[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 4]
[Senate]
[Pages 5401-5404]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                             MOSCOW TREATY

  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the Senate now 
resume consideration of the Moscow Treaty and that Senator Feinstein be 
recognized in order to offer an amendment. I would simply add the 
chairman is tied up in a committee hearing, but I know he would want 
the Senator from California to go ahead.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       Resolution of Ratification to Accompany Treaty Document 
     107-8, Treaty Between the United States of America and the 
     Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California is recognized.


                           Amendment No. 251

       (Purpose: To provide an additional declaration)
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I send an amendment to the desk on behalf of Senators 
Leahy, Wyden, Harkin, and myself.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from California [Mrs. Feinstein], for herself, 
     Mr. Leahy, Mr. Wyden, and Mr. Harkin, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 251.

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I ask unanimous consent the reading of the amendment 
be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of section 3, add the following new declaration:
       (7) Stand-down from alert status of forces covered by 
     treaty.--Noting that the Administration has stated that 
     ``[t]he first planned step in reducing U.S. operationally 
     deployed strategic nuclear warheads will be to retire 50 
     Peacekeeper ICBMs, remove four Trident Submarines from 
     strategic service, and no longer maintain the ability to 
     return the B-1 to nuclear service,'' the Senate--
       (A) encourages the President, within 180 days after the 
     exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty, to 
     initiate in a safe and verifiable manner a bilateral stand-
     down from alert status of all United States and Russian 
     Federation nuclear weapons systems that will no longer be 
     operationally deployed under the Treaty, but which the United 
     States and the Russian Federation may keep operationally 
     deployed under the Treaty until December 31, 2012; and
       (B) expects a representative of the executive branch of the 
     Government to offer regular briefings to the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the 
     Senate regarding--
       (i) the alert status of the nuclear forces of the United 
     States and the Russian Federation;
       (ii) any determination of the President to order a stand-
     down of the alert status of United States nuclear forces; and
       (iii) any progress in establishing cooperative measures 
     with the Russian Federation to effect a stand-down of the 
     alert status of Russian Federation nuclear forces.

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to offer this amendment. 
I recognize that the leadership is not accepting amendments. I accept 
that. I am a supporter of the treaty, and I am happy to cast my vote 
for it.
  But there is one significant omission from this treaty, and I want to 
point

[[Page 5402]]

out that omission. That omission is that we have literally thousands of 
nuclear missiles on hair trigger alert. The Russian Federation has 
thousands of nuclear missiles on hair trigger alert. This treaty does 
not take that into consideration and does not urge or does not certify 
a reduction of the alert status of these missiles. I believe if we fail 
to address this issue, we risk the lives of millions of people over 
what may turn out to be a simple miscalculation.
  People hearing me might say, how can that possibly happen? I would 
like to explain how it can happen.
  On the morning of January 25, 1995, the Russian military initially 
interpreted the launch of a U.S. weather rocket from Norway as a 
possible nuclear attack on the Russian Federation. That is just 8 years 
ago. Thankfully, the true nature of the launch became known and a 
catastrophic mistake was averted. Nevertheless, then-President Yeltsin 
and his advisers had only minutes to decide whether the launch of a 
weather rocket was a surprise attack because Russia, like the United 
States, maintained and continues to maintain thousands of nuclear 
weapons on high alert status, ready to be launched at a moment's 
notice.
  This was not the only instance in which both countries have come 
close to the unthinkable. On at least two occasions in the United 
States and at least one occasion in Russia, false alarms could have led 
to the accidental launch of nuclear weapons.
  Today, Russia and the United States are entering into a new era of 
relations. We do so with the advent of this treaty. A deliberate 
nuclear strike by either side is unthinkable. In fact, the 
administration states the brevity of the Moscow Treaty and the lack of 
verification, timetables, and a list of specific weapons to be 
destroyed, is due to the fact that Russia and the United States are no 
longer strategic competitors but today we are strategic allies. So fear 
and suspicion have been replaced by trust, cooperation, and friendship.
  It is surprising, then, that the United States and Russia continue to 
maintain their nuclear arsenals on this high alert status. It is 
surprising the Moscow Treaty, a symbol of the new relationship, in the 
words of the administration, does not address this issue. In the past, 
President Bush has recognized the dangers of high alert status and the 
need to reevaluate our nuclear weapons. As a candidate, he stated in a 
speech on May 23, 2000:

       Keeping so many weapons on high alert may create 
     unacceptable risks of accidental or unauthorized launch.

  Experts on nuclear weapons issues have expressed similar concerns. In 
his testimony on the Moscow Treaty before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, former Senator Sam Nunn stated that the alert status:

       . . . may well be more important to stability and security 
     than the actual number of nuclear weapons.

  He likened the issue to two families who have agreed to reduce the 
number of high-powered automatic weapons aimed at each other in several 
years' time but in the meantime decide to keep the weapons loaded with 
a finger on the trigger.
  Former Secretary of Defense William Perry testified that the Moscow 
Treaty's failure to address the alert status of the United States and 
Russia's nuclear weapons represented a significant missed opportunity. 
He concurred with retired Air Force GEN Eugene Habiger, former 
commander in chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, who recommended that 
the United States take a first step by immediately standing down all 
nuclear weapons systems that will not be operationally deployed under 
the Moscow Treaty.
  If you will note, the amendment I have sent to the desk does not say 
this should be unilateral, on our part only; it says a bilateral 
reduction of alert status of operational nuclear weapons deployed 
today.
  I believe we should take the words of the general, of the very 
respected Senator Nunn, and former Defense Secretary Bill Perry and 
take some action. A miscalculation, in Senator Nunn's scenario, would 
result in the loss of a few lives from these automatic weapons in a 
family feud situation, but a miscalculation between Russia and the 
United States could result in the loss of millions of lives. De-
alerting will give the leaders of the United States and Russia 
sufficient time to evaluate fully a situation before making a decision 
on a nuclear response in a matter of minutes or seconds, and it would 
greatly reduce the possibility of an accidental nuclear launch due to 
false alarm and miscalculation.
  The amendment I sent to the desk encourages the President, within 180 
days of exchange of instruments and ratification, to initiate in a safe 
and verifiable manner a stand-down from alert status of all nuclear and 
Russian nuclear weapons systems that will not be operationally deployed 
under the treaty.
  In other words, the treaty calls for removing the operational 
deployment. But in the meantime all these missiles remain on high alert 
status--hair trigger alert status.
  The amendment would urge the President to call on the Russian 
Federation to reciprocate in kind, and the amendment asks that a 
representative of the executive branch of the Government offer regular 
briefings to the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
Foreign Relations of the Senate on three specific topics: First, the 
alert status of the nuclear forces of the United States and Russia; 
second, any determination of the President to order a standdown of the 
alert status on the U.S. nuclear forces; third, any progress in 
establishing cooperative measures with Russia to effect a standdown of 
Russia's nuclear forces.
  There is a precedent for de-alerting our nuclear weapons and 
prompting the Russians to do likewise. In 1991, as the Soviet Union 
began to crumble, then-President Bush ordered a unilateral standdown of 
the U.S. strategic bombers and de-alerted some missiles scheduled for 
deactivation under the START treaty. Soviet President Gorbachev at that 
time reciprocated with similar measures, and the world breathed a 
little easier during those turbulent times. So there is precedent for 
their de-alerting missiles. And I believe that this Moscow Treaty, 
which is based on friendship, trust, and cooperation, necessitates an 
increased de-alerting status of the literally thousands of nuclear 
weapons that remain in their silos on a hair trigger alert.
  The amendment is simple and straightforward. We can take it very 
easily. I very much regret that we are in a no-amendment scenario. What 
I hope to do and my cosponsors hope to do is enter into a colloquy in 
the Record indicating support for this measure and, second, we will 
draft a letter and try to get as many signatures from other Senators as 
we can.
  I believe this treaty, which should be ratified by this Senate today, 
has this significant oversight. I believe that to leave these missiles 
on hair trigger alert status when we enter into this treaty really 
downgrades the treaty. If we truly trust, if we truly want to be 
cooperative, and if we truly are friends, friends don't aim loaded guns 
at each other with the triggers pulled back.
  I am hopeful that the administration would respond and begin a 
discussion between President Putin and President Bush to see if we 
cannot reach a bilateral de-alerting of the literally--probably more 
than--10,000 missiles that will remain with nuclear warheads on hair 
trigger alert.


                      Amendment No. 251 Withdrawn

  I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be withdrawn.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is withdrawn.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I take the opportunity to make some 
comments regarding the ratification of the Moscow Treaty. I do it with 
some

[[Page 5403]]

reservation. I think the treaty is both a ``good news'' and ``bad 
news'' story.
  Right now, roughly speaking, the United States and Russia each deploy 
6,000 nuclear warheads. The treaty would require the U.S. and Russia to 
reduce these levels to 1,700 to 2,200 ``operationally'' deployed 
strategic nuclear weapons on each side by December 2012.
  The good news is that this treaty is a positive step--long overdue, 
but a positive step nonetheless. Over 10 years ago, in January of 1992, 
when U.S.-Russian relations were the warmest in years, President 
Yeltsin of Russia proposed that the U.S. and Russia reach a strategic 
arms control agreement that set the levels at 2,000-2,500 in a START II 
agreement.
  If former President Bush had agreed back then, we could be close to 
the levels today that the Moscow Treaty envisions for 10 years from 
now.
  At the time former President Yeltsin made his proposal for deep 
reductions, Defense Department officials, especially Defense Secretary 
Cheney--now our Vice President--opposed them.
  As a result, the START II agreement, signed in January 1993, only 
limited the number of strategic nuclear warheads to 3,000 to 3,500 on 
each side. And due to wrangling over national missile defense the START 
II agreement never entered into force.
  So I am glad to see that the administration and Vice President Cheney 
now support cuts to levels first proposed by President Yeltsin in 
January 1992. This support for stronger strategic arms control steps is 
long overdue but welcome.
  A second chance to achieve greater reductions came 6 years ago in 
1997. President Clinton agreed with President Yeltsin at Helsinki that 
a future START III agreement would entail reductions to 2,000-2,500 
strategic warheads on each side. Most likely, the START III agreement 
would have overlapped with the START II agreement, finishing 
implementation at the end of December 2007.
  The START III levels of 2,000 to 2,500 are essentially the same as 
those embodied in the Moscow Treaty. The START III would have counted 
several hundred warheads on systems in overhaul; the Moscow Treaty will 
not.
  Unfortunately, because START II never entered into force, START III 
negotiations never began. In addition, after 1994, our Republican 
colleagues deliberately made it more difficult to make progress on 
reducing strategic nuclear arms.
  Starting with the fiscal year 1995 Defense authorization bill, a 
provision was regularly added forbidding the President from reducing 
U.S. strategic forces below the START I levels of 6,000 strategic 
nuclear warheads. In time for this treaty, this provision has been 
repealed.
  So I am pleased to see that my Republican colleagues now support cuts 
to the levels envisioned by President Clinton and President Yeltsin in 
March 1997. It is a welcome change of heart, even though it is long 
overdue.
  The bad news, however, as many have noted, is that the treaty is but 
a modest step forward. Many have argued it has several major 
shortcomings.
  First, the 10-year implementation period is too long and includes no 
benchmarks for progress or verification measures. Theoretically, as the 
treaty now stands, both sides could wait until the last moment to make 
their reductions, right before the treaty expires.
  Second, only some of the warheads removed from missiles and bombers 
will be dismantled. The rest would merely be put into storage, where 
they could be redeployed. Thus, there will not be a real reduction in 
the United States or Russian strategic nuclear arsenals. Moreover, the 
security of thousands of stored weapons will remain a matter of major 
concern, especially during this era of heightened terrorism.
  Third, the treaty could have reduced the strategic arsenals of the 
United States and Russia even further.
  Fourth, the treaty does not cover the thousands of small tactical 
nuclear weapons that are a major concern for theft by terrorist groups. 
And they are weapons of great power, great destructive capability.
  Since this treaty is so long overdue, and such a modest 
accomplishment, we must work hard through the Bilateral Implementation 
Commission to improve it in the coming years. We also need to take 
steps beyond the scope of this treaty to reduce our nuclear arsenals 
even more.
  So I strongly endorse the call in the Foreign Relations Committee 
Resolution of Ratification for the President to ``accelerate'' U.S. 
strategic force reductions so they can be achieved before December 31, 
2012. We should aim to accomplish this by the end of 2007.
  We should also seek to dismantle the 4,000 or so warheads that will 
be removed from launchers--not just put them in storage. Otherwise, 
this treaty is more of a nuclear ``shell game'' than a true disarmament 
measure. Warheads taken off missiles today could be put back tomorrow.
  We should begin new discussions to reach new lower levels of 
strategic nuclear weapons. I strongly support the Resolution of 
Ratification's call for the President to continue reductions in 
strategic nuclear warheads. President Putin wanted each side to 
decrease to levels of 1,500 warheads. There isn't any reason we can't 
reduce to levels of 1,000 to 1,500 in the next 5 to 10 years.
  There are other problems relating to tactical nuclear weapons and 
transparency and security of nuclear arsenals that need to be addressed 
and that many have touched upon today. The Senate needs to be active in 
addressing these questions. I look forward to seeing the reports 
required by the Resolution of Ratification so we can monitor the 
progress of the treaty and act accordingly.
  We have waited too long for this treaty. We cannot let the long 
implementation time of the treaty sweep these important questions from 
our agenda for the next 10 years.
  With the assumption that the Senate will remain active on these 
questions and the administration will follow through with the 
provisions of the Resolution of Ratification, I give my reluctant 
advice and consent to this treaty and look back and see how much more 
we could have accomplished. Nevertheless, let's get on with what we 
have in front of us and start reducing the size of the nuclear forces 
out there.
  With that, Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence 
of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The senior assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the 
quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Graham of South Carolina). Without 
objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I wanted to come to the floor just to 
give our colleagues a brief report on the status with regard to 
amendments to the treaty legislation. Senator Byrd has indicated he 
wishes to offer an amendment. Senator Conrad has an amendment. Senator 
Feingold may have an amendment. We are trying to verify whether he 
still intends to offer it. And then Senator Levin has an amendment.
  I had indicated to the distinguished majority leader that we felt we 
could accommodate these amendments today and vote on final passage 
tonight. He has indicated that if that were the case there would be no 
votes tomorrow.
  I hope our colleagues can accommodate that schedule to come over and 
offer their amendments, and perhaps we can even agree to a timeframe 
within which these amendments can be considered. We have been in a 
quorum call now for about an hour. Obviously, if we want to finish at a 
reasonable hour today, it would be very helpful if our colleagues could 
come to the floor to offer their amendments. We will have to do it 
sometime today. It seems to me the sooner we get on with this debate, 
the sooner we can offer those amendments and the sooner we can complete 
our work and do so in a way that will accommodate other schedules which 
I know Senators have tonight and tomorrow.
  I make that report. I make that plea. I hope our colleagues can allow 
us to

[[Page 5404]]

finish our work on this legislation so that we can move on to other 
matters.
  I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Democratic leader 
for his thoughtful comments. I encourage amendments to be offered as 
soon as possible and that we be prepared to debate those amendments and 
work with both leaders to finalize actions on the Moscow Treaty today. 
I appreciate very much the specific amendments that are out there. I 
hope we can identify those amendments and work with the offerers of the 
amendments.
  Mr. President, while I have the floor, I would simply indicate that 
the Moscow Treaty before the Senate today is very important for several 
reasons. Some of these were outlined by Senator Biden, myself, and 
others yesterday.
  But let me reiterate the fact that this treaty arose from a very 
important meeting that President Bush had with President Putin of 
Russia last May. During the course of that time, both leaders 
identified the fact that both countries were in the process of thinking 
through how to reduce the number of nuclear warheads that are still on 
missiles aimed at each other. These leaders identified thousands of 
such warheads and the dangers of leaving things where they were. Our 
President has indicated that he had already reached a determination 
with his advisers. It would be in our best interests, if necessary, to 
unilaterally change our situation; that is, to think through carefully 
how many warheads the United States needs to defend itself against all 
potential adversaries and to move to that number. That would save a 
great deal of expense for the taxpayers in perpetuity--every year that 
these warheads were no longer required. Furthermore, and more 
obviously, it would relieve the anxiety of people all over the world 
who see the cold war still manifested in a very large number of nuclear 
weapons on missiles that could convey them.
  The Russians have had the same idea. They have budget stringencies 
that are much more severe than our own. Therefore, the two leaders came 
to a conclusion that an agreement was useful, and, furthermore, it 
would illustrate what both characterized as a new relationship between 
Russia and the United States in a very visible and tangible way.
  Some advisers of both President Bush and President Putin may have 
believed all of this might be done without a treaty; that is, both 
countries simply taking action would seem to be in the self-interest of 
the two countries. Others clearly believed it would be best to codify 
this in as simple an agreement as possible. The Moscow Treaty was the 
product of that effort. It is a short treaty, as many have pointed out.
  As I mentioned yesterday, many of the critics believe it is far too 
short; that it should have covered a great number of areas in much 
greater detail, including verification procedures and a number of 
aspects that have been part and parcel of previous arms control 
agreements between Russia and the United States, and/or the United 
States and other parties. Nevertheless, the treaty that was adopted 
does speak clearly to the aim by the year 2012. Both of our countries 
will, in fact, have reduced the number of warheads that are viable 
vehicles of destruction from a level of roughly 6,000 apiece now to 
somewhere in the 1,700-to-2,200 range.
  We will do this on our own schedules, and we will have the protocols 
of START before us through 2009 and the cooperative threat reduction 
activity--at least the very visible form of cooperative activity and 
verification--through that means.
  I mention all of that because some Senators have asked both on the 
floor and off the floor, Is this important to President Bush now? Why 
is the Moscow Treaty coming up at this particular moment?
  I would respond to those questions by saying from the very first 
meeting the President had with Senator Biden, then-chairman of the 
Foreign Relations Committee, and me, he encouraged us to move as 
rapidly as prudent. And we have done so. We pledged to the President 
that day that hearings would be held. In fact, they were held last 
year. They were extensive. We have mentioned that hearings were held 
also in the Armed Services Committee and there were behind-closed-door 
hearings in the Intelligence Committee, and that both of the other 
committees shared with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the 
product of those hearings.
  Senators have been on the floor of the Senate as members of those 
committees and have already testified to the efficacy and the 
importance of the treaty.
  This is the first period of time available on the calendar of the 
Senate. The majority leader has given this time to our committee with 
the full cooperation of Senator Daschle and Democratic leaders of the 
Senate. I treasure that fact because I think it is important and it is 
keeping the faith not only with our President but with the relationship 
that our President and President Putin have been attempting to forge.
  I would simply point out that we have just concluded in the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee another extensive hearing on North Korea. 
There we talked about the importance of a relationship between Russia 
and the United States. That is a very important relationship. The 
United States is counting upon Russian friends to be forthcoming with 
regard to their understanding of the risks that are involved in the 
Korean peninsula, the risk to Russia, the risk to the United States, 
and the risk with regard to nuclear weapons throughout the world in 
which Russia and the United States have perhaps the greatest 
responsibility and the greatest stake.
  The Moscow Treaty is timely with regard to dialog and diplomacy with 
the United States and Russia with regard to North Korea. Many hope it 
may be relevant still with regard to our dialog on the question of Iraq 
and Resolution 1441 at the United Nations or its successor.
  I mention those aspects not with prediction but simply with the 
relevancy and the timeliness of this debate. I think it is important 
for us to proceed, if we can, to have a successful conclusion of the 
debate and a vote on the Moscow Treaty today.
  The distinguished Democratic leader has indicated that he perceives 
this as in the best interests of the Senate. I know our leader feels 
the same. I simply invite Senators to come to the floor to come forward 
with their amendments, and we will try to proceed.
  I finally add, both Senator Biden and I indicated yesterday it would 
be our hope that amendments would not be adopted to the text of the 
treaty or its annexes at this point. We believe passage by the Duma, as 
well as passage by the Senate, in a timely manner is very important.
  We understand there are many Senators who wish the treaty had been 
longer, more extensive, more intrusive with regard to Russian 
procedures as well as our own, but we have attempted to achieve a great 
deal. We have much further to go as we negotiate with our Russian 
friends. Therefore, I hope Senators will not call for bridges that are 
too far on this treaty and thus jeopardize both its passage here and 
its implementation by both countries.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________