsibility was to develop an action plan 
of recommendations to mitigate a repeat of this tragedy.
  Our staff reviewed more than 500,000 pages of documents. We conducted 
22

[[Page 7813]]

hearings, 13 of them closed, 9 open to the public. We filed our final 
report--the classified version--on December 20, 2002.
  The joint inquiry has requested declassification of our final report, 
as well as key documents related to the Government's knowledge of al-
Qaida and potential terrorist threats. For 100 days, congressional 
staffers have been working with the Central Intelligence Agency, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other relevant agencies to get the 
final report of the joint inquiry declassified. We have not yet been 
successful. I am hopeful that we can present most of this material to 
the public at the earliest date. We have already released, in 
declassified form, our findings and our recommendations.
  I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a copy of those 
recommendations at the conclusion of my statement.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. Mr. President, I want to read one of the 
recommendations from the joint inquiry committee. It is recommendation 
No. 15:

       The President should review and consider amendments to the 
     Executive Orders, policies and procedures that govern the 
     national security classification of intelligence information, 
     in an effort to expand access to relevant information for 
     Federal agencies outside the Intelligence Community, for 
     State and local authorities, which are critical to the fight 
     against terrorism, and to the American public.
       In addition, the President and heads of Federal agencies 
     should ensure that the policies and procedures to protect 
     against the unauthorized disclosure of classified 
     intelligence information are well understood, fully 
     implemented, and vigorously enforced.
       Congress should also review the statutes, policies, and 
     procedures that govern the national security classification 
     of intelligence information and its protection from 
     unauthorized disclosure.
       Among other matters, Congress should consider the degree to 
     which excessive classification has been used in the past and 
     the extent to which the emerging threat environment has 
     greatly increased the need for real-time sharing of sensitive 
     information.
       The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with 
     the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Attorney General, 
     should review and report to the House and Senate Intelligence 
     Committees on proposals for a new and more realistic approach 
     to the processes and structures that have governed the 
     designation of sensitive and classified information.
       The report should include proposals to protect against the 
     use of the classification process as a shield to protect 
     agency self-interest.

  The public has the right to know what its Government has done and is 
doing to protect Americans and United States interests. Potential 
embarrassment is not a good enough reason to keep past or current 
Government materials secret.
  One of the most fitting tributes we could pay to Pat Moynihan would 
be a heightened recognition of the damage that excessive secrecy exacts 
on our Government's credibility, and to recommit ourselves to a 
Government which trusts its people to know the truth.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to print in the Record an 
editorial from the New York Times of March 28, 2003.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                        Secrecy: The Bush Byword

       Add one more item to the list of things the Bush 
     administration has been quietly doing on the home front while 
     the nation is preoccupied with Iraq. This week President Bush 
     signed an executive order that makes it easier for government 
     agencies, including the White House, to keep documents 
     classified and out of public view.
       The order does a number of things at once. It delays by 
     three years the release of declassified government documents 
     dating from 1978 or earlier. It treats all material sent to 
     American officials from foreign governments--no matter how 
     routine--as subject to classification. It expands the ability 
     of the Central Intelligence Agency to shield documents from 
     declassification. And for the first time, it gives the vice 
     President the power to classify information. Offering that 
     power to Vice President Dick Cheney, who has shown 
     indifference to the public's right to know what is going on 
     inside the executive branch, seems a particularly worrying 
     development.
       All of this amends an order by President Bill Clinton that 
     actually eased the process of declassification. The 
     administration says the three-year delay in declassifying 
     documents dating to the Carter administration and earlier is 
     necessary because of a huge backlog of documents that must be 
     reviewed before decisions are made on whether to declassify 
     them.
       Taken individually, each of these actions might raise 
     eyebrows for anyone who values open government. Taken 
     together, they are reminders that this White House is 
     obsessed with secrecy. President Clinton's policy was that 
     ``when in doubt,'' a document was not automatically 
     classified. That ensured that government papers would not 
     easily be kept under wraps without a compelling reason. And 
     while President Bush keeps in place many of the mechanisms 
     for automatic declassification, he has raised a bar that can 
     only hurt the ability of historians, researchers and all 
     Americans to arrive at informed judgments about the actions 
     of the presidents and their administrations.
                                  ____


                               Exhibit 1

                            Recommendations

       Since the National Security Act's establishment of the 
     Director of Central Intelligence and the Central Intelligence 
     Agency in 1947, numerous independent commissions, experts, 
     and legislative initiatives have examined the growth and 
     performance of the U.S. Intelligence Community. While those 
     efforts generated numerous proposals for reform over the 
     years, some of the most significant proposals have not been 
     implemented, particularly in the areas of organization and 
     structure. These Committees believe that the cataclysmic 
     events of September 11, 2001 provide a unique and compelling 
     mandate for strong leadership and constructive change 
     throughout the Intelligence Community. With that in mind, and 
     based on the work of this Joint Inquiry, the Committees 
     recommend the following:
       1. Congress should amend the National Security Act of 1947 
     to create and sufficiently staff a statutory Director of 
     National Intelligence who shall be the President's principal 
     advisor on intelligence and shall have the full range of 
     management, budgetary and personnel responsibilities needed 
     to make the entire U.S. Intelligence Community operate as a 
     coherent whole. These responsibilities should include:
       Establishment and enforcement of consistent priorities for 
     the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence 
     throughout the Intelligence Community;
       Setting of policy and the ability to move personnel between 
     elements of the Intelligence Community;
       Review, approval, modification, and primary management and 
     oversight of the execution of Intelligence Community budgets;
       Review, approval, modification, and primary management and 
     oversight of the execution of Intelligence Community 
     personnel and resource allocations;
       Review, approval, modification, and primary management and 
     oversight of the execution of Intelligence Community research 
     and development efforts;
       Review, approval, and coordination of relationships between 
     the Intelligence Community agencies and foreign intelligence 
     and law enforcement services; and
       Exercise of statutory authority to insure that Intelligence 
     Community agencies and components fully comply with 
     Community-wide policy, management, spending, and 
     administrative guidance and priorities.
       The Director of National Intelligence should be a Cabinet 
     level position, appointed by the President and subject to 
     Senate confirmation. Congress and the President should also 
     work to insure that the Director of National Intelligence 
     effectively exercises these authorities.
       To insure focused and consistent Intelligence Community 
     leadership, Congress should require that no person may 
     simultaneously serve as both the Director of National 
     Intelligence and the Director of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency, or as the director of any other specific intelligence 
     agency.
       2. Current efforts by the National Security council to 
     examine and revamp existing intelligence priorities should be 
     expedited, given the immediate need for clear guidance in 
     intelligence and counterterrorism efforts. The President 
     should take action to ensure that clear, consistent, and 
     current priorities are established and enforced throughout 
     the Intelligence Community. Once established, these 
     priorities should be reviewed and updated on at least an 
     annual basis to ensure that the allocation of Intelligence 
     Community resources reflects and effectively addresses the 
     continually evolving threat environment. Finally, the 
     establishment of Intelligence Community priorities, and the 
     justification for such priorities, should be reported to both 
     the House and Senate Intelligence Committees on an annual 
     basis.
       3. The National Security Council, in conjunction with the 
     Director of National Intelligence, and in consultation with 
     the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, the 
     Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, should prepare, 
     for the President's

[[Page 7814]]

     approval, a U.S. government-wide strategy for combating 
     terrorism, both at home and abroad, including the growing 
     terrorism threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of 
     mass destruction and associate technologies. This strategy 
     should identify and fully engage those foreign policy, 
     economic, military, intelligence, and law enforcement 
     elements that are critical to a comprehensive blueprint for 
     success in the war against terrorism.
       As part of that effort, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall develop the Intelligence Community 
     component of the strategy, identifying specific programs and 
     budgets and including plans to address the threats posed by 
     Osama Bin Laden and al Qa'ida, Hezbollah, Hamas, and other 
     significant terrorist groups. Consistent with applicable law, 
     the strategy should effectively employ and integrate all 
     capabilities available to the Intelligence Community against 
     those threats and should encompass specific efforts to:
       Develop human sources to penetrate terrorist organization 
     and networks both overseas and within the United States;
       Fully utilize existing and future technologies to better 
     exploit terrorist communications; to improve and expand the 
     use of data mining and other cutting edge analytical tools; 
     and to develop a multi-level security capability to 
     facilitate the timely and complete sharing of relevant 
     intelligence information both within the Intelligence 
     Community and with our appropriate federal, state, and local 
     authorities;
       Enhance the depth and quality of domestic intelligence 
     collection and analysis by, for example, modernizing current 
     intelligence reporting formats through the use of existing 
     information technology to emphasize the existence and the 
     significance of links between new and previously acquired 
     information;
       Maximize the effective use of covert action in 
     counterterrorist efforts;
       Develop programs to deal with financial support for 
     international terrorism; and
       Facilitate the ability of CIA paramilitary units and 
     military special operations forces to conduct joint 
     operations against terrorist targets.
       4. The position of National Intelligence Officer for 
     Terrorism should be created on the National Intelligence and 
     a highly qualified individual appointed to prepare 
     intelligence estimates on terrorism for the use of Congress 
     and policymakers in the Executive Branch and to assist the 
     Intelligence Community in developing a program for strategic 
     analysis and assessments.
       5. Congress and the Administration should ensure the full 
     development within the Department of Homeland Security of an 
     effective all-source terrorism information fusion center that 
     will dramatically improve the focus and quality of 
     counterterrorism analysis and facilitate the timely 
     dissemination of relevant intelligence information, both 
     within and beyond the boundaries of the Intelligence 
     Community. Congress and the Administration should ensure that 
     this fusion center has all the authority and the resources 
     needed to:
       Have full and timely access to all counterterrorism-related 
     intelligence information, including ``raw'' supporting data 
     as needed;
       Have the ability to participate fully in the existing 
     requirements process for tasking the Intelligence Community 
     to gather information on foreign individuals, entities and 
     threats;
       Integrate such information in order to identify and assess 
     the nature and scope of terrorist threats to the United 
     States in light of actual and potential vulnerabilities;
       Implement and fully utilize data mining and other advanced 
     analytical tools, consistent with applicable law;
       Retain a permanent staff of experienced and highly skilled 
     analysts, supplemented on a regular basis by personnel on 
     ``joint tours'' from the various Intelligence Community 
     agencies;
       Institute a reporting mechanism that enables analysts at 
     all the intelligence and law enforcement agencies to post 
     lead information for use by analysts at other agencies 
     without waiting for dissemination of a formal report;
       Maintain excellence and creativity in staff analytic skills 
     through regular use of analysis and language training 
     programs; and
       Establish and sustain effective channels for the exchange 
     of counterterrorism-related information with federal agencies 
     outside the Intelligence Community as well as with state and 
     local authorities.
       6. Given the FBI's history of repeated shortcomings within 
     its current responsibility for domestic intelligence, and in 
     the face of grave and immediate threats to our homeland, the 
     FBI should strengthen and improve its domestic capability as 
     fully and expeditiously as possible by immediately 
     instituting measures to:
       Strengthen counterterrorism as a national FBI program by 
     clearly designating national counterterrorism priorities and 
     enforcing field office adherence to those priorities;
       Establish and sustain independent career tracks within the 
     FBI that recognize and provide incentives for demonstrated 
     skills and performance of counterterrorism agents and 
     analysts;
       Significantly improve strategic analytical capabilities by 
     assuring the qualification, training, and independence of 
     analysts, coupled with sufficient access to necessary 
     information and resources;
       Establish a strong reports officer cadre at FBI 
     Headquarters and field offices to facilitate timely 
     dissemination of intelligence from agents and to analysts 
     within the FBI and other agencies within the Intelligence 
     Community;
       Implement training for agents in the effective use of 
     analysts and analysis in their work;
       Expand and sustain the recruitment of agents and analysts 
     with the linguistic skills needed in counterterrorism 
     efforts;
       Increase substantially efforts to penetrate terrorist 
     organizations operating in the United States through all 
     available means of collection;
       Improve the national security law training of FBI 
     personnel;
       Implement mechanisms to maximize the exchange of 
     counterterrorism-related information between the FBI and 
     other federal, state and local agencies; and
       Finally solve the FBI's persistent and incapacitating 
     information technology problems.
       7. Congress and the Administration should carefully 
     consider how best to structure and manage U.S. domestic 
     intelligence responsibilities. Congress should review the 
     scope of domestic intelligence authorities to determine their 
     adequacy in pursuing coun-
     terterrorism at home and ensuring the protection of privacy 
     and other rights guaranteed under the Constitution. This 
     review should include, for example, such questions as whether 
     the range of persons subject to searches and surveillances 
     authorized under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     (FISA) should be expanded.
       Based on their oversight responsibilities, the Intelligence 
     and Judiciary Committees of the Congress, as appropriate, 
     should consider promptly, in consultation with the 
     Administration, whether the FBI should continue to perform 
     the domestic intelligence functions of the United States 
     Government or whether legislation is necessary to remedy this 
     problem, including the possibility of creating a new agency 
     to perform those functions.
       Congress should require that the new Director of National 
     Intelligence, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of the 
     Department of Homeland Security report to the President and 
     the Congress on a date certain concerning:
       The FBI's progress since September 11, 2001 in implementing 
     the reforms required to conduct an effective domestic 
     intelligence program, including the measures recommended 
     above;
       The experience of other democratic nations in organizing 
     the conduct of domestic intelligence;
       The specific manner in which a new domestic intelligence 
     service could be established in the United States, 
     recognizing the need to enhance national security while fully 
     protecting civil liberties; and
       Their recommendations on how to best fulfill the nation's 
     need for an effective domestic intelligence capability, 
     including necessary legislation.
       8. The Attorney General and the Director of the FBI should 
     take action necessary to ensure that:
       The Office of Intelligence Policy and Review and other 
     Department of Justice components provide in-depth training to 
     the FBI and other members of the Intelligence Community 
     regarding the use of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Act (FISA) to address terrorist threats to the United States;
       The FBI disseminates results of searches and surveillances 
     authorized under FISA to appropriate personnel with the FBI 
     and the intelligence Community on a timely basis so they may 
     be used for analysis and operations that address terrorist 
     threats to the United States.
       The FBI develops and implements a plan to use authorities 
     provided by FISA to assess the threat of international 
     terrorist groups within the United States fully, including 
     the extent to which such groups are funded or otherwise 
     supported by foreign governments.
       9. The House and Senate Intelligence and Judiciary 
     Committees should continue to examine the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act and its implementation 
     thoroughly, particularly with respect to changes made as a 
     result of the USA PATRIOT Act and the subsequent decision of 
     the United States Foreign Intelligence Court of Review, to 
     determine whether its provisions adequately address present 
     and emerging terrorist threats to the United States. 
     Legislation should be proposed by those Committees to remedy 
     any deficiencies identified as a result of that review.
       10. The Director of the National Security Agency should 
     present to the Director of National Intelligence and the 
     Secretary of Defense by June 30, 2003, and report to the 
     House and Senate Intelligence Committees, a detailed plan 
     that:
       Describes solutions for the technological challenges for 
     signals intelligence;
       Requires a review, on a quarterly basis, of the goals, 
     products to be delivered, Funding levels and schedules for 
     every technology development program;

[[Page 7815]]

       Ensures strict accounting for program expenditures;
       Within their jurisdiction as established by current law, 
     makes NSA a full collaborating partner with the Central 
     Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
     in the war on terrorism, including fully integrating the 
     collection and analytic capabilities of NSA, CIA, and the 
     FBI; and
       Makes recommendations for legislation needed to facilitate 
     their goals.
       In evaluating the plan, the Committees should also consider 
     issues pertaining to whether civilians should be appointed to 
     the position of Director of the National Security Agency and 
     whether the term of service for the position should be longer 
     than it has been in the recent past.
       11. Recognizing that the Intelligence Community's employees 
     remain its greatest resource, the Director of National 
     Intelligence should require that measures be implemented to 
     greatly enhance the recruitment and development of a 
     workforce with the intelligence skills and expertise needed 
     for success in counterterrorist efforts, including:
       The agencies of the Intelligence Community should act 
     promptly to expand and improve counterterrorism training 
     programs within the Community, insuring coverage of such 
     critical areas as information sharing among law enforcement 
     and intelligence personnel; language capabilities; the use of 
     the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act; and watchlisting;
       The Intelligence Community should build on the provisions 
     of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 
     regarding the development of language capabilities, including 
     the Act's requirement for a report on the feasibility of 
     establishing a Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps, and implement 
     expeditiously measures to identify and recruit linguists 
     outside the Community whose abilities are relevant to the 
     needs of counterterrorism;
       The existing Intelligence Community Reserve Corps should be 
     expanded to ensure the use of relevant personnel and 
     expertise from outside the Community as special needs arise;
       Congress should consider enacting legislation, modeled on 
     the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, to instill the concept of 
     ``jointness'' through the Intelligence Community. By 
     emphasizing such things as joint education, a joint career 
     specialty, increased authority for regional commanders, and 
     joint exercises, that Act greatly enhanced the joint 
     warfighting capabilities of the individual military services. 
     Legislation to instill similar concepts throughout the 
     Intelligence Community could help improve management of 
     Community resources and priorities and insure a far more 
     effective ``team'' effort by all the intelligence agencies. 
     The Director of National Intelligence should require more 
     extensive use of ``joint tours'' for intelligence and 
     appropriate law enforcement personnel to broaden their 
     experience and help bridge existing organizational and 
     cultural divides through service in other agencies. These 
     joint tours should include not only service at Intelligence 
     Community agencies, but also service in those agencies that 
     are users or consumers of intelligence products. Serious 
     incentives for joint service should be established throughout 
     the Intelligence Community and personnel should be rewarded 
     for joint service with career advancement credit at 
     individual agencies. The Director of National Intelligence 
     should also require Intelligence Community agencies to 
     participate in joint exercises;
       Congress should expand and improve existing educational 
     grant programs focused on intelligence-related fields, 
     similar to military scholarship programs and others that 
     provide financial assistance in return for a committee to 
     serve in the Intelligence Community; and
       The Intelligence Community should enhance recruitment of a 
     more ethnically and culturally diverse workforce and devised 
     a strategy to capitalize upon the unique cultural and 
     linguistic capabilities of first-generation Americans, a 
     strategy designed to utilize their skills to the greatest 
     practical effect while recognizing the potential 
     counterintelligence challenges such hiring decisions might 
     pose.
       12. Steps should be taken to increase and ensure the 
     greatest return on this nation's substantial investment in 
     intelligence, including:
       The President should submit budget recommendations, and 
     Congress should enact budget authority, for sustained, long-
     term investment in counterterrorism capabilities that avoid 
     dependence on repeated stop-gap supplemental appropriations;
       In making such budget recommendations, the President should 
     provide for the consideration of a separate classified 
     Intelligence Community budget;
       Long-term counterterrorism investment should be accompanied 
     by sufficient flexibility, subject to congressional 
     oversight, to enable the Intelligence Community to rapidly 
     respond to altered or unanticipated needs;
       The Director of National Intelligence should insure that 
     Intelligence Community budgeting practices and procedures are 
     revised to better identify the levels and nature of 
     counterterrorism funding within the Community;
       Counterterrorism funding should be allocated in accordance 
     with the program requirements of the national 
     counterterrorism strategy; and
       Due consideration should be given to directing an outside 
     agency or entity to conduct a thorough and rigorous cost-
     benefit analysis of the resources spent on intelligence.
       13. The State Department, in consultation with the 
     Department of Justice, should review and report to the 
     President and the Congress by June 30, 2003 on the extent to 
     which revisions in bilateral and multilateral agreements, 
     including extradition and mutual assistance treaties, would 
     strengthen U.S. counterterrorism efforts. The review should 
     address the degree to which current categories of 
     extraditable offenses should be expanded to cover offenses, 
     such as visa and immigration fraud, which may be particularly 
     useful against terrorists and those who support them.
       14. Recognizing the importance of intelligence in this 
     nation's struggle against terrorism, Congress should maintain 
     vigorous, informed, and constructive oversight of the 
     Intelligence Community. To best achieve that goal, the 
     National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
     States should study and make recommendations, concerning how 
     Congress may improve its oversight of the Intelligence 
     Community, including consideration of such areas as:
       Changes in the budgetary process;
       Changes in the rules regarding membership on the oversight 
     committees;
       Whether oversight responsibility should be vested in a 
     joint House-Senate Committee or, as currently exists, in 
     separate Committees in each house;
       The extent to which classification decisions impair 
     congressional oversight; and
       How Congressional oversight can best contribute to the 
     continuing need of the Intelligence Community to evolve and 
     adapt to changes in the subject matter of intelligence and 
     the needs of policy makers.
       15. The President should review and consider amendments to 
     the Executive Orders, policies and procedures that govern the 
     national security classification of intelligence information, 
     in an effort to expand access to relevant information for 
     federal agencies outside the Intelligence Community, for 
     state and local authorities, which are critical to the fight 
     against terrorism, and for the American public. In addition, 
     the President and the heads of federal agencies should ensure 
     that the policies and procedures to protect against the 
     unauthorized disclosure of classified intelligence 
     information are well understood, fully implemented and 
     vigorously enforced.
       Congress should also review the statues, policies and 
     procedures that govern the national security classification 
     of intelligence information and its protection from 
     unauthorized disclosure. Among other matters, Congress should 
     consider the degree to which excessive classification has 
     been used in the past and the extent to which the emerging 
     threat environment has greatly increased the need for real-
     time sharing of sensitive information. The Director of 
     National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of 
     Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security, and the Attorney General, should review and report 
     to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees on proposals 
     for a new and more realistic approach to the processes and 
     structures that have governed the designation of sensitive 
     and classified information. The report should include 
     proposals to protect against the use of the classification 
     process as a shield to protect agency self-interest.
       16. Assured standards of accountability are critical to 
     developing the personal responsibility, urgency, and 
     diligence which our counterterrorism responsibility requires. 
     Given the absence of any substantial efforts within the 
     Intelligence Community to impose accountability in relation 
     to the events of September 11, 2001, the Director of Central 
     Intelligence and the heads of Intelligence Community agencies 
     should require that measures designed to ensure 
     accountability are implemented throughout the Community.
       To underscore the need for accountability:
       The Director of Central Intelligence should report to the 
     House and Senate Intelligence Committee no later than June 
     30, 2003 as to the steps taken to implement a system of 
     accountability throughout the Intelligence Community, to 
     include processes for identifying poor performance and 
     affixing responsibility for it, and for recognizing and 
     rewarding excellence in performance.
       As part of the confirmation process for Intelligence 
     Community officials, Congress should require from those 
     officials an affirmative commitment to the implementation and 
     use of strong accountability mechanisms throughout the 
     Intelligence Community; and
       The Inspectors General at the Central Intelligence Agency, 
     the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, and the 
     Department of State should review the factual findings and 
     the record of this Inquiry and conduct investigations and 
     reviews as necessary to determine whether and to what extent 
     personnel at all levels should be held accountable for any 
     omission, commission, or failure to meet professional 
     standards in regard to the identification, prevention, or

[[Page 7816]]

     disruption of terrorist attacks, including the events of 
     September 11, 2001. These reviews should also address those 
     individuals who performed in a stellar or exceptional manner, 
     and the degree to which the quality of their performance was 
     rewarded or otherwise impacted their careers. Based on those 
     investigations and reviews, agency heads should take 
     appropriate disciplinary and other action and the President 
     and the House and Senate Intelligence Committees should be 
     advised of such action.
       17. The Administration should review and report to the 
     House and Senate Intelligence Committees by June 30, 2003 
     regarding what progress has been made in reducing the 
     inappropriate and obsolete barriers among intelligence and 
     law enforcement agencies engaged in counterterrorism, what 
     remains to be done to reduce those barriers, and what 
     legislative actions may be advisable in that regard. In 
     particular, this report should address what steps are being 
     taken to insure that perceptions within the Intelligence 
     Community about the scope and limits of current law and 
     policy with respect to restrictions on collection and 
     information sharing are, in fact, accurate and well-founded.
       18. Congress and the Administration should ensure the full 
     development of a national watchlist center that will be 
     responsible for coordinating and integrating all terrorist-
     related watchlist systems; promoting awareness and use of the 
     center by all relevant government agencies and elements of 
     the private sector; and ensuring a consistent and 
     comprehensive flow of terrorist names into the center from 
     all relevant points of collection.
       19. The Intelligence Community, and particularly the FBI 
     and the CIA, should aggressively address the possibility that 
     foreign governments are providing support to or are involved 
     in terrorist activity targeting the United States and 
     interests. State-sponsored terrorism substantially increases 
     the likelihood of successful and more lethal attacks within 
     the United States. This issue must be addressed from a 
     national standpoint and should not be limited in focus by the 
     geographical and factual boundaries of individual cases. The 
     FBI and CIA should aggressively and thoroughly pursue related 
     matters developed through this Joint Inquiry that have been 
     referred to them for further investigation by these 
     Committees.
       The Intelligence Community should fully inform the House 
     and Senate Intelligence Committees of significant 
     developments in these efforts, through regular reports and 
     additional communications as necessary, and the Committee 
     should, in turn, exercise vigorous and continuing oversight 
     of the Community's work in this critically important area.

  Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a 
quorum.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.
  Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Chair.
  (The remarks of Mr. Specter pertaining to the submission of S. Res. 
101 is located in today's Record under ``Submitted Resolutions.'')
  Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, it was with great sorrow that I learned 
last week of the death of our former colleague, Senator Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan of New York.
  Senator Moynihan, was an intellectual giant in the Senate and 
throughout his service to our Nation. The breadth of his interests--and 
his knowledge--was extraordinary. From questions about the architecture 
and urban development of Washington, D.C. to the problems created by 
single parent families to the workings of the International Labor 
Organization, Senator Moynihan had thought deeply and designed policy 
answers. I don't think there was a Senator who served with Pat Moynihan 
who didn't learn something from Senator Moynihan's vast stock of 
personal experience, understanding of history, and ability to draw 
parallels between seemingly unrelated topics to enlighten our 
understanding of both.
  I will always have fond memories of the several occasions on which I 
joined Senator Moynihan in the Senators' private dining room and was 
treated to a lunchtime tutorial. I could ask a question on virtually 
any topic and get a dissertation in response. Our conversations ranged 
from art history to baseball, American history, our Middle East policy, 
the history of science and scientific advancement, and more. Seemingly 
there was no topic on which Pat did not have unique insight, and I 
always came away from those lunches feeling like I had just emerged 
from an intellectually stimulating graduate seminar.
  I had the particular pleasure of serving with Senator Moynihan on the 
Finance Committee for eight years. As Chairman and as ranking member of 
the Finance Committee, Senator Moynihan was a true leader. Starting in 
1993, when I took Senator Bentsen's seat on the Committee and Senator 
Moynihan claimed his chairmanship, Chairman Moynihan successfully 
guided the 1993 economic plan through the committee and the Senate. 
That budget, which I was proud to help shape and support, laid the 
foundation for the record economic expansion of the 1990s.
  After Republicans took control of the Senate in the 1994 election, 
Senator Moynihan was a fierce critic of their excessive tax cut 
proposals. We joined in opposing shortsighted proposals to have 
Medicare ``wither on the vine,'' turn Medicaid into a block grant, and 
destroy welfare rather than reforming it. Senator Moynihan was, as 
always, an especially passionate defender of teaching hospitals, 
warning that the plan to slash spending for Medicare's graduate medical 
education would threaten medical research in this country--a fear that 
has proved well-founded as teaching hospitals have struggled to survive 
the much smaller changes enacted as part of the compromise Balanced 
Budget Act that emerged in 1997.
  The Finance Committee--and the Senate--would not have been the same 
without him. Who else will be able to gently tutor witnesses on the 
relevance of the grain trade in upstate New York in the early 
nineteenth century to a current debate about health care policy? Who 
else will call for the Boskin and Secrecy Commissions of the future? 
And who else will educate his colleagues on the impact on our society 
of the demographic time bomb of the baby boom generation?
  The Senate has lost a legend. The country has lost a brilliant and 
unconventional thinker who contributed greatly to our society on fronts 
ranging across transportation, welfare and poverty, racism and civil 
rights, and architecture and urban planning.
  I will miss Pat Moynihan. I will miss his sly wit, his apt and 
splendidly diverse quotations, his sharp questioning and distrust of 
glib answers, and his fierce humanity. On behalf of myself and my wife 
Lucy, I want to express my deepest condolences to his wife Liz, their 
children and the rest of his family and friends. My heart goes out to 
them.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to honor Senator Daniel 
Patrick Moynihan, an intellectual pioneer who I felt honored to serve 
with in the U.S. Senate. He rose from humble beginnings to Harvard, and 
to a life of service in four different Presidential administrations, as 
an ambassador to India and the U.N., and as New York's Senator for four 
terms. Throughout his career in service, he paved his own path--one of 
integrity, independence, and principled leadership on the critical 
national questions of our age.
  Whenever he spoke I listened closely, because I knew I would always 
learn something from him. He possessed tremendous intellect and 
foresight, showed unflagging courage in championing unsung causes, and 
commanded extraordinary respect on both sides of the aisle. He was a 
true renaissance man who put action behind his diverse interests: from 
protecting the sanctity of the American family, to preserving historic 
art and architecture, to restoring Pennsylvania Avenue as America's 
``main street,'' to saving Social Security for future generations.
  I offer my condolences to his wife Elizabeth, who was truly his life 
partner. There will no doubt be a memorial built in his honor someday 
soon on the streets of New York; but Senator Moynihan's legacy is 
already living--in safer streets in our cities, a cleaner environment, 
and a stronger national community. To borrow a memorable Moynihan 
phrase, his life defined public service and public policy up for all

[[Page 7817]]

who aspire to contribute to our country.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Murkowski). The Senator from Montana.

                          ____________________