[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 5]
[House]
[Pages 5808-5809]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




   IMPLICATIONS OF WAR WITH IRAQ MUST BE EXPLAINED BY ADMINISTRATION

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the order of the House of 
January 7, 2003, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Brown) is recognized 
during morning hour debates for 5 minutes.
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, the administration continues to 
assert rightly that Saddam Hussein is an evil dictator, but the 
administration fails to explain how a preemptive war is in the best 
interest of the American people.
  On February 25 I introduced House Joint Resolution 24 with the 
gentlewoman from California (Mrs.

[[Page 5809]]

Tauscher) and the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Hoeffel.) The 
resolution requires the President to submit a new report to Congress 
that answers eight specific questions. It includes a sense of Congress 
clause that requests the President present the report before a public 
joint session of Congress.
  It is our duty in Congress on behalf of the American people to ensure 
that if the President authorizes military force against Iraq, that he 
first give Congress a full accounting of the potential cost and the 
potential consequences.
  The two reports submitted to Congress by the administration under 
requirements of the October resolution have failed to communicate the 
President's plans for Iraq. The administration in reports included no 
indication of the potential financial costs of the war and its 
aftermath, no indication of how weapons of mass destruction will be 
secured, and no discussion of blow-backs, the CIA term for terrorist 
actions against the United States.
  The second report clearly acknowledges the magnitude of the task of 
reconstructing and stabilizing Iraq, calling it a massive undertaking. 
Unfortunately, the report fails to explain how this challenge will be 
overcome, what level of financial, what level of political, what level 
of military commitment that the administration is willing to make in 
Iraq after the war.
  Before the U.S. initiates a preemptive strike, something we have 
never done before, without the consensus of the U.N. Security Council 
and in the absence of a clear, imminent threat to the United States of 
America, the administration must clearly explain to the American people 
the short- and long-term implications of attacking Iraq. H.R. 24 asks, 
and the administration should answer to the American public and to 
Congress:
  Have we exhausted every diplomatic means of disarming Iraq?
  Will America be safer from terrorism if we attack Iraq?
  How will we deal with the humanitarian crisis that inevitably will 
follow this war?
  How will the war with Iraq affect our already weak economy?
  What will reconstruction of Iraq and providing humanitarian 
assistance to that country cost? And how long will it take, how long 
will American troops and civilians be stationed there and at what cost?
  How will attacking Iraq prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, when Korea and Libya and other countries, and Iran, for 
instance, are much further along with nuclear development, we know, 
than Iraq is?
  What will preemptive war do to the stability of the Middle East?
  Are we ready to commit to a decade of military troops policing Iraq 
and the billions of dollars needed to rebuild and stabilize that 
country and make that country, in the words of the President, into a 
democracy?
  These important questions need to be answered to the American public 
before President Bush decides preemptively, without U.N. support, to 
attack another country.
  The Washington Post reported today: ``The greatest source of concern 
among senior army leaders is the uncertainty and complexity of the 
mission in postwar Iraq, which could require U.S. forces,'' and get 
this, ``to protect Iraq's borders, referee clashes between ethnic and 
religious groups, ensure civilian security, provide humanitarian 
relief, secure possible chemical and biological weapon sites, and 
govern hundreds of towns and villages.'' Simply put, we could be in the 
middle of a civil war.
  How has the administration responded to these concerns? With silence. 
There are no legitimate plans for reconstruction that anyone has seen. 
There are no cost estimates for the conflict or the post-conflict 
occupation. There are no casualty estimates. These are concerns we must 
address.
  Retired Army Major General William Nash commanded the first 
peacekeeping operation in the Balkans in 1995. After the Gulf War in 
1991, he occupied the area around the Iraqi town of Safwan on the 
Kuwaiti border almost 2 years ago. He told The Post that during this 
time his troops dealt with recurring murders, attempted murders, 
``ample opportunity,'' in his words, ``for civil disorder,'' and 
refugee flows they could never fully fathom. He went on to say that 
200,000 U.S. and allied forces will be necessary to stabilize Iraq. Two 
hundred thousand.
  Note that he uses the term ``allied forces'' in that total. If we 
continue on the course we are on, there will be few allied forces. 
Maybe Great Britain, maybe a few Turks, if we pay them enough, maybe a 
few Spaniards, maybe a few Italians, but overwhelming almost all of 
those 200,000 will be Americans and we will be footing the bill alone.
  The civilian leadership at the Pentagon and the Department of Defense 
continually refuse to acknowledge the enormity of the challenge in 
post-conflict Iraq. They respond to inquires with delay tactics and 
uncertain estimates.
  I am certain of one thing, Mr. Speaker. Any action against Iraq will 
be difficult, costly, and dangerous if we do not go to the U.N. 
Security Council.

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