[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 5]
[Senate]
[Pages 5932-5934]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                       WINNING THE PEACE IN IRAQ

  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, as President Bush prepares for war with 
Iraq, the administration also must prepare to win the peace.
  While I have grave reservations about this administration's rush to 
war with Iraq, we all hope that if the President goes forward, the war 
will be quick and our troops will be safe.
  But we must also recognize that once war is launched, American 
obligations in Iraq are only just beginning. The instant we occupy 
Iraq, we become responsible for the security, care, and feeding of its 
people--even the education of its children. Years of reconstruction and 
assistance to the Iraqi people will be necessary to bring Iraq to 
independence into the family of nations. And we can expect an American 
presence in that country for months and even years to come.
  This is an enormous enterprise and an extraordinary obligation. But 
to win the peace in Iraq, we must get it right.
  Today the Council on Foreign Relations issued a report on how this 
might be accomplished. The experts who contributed to this thoughtful 
report bring years of experience in addressing post-conflict 
reconstruction issues in both Republican and Democratic 
administrations.
  The task force that developed this report was chaired by former 
Ambassador Thomas Pickering and former Defense Secretary James 
Schlesinger. And the project director is Eric Schwartz, who served in 
the Clinton White House as a senior official in the National Security 
Council.
  The administration and Congress would do well to heed their 
recommendations. And I ask unanimous consent that the executive summary 
of the report be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                          Iraq: The Day After


       report of an independent task force on post-conflict iraq

Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, Thomas R. Pickering and 
James R. Schlesinger, Co-Chairs, and Eric P. Schwartz, Project Director


                           EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

       If the United States goes to war and removes the regime of 
     Saddam Hussein, American interests will demand an 
     extraordinary commitment of U.S. financial and personnel 
     resources to post-conflict transitional assistance and 
     reconstruction. These interests include eliminating Iraqi 
     weapons of mass destruction (WMD); ending Iraqi contacts, 
     whether limited or extensive, with international terrorist 
     organizations; ensuring that a post-transition Iraqi 
     government can maintain the country's territorial integrity 
     and independence while contributing to regional stability; 
     and offering the people of Iraq a future in which they have a 
     meaningful voice in the vital decisions that impact their 
     lives.
       But U.S. officials have yet to fully describe to Congress 
     and the American people the magnitude of the resources that 
     will be required to meet post-conflict needs. Nor have they 
     outlined in detail their perspectives on the structure of 
     post-conflict governance. The Task Force believes that these 
     issues require immediate attention, and encourages the 
     administration to take action in four key areas:
       Key Recommendation #1: An American political commitment to 
     the future of Iraq: The president should build on his recent 
     statements in support of U.S. engagement in Iraq by making 
     clear to Congress, the American people, and the people of 
     Iraq that the United States will stay the course. He should 
     announce a multibillion dollar, multiyear post-conflict 
     reconstruction program and seek formal congressional 
     endorsement. By announcing such a program, the president 
     would give Iraqis confidence that the United States are 
     committed to contribute meaningfully to the development of 
     Iraq and would enable U.S. government agencies to plan more 
     effectively for long-term U.S. involvement.
       The scale of American resources that will be required could 
     amount to some $20 billion per year for several years. This 
     figure assumes a deployment of 75,000 troops for post-
     conflict peace stabilization (at about $16.8 billion 
     annually), as well as funding for humanitarian and 
     reconstruction assistance (as

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     recommended immediately below). If the troop requirements are 
     much larger than 75,000--a genuine possibility--the funding 
     requirement would be much greater.
       For reconstruction and humanitarian assistance alone, the 
     president should request from Congress $3 billion for a one-
     year period, and make clear the United States will be 
     prepared to make substantial additional contributions in the 
     future. This initial contribution would include $2.5 billion 
     for reconstruction and $500 million for humanitarian aid. 
     (However, if there are significant interruptions in the 
     availability of Iraqi oil revenues for the Oil for Food 
     Program, the figure for humanitarian assistance would need to 
     be considerably higher).
       Key Recommendation #2: Protecting Iraqi civilians--a key to 
     winning the peace: From the outset of conflict, the U.S. 
     military should deploy forces with a mission to establish 
     public security and provide humanitarian aid. This is 
     distinct from the tasks generally assigned to combat troops, 
     but it will be critical to preventing lawlessness and 
     reassuring Iraqis who might otherwise flee their homes. As 
     women and children will constitute the majority of refugees 
     and internally displaced persons, special efforts should be 
     made to ensure that they are protected from sexual assault 
     and that their medical and health care needs are met. The 
     Bush administration should sustain this public security focus 
     throughout the transition. None of the other U.S. objectives 
     in rebuilding Iraq would be realized in the absence of public 
     security. If the administration fails to address this issue 
     effectively, it would fuel the perception that the result of 
     the U.S. intervention is an increase in humanitarian 
     suffering.
       Additional recommendations--protecting Iraqi civilians: 
     Assist civilian victims of any use of WMD. The U.S. and 
     coalition partners should be ready to conduct rapid 
     assessment of any WMD damage, publicize the results of such 
     assessments, provide information to Iraqis on how to mitigate 
     the impact of WMD use, and provide assistance to alleviate 
     the health effects of WMD exposures should it occur.
       Seek to ensure protection for displaced persons and 
     refugees. Administration officials should press neighboring 
     governments to provide safe haven in their countries to 
     fleeing Iraqis. If the government of Turkey and other 
     governments are determined to establish camps within the 
     territory of Iraq, U.S. officials should seek to ensure that 
     such camps are safe and secure.
       Sustain, for the time being, the basic structure of the Oil 
     for Food Program. U.S. officials should work closely and 
     intensively with the World Food Program (WFP) to ensure the 
     continuation of the distribution network that sustains the 
     Oil for Food Program in central and southern Iraq. The 
     program should be modified over time to ensure transparency 
     and effectiveness in meeting Iraqi needs.
       Actively recruit international civilian police (civpol) and 
     constabulary forces. Constabulary units such as Italy's 
     Carabinieri have equipment, training, and organization that 
     enable it to maintain public order and address civil unrest. 
     In addition, international civilian police could play an 
     important role in vetting, training, and mentoring Iraqi 
     police.
       Key Recommendation #3: Sharing the burden for post-conflict 
     transition and reconstruction: The Bush administration should 
     move quickly to involve international organizations and other 
     governments in the post-conflict transition and 
     reconstruction process. This move will lighten the load on 
     U.S. military and civilian personnel, and help to diminish 
     the impression that the United States seeks to control post-
     transition Iraq.
       The Bush administration will likely be reluctant, 
     especially early in the transition process, to sacrifice 
     unity of command. On the other hand, other governments may be 
     hesitant to participate in activities in which they have 
     little responsibility. The Task Force recommends that the 
     administration address this dilemma by promoting post-
     conflict Security Council resolutions that endorse U.S. 
     leadership on security and interim civil administration in 
     post-conflict Iraq, but also envision meaningful 
     international participation and the sharing of responsibility 
     for decision-making in important areas. The resolutions could 
     direct WFP or another international humanitarian organization 
     to assume lead responsibility for humanitarian assistance 
     (and involve NGOs and Iraqi civil society in aid management 
     and delivery); indicate that the United Nations will take 
     responsibility in organizing (with U.S. support and 
     assistance) the political consultative process leading to a 
     transition to a new Iraqi government; establish an oil 
     oversight board for Iraq; authorize the continuation of the 
     UN's Oil for Food Program; establish a consortium of donors 
     in conjunction with the World Bank and the IMF, to consider 
     Iraqi reconstruction needs as well as debt relief; and 
     indicate that responsibilities in other areas could be 
     transferred to the United Nations and/or other governments as 
     conditions permit.
       Key recommendation #4: Making Iraqis stakeholders 
     throughout the transition process: The administration should 
     ensure that Iraqis continued to play key roles in the 
     administration of public institutions, subject to adequate 
     vetting. Continuity of basic services will be essential, and 
     will require that thousands of Iraqi civil servants continue 
     to do their jobs. In addition, every effort should be made 
     quickly to establish Iraqi consultative mechanisms on 
     political, constitutional, and legal issues, so that the 
     period of interim governance will be limited and 
     characterized by Iraqi engagement on the political as well as 
     administrative level.
       Additional recommendation--making Iraqis stakeholders: 
     Encourage a geographically based, federal system of 
     government in Iraq. In northern Iraq, the Kurdish population 
     has operated outside of regime control for over a decade. 
     While decisions on Iraq's constitutional structure should be 
     made by Iraqis, the Task Force believes that a solution short 
     of a federal system will risk conflict in a future Iraq, and 
     that U.S. officials should adopt this perspective in their 
     discussions with Iraqi counterparts and with Iraq's 
     neighbors.


               other issues of concern to the task force

       The rule of law and accountability: Police training must be 
     supplemented by efforts to build other components of a system 
     of justice, especially courts. The Task Force thus makes the 
     following recommendations: Deploy judicial teams, seek 
     international involvement. The administration should promote 
     the post-conflict deployment of U.S. and international legal 
     and judicial assistance teams to help address immediate and 
     longer term post-conflict justice issues.
       Act early on accountability, seek international involvement 
     in the process, and ensure a key role for Iraqis. Given the 
     enormity of human rights abuses by the regime, the Task Force 
     believes that accountability issues should be an early 
     priority for the transitional administration. International 
     involvement in the process, either through the creation of an 
     international ad hoc tribunal, or the development of a mixed 
     tribunal, will enhance the prospects for success. The Task 
     Force notes that a truth and reconciliation process could be 
     established concurrently with such a tribunal, as a 
     complement to criminal accountability for those who bear 
     greatest responsibility for abuses.
       The Iraqi oil industry: U.S. officials will have to develop 
     a posture on a range of questions relating to control the oil 
     industry, such as how decisions on contracts for equipment 
     and oil field rehabilitation will be made; who will consider 
     and make judgments on the viability of executory contracts 
     for development of oil fields, which have as a condition 
     precedent the lifting of sanctions; and what will be required 
     for transition from the Oil for Food Program to a transparent 
     and accountable indigenous system to receive and disburse 
     oil-related revenues?
       The Task Force recommends that the administration strike a 
     careful balance between the need to ensure that oil revenues 
     benefit the people of Iraq and the importance of respecting 
     the right of Iraqis to make decisions about their country's 
     natural resources. In particular, the administration should 
     undertake the following steps: Emphasize publicly that the 
     United States will respect and defend Iraqi ownership of the 
     country's economic resources, especially oil; seek an 
     internationally sanctioned legal framework to assure a 
     reliable flow of Iraqi oil and to reserve to a future Iraqi 
     government the determination of Iraq's general oil policy. 
     The removal of the regime will not alter Iraqi obligations 
     under the existing, UN-managed, legal framework for oil, but 
     it will likely result in the need for modifications. The Task 
     Force believes that a new framework, which could be affirmed 
     by a Security Council resolution, could establish a decision-
     making oversight board with international and significant 
     Iraqi participation.
       Address potential impact of regime change on Jordanian oil 
     imports from Iraq. The Iraqi regime has provided the 
     government of Jordan with free and heavily discounted oil. It 
     is unclear whether such arrangements would continue in the 
     post-conflict environment. In view of Jordan's economic 
     situation and its important role on regional and 
     international security issues, the administration should make 
     efforts to address Jordanians needs in this area.
       Regional diplomatic and security issues: In the Gulf, U.S. 
     officials will confront the challenge of effectively 
     downsizing the Iraqi military while seeking to promote a 
     longer-term security balance in which Iraq's territorial 
     integrity can be maintained. In the Middle East, a successful 
     U.S. and coalition intervention in Iraq will raise 
     expectations about a new U.S. diplomatic initiative on the 
     Arab-Israeli dispute. On these issues, the Task Force makes 
     the following recommendations: Closely monitor restructuring 
     and professionalization of the Iraqi military, as well as 
     disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. These tasks 
     are likely to be carried out largely by private contractors 
     and/or international development organizations, and will 
     require close supervision of what might otherwise be an 
     uncoordinated effort. In addition, the Bush administration 
     should promote programs in this area that include curricula 
     emphasizing civilian control of the military and respect of 
     human rights.
       Consider a regional forum for discussion of security 
     issues. The administration should

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     strongly consider encouraging a security forum with states in 
     the region. The forum could address confidence-building 
     measures, and related issues such as external security 
     guarantees and nonproliferation.
       Initiate post-conflict action on the Middle East Peace 
     Process. The Task Force encourages the administration to give 
     high priority to an active, post-conflict effort to engage 
     the peace process, and also believes that any such action by 
     the administration must be accompanied by greater efforts by 
     Arab states and the Palestinian leadership to discourage and 
     condemn acts of terrorism and violence against Israelis and 
     elsewhere in the region.

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