[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 4]
[Senate]
[Pages 5264-5291]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                             MOSCOW TREATY

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the hour of 12 noon 
having arrived, the Senate will now proceed to the consideration of 
Executive Calendar No. 1, which the clerk will report.
  The senior assistant bill clerk read as follows:

       Resolution of Ratification to Accompany Treaty Document 
     107-8, Treaty Between the United States of America and the 
     Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
  Mr. FRIST. Madam President, the treaty we consider today, known 
officially as the treaty between the United States of America and the 
Russian Federation on strategic reductions, is truly remarkable in many 
respects.
  The treaty is, of course, remarkable because it encompasses the most 
dramatic reductions in strategic nuclear weapons ever envisioned 
between two nuclear powers. It is also worth noting that not since 1954 
have the two parties held such a low number of strategic nuclear 
weapons as that which will be enforced by the agreed numerical limits 
of this treaty.
  Many have observed the extraordinary ease by which this treaty was 
negotiated and compare its three short pages--indeed, it is just three 
short pages--to the many thousands of pages of documents negotiated 
between the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war.
  This last point is, for me, the most significant of all, for as 
important as the substance of this treaty is, it is the form--the trust 
between the United States and Russia--that most shines through.
  Perhaps this treaty should be known by the epitaph: ``Cold War RIP,'' 
for it is not unreasonable to hope that this treaty represents and 
indeed reflects the close of a long era of hostility between these two 
nations.
  In the past few weeks, I and many of my colleagues have had the 
opportunity to meet with a variety of Russian Government officials who 
have become regular and welcome visitors in Washington, DC. I am struck 
with the degree to which these meetings are about routine matters. We 
do not agree on everything, but what is most remarkable to me is we do 
not disagree on everything.
  The United States and Russia are entering a new era of relations. Our 
two nations confront many of the same challenges in today's world, and 
we have found common cause in responding to the immediate threat of 
international terrorism. Intelligence sharing and joint action between 
our two governments has made both of our countries much safer. We seek 
broader cooperation between our institutions of government, and to that 
end, I am hopeful the Senate will be able to enter into a deep and 
longstanding relationship with the upper House of the Russian 
legislature, the Federation Council. This indeed will build on the 
excellent work that was initiated and done by my distinguished 
colleague in the Senate, Senator Lott from Mississippi.
  Finally, we seek to advance the growing economic relationship between 
our two countries. Toward that end, I will strongly support legislation 
to permanently remove the Russian Federation from the Jackson-Vanik 
agreement.
  I thank Senators Lugar and Biden for their fine efforts to bring this 
treaty to the Senate floor in a timely manner. When this treaty was 
submitted to the Senate, the administration set the not unreasonable 
expectation that the resolution of ratification not exceed the treaty 
in length. The committee has indeed met that goal in providing the 
Senate with a well-crafted resolution of ratification that nonetheless 
addresses several key elements of Senate prerogative.
  I congratulate Chairman Lugar and Senator Biden for their fine work.
  Finally, I trust that all Senators have indeed had time to review the 
committee report on the treaty. It is my hope those who wish to discuss 
it will do the managers the courtesy of coming forth to speak. Although 
amendments are in order, I think it would be a worthy tribute to the 
work of the Foreign Relations Committee to support this resolution in 
its current form. I look forward to its approval.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I thank the distinguished majority leader 
for his thoughtful commendation of the work of our committee. I 
appreciate especially the strong endorsement he has given to the treaty 
and to the procedures that have brought us to this day.
  On behalf of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I am honored to 
bring the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, better known as the 
Moscow Treaty, to the floor for Senate consideration and ratification. 
The treaty was signed on May 24, 2002, and was transmitted by President 
Bush to the Senate on June 20, 2002. It reduces operational deployed 
strategic nuclear warheads to a level of between 1,700 and 2,200 by 
December 31, 2012.
  This is truly a tremendous accomplishment and deserves the full 
support of the Senate and the Russian Duma. I believe this treaty is an 
important step toward a safer world.
  The Foreign Relations Committee held four hearings and numerous 
briefings on the treaty, starting in July of last year, under the 
chairmanship of Senator Joe Biden. I thank Senator Biden and his staff 
for the timely consideration the treaty received and for the many 
opportunities provided to members of the committee to hear testimony 
and to engage in conversation with experts from the administration and 
from the private sector.
  Moreover, during the last 2 months, Senator Biden has been an 
indispensable partner in constructing this resolution of ratification. 
Its provisions reflect our mutual efforts to construct a bipartisan 
resolution that could be broadly supported by the Senate.
  The resolution, in fact, was approved unanimously by the Foreign 
Relations Committee. We are hopeful of a very strong vote on the Senate 
floor.
  During the course of the committee's consideration of the Moscow 
Treaty,

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we received testimony from Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary 
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Richard Myers. Each expressed a strong desire for an 
overwhelming vote of approval. In addition to administration witnesses, 
we heard from the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
Ken Adelman; from the former commander in chief of U.S. Strategic 
Command, GEN Gene Habiger; and our former colleague, Sam Nunn; as well 
as numerous representatives of think tanks and interest groups.
  In addition to efforts undertaken in the Foreign Relations Committee, 
Senators Levin and Warner and the Committee on Armed Services conducted 
two hearings examining the military implications of the treaty and 
shared analysis of their findings with us. These letters have been made 
a part of the record and our committee report.
  Furthermore, the Intelligence Committee conducted a thorough review 
of the treaty's verification procedures through numerous members only 
and staff briefings. The Committee on Foreign Relations appreciates the 
expertise of our colleagues on the Intelligence Committee and what they 
have lent to this process.
  President Bush and President Putin have assigned a high priority to 
the timely ratification of the Moscow Treaty. Both point to the treaty 
as evidence that the U.S.-Russian relationship has turned the corner. 
Areas of disagreement clearly remain, but we are attempting to develop 
a partnership in the war against terrorism, and both Russians and 
Americans believe that political and economic cooperation can increase 
dramatically in the coming decade.
  On May 1, 2001, in a speech at the National Defense University, 
President Bush called for a new strategic framework to transform our 
relationship with Russia ``from one based on a nuclear balance of 
terror to one based on common responsibilities and common interests.''
  Less than 8 months later, President Bush announced his intention to 
reduce our nuclear levels unilaterally and invited President Putin to 
implement similar reductions. This was the beginning of a process that 
led to a treaty signing during the summit in Moscow last year.
  The Moscow Treaty is unlike arms control agreements we have 
considered in the past. I remember vividly, as do many of our 
colleagues, visiting the START I and START II treaty negotiations. The 
United States and the Soviet Union faced off against each other, 
against conference tables. They met for years. These negotiations 
produced extensive treaties and verification annexes that described in 
detail the requirements mandated by the treaties.
  To be sure, the treaty before us today could have been more 
expansive, rigid, and demanding. The negotiators could have followed 
the cold war template for arms control negotiations and entered into a 
multiyear discussion process. That procedure did not serve the best 
interest of either side. Both sides, Americans and Russians, wanted to 
move quickly to capitalize on the opportunity to sharply reduce 
strategic weaponry.
  The agreement benefits not only the cause of arms control, but also 
the broader United States-Russia relationship. In my opinion, President 
Bush was wise to conclude the treaty quickly in this form rather than 
enter into a more lengthy and uncertain negotiation process.
  Russian strategic and nuclear forces are declining. Russian leaders 
have indicated they would prefer warhead levels to be less than 2,200 
by 2012. In fact, Moscow pushed for a limit of 1,500 nuclear warheads 
and settled for a range of 1,700 to 2,200. It would appear that Moscow 
is reluctant to accept the resource tradeoffs necessary to maintain a 
larger force. President Putin inherited a force structure that already 
was moving toward the deep reductions necessary for START II 
implementation. Faced with continued resource constraints, he decided 
to limit further spending on strategic forces while seeking a new 
treaty to limit the United States and Russian forces in a predictable 
manner.
  In the past, most critics of strategic arms control treaties objected 
to the constraints these treaties placed on U.S. forces. They often 
alleged the treaties would expose U.S. security to unnecessary risk. 
Critics of the Moscow Treaty, however, have made the opposite 
complaint. They have said the treaty's constraints do not go far 
enough. Various analysts have suggested the treaty should include a 
verification system requirement to dismantle warheads, a specific 
reduction schedule, and provisions dealing with tactical nuclear 
weapons.
  I share some of the concerns expressed by these critics, but the 
treaty is an important step forward because it maintains the momentum 
of an arms control process that has been successful.
  The treaty provides a mutual framework for continuing the destruction 
of offensive nuclear weapons whose purpose was to target the United 
States of America. It also underscores the importance of the United 
States-Russia relationship at a time when we are depending on Russian 
support for the war on terrorism.
  Nevertheless, important questions remain and will be discussed during 
this debate. What happens to the nuclear warheads taken from dismantled 
Russian delivery systems? I have confidence in the United States 
storage procedures and appreciate the flexibility the treaty permits in 
our strategic systems, but I am concerned with the parallel Russian 
process. We must work with Russia to make certain that these dangerous 
weapons do not fall into the wrong hands. However, there are readily 
available means to address these deficiencies.
  The primary vehicle for cooperation in reducing warheads to levels 
set by the Moscow Treaty and addressing the threat posed by warhead 
security is the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction program. 
Without Nunn-Lugar, it is unlikely that the benefits of the treaty will 
be realized.
  During consideration of the treaty, the committee heard testimony 
from Secretary Powell asserting that increased Nunn-Lugar assistance 
would serve as a foundation for the cooperation necessary to meet 
Russian obligations under the treaty and as additional means of 
verifying that those obligations are met.
  My concerns about treaty implementation are compounded by the impasse 
we experienced over the Nunn-Lugar certification process last year. 
Each year, our President is required by law to certify that Russia is 
``committed to the goals of arms control.'' In 2002, the administration 
requested a waiver to this condition, pointing out that unresolved 
concerns in the chemical and biological arenas made this difficult. 
Meanwhile, existing Nunn-Lugar activities and projects were permitted 
to continue, but no new projects were initiated and no new contracts 
were finalized.
  President Bush requested a permanent annual waiver to the Nunn-Lugar 
legislation so we could continue with important work. But some in 
Congress preferred just a 1-year waiver or no waiver at all. Without a 
permanent waiver, the President would be forced to suspend dismantling 
assistance each year pending congressional action to waive the 
requirement. This could lead to delays of up to 6 months or more, just 
as we experienced last year.
  Let me assure my colleagues, this is not a hypothetical situation. It 
just happened to us. For more than 6 months, submarines on the Kola 
Peninsula awaited destruction. Regiments of SS-18 missiles loaded with 
10 nuclear warheads apiece were left standing in Siberia, and almost 2 
million rounds of chemical weapons in relatively transportable shells 
awaited elimination at Shchuch'ye. But the Nunn-Lugar program was 
powerless to address these threats because of congressional conditions 
drafted over a decade ago.
  American dismantlement experts in Russia were forced to wait and 
watch as these dangerous weapons systems sat in their silos, docks, or 
warehouses while the conference committee process between the two 
Houses of Congress dragged on through the summer.
  Without the changing of congressional conditions on the legislation 
or

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the granting of a permanent Presidential waiver, the current situation 
could reoccur in the years ahead. To say the least, this would delay 
full implementation of the Moscow Treaty far beyond the envisioned 10-
year time period; namely, 2012.
  Let me be clear. The Moscow Treaty alone is insufficient to meet our 
security needs. The treaty is part of the answer, but without 
cooperative threat reduction, dismantlement, and warhead security 
projects, the agreement will not reach its potential in a timely 
manner.
  Critics of the Moscow Treaty suggest this lack of a new verification 
regime is a weakness that must be rectified. Some have gone so far as 
to suggest the treaty be shelved until verification is strengthened. 
But this point of view sees the treaty through a cold war prism when 
cooperative threat reduction programs did not exist and both sides were 
trying to maximize strategic nuclear force levels.
  The Bush administration has been forthright in its recognition of the 
lack of a verification provision in the Moscow Treaty, including 
statements in the President's letter of transmittal and the testimony 
of Secretary Powell before the Foreign Relations Committee.
  The administration's views on verification of the treaty are based 
upon three basic assumptions: First, the United States and Russia have 
moved beyond cold war tensions, and the United States would have 
undertaken these reductions of nuclear warheads regardless of Russia's 
view--unilateral disarmament. Second, the national security interests 
of the United States are better served through the flexibility of the 
Moscow Treaty. And third, Russia is unlikely to have the means or the 
incentives to violate or withdraw from this agreement.
  I believe the level of verification of the Moscow Treaty is 
sufficient. American verification experts will have the START I treaty 
verification procedures in place throughout at least 2009. But perhaps 
more importantly, the Nunn-Lugar program has placed American 
dismantlement teams and equipment on the ground in Russia now. These 
teams work on a daily basis with their Russian counterparts to safely 
dismantle weapons systems. For example, at Surovatika, U.S.-provided 
equipment is routinely dismantling four ICBMs per month. It is hard to 
imagine a more complete means by which to verify the dismantlement of 
weapons than the systematic work occurring under cooperative threat 
reduction at Surovatika.
  Senator Biden and I met with President Bush last June to discuss 
Senate consideration of the treaty, just after the President returned 
from his visit at the Moscow Summit. We committed to moving the treaty 
forward in a responsible, bi-partisan, and expeditious manner. The 
resolution before us today is a product of close cooperation and 
consultation. I am pleased to report that it enjoys the strong support 
of the administration.
  The resolution of ratification contains two conditions and six 
declarations. I would like to describe each of these provisions for the 
Senate.
  The first condition requires the President to submit to the Foreign 
Relations and Armed Services Committees an annual report on the amount 
of Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction assistance that Russia will 
need to meet its obligations under the Treaty. As I mentioned earlier, 
without U.S. assistance, Russia cannot meet the timetable of its 
obligations under this treaty. Without the Nunn-Lugar program, it is 
likely the benefits of this treaty will be postponed or never realized.
  The second condition requires the President to report to the Foreign 
Relations and Armed Services Committees on important items related to 
the treaty, including: 1, Strategic force levels; 2, planned offensive 
reductions; 3, treaty implementation plans; 4, efforts to improve 
verification and transparency; 5, status of START I treaty verification 
extension; 6, information regarding the ability of either side to fully 
implement the treaty; and 7, any efforts proposed to improve the 
effectiveness of the treaty.
  The report contained in this condition must be submitted within 60 
days of the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty and 
by April 15 of each following year. The extensive nature of this report 
protects our critical Senate role in oversight of implementation and 
ensures that this body will remain an integral part of the process 
throughout the treaty's life.
  The first declaration has been in each resolution of ratification for 
arms control treaties since the INF Treaty's resolution of ratification 
in 1988. It is known to colleagues here as the Byrd-Biden Condition. 
The condition articulates the Constitutional principles on which the 
common understanding of the terms of a treaty will be based.
  The second declaration encourages the President to continue efforts 
to eliminate the threats posed by strategic offensive nuclear weapons 
to the lowest level possible while not jeopardizing our country's 
national security or alliance obligations. Secretary Powell stated in 
his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee that ``the Moscow 
Treaty represents significant progress in meeting the obligations set 
forth in Article VI of the Nonproliferation Treaty.'' This treaty takes 
another step in meeting the U.S. and Russian commitments under the 
Nonproliferation Treaty.
  The treaty establishes a Bilateral Implementation Commission, as a 
diplomatic consultative forum to discuss issues related to 
implementation of the Treaty. The resolution's third declaration calls 
on the Executive Branch to provide briefings before and after meetings 
of the commission concerning: 1, issues raised during meetings; 2, any 
issues the United States is pursuing through other channels; and 3, 
Presidential determinations with regard to these issues. This provision 
has been included to ensure that we remain fully aware of the 
activities of the Bilateral Implementation Commission.
  During the hearings on the treaty, Secretary Powell and Secretary 
Rumsfeld testified that non-strategic nuclear weapons remain an 
important issue and expressed a strong interest in working closely with 
Russia to reduce associated threats. The resolution's fourth 
declaration is meant to underscore the threat posed by tactical nuclear 
weapons. It urges the President to work closely with Russia and to 
provide assistance on the full accounting, safety, and security of the 
Russian tactical nuclear weapon stockpile.
  In 1991, President George H. W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev announced 
the removal of their deployed nonstrategic nuclear weapons. In Helsinki 
in 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to begin talks on these 
weapons, but negotiations have failed to materialize.
  Secretary Powell has reported that the inclusion of tactical nuclear 
weapons was not possible in the Moscow Treaty. Thus far, Russia has 
declined to engage in discussions on the future of non-strategic 
systems. This declaration is meant to communicate the Senate's concerns 
about the threats associated with non-strategic weapons. It is our hope 
that there will be further dialogue and, if possible, greater efforts 
to secure these systems.
  The fifth declaration encourages the President to accelerate U.S. 
reductions where feasible and consistent with U.S. national security 
requirements so that reductions may be achieved prior to December 31, 
2012.
  The final declaration has been included in an attempt to address 
concerns put forward by some Senators regarding the treaty's withdrawal 
clause in Article IV. This text follows up on Secretary Powell's 
commitment to consult with the Senate should the President consider the 
utilization of the withdrawal provision.
  The Foreign Relations Committee asked the Secretary: ``What role will 
the Congress have in any decision to withdraw from this treaty?''; and 
``Will the administration agree to at least consult closely with this 
committee before making any such decision?'' The Secretary responded 
that: ``While it is the President who withdraws from treaties, the 
administration intends to discuss any need to withdraw from the treaty 
with the Congress, to include

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the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, prior to announcing any such 
action.''
  While I am sympathetic to arguments from Senators regarding the need 
to maintain Senate prerogatives, the process governing termination and 
withdrawal is a point of Constitutional debate. Although the 
Constitution assigns a specific role for the Senate in the treaty 
ratification process, it is silent on the is due of treaty termination. 
Furthermore, nothing in the Constitution restricts the President from 
terminating or withdrawing from a treaty on his own authority.
  Presidents have consistently terminated advice and consent treaties 
on their own authority since 1980. Twenty-three of the thirty treaties 
terminated during this period were bilateral; seven were multilateral. 
Prior to 1980, Senator Barry Goldwater challenged Presidents Carter's 
termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. Senator 
Goldwater's challenge failed and the treaty was terminated. Since that 
time, objections have been raised only with respect to Presidents 
Bush's withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.
  The White House Legal Advisor has long argued that the President is 
the principle spokesman of the nation in foreign affairs and 
restrictions on the power have been strictly construed.
  Given the absence of a textual basis conferring the termination power 
on another branch or an established practice derogating from the 
President's termination power, it is difficult to envisage such a role 
for the Senate.
  Proponents of a Senatorial role in this process will often respond by 
suggesting that the President cannot on his own authority terminate a 
treaty because it is the ``law of the land.'' Again, the White House 
suggests this is a fallacy. A terminated treaty no longer has effect in 
much the same way that a provision of a law or treaty found by the 
courts to be unconstitutional no longer has effect. However, in neither 
case is the law repealed.
  Historically there is evidence of only one instance in which the 
Senate sought by a resolution of advice and consent to limit the 
President's constitutional power to terminate a treaty. The first 
condition to the 1919 proposed resolution of advice and consent to 
ratification of the Versailles Treaty would have provided: ``notice of 
withdrawal by the United States may be given by a concurrent resolution 
of the Congress of the United States.'' Vice President Thomas Marshall, 
addressing the Senate before the vote, called the condition an 
unconstitutional limitation on the President's powers--a view with 
which a number of leading scholars of the day concurred. However, the 
resolution failed to receive the required two-thirds vote and the 
question has remained moot for the better part of a century.
  Beyond the legal issues which underlie this debate, some have 
expressed concern that Article IV differs from previous arms control 
agreements in that it only requires three months notice and permits 
withdrawal based upon issues related to national sovereignty. Critics 
point out that the START Treaty allows a Party to withdraw, after 
giving 6 months' notice and only ``if it decides that extraordinary 
events related to the subject of this Treaty have jeopardized its 
supreme interests.''
  I do not view the withdrawal provisions as a weakness in the treaty. 
Instead, I believe it is another manifestation of the improved U.S.-
Russian relationship. It should also be pointed out that our bilateral 
relationship provides us with some confidence that the time and reasons 
for withdrawal would not necessarily relate to the agreement. As the 
Secretary of State told the Committee: ``The Moscow Treaty's 
formulation for withdrawal reflects the likelihood that a decision to 
withdraw would be prompted by causes unrelated either to the Treaty or 
to our bilateral relationship. We believe this formulation more 
appropriately reflects our much-improved strategic relationship with 
Russia.''
  Mr. President, in performing its constitutional responsibilities with 
respect to treaties and international agreements, the Senate has to 
reach a judgment as to whether, on balance, U.S. acceptance of the 
obligations contained in the treaty serves the national interests of 
the United States.
  The Moscow Treaty is not without blemishes. The Senate should not be 
surprised that the treaty is not perfect or that it does not cover 
every desired area of bilateral arms control. But that is not the 
point. The proper question is whether on balance, the Moscow Treaty 
serves the national security of our nation.
  For some, no arms control treaty is good enough. Indeed, the very 
high stakes of the cold war and the fact that arms control cheating by 
the Soviet Union represented a potential threat to the survival of the 
United States led to a legitimate focus on treaties with high 
standards, especially for verification and the ability to detect even 
minor violations.
  The cold war is over, and treaty requirements must suit U.S. national 
interests as they exist today. The Moscow Treaty charts a course 
towards greater security for both the United States and Russia. I urge 
my colleagues to ratify this treaty and approve the resolution of 
ratification without amendment.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hagel). The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BIDEN. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call 
be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am pleased to join our esteemed chairman, 
Senator Lugar, in presenting the Senate this resolution giving the 
Senate's advice and consent to ratification of the Treaty on Strategic 
Offensive Reductions, known in the vernacular as the Moscow Treaty. Let 
me state flatly at the outset, I urge my colleagues to support the 
treaty.
  On February 5, as Senator Lugar noted, the Senate Foreign Affairs 
Committee approved this resolution unanimously. The committee did so, 
in my view, for two very good reasons.
  First, the Moscow Treaty should be ratified and implemented. It is 
true that there is much that the Moscow Treaty does not do, which I 
will discuss at some length. But virtually all of the witnesses at our 
hearing recommended the ratification of the treaty because its 
implementation would be a step toward a more secure world. Reducing 
each nation's deployed strategic warheads from approximately 6,000 to 
between 1,700 and 2,200, in my view, will move us further away from the 
cold war era and may--I emphasize may--and I hope promote a United 
States-Russian relationship based upon mutual cooperation.
  Second, in my view, while the resolution does not include everything 
we may want, it does address many of our concerns. It requires 
significant annual reporting by the executive branch on implementation 
of the treaty so that the Senate can oversee and support that 
implementation. These are important gains from an administration that 
first opposed any treaty at all and then pressed for a clean resolution 
of ratification. The administration has agreed to support and implement 
this resolution before the Senate. I think the country will benefit 
from that.
  But there is much the Moscow Treaty does not do. So in the spirit of 
not engaging in false advertisement, I think we should speak about that 
a little bit. It is very unusual, at least in my 30 years as a Senator 
working on many arms control agreements from the Senate perspective, 
that an arms control agreement by any standard be put forward the way 
in which this one has.
  In our hearings, the Secretary of Defense proudly compared the three 
pages of this treaty to the roughly 300 pages of the START treaty 
signed by the first President Bush. But that is just the beginning. 
Traditional arms control agreements usually involve the negotiated 
level of arms to which the parties will be held. They usually require 
the destruction of some weapons. Often they specify milestones that 
must be achieved in reducing those arms and

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bar withdrawal from the treaty unless there is a good reason to 
withdraw and the President gives or the other side gives 6 months 
notice.
  For decades, there has been emphasis on verifying that each party is 
complying with its obligations. We remember the famous phrase uttered 
by former President Reagan: Trust but verify.
  In addition, the United States worked to ban MIRV ICBMs in the START 
II treaty. I know the Presiding Officer knows, but for those who may be 
listening, the MIRV'd ICBM is a single missile, a single rocket upon 
which multiple nuclear warheads sit and when the rocket goes off and 
the head of the missile comes off, it contains more than one nuclear 
warhead, and you can independently target each of those nuclear 
warheads, in the vernacular.
  So we have thought for years and years, these are the most 
destabilizing weapons that existed, and we worked very hard, and the 
first President Bush worked very hard, to eliminate either side being 
able to possess these multiple warhead missiles with independently 
targeted warheads. It was contained in the START II treaty.
  We were hoping in START III to control tactical nuclear weapons. They 
are the weapons that are shorter range and are used at shorter 
distances, referred to as tactical nuclear weapons. We had hoped to 
have a de-alerting of weapons slated for later elimination.
  That is, the purpose we initially started off with was: Look, if we 
are agreeing we are going to get rid of these weapons, while we are 
going through the process of destroying them or taking them out of the 
silos or out of the bellies of submarines or out of the bellies of 
bombers, what we will do is we will de-alert them. That is, we will 
pull the plug. They will sit there, but they will not be aimed at 
anybody. They will not be on alert.
  So for the longest time our objective, for stability reasons and for 
security reasons, was to get rid of multiple warheads, to make sure we 
move to include tactical nuclear weapons which are destabilizing so we 
begin to reduce them and, third, to say while we are getting ready to 
destroy these weapons, or take them out of the inventory, we will de-
alert them. That is, not keep them on a hair trigger.
  None of these objectives was achieved, or for that matter attempted, 
in the Moscow Treaty we are about to ratify--I hope ratify.
  For starters, the United States unilaterally set this treaty's arms 
control levels before any negotiation. Indeed, the administration saw 
no particular reason for this treaty in the first place. Initially they 
said they would not do it as a treaty.
  According to the Secretary of State:

       We concluded before the Moscow Treaty was negotiated that 
     we could and would safely reduce to 1,700 to 2,200 
     operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads, regardless 
     of what the Russians did.

  Secretary Powell reports that President Bush then told President 
Putin:

       This is where we are going. We are going there 
     unilaterally. Come with us or not, stay where you are or not.

  In short, the Moscow Treaty does not codify an agreement. Rather, it 
codifies two unilateral decisions to reduce strategic forces. That is 
not a bad thing, but it is not such a significant thing.
  Another way in which the Moscow Treaty differs from previous arms 
control agreements is that it does not require the elimination of any 
missiles, any bombers, any submarines, or any warheads. As a result, 
each party is free to stockpile its officially reduced weapons.
  We used to fight with our conservative friends on this floor who said 
we could not support such-and-such arms control treaty proffered from 
President Nixon through to President Ford and President Reagan and 
President Bush--we could not do it unless we were certain that the 
missile was destroyed, the warhead was destroyed, the submarine was 
destroyed. We used to hear what is going to happen is they are going to 
take these missiles and they are going to hide them in barns and they 
are going to hide them in the woods and they are going to hide them in 
camouflaged areas.
  Let's be clear what this treaty does. It says you have to get down to 
1,700 to 2,200 of these within the next 10 years or so, but all you 
have to do is take them out of commission. You don't have to destroy 
them. You can stockpile them. You can put them in a warehouse. You can 
pile them up in a barn for ready reload. You can take them back out. 
You don't have to destroy anything. That is in fact what the United 
States plans to do with many of its reduced weapons. They are reduced, 
not destroyed.
  Trident submarines that are taken off nuclear patrol will be 
converted to other purposes--and could presumably be reconverted to 
carry strategic nuclear weapons, although at some cost.
  Bombers will also be converted; actually, their re-conversion to 
strategic nuclear uses might be rather difficult.
  According to recent press stories, the United States might use ICBMs 
to deliver conventional payloads. That would leave the missiles still 
available for use with nuclear warheads instead.
  And the administration says that about three-quarters of the 
reductions may be made simply by ``down-
loading''--that means by removing bombs and warheads from bombers and 
missiles, while leaving the delivery vehicles in service.
  What happens to those ``downloaded'' warheads? Of the thousands of 
warheads that will be ``reduced'' by the United States, many--perhaps 
almost all--would be retained in some form of reserve status, available 
to be returned to action in months, weeks, or even days.
  The Secretary of State did not indicate that some warheads would be 
dismantled. But the administration has yet to earmark a single type of 
warhead for dismantlement.
  For years, now, the Air Force has been prepared to give up the W-62 
warheads on its Minuteman Three missiles.
  They will be replaced by the W-87 warheads that are removed from the 
Peacekeeper missile, which is to be retired. But the Defense Department 
seems incapable of letting go of the old warheads.
  I will move on. The Secretary of State did indicate, though, that 
some warheads would be dismantled, but the administration is yet to 
earmark a single type of warhead that we are going to dismantle. My 
support for ratification of this treaty is based in part on the 
administration's assurances for the record that ``some warheads are to 
be removed and will be destroyed or dismantled.''
  Since the statement was made, however, there has been no action by 
the executive branch to turn this into a reality. I expect the 
administration to live up to Secretary Powell's commitment. If it 
should fail to do so, this would endanger the process by which the 
Senate gives advice and consent to the ratification of not only this 
treaty but every treaty in the future.
  An equal concern for me is the question of what the Russians will do 
with its reduced weapons. If it follows the lead of the United States, 
it will try to retain as many missiles and bombers as possible, and it 
will stockpile its downloaded nuclear weapons rather than dismantling 
them and disposing of the excess fissile material.
  Under this treaty, Russia can do whatever it wants with its so-called 
reduced weapons. But we have a stake in Russia's decision on this. That 
is because of the risk that Russia will not adequately protect the 
weapons and nuclear materials it has stockpiled.
  It is one thing for us to decommission, reduce our nuclear weapon and 
stockpile it. We have exceedingly tight security on such material.
  The Russians have incredibly, incredibly insecure facilities because 
they lack the money to be able to maintain these secure facilities. I 
worry that if Russia does not destroy them, that they will find 
themselves--and we will find ourselves--susceptible to the clandestine 
sale or the actual stealing of these materials, and they will fall into 
the hands of people who do not have our interests at heart.
  The only threat to our very existence is the accidental launch of 
Russian missiles, and that is why I still worry

[[Page 5269]]

about the MIRV'd ICBMs. But perhaps the worst other threat to America 
is that some Russian nuclear weapons, or material with which they make 
them, could be stolen or diverted to rogue states or terrorist groups. 
The more weapons Russia stockpiles, the greater the risk not all of 
them will be properly safeguarded.
  To combat that danger, our chairman cofounded the Nunn-Lugar program 
to assist the Soviet Union--and now its successor states--in meeting 
their arms control obligations.
  Related programs in the Energy Department and the State Department 
help Russia to safeguard its sensitive materials, and to find civilian 
careers for its thousands of weapons scientists.
  These programs will have a major role to play in the years to come. 
With Nunn-Lugar, we can enable Russia to destroy its old delivery 
vehicles rather than mothballing them. Russian officials have already 
decided they want to move in that direction.
  Let me put something in focus, by the way. The entire budget for 
Russia for this fiscal year is roughly $40 billion. The entire Russian 
military budget is $9 billion.
  My neighboring States of Pennsylvania and New Jersey have budgets 
bigger than all of Russia. I suspect if you added up all their law 
enforcement and prison-related budgets, it probably exceeds the entire 
defense budget of Russia.
  Our defense budget, and I make no apologies for it, is between $350 
and $400 billion. So I want us to keep this in focus. The ability of 
Russia to maintain and/or take the money to destroy this fissile 
material and mothball nuclear capacity is very limited, increasing the 
need for Nunn-Lugar, the threat reduction money, to be spent on 
American scientists with American contractors to go to Russia to 
destroy these weapons for them because they do not have the money to do 
it.
  U.S. assistance can also help Russia to secure and dispose of its 
excess fissile material. That is the stuff that makes nuclear 
explosions. That is the stuff that is the product from which chain 
reactions, nuclear chain reactions start.
  That is an urgent and continuing task, with or without this treaty.
  I think the administration understands this. The Secretary of State 
has laid it out:

       U.S. assistance helps to improve the security of Russia's 
     nuclear weapons by improving their physical protection 
     (fencing, sensors, communications); accounting (improved 
     hardware and software); personnel reliability (better 
     screening); and guard force capabilities (more realistic 
     training).
       These improvements are particularly important because 
     Russia faces a difficult threat environment--political 
     instability, terrorist threats, and insider threats resulting 
     from financial conditions in Russia.

  Translated: The Russian Mafia; translated: Departments seeking money 
to keep their folks employed doing things that are not in the interest 
of Russia, and clearly not in the interest of the United States.
  The Secretary of State also assured the Committee that:

       . . . we intend to continue to work with Russia, under the 
     Cooperative Threat Reduction, CTR program, when and to the 
     extent permitted by law, to make its warhead storage 
     facilities more secure.
       Such U.S. assistance will also increase the security of the 
     Russian warheads made excess as provided in the Moscow 
     Treaty.

  The Secretary of State continued:

       If requested by the Russian Federation, and subject to the 
     laws related to CRT certification, the Administration would 
     be prepared to provide additional assistance for removing, 
     transporting, storing, and securing nuclear warheads, 
     disassembling warheads and storing fissile material, 
     dismantling surplus strategic missiles, and disposing of 
     associated launchers.

  I am pleased that the administration accepts the need to use Nunn-
Lugar and related programs in implementing this treaty, and that the 
2004 budget request has a 9-percent increase for Nunn-Lugar.
  That increase is probably spoken for, however, by the cost of 
building--belatedly--a chemical weapons destruction facility at 
Shchuch'ye. So I wonder, at least, whether enough fund are budgeted for 
Nunn-Lugar; I hope they are but I don't think they are.
  And I hope that the President will prevail upon his own party in the 
House to give him more than temporary authority to waive certification 
requirements for these programs.
  Nunn-Lugar efforts cannot achieve their maximum effectiveness if 
every year or so the funds dry up for months at a time, while waiting 
for Congress to permit another presidential waiver.
  The laissez-faire nature of the Moscow Treaty is also evident in the 
timing of its reduction requirement.
  This is very unusual. Under Article I of the Treaty, the reductions 
must occur ``by December 31, 2012.'' Until that date, there is no 
reduction requirement. Indeed, until that date, there is nothing 
barring each party from increasing its force levels.
  A party could even have more weapons than it has today, so long as it 
does not exceed START Treaty levels before that treaty expires in 2009. 
I don't expect that, of course, but there is nothing to prohibit it.
  And what happens on December 31, 2012. The treaty expires.
  If a party fails to achieve the reductions required by this treaty, 
the other party will have little recourse. The treaty codifies legally 
binding promises, but provides no way to make the Parties live up to 
them.
  This is a very unusual treaty.
  Most curious of all, perhaps, is the withdrawal provision in Article 
IV of the treaty. You might think that, with no obligations until the 
very last day of this treaty's existence, there would be little reason 
ever to withdraw from it. That is certainly what I think.
  Just in case, however, the treaty has what is probably the most 
liberal withdrawal clause in any arms control treaty. A party can 
withdraw with only 3 months' notice.
  There is no need for withdrawal to be due to ``extraordinary events 
related to the subject matter of this treaty [that] have jeopardized 
its supreme interests,'' as is required in the START Treaty signed by 
the first President Bush.
  Indeed, there is no requirement in this treaty to state any reason 
for withdrawal.
  I hope the administration is correct in its view that we no longer 
need verification. The Secretary of State said, ``in the context of 
this new relationship, a treaty with a verification regime under the 
Cold War paradigm was neither required nor appropriate.''
  It may be that we need not care what Russia does. That might explain 
why the Moscow Treaty leaves it to each party to decide what weapons it 
is reducing and how it will do that, and sets no benchmarks for 
measuring progress between now and December 31, 2012.
  To this day, the Russian Federation has yet to say how it defines the 
term ``strategic nuclear warheads,'' or how its reductions will be 
made.
  We can only hope that his laissez-faire approach to arms control 
obligations will not lead to misunderstandings down the road. With no 
agreed definitions and no benchmarks, I respectfully suggest that there 
is lots of room for quarrels over whether a party will really be in 
compliance by December 31, 2012.
  Perhaps voluntary transparency by each party will assure the other 
that arms reductions are proceeding properly.
  I applaud the decision to establish a transparency committee under 
the U.S.-Russia Consultative Group on Strategic Security.
  But I am not reassured by the Secretary of State's statement that 
``specific additional transparency measures are not needed, and will 
not be sought, at this time.''
  It may be that continuing U.S. assistance to Russia under the Nunn-
Lugar program and other assistance programs will give us such 
visibility into Russian forces that we will have no need of 
verification.
  But if we are to rely on that window, then--as I noted earlier--
President Bush ought to persuade House Republicans to let him waive the 
certification requirements that periodically stall the funding of our 
programs for months at a time because if there is no verification and 
no ability through the threat reduction program to look inside what 
Russia is doing, then we are operating in the blind.

[[Page 5270]]

  When the President requested that authority to waive provisions 
allowing him to move forward with Nunn-Lugar, it was people in his own 
party in the House who refused to make that authority permanent.
  Previous Presidents gave special attention to the need to do away 
with MIRVed ICBMs. The first President Bush achieved that in the START 
II Treaty.
  But Russia refused to let that treaty enter into force unless we 
continued to adhere to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. When the 
current President Bush pulled us out of the ABM Treaty, START II died.
  Why worry about MIRVed ICBMs? A MIRVed missile has multiple warheads. 
It's cheaper to put several warheads on a single missile than it is to 
build, house and launch several missiles.
  But if I put 6 or 10 warheads on a missile, and you can take that 
missile out with only 1 or 2 warheads by attacking first, then my 
military planners are going to be nervous.
  And that is precisely what can happen if my missile is an ICBM in a 
fixed silo. It may be powerful, but it is also a sitting duck.
  So my military planners are going to say to me: We need to be able to 
fire our missiles before the attacking missiles land on them. The 
nuclear theologians call this: ``Use 'em or lose 'em.'' Put another 
way, if Russia has MIRV'd ICBMs sitting in silos, and we get to a 
point--hopefully, that will never happen--in the next year, decade or 
two decades, and they know that one of our warheads can take out that 
multiple warhead ICBM they have on the ground, their military planners 
are going to say: You better strike first with that missile because if 
you don't, it will be taken out. And we are going to sit here and say: 
We know that is what their military planners are going to do, so we 
better take that missile out first.
  That is called destabilizing. That does not lend security or a sense 
of security. That is why the first President Bush, and every other 
President before him, said it was important, of any missile you get rid 
of, to do away with MIRVed warheads because they were destabilizing, 
they were on a hair trigger.
  This ``use 'em or lose 'em'' strategy is still in play. I will use 
radars and satellites to tell when somebody is attacking me. My command 
and control system will allow me to order a launch of my nuclear-tipped 
missiles within 10 minutes because that is all the time I will have 
between the warning of a possible attack and when the warheads will 
start falling on my MIRVed missiles.
  Now, if I am the United States, that works. But if I am Russia, my 
missile warning network is made of Swiss cheese. Some of my satellites 
do not even work if I am Russia. I lost some radars when the Soviet 
Union broke up. And worse yet, my rocket force troops are so poorly 
paid, so ill-housed, that sometimes they even go berserk and shoot each 
other. This is not a joke. They really do. So there are risks in basing 
our deterrent force on MIRVed ICBMs. And if Russia's nuclear-tipped 
missiles are ever launched in error, we in the United States are the 
ones most likely to suffer.
  But the administration is confident that none of this will happen. 
The Secretary of State told the Foreign Relations Committee:

       We cannot conceive of any credible scenario in which we 
     would threaten to launch our strategic forces at Russia. The 
     scenario . . . of Russia believing it faced a ``use it or 
     lose it'' situation with its force of MIRVed ICBMs is 
     therefore not a credible concern.

  As a former press secretary of mine used to say--Evelyn Lieberman--
``My lips to God's ears.'' Hopefully, that is true.
  As a result, President Bush felt at liberty to tell President Putin:

       [Y]ou can do whatever you think you have to do for your 
     security. You can MIRV your missiles, you can keep more, you 
     can go lower. Do what you think you need.

  I sincerely hope the relationship between the United States and 
Russia has truly been transformed and that, as President Bush wrote in 
his letter of transmittal, ``Russia is not an enemy, Russia is a 
friend''--a friend, I might add, that is not with us right now on the 
Security Council and not with us with regard to Iraq, but that is a 
parenthetical note.
  Most of all, I hope that Russia feels the same way. If President 
Putin fears a U.S. attack, then it won't matter what President Bush has 
as his intent.
  If the Russian military fears a U.S. attack, their missiles may stay 
on a ``hair trigger'' alert even if President Putin does not share 
their fears.
  In short, the Moscow Treaty is a treaty that is long on flexibility 
accorded to each party and short on provisions intended to ensure 
compliance. That emphasis on military flexibility is the hallmark of 
this administration. It is an understandable response to dangerous 
times, but I think it is also a vision that ignores many of the 
political risks.
  This administration has also promoted a nuclear weapons policy that 
speaks of the use of new ``bunker-buster'' weapons against deeply 
buried targets, treating nuclear weapons as a handy tool just as any 
other weapon, and thus lowering the threshold for nuclear war.
  This administration also speaks of possible new nuclear weapons 
tests. This administration speaks of the possible use of nuclear 
weapons against states that neither have such weapons nor are allied 
with states that have them, contradicting previous American statements 
that we made in order to maintain other countries' support for the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
  This administration has indicated possible preemptive attacks, 
perhaps with nuclear weapons, on states that we fear are preparing to 
do us harm--again, perhaps even if those states do not have nuclear 
weapons.
  I do not doubt that if we went through this list, issue by issue, we 
would find that the administration has understandable reasons for its 
actions. But in foreign affairs, understandable reasons are not enough. 
We need a sensible strategy. We need statecraft that offers what Thomas 
Jefferson called ``a decent respect to the opinions of mankind.''
  In that respect, we risk alienating ourselves from those who could be 
of help to us in many areas. The issue may be to keep an American on a 
United Nations commission or whether to support an American use of 
force in Iraq. Chickens come home to roost.
  The fact is, we cannot take these unilateral positions irrespective, 
in my view, of world public opinion and then not expect to pay for it 
down the road somewhere. I would respectfully suggest, parenthetically, 
I think we are paying for some of that right now in the United Nations 
Security Council.
  This fixation with military power extends to the Moscow Treaty as 
well. How should we handle a treaty that calls for significant force 
reductions but also allows each party to keep its powder dry?
  Retired Senator Sam Nunn, former chairman of the Armed Services 
Committee, has a good term for the Moscow Treaty. He calls it, not 
``the Moscow Treaty,'' but the ``good-faith treaty.'' Senator Nunn 
adds:

       It expresses--and relies upon--good faith in our common 
     interests and the common vision of our leaders.

  I think it is a pretty good way to characterize this treaty.
  But when he testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
Senator Sam Nunn added a very important point about the treaty. He 
said:

       If it is not followed with other substantive actions, it 
     will become irrelevant at best--counterproductive at worst.

  Let me read that again. He said: ``If it is not followed with other 
substantive actions''--he means actions in terms of arms control and 
verification, and the like--``it will become irrelevant at best--
counterproductive at worst.'' I share his view.
  I support the Moscow Treaty because, on balance, it enhances our 
national interests. Put another way: To reject this treaty, in my view, 
would harm our national interest and, as I said at the outset, the 
relationship between the United States and Russia.
  The arms reductions in it do not go far enough, in my view, but they 
are better than nothing. There is no

[[Page 5271]]

verification provisions, but good faith, information from START 
verification activities, and Nunn-Lugar may be a good substitute for 
verification.
  There is a risk that the Russians will rely upon MIRVed ICBMs that 
raise the threat of an accidental war, but there is also a chance that 
Russia will destroy those missiles as fast as they can pay for their 
destruction.
  The flexibility built into this treaty could undermine each party's 
commitment to reductions and its confidence that the other side will 
achieve them, but the Bush-Putin relationship, which is now being 
somewhat strained on North Korea and on Iraq, could lead to new 
patterns of cooperation that make further formal agreements 
unnecessary.
  May all the good outcomes come to pass, but they require a leap of 
faith. In the meantime, however, I worked with Chairman Lugar to draft 
a resolution of ratification that keeps Senator Nunn's admonition in 
mind. We must build on this treaty in order to ensure its success.
  The resolution before us strengthens congressional oversight of the 
Moscow Treaty implementation and highlights some of the areas on which 
the administration should build on the treaty to secure a safer world 
for ourselves and future generations. The resolution includes two 
conditions and six declarations. Let me briefly go through them.
  Condition (1) requires an annual report to the Senate Foreign 
Relations and Armed Services Committees on how U.S. cooperative threat 
reduction and nonproliferation assistance to Russia can best contribute 
to enabling Russia to implement its side of the bargain. Reports 
subsequent to the initial report will be due on February 15 so that the 
Senate can take them into account as it considers the budget for 
programs for which the administration is calling. This is vital because 
U.S. assistance can bring about the weapons dismantlement the Moscow 
Treaty fails to achieve.
  Condition (2) requires an annual report to the Foreign Relations and 
Armed Services Committee on U.S. and Russian strategic force levels; 
each party's planned reductions for the current year; each party's 
plans for achieving the full reductions by December 31, 2012. Further, 
it requires reporting on any measure, including verification or 
transparency measures, taken or proposed by a party to assure each 
party that the other will achieve its reductions by December 31, 2012.
  Condition (2) also requires information relevant to the treaty 
learned through START verification, and the status of consideration of 
extending the START verification regime beyond December 2009 when the 
START treaty is scheduled to expire; anything calling into question 
either party's intention or ability to achieve the full Moscow Treaty 
reductions by December 31, 2012; and any action taken or proposed by 
the parties to address such concerns. This report will provide a strong 
foundation for Senate oversight of the treaty's implementation.
  The first declaration in the treaty reaffirms the Biden-Byrd 
condition on the authoritative nature of executive branch 
representations to the Senate and its committees during the 
ratification process insofar as they are directed to the meaning and 
legal effect of the treaty.
  In other words, it says the President--this President or a future 
Democrat or Republican President--cannot reinterpret the treaty, cannot 
give it a meaning different than was suggested to us as what it meant.
  There is a second declaration. It encourages the President to 
continue strategic offensive reductions beyond those mandated by this 
treaty to the lowest possible levels consistent with national security 
requirements and alliance obligations of the United States. 
Declarations, I might note, for the Presiding Officer, who knows this 
well, are nonbinding. But this one makes clear that the Moscow Treaty 
should not be the end of arms control.
  President Bush also issued a joint declaration on May 24, 2002, with 
Russian President Putin that declared ``their intention to carry out 
strategic offensive reductions to the lowest possible levels consistent 
with our national security requirements and alliance obligations and 
reflecting the new nature of their strategic reductions.''
  The joint declaration went on to call the Moscow Treaty a major step 
in this direction--not the final step, only a major one. The clear 
implication is that further reductions may follow. This declaration 
gives the arms reduction process the Senate's blessing, just as we did 
when considering ratification of START and the START II treaties.
  The third declaration states the Senate's expectation that the 
executive branch will offer to brief the Senate Foreign Relations and 
Armed Services Committees on issues raised in the bilateral 
implementation commission, which is part of this treaty, on Moscow 
Treaty issues raised in other channels, and on any Presidential 
determination regarding such issues.
  Given the lack of verification or transparency provisions in the 
Moscow Treaty, the bilateral implementation committee established by 
article III of the treaty may play a major role in assuring that each 
party knows what the other party is doing and retains confidence that 
the reductions required by article I will be completed on time--a very 
important point, on time. Remember, there are no drop-dead dates here.
  The fourth declaration urges the President to engage Russia with the 
objective of, one, establishing cooperative measures regarding the 
accounting and security of nonstrategic--that is, or tactical--nuclear 
weapons, and two, providing U.S. and other international assistance to 
help Russia improve its accounting and security of these weapons. The 
first meeting of the U.S.-Russian Consultative Group on Strategic 
Security established a committee to examine these issues. The 
administration witnesses listed this as a top priority. This 
declaration, in my view, adds the Senate's encouragement to pursue the 
issue of tactical nuclear weapons. It does not call for bilateral 
agreement on reductions of those weapons because several outside 
witnesses said no Russian agreement to such reductions was likely.
  The fifth declaration before us encourages the President to 
accelerate U.S. force reductions where feasible and consistent with 
U.S. national security and alliance obligations. The Treaty's intended 
reductions may be achieved prior to December 2012. To me, the wisdom of 
faster reductions is clear. It will reassure the world of our 
commitment to reduced nuclear forces to a reasonable level as speedily 
as we can. They will also ease any possible Russian concerns about 
whether we will meet the one deadline in the treaty. Department of 
Energy and Air Force officials warn that absent additional resources, 
major bottlenecks would slow down an accelerated reduction effort.
  The Congressional Budget Office report on the treaty cites specific 
concerns in that regard. But those concerns relate to an effort to 
complete all reductions by the year 2007.
  I believe in the years after 2007, when the transfer of Peacekeeper 
warheads to the Minuteman III missile will have been completed, faster 
reductions will be much more feasible.
  There is declaration 6. It urges the President to consult with the 
Senate prior to actions relevant to article IV, paragraph 2, which 
relate to extending or superseding a treaty, or paragraph 3, which 
relate to withdrawal from the treaty. This declaration builds on the 
statement of the Secretary of State that ``the administration intends 
to discuss any need to withdraw from the treaty with the Congress, to 
include the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, prior to announcing any 
such action.''
  The Secretary's statement could mean only that the administration 
would discuss with the Senate the need to withdraw when the decision 
has already been made. This declaration we have in the resolution goes 
further, by urging the President to consult with the Senate. One may 
discuss after the decision has been made, but one can only consult 
before a decision has been taken. The latter is what the Senate expects 
if this treaty is passed, and this expectation extends beyond the 
withdrawal issue to cover actions relevant to extending or superseding 
the

[[Page 5272]]

treaty. It is vital that the executive branch consult with us when it 
is considering changes in a treaty. That way, Senators can raise any 
concern before decisions are made that might jeopardize the chances of 
securing our advice and consent to ratification.
  The resolution of ratification before us was recommended unanimously 
by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I believe it will make a 
real contribution to the success of this treaty, and I urge all of my 
colleagues to support it.
  To be sure, the resolution does not address every issue we could 
raise. It clearly does not speak to every declaration that I think 
should be included in this treaty, but neither is it the only venue in 
which to raise those issues. For example, consider what the Foreign 
Relations Committee's report of the treaty says about the proposal by 
GEN Eugene Habiger, former commander of U.S. Strategic Command:

       Members of the committee . . . share General Habiger's view 
     that options for reducing alert status should be evaluated by 
     those with significant expertise on the specific weapons 
     systems in question. If the President does not order 
     preparation for such analyses, Congress could require the 
     analyses or establish a commission of weapons systems experts 
     to undertake this task. Such commissions have been created 
     before, some under the auspices of the National Academy of 
     Sciences, and have proven useful in considering issues of 
     such a technical nature.

  Senator Lugar and I do not think this resolution of ratification is a 
proper vehicle through which to establish such a commission, but unless 
something has changed, which I know it has not, we will continue to 
pursue this proposal in a venue other than this treaty.
  The committee's report also addresses two other issues we were unable 
to incorporate in the resolution of ratification. On verification and 
transparency, our report says:

       The committee believes that the absence of verification 
     provisions in the Moscow Treaty makes confidence and 
     transparency a high priority issue. . . . The United States 
     should not only practice transparency, but also promote it, 
     in close coordination with the Russian Federation.

  Our report goes on to say:

       The committee urges the President to use implementation of 
     the Moscow Treaty as a means to foster . . . mutual 
     confidence in the national security field.

  The report also calls attention to the Congressional Budget Office's 
estimate that further drawdowns in strategic delivery vehicles after 
2007 could save some $5 billion.
  Our report adds:

       The committee recommends that the President give particular 
     attention, as the Moscow Treaty implementation proceeds, to 
     the possibility that modest further reductions in strategic 
     delivery systems after 2007 could lead to significant cost 
     savings without endangering the national security.

  The Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee can 
pursue both of these issues as they oversee the implementation of the 
treaty in the coming years, and I am committed to doing so, and I 
believe the chairman is as well.
  Some of my colleagues are concerned about still other issues. Several 
amendments may be proposed today. Some of them are amendments I would 
like to support, but I will not support any additional amendments 
because I think it is fair to say, speaking for myself, but I think it 
reflects the view of the chairman--he may have already mentioned it--we 
believe that in order to get the cooperation we had to add the total of 
eight declarations or conditions to this treaty, we would, in fact, 
oppose other amendments, some positive, some, in my view, very 
negative. So it will be my dubious distinction of possibly voting 
against some amendments that I think are useful because I think if that 
were to happen and we started to load this up, we might very well lose 
this treaty. I think it is very important.
  It is a mild exaggeration to suggest, but not very far off, that my 
view is that the value of the treaty is exceeded only by the danger of 
failing to ratify this treaty, and there is a danger, in my view, of 
failing to ratify this treaty. This is not a treaty, were I in charge 
of negotiation--as my Grandfather Finnegan used to say, this is not the 
whole of it--this is not all of what I would like to have seen in this 
treaty. I sincerely hope this further changes the atmosphere in the 
positive direction it has been changing, that this administration and 
the Russian administration will conclude we should be dealing with MIRV 
missiles, we should be dealing with tactical nuclear weapons, and we 
should be dealing with other genuine mutual concerns that we have. I am 
confident if we reject this treaty, if we bog it down and it does not 
get the necessary supermajority required, then it will make those 
possibilities impossible in the near term.
  So in each case, as these amendments are put forward, if they are, I 
will be guided also by the need to maintain administration support and 
Senate consensus regarding the resolution of ratification as a whole.
  I say to my Democratic colleagues on my side of the aisle, I do not 
presume to speak for them all. Generally, I do not think it is 
appropriate for the chairman or a ranking member to commit his or her 
party to a single position that that chairman or, in this case, the 
ranking member takes.
  I respect my colleagues who may come forward with amendments, but I 
hope they understand my rationale and why I will not be supporting 
those amendments, even the good ones, because there is no amendment I 
can see that is so significant that it would cure all the defects or 
all the things this treaty fails to address. The risk I am concerned 
about is bogging this treaty down.
  It is a good resolution, I say to the Presiding Officer, who knows 
that as well as or better than anyone present--he is one of the most 
informed people in this body on foreign relations and arms control 
issues. I think it will be implemented. The reporting it requires, I 
think, will enable us to do our constitutional duty of watching over 
the treaty in the coming years.
  Let's pass it and then work together to make it a success and work 
together to take the next steps we have to take.
  I would note to my chairman that there may be a resolution unrelated 
to any amendment to this treaty calling for the Senate to go on record 
in a much more forceful way to support a comprehensive non-
proliferation strategy and Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction 
efforts. As I said in the chairman's absence, without verifi-
cation, there are only two things that give me real solace, and they 
are the insight we get from the Nunn-Lugar initiatives and cooperative 
threat reduction, as well as the remaining verification process that 
exists within the START treaty which will expire three years before 
this treaty expires. But it will not, I assure my colleague, be as an 
amendment. It will not be as a declaration which we cannot amend. It 
will not be as a condition to this treaty.
  I thank my colleagues for their indulgence. I do not plan on speaking 
on this issue very much longer except on each amendment at some point. 
I hope we can move as rapidly as possible because, again, the treaty is 
valuable, but it is dangerous if we do not pass this treaty.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.
  Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, I commend the chairman and ranking 
member for the work they have done. I can only agree wholeheartedly 
with the ranking member's comments about the problems this treaty has, 
although I also intend to vote for it.
  I came to the Senate in 1989. At that time, Vermont was a leader in 
the effort to reduce nuclear weapons. I, therefore, became very 
interested in what we could do to reduce the threat of nuclear war.
  In November 1990, I traveled with seven Members of Parliament from 
the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. We went to the 
capital of each of our countries. We worked as hard as we could to 
raise awareness of the dangers of nuclear war and discuss what could be 
done to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
  In England, we spoke with people who were involved with nuclear 
issues. We had a very memorable time with the Speaker of the House of 
Lords and also the House of Commons and gained insight into the British 
perspective on these issues.

[[Page 5273]]

  We then traveled to Moscow on the evening Soviet President Gorbachev 
gave his annual economic speech. We were amazed when, following the 
speech, he spent a great deal of time with us discussing the nuclear 
issue. He stated that the Soviet Union would certainly welcome a 
prohibition on nuclear testing. At the end of that meeting, there was 
one light moment. I brought him a pint of maple syrup. I offered it to 
him and said that if he were to give a teaspoonful of this to someone, 
why, they would immediately seek peace. He responded: Do you have a 
liter? I said: No, but I will get you one. It was an interesting time.
  We flew from there to Washington and met with National Security 
Advisor Brent Scowcroft.
  This is an issue I have followed for many years. I agree with my 
predecessor, the ranking member, that this treaty is far from perfect. 
We are engaged in a global struggle to confront the terrorist threat 
and to curtail the dangers posed by the prospect of nuclear materials 
in the hands of so-called rogue nations.
  While I will vote for this treaty, I cannot help but feel that the 
Moscow Treaty represents a tragic waste of opportunity. Instead of 
capitalizing on the Russian desire to reach agreement on deep cuts in 
nuclear warheads and instead of seeking destruction of warheads to 
ensure that Russian nuclear materials never fall into the hands of 
America's enemies, the Bush administration's distaste for arms control 
agreements--indeed, for any sort of internationally binding agreement--
has prevented it from seizing the opportunity to make the American 
people more secure.
  There is nothing inherently wrong with the Moscow Treaty. It requires 
the United States and Russia to reduce their operationally deployed 
strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,700 to 2,200 warheads.
  In a small way, it will make the United States, Russia, and the world 
a safer place--a very small way. It also is consistent with the 
previous administration's recommendations in the 1994 Nuclear Posture 
Review.
  The shame of the Moscow Treaty is not in what it does, but in what it 
does not do. The treaty represents a lost opportunity. The Bush 
administration's scorn for arms control blinded it to a golden 
opportunity presented by negotiation of the Moscow Treaty to address 
bigger nonproliferation and counterterrorism concerns of the United 
States.
  The Bush administration came into this negotiation only reluctantly. 
It repeatedly declared its opposition to the negotiation of a legally 
binding treaty text, asserting that less formal agreements or 
statements would suffice.
  Press reports are replete with examples of conflict between the 
Pentagon, which opposed any limitations on its offensive nuclear 
weapons and wanted the flexibility to increase nuclear forces, and the 
State Department, which supported the negotiation of a legally binding 
agreement.
  In the end, the State Department got its legally binding agreement, 
and the Pentagon got an agreement that is notable not only for its 
brevity, but also for its lack of lasting impact.
  While the treaty calls for each side to ``reduce and limit'' its 
strategic nuclear warheads to within the 1,700 to 2,200 range, the 
United States made clear early in the negotiation that it would 
interpret this phrase to apply only to ``operationally deployed'' 
warheads. In other words, there is no obligation to destroy even a 
single warhead under the Moscow Treaty.
  Warheads can be removed from their delivery vehicles and stored close 
by and still count as a ``reduction'' under the treaty. The United 
States has made clear that it plans to dismantle some warheads, put 
some in deep storage, and store others as spares.
  The absence of any obligation to destroy warheads leads to one of the 
treaty's most striking anomalies. The deadline for the reduction of 
operationally deployed warheads to within the 1,700 to 2,200 range is 
December 31, 2012. Unless otherwise agreed, the treaty expires the very 
same day. So the reduction in operationally deployed warheads, which 
are the only reductions in strategic nuclear weapons required by the 
treaty, lasts for only 1 day.
  On January 1, 2013, each party will be free from Moscow Treaty 
constraints on deployment of its strategic nuclear warheads. Moreover, 
if either the United States or Russia decides at any time in the 
interim that it wants to redeploy its warheads, it need only provide 90 
days notice of withdrawal, and it will be free to do so.
  On May 13, 2002, the President stated that he was ``pleased to 
announce that the United States and Russia have agreed to a treaty 
which will substantially reduce our nuclear arsenals to the agreed-upon 
range of 1,700 to 2,200 warheads. This treaty will liquidate the legacy 
of the cold war.''
  This statement provides one more example of the President's rhetoric 
not matching reality. The treaty does not reduce our nuclear warhead 
arsenals to the range of the 1,700 to 2,200 warheads. Far from it. The 
White House refused to agree to such reductions. The treaty merely 
removes warheads from operational deployment. There is no reduction in 
nuclear arsenals. The legacy of the cold war lives on. It just sits a 
short distance from our missiles, bombers, and submarines rather than 
in a deployed posture.
  Faced with the opportunity to lock in reductions of Russian strategic 
nuclear warheads, the President let ideology get in the way of 
meaningful agreement. Despite well-publicized concerns over Russia's 
ability to control its nuclear materials, he passed on an opportunity 
to assist global efforts against proliferation and terrorist attack by 
helping Russia deal with its nuclear stockpiles.
  There are a host of additional steps that could have been taken in 
connection with the negotiation of the Moscow Treaty.
  The President could have acted upon Russian desires to make true 
reductions in our offensive strategic nuclear weapons. He refused, 
despite the fact that destruction of Russian nuclear warheads would 
have eliminated their vulnerability to theft or diversion to 
terrorists.
  The President could have agreed to Russian proposals for negotiation 
of a verification regime to track progress toward the 2012 limits on 
deployed warheads.
  He refused, despite the confidence it would have instilled in the 
reduction process.
  The President could have expanded the negotiation to cover tactical 
nuclear weapons.
  He refused, despite the fact that thousands of such weapons exist in 
Russia and the United States without any sort of monitoring or control 
by an arms control regime.
  Because of their small size and battlefield application, these 
weapons are extremely attractive to terrorist organizations, and 
relatively vulnerable.
  The United States is currently unable to determine the precise number 
of Russian tactical nuclear weapons, and therefore unable to determine 
the nature of Russian control over such weapons and whether some might 
already have been lost or stolen.
  The President also could have expanded the negotiation to cover the 
problem of multiple independently targeted warheads known as MIRVs.
  Refusal to do so by the President leaves the American people 
vulnerable to the loss of several sites from a single missile launch.
  Steps of this sort truly would have matched the President's rhetoric, 
and they would have made this world far safer for our children.
  The opportunities presented by the Moscow Treaty are now lost. Other 
opportunities exist, however, to work with Russia and others around the 
world to fight the proliferation of nuclear weapons, material, and 
knowledge.
  Such work is critical to our efforts to combat terrorism and to halt 
the spread of nuclear weapons and know-how to countries such as North 
Korea, Iran, and Iraq.
  It is my sincere hope that in the future the President will 
reconsider the narrow approach taken toward the Moscow Treaty, and to 
other agreements such as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

[[Page 5274]]

  The fight against terrorism and the spread of nuclear weapons must be 
fought on several fronts.
  Half-hearted efforts like the Moscow Treaty will not meet the needs 
of the American people and the world.
  Mr. LUGAR. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Dole). The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. HAGEL. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HAGEL. Madam President, I rise today to support the resolution of 
ratification of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions--or, as we 
call it, the Moscow Treaty--now before the Senate.
  The Moscow Treaty represents a shared commitment by the United States 
and Russia to step back from the cold war policies of nuclear 
confrontation and enter into a new era of cooperation. This is to 
assure that our nuclear weapons no longer threaten either our peoples 
or our civilization.
  It was the bold vision of President Ronald Reagan, 17 years ago, at 
the Gorbachev summit in Reykjavik that set in motion this effort to 
make dramatic reductions in the nuclear weapons arsenals of the United 
States and then the Soviet Union. President Reagan's vision, once 
considered by some a fantasy or a negotiating ploy, is becoming the 
standard by which we should measure our success in arms control.
  The Moscow Treaty avoids the strategic gamesmanship and pitfalls of 
the SALT treaties, the ABM Treaty, and other negotiations of the cold 
war.
  The simplicity of this treaty, only three pages in length, betrayed 
its historic significance for United States-Russian relations and for 
global security. Its strength is the power of its objective, to 
dramatically reduce American and Russian strategic weapons.
  On November 13, 2001, President Bush announced that the United States 
would reduce its strategic nuclear arsenal by two-thirds, from 
approximately 6,000 nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 
operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons by December 31, 2012. 
The President made this determination independent of what Russia would 
do, knowing that these reductions would be in the overall strategic 
interest of the United States.
  President Putin determined that comparable reductions would also be 
in his country's own national security interest. On May 24, 2002, Bush 
and Putin agreed that their commitment to these reductions would take 
the form of a legally binding treaty.
  The negotiations over the Moscow Treaty did not fall into the traps 
of previous arms control agreements negotiated with the Soviet Union 
during the cold war. That is as much a testimony to the new spirit of 
U.S.-Russian relations and the realities of today's threats as it is to 
the strength of the treaty. For example, it took the United States 
Senate 3 years to ratify the START II treaty. It took the Russian Duma 
7 years for ratification. And both sides put conditions unacceptable to 
the other side on the respective ratification agreements. As a result, 
that agreement never went into force.
  Instead of years of back and forth negotiations, with each side 
seeking a strategic advantage, the Moscow Treaty illustrates a turning 
point in America's relationship with Russia. It should provide an 
environment conducive to future arms control negotiations.
  The Resolution of Ratification before us today introduces just two 
straightforward conditions that complement rather than complicate the 
treaty. First, the administration must report to the Senate annually on 
how the United States plans to reach the required reduction goals. 
While this resolution does not set a rigid timetable, these reports 
will allow the Senate to oversee the implementation of this treaty.
  The second condition deals with the Cooperative Threat Reduction or 
Nunn-Lugar programs. Russia is committed to meeting these reductions, 
but the question remains if Russia has the resources to meet them. The 
Nunn-Lugar program has been successful in assisting the former states 
of the Soviet Union to help reduce their nuclear arsenals. The 
Resolution of Ratification rightly includes Nunn-Lugar programs as 
instrumental in achieving lasting and durable arms reduction.
  The Moscow Treaty should not be considered as the final chapter in 
U.S.-Russian arms control, but it is an important and historic step 
forward. The United States and Russia must do more to prevent the 
proliferation of dual use technology and weapons of mass destruction to 
Iran, North Korea, and other countries. The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative 
Threat Reduction programs are crucial to our shared security interests 
in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destructions. For us 
to succeed in making a safer world, Washington and Moscow must be 
strategic partners, not strategic adversaries.
  The Bush Administration, Chairman Lugar, Senator biden, and others 
who have framed the Treaty and the Resolution of Ratification deserve 
credit and thanks for their leadership and steady focus. I urge my 
colleagues to vote yes on the resolution without amendments, for the 
very reasons Senator Biden articulated just minutes ago, and to 
understand the broader context and significance of this treaty for 
U.S.-Russian relations and global security. I yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The senior assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DORGAN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DORGAN. Madam President, I will speak briefly today about the 
treaty we are considering. I spoke about it in brief yesterday and said 
while I would vote for it, I think it is not much better than nothing 
with respect to arms control. I will explain a little bit about where I 
think we are and where I hope we might go on some of these issues.
  I note that Senator Lugar is in the Chamber, the chairman of the 
committee. He might or might not know that yesterday when I spoke on 
these issues, I spoke about the general issue of threat reduction. I 
spoke about the Nunn-Lugar, or Lugar-Nunn, programs by which we were 
actually using taxpayer money in this country to dismantle delivery 
systems and weapons in the old Soviet Union and in Russia, the very 
success of those programs, and how much I thought those programs have 
contributed to moving in the right direction.
  We may not agree. I do not know. I suspect there are some who think 
this Moscow Treaty actually advances our interests. I think it probably 
does not, but I do not think it hurts anything. It is an agreement by 
which the United States and Russia decide that a number of nuclear 
weapons will be taken off the active delivery systems and put in 
storage, but at the end of the time during which this transition takes 
place, in 2012, we will have exactly the same number of nuclear weapons 
in Russia and in the United States as we have today, at least as a 
result of this treaty.
  This treaty does not propose that any nuclear weapons be disassembled 
or destroyed. It is simply putting nuclear weapons in storage 
facilities somewhere. Are they at the ready? Are they in storage? I 
think it is not a great distinction, or at least it is a distinction 
without much of a difference.
  While Senator Lugar is present, I want to mention, as I did 
yesterday, I have here a piece of a strut from a wing of a Soviet 
bomber. Some of my colleagues have been given pieces of this as a 
commemorative of a very successful effort we have made and continue to 
make with respect to arms reductions. I stress the word ``reductions'' 
of both nuclear weapons and delivery systems.
  I ask unanimous consent to use this old strut of a Soviet bomber to 
make the point.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[[Page 5275]]


  Mr. DORGAN. The point is this: I hold in my hand a piece of metal 
that belonged to a bomber that presumably carried nuclear weapons that 
threatened every American. Did we shoot this bomber down? No, we did 
not. We sawed the wings off and destroyed the fuselage. How did we do 
that? Because we had a program called Nunn-Lugar, or Lugar-Nunn, that 
actually recognized it is a whole lot better to reach an agreement for 
arms reduction and then help pay for the destruction of a Soviet bomber 
or a Russian bomber, or the dismantlement of a missile or a submarine 
and the destruction of a warhead, than it is to exchange them or to try 
to shoot it down or to sink the submarine. So we appropriated 
taxpayers' money for this purpose. This is called peace.
  This is another item I showed yesterday: Ground-up copper from a 
dismantled Soviet submarine that carried missiles with warheads aimed 
at American cities. This is called progress. This submarine does not 
exist any longer. Why? Because we had the foresight, particularly by 
Senator Lugar and Senator Nunn, to say if we can have verifiable 
reductions in both delivery systems and nuclear weapons, and even help 
pay for that destruction, it is far better than having this continued 
standoff and actually having to fight at some point to try to knock 
down a Soviet bomber or destroy a Russian submarine. We are destroying 
them, all right, but peacefully, through a program that works.
  Because I think that is very important to understand, I made the 
point yesterday that there are thousands and thousands of nuclear 
weapons in this world. The bulk of them are contained in arsenals by 
Russia and the United States. Many of them are called theater nuclear 
weapons, lower yield, smaller nuclear weapons. Then there are strategic 
nuclear weapons, the larger nuclear weapons. There are thousands of 
each, and over time, through arms control agreements, we have reached 
some understanding that we want to reduce the number of warheads, the 
number of delivery systems. We have moved back and forth about exactly 
how we do that. In some cases, there has been great emphasis on 
dismantling or limiting the number of delivery systems, the missiles 
themselves, or the bombers or the submarines. They are mere delivery 
systems for a weapon of mass destruction. In some cases, we paid great 
attention to that. In other cases, we have paid attention to the number 
of warheads themselves.
  All of that is important. But I must say a treaty is not, at the end 
of the day, very important to us if it discontinues the effort to 
actually reduce the threat of war through dismantling weapons and 
delivery systems. We have made some progress in arms control, progress 
that I think is very important to the American people, but there is so 
much more to be done.
  A rumor that someone had stolen one nuclear weapon some many months 
ago caused great concern in this country. The loss of one nuclear 
weapon to a terrorist could hold hostage an entire American city or, 
for that matter, much of a country, and there are thousands and 
thousands of these weapons.
  It seems to me, if we wish to make this a safer world for our 
children and grandchildren, it is our job to aggressively stop the 
spread of nuclear weapons. God forbid other countries will become part 
of the nuclear club or that terrorists and terrorist organizations will 
acquire weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. We 
will stop the spread of nuclear weapons. And we must be the leader to 
do that. This country must be in the lead. It is our job. This 
responsibility falls on our shoulders at this time.
  No. 2, in addition to stopping the spread, we must systematically, 
over a period of time, begin reducing the stockpiles. We must do that.
  I have been disappointed for some long while on arms control issues. 
I don't believe we should disarm. I don't want our country to be weak. 
But I believe it is in our country's best interests to stop the spread 
of nuclear weapons and to have a mutually agreed upon reduction in the 
number of nuclear weapons.
  In October of 1999, this Senate rejected the Comprehensive Nuclear 
Test-Ban Treaty. That was a terrible disappointment, certainly for me 
and for many around the world. We have not tested nuclear weapons for 
nearly a decade, yet we send a message to the rest of the world that we 
do not want a Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, one that much of 
the world has already embraced. That was a terrible setback. Since that 
time, by the way, the reports by former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman 
Shalikashvili and the National Academy of Sciences have endorsed the 
Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty and concluded that the treaty can be 
verified adequately, adversaries cannot significantly advance their 
nuclear weapons by cheating, and the United States can maintain 
confidence in its nuclear stockpile without testing. We made a horrible 
mistake in rejecting that treaty.
  This country, in December 2001, announced it would unilaterally 
withdraw from the ABM Treaty with Russia. In my judgment, that was a 
significant mistake. That treaty was the center pole of nuclear arms 
reduction agreements, talks, and discussions.
  In January 2002, the administration released its Nuclear Posture 
Review, and it said the United States needs to keep a very substantial 
nuclear force for 20 years. It set out what that nuclear force would 
be. But that Nuclear Posture Review blurred the lines between 
conventional and nuclear weapons, calling for a new generation of 
smaller, easy-to-use nuclear weapons, including smaller bunker buster 
weapons--the wrong thing for our country if we are going to be a leader 
in trying to say to another nation, let's never see a nuclear weapon 
used again anywhere in this world. And yet we are talking about perhaps 
designing new bunker buster nuclear weapons--moving exactly in the 
opposite direction, in my judgment.
  The Nuclear Posture Review called for increasing our readiness to 
resume testing of nuclear weapons. I don't understand that.
  All of these, together, represent movement in exactly the wrong 
direction for this country. We have very serious challenges in the 
world that require our leadership. India and Pakistan don't like each 
other. They are shooting at each other at the border, over Kashmir. 
They both have nuclear weapons. It was not too many months ago we had a 
very serious, very tense time with respect to India and Pakistan.
  The message we send as the world leader, the strongest military power 
in the world, is critically important. Our message ought to be that we 
want to make this a safer world by beginning the long process of 
reducing the stockpile of nuclear weapons, not by putting them in 
warehouses someplace. We should be really reducing the number of 
nuclear weapons and making sure that our efforts as the United States 
of America are used to try to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to 
any other country in the world, any other group in the world--that is 
our responsibility. It is what we must be about. If that mantle of 
world leadership is not borne by us, that leadership will not exist. I 
fear our future will not be a particularly good future with more and 
more countries becoming a part of the nuclear club.
  As I indicated, the Moscow Treaty does not require a single missile 
silo, submarine, bomber, missile, or bomb, for that matter, to be 
eliminated. Compare this with previous treaties. The Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces Treaty required the destruction of an entire class of 
ballistic missiles with ranges from 2,000 to 3,000 miles.
  I had a picture in the Senate one day of a few acres of sunflowers. 
This few acres of sunflowers were sunflowers planted on a piece of 
ground that used to house missiles in the Ukraine with a warhead aimed 
at the United States of America. It is not a warhead. It is not a 
missile. It is gone. It is destroyed. And now where a missile was once 
buried, there grows a field of sunflowers. What a wonderful thing.
  The fact is, these agreements, these treaties that we have had, have

[[Page 5276]]

worked. The treaties require irreversible action by requiring the 
destruction of delivery vehicles and warheads.
  As I indicated, the Moscow Treaty does not require a single nuclear 
warhead to be destroyed. It limits the number of strategic nuclear 
weapons that each side can deploy, from 1,700 to 2,200.
  Admittedly, previous arms treaties did not require the destruction of 
warheads, but at the Helsinki summit Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin 
agreed to a framework of SALT III negotiations for destruction of 
warheads. During treaty negotiations, Russia insisted that it require 
the elimination of nondeployed warheads, but our country resisted 
because we wanted to keep warheads removed from deployment in storage.
  So now we have a Moscow Treaty that says we are going to keep these 
warheads in storage but we will count them as a reduction in warheads 
because they are no longer active with respect to the ability to put 
them on an airplane or submarine or on the tip of a missile. Frankly, 
it does not reduce the number of nuclear warheads in a significant way, 
and in my judgment, we ought to be doing that.
  We have the START treaty. We have a whole series of efforts that have 
occurred over a long period of time that give us a roadmap on how to 
succeed with respect to what I think our obligation is in these areas. 
There is nothing particularly objectionable about this treaty, but it 
does not really provide any progress for us. One can hardly object to 
something that does not do anything, except that my wish would be that 
we would engage in a manner that would allow us to make some progress.
  I intended to offer an amendment. I say to my colleague from Indiana 
that I am not going to offer an amendment. I have the amendment, but I 
will not offer it because my understanding is that the ranking member 
would be obligated to vote against it based on an agreement the 
chairman and the ranking member have reached. But let me read my 
amendment and state what I hope this country will do at some point.
  My amendment would have added a section (7):

       Further Negotiations.--The Senate urges the President to 
     build upon the foundation of the Treaty by negotiating a new 
     treaty with the Russian Federation that would enter into 
     force upon the termination of the Treaty on Reduction and 
     Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, with Annexes, 
     Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding, signed at Moscow 
     on July 31, 1991 (START Treaty), and would require deep, 
     verifiable, and irreversible reductions in the stockpiles of 
     strategic and non-strategic nuclear warheads of the United 
     States and the Russian Federation.

  The purpose of this would be to say that future negotiations which 
should occur, and should occur now, should have as an objective to 
reduce the stockpile of nuclear weapons contained both in Russia and 
the United States. I do not propose disarmament. I do propose that in 
circumstances where each of us has thousands and thousands and 
thousands of nuclear weapons--perhaps as many as 25 to 30,000 between 
both countries, if you include both theater and strategic nuclear 
weapons--I do propose we find a way to reduce the stockpiles on both 
sides in an irreversible way.
  Then, as I indicated previously, my fervent hope and prayer is that 
the leadership of this country will exert itself to try to do 
everything it can to be a world leader to stop the spread of nuclear 
weapons. This country's future depends on it.
  Let me conclude by saying I have great admiration for Senator Biden, 
who has had a world of experience in these areas, and for Senator 
Lugar. I have already spoken of Senator Lugar. I will not go on at 
great length. But his work has been extraordinary. Senator Biden's 
work, as well, contributes a great deal to this Senate and to this 
country.
  I know he believes, as I do, that we have seen many missed 
opportunities in recent years to don the mantle of world leadership 
that we must assume dealing with these areas. While I will vote for 
this treaty, I am confident that Senator Lugar and Senator Biden 
understand, perhaps even if this administration does not, based on 
their past actions and based on the things they have supported 
previously, this is a step, even if a baby step, that must be followed 
by very large strides, vigorous, aggressive approaches to do what we 
know needs to be done: A real reduction in the stockpile of nuclear 
weapons and a major effort on behalf of America to stop the spread of 
nuclear weapons in the rest of the world.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.


                           Amendment No. 250

             (Purpose: To provide an additional condition)

  Mr. DURBIN. Madam President, the resolution of ratification we have 
before us on the treaty between the United States of America and the 
Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions, also known as the 
Moscow Treaty, is a step forward but in many ways it is a very modest 
step. The treaty is a three-page document signed by Presidents Bush and 
Putin on May 24, 2002, to reduce deployed strategic nuclear weapons to 
between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by December 31, 2012.
  The treaty actually calls for no warheads or delivery vehicles to be 
destroyed. They can simply be stored. There are no verification 
provisions, other than those still in effect through 2009 from the 
START treaty, and the reductions in deployed warheads have to occur by 
December 31, 2012, the very same day the treaty expires.
  However, once the reductions in deployed warheads are met, it means a 
large number of warheads will not be ready to launch at a moment's 
notice. That is a positive thing, even if no warheads are dismantled 
and no delivery vehicles are destroyed.
  When nonnuclear countries agreed to forgo nuclear weapons in the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, an essential part of the grand bargain 
was that nuclear countries, like the United States and the Russian 
Federation, were to control and reduce their nuclear weapons. Because 
this treaty is an effort to control and reduce the number of deployed 
warheads, I will vote for the resolution of ratification.
  From the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty flowed all the various 
efforts of U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control, including the SALT and 
START treaties. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was renewed in 
1995, but it required a lot of arm twisting by the United States 
because nonnuclear countries have accused the nuclear powers of not 
being serious about nuclear arms control and reduction. A major reason 
nonnuclear states agreed to renew the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
is because the United States signed and agreed to pursue ratification 
of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, which sadly, this body, 
the Senate, rejected on October 13, 1999.
  The failure of the Senate to meet its obligation and ratify the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty left us with little or no 
leverage to keep Asia from a spiraling arms race in India, Pakistan, 
China, and perhaps even other countries. Pakistan and India are in a 
tense nuclear standoff that came to the brink of nuclear war over 
Kashmir and easily could again. North Korea, we all know, already has 
nuclear weapons and is likely to build more. Libya, Iran, and Iraq, may 
be seeking to acquire or develop nuclear weapons.
  For those who think nuclear arms control is just a quaint leftover of 
the cold war, let me say we are facing a major round of nuclear 
proliferation with destabilizing effects that we may have no way to 
stop.
  Let me at this point pay special tribute to the Senator from Indiana, 
Mr. Lugar. Several weeks ago I went to a breakfast at which Senator 
Lugar spoke relative to the issue of nuclear proliferation. Since the 
days of Nunn-Lugar, with Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, Dick Lugar of 
Indiana has been a leader, a global leader, on the question of nuclear 
proliferation. I hope more Members of the Senate on both sides of the 
aisle will pay particular heed to his warnings about proliferation and 
about the need for the United States and other countries

[[Page 5277]]

seeking stability and peace in the world to be mindful of the danger of 
proliferation of nuclear weapons.
  Some of the examples he gave us from his own life experience, 
visiting the former Soviet Union, were chilling--chilling because we 
are this close to the proliferation of weapons, weapons in the hands of 
countries that will not deal with them in a responsible way.
  Having said that, though, I am still very concerned about the 
policies of this administration that could, in fact, further fray the 
fabric of the grand bargain struck with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty and actually create an incentive for current nonnuclear states 
to acquire nuclear weapons--exactly the opposite of what we want to see 
in the world of tomorrow. This country has to do more to deal with the 
crisis in North Korea, do more to secure fissile materials in other 
countries, and do more to secure a broad international coalition 
against proliferation.
  I have cosponsored a resolution with Senator Tom Daschle, which will 
be introduced today, calling for a more vigorous nonproliferation 
policy.
  I am particularly concerned this administration's policy of 
preemption, combined with a new policy of first use of nuclear weapons, 
is an incentive, an invitation to proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, especially nuclear weapons. I have introduced a resolution 
of my own on that subject today.
  Let me elaborate with just a few points. Press reports about the 
December 31, 2001, Nuclear Posture Review indicated that the United 
States might use nuclear weapons to discourage adversaries from 
undertaking military programs or operations that could threaten U.S. 
interests; that nuclear weapons could be employed against targets able 
to withstand nonnuclear attack, and that setting requirements for 
nuclear strike capabilities, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya 
are among the countries that could be involved in so-called 
contingencies. The September 17, 2002, national security strategy of 
the United States stated:

       As a matter of common sense and self defense, America will 
     act against such emerging threats before they are fully 
     formed.

  It went on to say:

       To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our 
     adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act 
     preemptively.

  The U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control, John Bolton, 
recently announced this administration's abandonment of the so-called 
``negative security assurance,'' the pledge to refrain from using 
nuclear weapons against nonnuclear weapons, which was outlined in 1978, 
restated in 1995, and in 2002 in the context of gaining the support of 
other nations for the nonproliferation treaty. Press reports indicate 
that in a classified document, National Security Directive 17, the 
President may have made explicit what had been usefully ambiguous 
before--a threat to use nuclear weapons in response to an attack with 
chemical or biological weapons. Making that threat explicit may mean 
that leaders of other countries that fear a United States attack will 
think they have to have nuclear weapons to deter the United States, 
leading to even more proliferation.
  What we have here is an escalation of rhetoric, where we have moved 
beyond ``no first use of nuclear weapons,'' to the point where this 
administration is saying we can use nuclear weapons against those who 
do not have them. And now we have a new policy of preemption where the 
use of those weapons does not even require an imminent danger, imminent 
threat against the United States.
  This rhetoric and this policy cannot help but escalate the situation, 
leading to more proliferation. That is why I think it is sad that this 
U.S. Congress has been so passive, while this President has sought to 
dramatically radicalize and change the foreign policy which has guided 
this Nation for decades.
  The United States is currently engaged in the expansion of research 
and development of new types of nuclear weapons such as the so-called 
bunker busters, or small nuclear weapons intended to destroy 
underground facilities or buried chemical or biological weapons caches.
  These policies and actions threaten to make nuclear weapons appear to 
be useful, legitimate, offensive first-strike weapons, rather than a 
force for deterrence, and therefore this policy undermines an essential 
tenet of nonproliferation.
  The cumulative effect of the policies announced by President Bush is 
to redefine and broaden the concept of preemption, which has been 
understood to mean anticipatory self-defense in the face of imminent 
attack, and the right of every state to include preventive war without 
evidence of an imminent attack in which the United States may opt to 
use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states.
  We don't know where this dangerous policy may lead. But it is hard to 
imagine it will lead to a safer world. It is hard to imagine that a 
nonnuclear power can look at the new Bush foreign policy and say with 
any degree of confidence that forestalling the development of nuclear 
weapons is in their best interests in the long term. I am afraid the 
President has created an incentive for proliferation of nuclear 
weapons--exactly the opposite of what this world needs.
  Turning back to the treaty before us today, I am going to offer an 
amendment, and a number of colleagues will as well. It is my hope we 
will be able to make constructive and responsible improvements to the 
Resolution of Ratification that will address some of the weaknesses.
  When the Senate considered the Resolution of Ratification of the 
START treaty in 1992, it approved a condition that requires the 
President to seek a cooperative monitoring and verification arrangement 
in any future agreement.
  I am offering an amendment to this Resolution of Ratification that 
requires the President to report to relevant Senate committees on how 
he is complying with that requirement.
  The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty--also known as the Moscow 
Treaty--does not contain any veri-
fication measures other than those already required by the START 
treaty, which expires in 2009.
  The President's position is that our new cooperative relationship 
with Russia means no verification is necessary. Certainly our 
relationship with the Russian Federation is quite different than it was 
during the dark and dreary days of the cold war. The preamble to the 
treaty makes reference to this new relationship saying the two parties 
desire ``. . . to establish a genuine partnership based on the 
principles of mutual security, cooperation, trust, openness, and 
predictability.''
  I believe a series of cooperative measures, inspections, data sharing 
and other verification measures are appropriate even in a relationship 
based on trust, cooperation, openness, and predictability.
  I am sorry to remind my colleagues on the Republican side of the 
aisle that it was their President, Ronald Reagan, who said, ``Trust but 
verify.'' He was negotiating a START treaty at the time with the Soviet 
Union. I think his words still apply. Verification builds trust.
  As British Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston said in 1848--and it 
has become an often-quoted maxim in foreign affairs--``We have no 
eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are 
eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.'' 
In this case, the interests of both countries are served by reducing 
deployed warheads, but interests can change with the circumstances.
  President Bush has said several times--in fact, he said it in a 
conversation that I was a party to--that he has developed a 
relationship of trust with the Russian President, Vladimir Putin. In a 
joint press conference with the Russian President in June, 1991, 
President Bush said: ``I looked the man in the eye. I found him to be 
very straightforward and trustworthy. We had a very good dialogue. I 
was able to get a sense of his soul. . . . The Cold War said loud and 
clear that we're opponents and that we bring the peace

[[Page 5278]]

through the ability for each of us to destroy each other. . . . Friends 
don't destroy each other.''
  This may well be so, but the fact is that both countries still both 
have, at the push of a few buttons, the capability to destroy each 
other, and to destroy the world. There can be no more serious matter.
  President Bush and President Putin may have the best of trusting 
relationships, but we cannot know what the future will bring or who 
will be President of either country over the life of this treaty, or 
what kind of relationship those Presidents may have.
  Condition 8 of the resolution of ratification of the START treaty 
requires that in connection with any subsequent agreement reducing 
strategic nuclear weapons, the President shall seek appropriate 
monitoring measures. I want to read the entire condition, because I 
believe it is very important for my colleagues to hear what the Senate 
required in 1992:

       (8) Nuclear Stockpile Weapons Arrangement.--In as much as 
     the prospect of a loss of control of nuclear weapons or 
     fissile material in the former Soviet Union could pose a 
     serious threat to the United States and to international 
     peace and security, in connection with any further agreement 
     reducing strategic offensive arms, the President shall seek 
     an appropriate arrangement, including the use of reciprocal 
     inspections, data exchanges, and other cooperative measures, 
     to monitor--
       (A) the numbers of nuclear stockpile weapons on the 
     territory of the parties to this Treaty; and
       (B) the location and inventory of facilities on the 
     territory of the parties to this treaty capable of producing 
     significant quantities of fissile materials.

  This condition, originally offered to the START Resolution of 
Ratification during committee consideration, was offered by the Senator 
from Delaware, Mr. Biden, who is in the Chamber today and has been a 
leader, as well as Senator Lugar, in developing the kind of arms 
control which can make a safer world. Senator Biden offered an 
excellent condition that reflected deep concern about nuclear warheads 
and fissile material falling into the hands of terrorists and 
irresponsible states, and anticipated that future treaties would 
require cooperative measures to monitor and verify reductions in 
strategic weapons in a post-cold-war context.
  In fact, measures to monitor what becomes of the thousands of 
warheads to be taken off of operational deployment is one of the most 
important steps the United States and the Russian Federation can take 
to be sure those weapons or fissile materials are secured.
  The START treaty contains an extremely complex verification regime. 
Both countries collect most of the information to verify compliance 
through ``National Technical Means of Verification,'' in other words, 
satellites and remote sensing devices. START also allows intrusive 
measures, such as on-site inspections and exchanges of data.
  But these measures under START apply to the retirement and 
destruction of nuclear weapons launchers and not the warheads 
themselves. START has a complex way of limiting nuclear forces--rather 
than counting warheads, it attributes a certain number of warheads to 
each kind of missile or bomber.
  The treaty before us does not require the destruction of launchers, 
or warheads. There is simply no way to verify what may happen to the 
thousands of warheads that are to be taken out of operational 
deployment.
  When Senator Lugar came to our breakfast a few weeks ago, he told a 
story of visiting the submarine facility at Minsk--I am sure he can 
fill in the details--and seeing the long line of nuclear submarines 
that used to be part of the Soviet Navy. He raised a serious and 
important question about what would happen to the nuclear payload or 
the nuclear materials in those submarines. Will they be taken out to 
sea and scuttled, or dismantled and sold? It is a serious concern.
  Think about the materials we are talking about. I have seen Senator 
Biden many times come to the floor with materials no longer than a 
saucer, and easily transported in terms of their size. Now we are 
talking about a treaty before us which does not include verification 
procedures so that we are not certain that the Russian Federation is 
actually dealing with these fissile materials and nuclear weapons in a 
fashion to guarantee that they won't be the subject of proliferation.
  Doesn't it make sense for us to have a reciprocal obligation on the 
part of both the United States and the Russian Federation to make 
certain this treaty works? To say the President of the United States 
and the President of Russia have a trusting working relationship is a 
good thing for world peace. But who knows what tomorrow will bring? Who 
knows where we will be or where the Russian Federation will be? And who 
knows who the leaders will be?
  It is important for us, if we are ratifying a resolution for a treaty 
that will affect the United States for 9 or 10 years, that we at least 
consider the possibilities that things may not end up as smoothly as we 
hoped. It is far better for us to build into this resolution a 
verification procedure to make sure both sides live up to the terms of 
the treaty. As President Reagan said, ``Trust but verify.''
  I believe that it makes sense for new verification measures to be 
negotiated. A Bilateral Implementation Commission and the Consultative 
Group for Strategic Security have both been established in connection 
with the treaty, and verification and transparency measures may be 
discussed in these fora. Secretary of State Colin Powell said in his 
testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the 
Administration will ``consider whether to pursue expanded 
transparency'' at meetings of the Consultative Group.
  My amendment reminds the Executive Branch that it is already required 
to seek an arrangement on such issues by Condition 8 of the START 
treaty, and simply requires a report on what it has done to comply with 
the requirements of that condition.
  I believe this change, although small, is important. It is a change 
that states to every Member of the Senate and to the American people we 
represent and to future generations that this is more than just words 
on paper. It is more than just a blink of an eye and a relationship.
  There is a verification procedure to make sure that the nuclear 
weapons that are to be set aside and not menace the rest of the world 
are actually set aside, verification procedures which we can trust and 
the Russians can trust as well. That is not too much to ask. To do 
anything less is to perhaps jeopardize the good, positive relationship 
we have today, by leaving unsaid and unmet our obligation for 
verification.
  Madam President, I send this amendment to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Illinois [Mr. Durbin] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 250.

  Mr. DURBIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of section 2, add the following new condition:
       (3) Compliance Report.--Not later than 60 days after the 
     exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty, and 
     annually thereafter on April 15, the President shall submit 
     to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
     Armed Services of the Senate a report on the compliance of 
     the President with the requirements of condition (a)(8) of 
     the resolution of ratification of the Treaty on Reduction and 
     Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, with Annexes, 
     Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding, signed at Moscow 
     on July 31, 1991 (START Treaty), which states that ``[in] as 
     much as the prospect of a loss of control of nuclear weapons 
     or fissile material in the former Soviet Union could pose a 
     serious threat to the United States and to international 
     peace and security, in connection with any further agreement 
     reducing strategic offensive arms, the President shall seek 
     an appropriate arrangement, including the use of reciprocal 
     inspections, data exchanges, and other cooperative measures, 
     to monitor (A) the numbers of nuclear stockpile weapons on 
     the territory of the parties to [the START Treaty]; and (B) 
     the location and inventory of facilities on the territory of 
     the parties to [the START Treaty] capable of producing or 
     processing significant quantities of fissile materials''.


[[Page 5279]]

  Mr. DURBIN. Madam President, I have shared a copy of this amendment 
with Senator Lugar, and I hope Senator Biden's staff has a copy as 
well. If not, we will provide it to them immediately.
  At this point, I do not know if Senator Lugar would like to respond 
to the filing of the amendment or to engage me in a conversation about 
the nature of the amendment. I would welcome that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I thank the Senator for his very 
thoughtful and generous remarks about cooperative threat reduction and 
the conversations we have enjoyed about that.
  The Senator from Illinois has been a very strong supporter of 
nonproliferation in this country as we have worked with the Russians or 
we have tried to direct our own programs. It is always difficult to 
oppose an amendment of someone who has been so generous in mentioning 
cooperation we have had together.
  I will oppose the amendment because I believe that, in fact, the 
Senator's objectives are being realized in many ways. Some are known to 
the Senator; some I would like to discuss presently.
  But, first of all, I would say that in arguing in favor of the Moscow 
Treaty, Senator Biden and I have pointed out that the President had 
already made a determination that we were going to unilaterally destroy 
a good number of weapons. And the Russians, for their own reasons, had 
decided they wanted to do so.
  This is why it is a very short and simple treaty without extensive 
verification protocols that have characterized other treaties. But it 
comes with the START I verification procedures that last through 2009. 
In our hearings, we have pointed out 2009 is short of 2012, which is 
the timetable for the total treaty to be consummated. But, at the same 
time, there is all of the strictness the Senator from Illinois has 
mentioned in previous treaties incorporated in this one.
  The second point of verification is the Cooperative Threat Reduction 
Program, the Nunn-Lugar program. This has people from our country 
working with Russians on the ground in Russia. They are verifying 
precisely what they are doing.
  I want to mention the extent of this reporting and verification by 
pointing to the CTR report which was just published for the year 2002. 
It has, on the front, so that all Senators will be able to see, the CTR 
logo, and says: ``Cooperative Threat Reduction annual report, Fiscal 
Year 2002.''
  Now, page by page, the report goes through a description of 
cooperative threat reduction activities carried out in fiscal year 2000 
in the nuclear, chemical, and biological areas, project by project and 
objective by objective. It discusses the 5-year plan for destruction or 
containment, security of each of these materials or weapons systems.
  I mention this simply because that has been the objective of those of 
us who have tried to foster this Cooperative Threat Reduction Program; 
that in fact there be very close congressional scrutiny, dollar for 
dollar, area by area, all the way through.
  Now, Senator Biden was prescient in his amendment that the Senator 
from Illinois has cited. But this clearly influenced the subsequent 
work under cooperative threat reduction, and does to this day.
  The objectives that the Senator from Illinois has suggested that are 
especially important--and those were also mentioned by the 
distinguished Senator from North Dakota, Mr. Dorgan, early on--we are 
concerned about the tactical nuclear weapons. We have raised the 
question to Secretary Powell as to why this was not included. In 
essence, this is not a quote from the Secretary, but he said: It is a 
bridge too far. We raised this with the Russians. They are not prepared 
to come to agreement.
  Now, other countries are deeply interested in the Russians coming to 
agreement, the G-8 countries that have come together in the so-called 
10 plus 10 over 10 program, which means $10 billion for each of 10 
years from the countries in the G-8 other than the United States, thus 
matching essentially what we are doing under cooperative threat 
reduction.
  One of the objectives of the early meetings was clearly: What about 
the tactical weapons? These are very close to the Europeans. They are 
not long-range ballistic missiles. They are missiles on the continent 
in proximity to countries worried about their security.
  So we have friends, in a multilateral way, who are helping to pursue 
this situation. I have some confidence--because Secretary Powell and 
Secretary Rumsfeld, in their testimony, indicated this is a high 
priority for them, they will continue to raise it with the Russians--we 
will make some headway. But we have not thus far.
  I would just say to the distinguished Senator from Illinois, whether 
spurred by the Biden amendment years ago or various other activities, 
our activities as Members of the Senate and the House and on the ground 
in Russia have been vigorous.
  I think the Senator cited perhaps some of my trips. But one recently, 
last August, was an attempt to go to the biomilitary plant at so-called 
Kirov 200. I sought to go there because it was identified as one of 
four bioweapons facilities of which we believe the Russians are simply 
still in denial. They are not prepared to work with us, even though at 
14 other sites we do now have active programs.
  Under the ISTC Program, the International Science and Technology 
Program, we are giving stipends to Russian scientists who now have left 
the weapons field and are working on HIV/AIDS or other ways to combat 
chemical weapons poisoning.
  I would simply say that the Kirov 200 situation, for me, was almost a 
bridge too far, even though I thought arrangements were available for 
our U.S. Air Force plane to convey me and the party out there. At the 
airport that morning, we were informed we would not be able to land. We 
could fly, but we were not going to land. So we began to work our way 
through the bureaucracy of the foreign office of Russia, unwilling to 
take no for an answer. In due course, we did fly the aircraft, and we 
did land in Kirov.
  Having gotten there, I would say that I did not see everything that I 
wished to see. But what I did find were retired Russians, retired at 
55, who had come, from the plant that was denied to me, down to our 
activities and who, in essence, told me everything they were doing at 
either.
  So I think we have a pretty good insight. I just mention this because 
even as we legislatively will some things to happen, they do not happen 
without persistence and sort of doggedly pursuing those objectives. I 
am just testifying that is occurring, sometimes to the discomfort of 
our relationship with the Russians. But in this particular case, I 
reported all my activities to the defense minister, Mr. Ivanov, and at 
least mildly admonished him we ought to be beyond this. The whole idea 
of the Moscow Treaty should be a new relationship, a new trust between 
President Putin and our President Bush. And all of us on both sides 
need to be fostering that.
  So my response to the Senator from Illinois is to say that I think we 
are on the same side in pursuing congressional oversight, more vigor 
with regard to everything we are now doing, although I think it is 
fully reported annually by the Department of Energy, quite apart from 
CTR, and with goals to go where we have not been; namely, tactical 
weapons and future destruction.
  Mr. DURBIN. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. LUGAR. Yes, I yield for a question.
  Mr. DURBIN. Am I right in my premise that this SORT treaty, this 
Moscow Treaty, does not destroy the nuclear warheads but simply calls 
for them to be stored, set aside, not in a deployable mode, so they, 
frankly, are at least within the grasp of either country to be 
reactivated? Is that accurate?
  Mr. LUGAR. The Senator is correct. The treaty does not call for the 
destruction of warheads.
  Mr. DURBIN. May I also ask the Senator from Indiana, since we live in 
the

[[Page 5280]]

21st century in fear that fissile material and nuclear weapons will be 
transferred either openly or covertly to countries that will misuse 
them, why would the Senator from Indiana believe that a verification 
procedure which spotlights the location and number of these weapons in 
both countries would not be in the best interest of reducing the 
likelihood of proliferation?
  Mr. LUGAR. I would not disagree, in response to the distinguished 
Senator, that it would be ideal for this verification to occur, but I 
would simply respond that although we have been negotiating such 
verification for some time, the Russians have not agreed to do this. In 
other words, one reason that is not in this treaty is the negotiators 
have found resistance. I have found resistance. Other people have found 
resistance.
  These things open up tediously, sort of one by one. For example, 
after great pressure, I was taken on a small Russian aircraft to a 
plant where in fact there are warheads taken off of missiles, and they 
are stored almost like bodies in coffins side by side, lined there. 
Each one had a history of when the warhead was built, when it was taken 
off of the missile that would have conveyed it, when it was put there 
in storage, and some estimate as to its efficacy; that is, how long you 
can anticipate this warhead would actually be explosive. Much more 
ominous down the trail and something that I am pursuing is some sort of 
prediction as to when it might become dangerous.
  The difficulty--and the Senator knows this--is these warheads are 
unstable sometimes in terms of their chemical composition. They may not 
lie there in peace forever, like a sporting goods store situation of 
inert matter. That is the problem for the Russians. At some point they 
will have to move the warheads. So they already have a railway station 
secured. They have procedures because they know that at some stage they 
will have to take the warhead out and disassemble it, a very dangerous 
predicament and one that then leads to problems of storage of the 
fissile material. So in another Nunn-Lugar program we are trying to 
work on the storage facilities for thousands of these warheads because, 
for the moment, there is not adequate storage for the fissile material 
itself after it is taken as plutonium or highly enriched uranium from 
the warhead. The Russians would like to pursue that.
  So we asked the logical question the Senator has asked: Why can't we 
work together to verify where all these warheads are, what status they 
are in. We are interested in that. We don't want an accidental nuclear 
event in Russia. And the Russians have been resistant, in the fullness 
of time perhaps less resistant, but I would just say, once again, that 
was probably a bridge too far for this treaty. Our negotiators found 
the Russians not to be prepared.
  Mr. DURBIN. Will the Senator yield for another question?
  Mr. LUGAR. Of course.
  Mr. DURBIN. Is the Senator aware that the amendment I offer calls on 
the President to report to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
Committee on Armed Services of the Senate not later than 60 days after 
the exchange of instruments of ratification, annually thereafter on 
April 15, on the progress toward verification, and we go on to say that 
we are seeking the same type of verification as in the START treaty, 
the numbers of nuclear stockpiled weapons in the territories of the 
parties and the location and inventory of the facilities?
  I ask the Senator from Indiana, if we have not reached the stage we 
want to in verification, is it not of some value for this Senate to say 
as part of the agreement that we are going to ask this President, and 
any subsequent President affected by the treaty, to continue to report 
on an annual basis to the Senate the progress that is being made to 
reach verification?
  I would think that would have real value to spur this administration 
on to keep negotiating, keep trying to reach agreement with the 
Russians. And absent that, I am afraid there would be a disincentive 
for that sort of thing to occur. I ask the Senator if that is a 
reasonable interpretation of my own amendment.
  Mr. LUGAR. I think it is a reasonable interpretation, I respond to 
the Senator, but I would also say that in fact the President, at least 
through the Department of Defense, in the CDR report I have in front of 
me, is doing that each year. These are annual reports. Likewise the 
Secretary of Energy is making his own reports on the nuclear 
accountability issues. So it appears to me that generally the objective 
of the Senator is being fulfilled in current reports.
  What is not being fulfilled and what the Senator and I both wish was 
being fulfilled is more progress toward the destruction of the warheads 
themselves and more openness on the part of the Russians to what their 
problem clearly is and one in which we could help if we had more 
access. Before I got into this particular vault I am talking about, 
General Habiger, who has been mentioned in this debate, was the last 
American ever to get there. This is not openness or transparency. So 
even though property threat reduction brings a lot of Russians and 
Americans together, there are areas in which we have not come together, 
these bioweapons plants, the four of them, for example, and some of 
these vaults that we have not seen.
  Every year we are reporting, however, our deficiencies or our 
inability to reach agreement. It is a checkoff list with the Russians.
  I say, on behalf of those who are in the field with the CDR, they 
work at it all the time, working with their compatriots out in the 
hinterland of Russia to see what might open up this year.
  Mr. DURBIN. If I might say, by way of a question in closing so that 
we don't prolong this debate, I hope the Senator from Indiana will view 
this amendment as instructive and as friendly and not as adversarial to 
his goals. I took heart from the statements he made in meetings I 
attended about the need for all of us to be more sensitized to the 
problem of proliferation of nuclear weapons. What I am seeking to do is 
to get an ongoing relationship with the President and the Senate so 
that we can continue to monitor the progress being made and the 
incentive is there for this President and any other President in the 
Russian Federation or the United States to continue to move forward on 
this track so we can reduce the likelihood of proliferation of nuclear 
weapons.
  I ask my colleague from Indiana if he will consider this amendment I 
am offering in that light, as a positive, supportive effort, a friendly 
effort to add something that may be of value to the conversation.
  Mr. LUGAR. In response to the Senator, of course, I see it in that 
light. My only argument with the Senator today is that I do not believe 
it ought to be part of the treaty. I believe clearly the fulfillment is 
already occurring in terms of the reporting, with considerable vigor, 
but at the same time, as I have admitted to the Senator, the objectives 
we both seek by getting the President to indicate energy and so forth 
also requires the Russians to reciprocate. This particular treaty still 
has to be ratified by the Duma. We have our own debate here, but they 
will have theirs, too.
  Senator Biden and I in our opening comments indicated we would resist 
amendments simply because we believe we have at least in a very general 
way covered territory of what we ought to be doing in terms of 
oversight but in ways that would not in any way be objectionable to the 
Russians who have to ratify the treaty and thus at least preserve the 
spirit in which Presidents Putin and Bush negotiated, admittedly, a 
limited treaty. I would ask the Senator at least for his thoughts as to 
whether he would be sufficiently assured by the vigor of my response to 
withdraw the amendment, understanding that we will continue to pursue 
these reports.
  I will try to make available to Senators the CDR message if they do 
not have it which really reviews in detail the gist of what the Senator 
is requesting. But beyond that, it is a pledge of vigor in proceeding 
where we have not been, these bridges too far that I have described 
that are very important.

[[Page 5281]]


  Mr. DURBIN. May I ask the Senator from Indiana a followup question? 
Would the Senator be willing to join with me and perhaps Senator Biden 
in a letter to the administration relative to this verification 
procedure, asking that the administration move forward to at least 
establish on an informal basis a reporting with the Senate so we can 
see the progress being made? I would consider that to be a step in this 
direction which moves us to the same goal.
  Mr. LUGAR. I respond to the Senator that I would be pleased to work 
with the Senator on a letter which affirms, once again, the importance 
of the debate we are having, the interest of Members who are signing 
the letter, but others literally in the subject matter of what we are 
talking about who would acknowledge perhaps that some reports are being 
made and maybe ask for more vigor in being more complete. I would like 
to work with the Senator in that project.
  Mr. DURBIN. I ask my colleague from Delaware, since I am taking his 
language from the START treaty and have venerated it, deified it, given 
it all of the credence any Senator could ask, whether he would be kind 
enough to join me.
  Mr. BIDEN. The answer is yes. I think what the Senator is attempting 
to do is very important. Let me explain to the Senator my perspective, 
and to state the obvious--I may very well be wrong about this. But let 
me tell my colleague why I honestly think what Senator Lugar and I came 
up with is, quite frankly, more likely to get at what we need.
  Condition 8 that has been referred to in the START treaty was a very 
new and important idea when we enacted it 10 years ago. It led the 
Clinton administration to use the Nunn-Lugar program to achieve a 
measure of transparency into the Russian fissile stockpiles in the mid-
1990s.
  In recent years, the United States has helped Russia to conduct a 
census of its civilian fissile material, but I doubt that either side 
is now prepared to allow access to the weapons stockpiles that are not 
on the civilian side of this equation.
  It would be my expectation that a report called for on the activities 
pursuant to condition 8 to the START treaty resolution of ratification 
would only tell us there are no negotiations toward a bilateral 
agreement, even though there are useful efforts underway on the Nunn-
Lugar related programs.
  We already have a condition to the resolution before us that requires 
the Nunn-Lugar report; in other words, progress on Nunn-Lugar 
initiatives. We are required to have a report. While I will join the 
Senator in a letter, and I agree with what the Senator is trying to do, 
I honestly--not out of pride of authorship of what we came up with, but 
I honestly believe that what we did as a condition on the Nunn-Lugar 
programs on this treaty is, quite frankly, more effective than going 
the route of the condition 8 requirements in the START treaty. I hope I 
made that clear.
  Again, there is no disagreement I have with the Senator from 
Illinois. The bottom line is that what he has pointed out is, in my 
view, a real deficiency in this treaty overall. His legitimate attempt 
to take condition 8 of START and use it as a vehicle to stand in for 
the absence of a verification requirement in this treaty is useful.
  I honestly think, though, I say to Senator Durbin, the way we did it 
in the resolution is a more effective way of accomplishing what the 
Senator is trying to do than through condition 8 of the START treaty.
  I will conclude by saying, as I said in a necessarily lengthy 
statement laying out my interests, concerns, and the assets and 
deficiencies of this treaty when the chairman brought it to the floor, 
the treaty, as former Senator Sam Nunn said, in an overall context, can 
either be moderately helpful or it can be mischievous. I am 
paraphrasing.
  The absence of a verification provision worries me not so much 
because I think we are going to be put in jeopardy if they do not do 
what they are supposed to do, but because it is going to allow a future 
administration or Members of the Senate to do what they did when we had 
a verbal agreement on tactical nuclear weapons in the first Bush 
administration.
  It is going to allow some of our friends on the right, who are not 
going to like it when things are not going so smoothly with Russia, to 
say: See, these guys are liars. These guys do not keep their 
agreements. These guys are not doing what they said because we cannot 
verify that they have done what they said they were going to do.
  It leads to distrust because there is always, as my friend from 
Illinois knows, whether in the House or the Senate--and he has been 
here a long time--there is always a group in this body that trusts no 
agreement, none whatsoever, no arms control agreement, no matter how 
loosely structured.
  As Senator Helms, my good friend and the predecessor of the Presiding 
Officer, used to say: There is never a war we have lost or a treaty we 
have won. So it is axiomatic on the part of some, in the very 
conservative elements of our party, but clearly in the Republican 
Party, who say all treaties are bad ideas, they are just bad ideas.
  Absent verification provisions, we allow for misunderstanding to 
creep in over the next 10 years to what is basically a good-faith 
agreement until December 31, 2012, the drop-dead date when we know what 
has happened.
  I wish to make one other point because I think it will affect other 
legitimate points of view and amendments that are brought to the floor 
that I would be inclined to support.
  I remind everyone who may be listening--and I know my colleagues on 
the floor fully understand this--the President started off with a flat 
assertion that this would not be a treaty, the Moscow agreement. As a 
matter of fact, the day on which we had the police memorial service on 
The Mall--and I am part of that process--I was up on the stage, and the 
President, who has a great sense of humor and is really an engaging 
guy, walked up on the stage, grabbed my arm, and said: You owe me one, 
Joe.
  I looked at him joking and said: How is that, Mr. President?
  He said: You got your treaty.
  He was kidding about my owing him one. But the generic point was well 
taken. He never wanted this to be a treaty in the first place. The 
Senator from Indiana--I will not say the Senator from Indiana--the 
Senator from Delaware was vocal, vociferous privately and publicly with 
the President personally and on this floor that it had to be a treaty.
  The backdrop to all of this is, in terms of additional conditions 
that may or may not be added to this resolution, that if push comes to 
shove, I am convinced this President would not be disappointed if we 
did not vote for this. Let me restate that--he would be disappointed if 
we did not vote for it. But I am worried that, if certain amendments 
were added that he did not like, I do not think he would have any 
trouble saying, I would rather not have it as a treaty, and I will keep 
the verbal agreement, the executive agreement with Mr. Putin, rather 
than have it as a treaty and have to accept these conditions.
  It is very important this stay as a treaty as--flawed is the wrong 
word--but as incomplete as it happens to be. The Senator--I am not 
being solicitous--points out a deep and serious deficiency in this 
treaty, and I think the mechanism he chose to try to remedy it is, 
quite frankly, sound; but the remedy we chose to deal with the 
deficiency I think is a more likely way to achieve what we are seeking 
than condition 8 of the START treaty.
  Having said all of that, I will be happy to join the Senator in a 
letter, as strong as he would like to make the letter. I have already 
sent a few missives down to the President on my views on some of these 
issues, for what they are worth. I would be happy to join the Senator 
and sign with him a letter along the lines he has been talking about.
  Mr. DURBIN. I thank the Senator from Delaware.
  Madam President, because I am convinced of the genuineness and 
commitment of both the Senator from Indiana

[[Page 5282]]

and the Senator from Delaware to the issue of nonproliferation, of 
transparency in our agreement with any nation when it comes to nuclear 
weapons, I am going to defer to their judgment. But I will also add, 
were I to send a letter by myself, I am not sure what it might mean, 
but if they will join me in this correspondence to the administration, 
I am certain it will carry more weight and be a reminder that we are 
mindful of the need for real verification, to make certain these 
nuclear weapons do not end up in the wrong hands and, in fact, they are 
set aside so they will not be a threat to any other nation.


                      Amendment No. 250, Withdrawn

  For that reason, with the assurance of Senator Lugar, as well as 
Senator Biden, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw the amendment I 
filed.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has the right to withdraw the 
amendment, and the amendment is withdrawn.
  Mr. DURBIN. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sununu). The clerk will call the roll.
  The senior assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Murkowski). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator 
from Virginia be allowed to proceed as in morning business for such 
period of time as he may require.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The remarks of Mr. Warner are printed in today's Record under 
``Morning Business.'')
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, if I may paraphrase Winston 
Churchill, the ``only thing worse than this treaty would be not having 
this treaty at all.'' So I rise this afternoon in support of this 
treaty--a good but ultimately insufficient treaty--and in support of my 
colleagues' amendments to it.
  I rise also to lend my voice to a related resolution that I drafted 
with the minority leader and several of my colleagues, which enunciates 
the beginnings of a coherent non-proliferation strategy.
  A little over one decade ago we awoke to the sound of freedom. The 
Berlin Wall had fallen; brothers and sisters who had been kept forcibly 
apart were able, once more, to take up the rights which are enshrined 
in our own Declaration of Independence, rights which we all too often 
take for granted. The Soviet empire was no more. It was the beginning 
of a new era. The threat of nuclear war, at least between two great 
superpowers, had lifted. It soon became clear that the newest threat to 
our security, the increased chance of proliferation wrought by the fall 
of the Soviet empire, was perhaps an even greater challenge. The sword 
had slipped from the giant's hand. We knew then and we know now, that 
we had no choice but to take action and prevent those who would do us 
harm by picking the sword up again.
  We in the Congress and our President acted with resolve. We moved to 
strengthen international institutions and systems designed to prevent 
the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. And we were 
successful. The nuclear capable states of the former Soviet Union, one 
by one, renounced the use and possession of nuclear weapons and 
returned them to Russia. We had a few setbacks along the way, but 
overall we have managed to contain proliferation. But now I fear that 
this President has lost his way, and is undoing the good progress of 
previous administrations.
  The fact is, the events of September 11, 2001 should be a rallying 
cry for non-proliferation--we can imagine all too well the results if 
those who masterminded the attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon, had access to weapons of mass destruction. Yet since then, 
the Bush administration has unwisely led our Nation and the 
international community down a meandering path of policy choices with 
only one clear outcome: the increase of proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction. In doing so, their choices have raised more questions 
instead of settling them.
  Why has the administration failed to engage North Korea, the prime 
proliferator of missiles and the greatest threat for immediate nuclear 
proliferation in direct talks?
  Why has the President chosen to ignore the advice of General John 
Shalikashvili, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 
instead actively pursued new uses for, and types of, nuclear weapons, 
when such action will erode the nuclear firebreak?
  Why has the administration failed to meet the Baker-Cutler funding 
benchmarks for nonproliferation and arms control programs?
  Why has the administration failed to fully invest in the Nunn-Lugar 
program?
  Where is the long-term strategy to diplomatically engage 
proliferating nations?
  I agree with President Bush that ``history will judge harshly those 
who saw this coming and failed to act.'' However, at a time when the 
international community needs leadership and guidance on this issue, 
the administration is virtually silent. Too often on arms control and 
non-proliferation, America has become a colossus that oscillates 
between pouting and shouting. In contrast, the resolution that my 
colleagues and I are introducing today gives this nation a strong, 
clear, and constructive voice on these critical issues. Here and now we 
call for the administration to rebuild the broad international 
coalition against proliferation that it has permitted, and even 
encouraged, to deteriorate over the past two years. We call for the 
full funding of all Federal non-proliferation and arms control programs 
to the levels prescribed by the Baker-Cutler report. We call for 
engaging North Korea in direct and full talks. We call for the 
expansion of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program to include 
additional states willing to engage in bilateral efforts to reduce 
their nuclear stockpiles. These would be acts of strength by the 
strongest nation in the history of the world and they would be acts of 
wisdom because these acts would increase our security.
  The bottom line: the United States must start now to rebuild the 
international community's consensus on stopping proliferation in its 
tracks. The measures outlined in our resolution will begin to do just 
that.
  On September 11, 2001, in a single fell blow, we learned just how 
vulnerable we may be if we do not act with foresight and urgency on 
containing weapons of mass destruction. Today, I believe everyone in 
this chamber understands that we cannot speak of homeland security 
without addressing non-proliferation.
  We cannot debate national security without including arms control. 
This Nation requires a coherent non-proliferation policy, and a clear 
voice on the matter in the international community. This resolution is 
the start.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
  Mr. LOTT. Madam President, I rise in support of the ratification of 
the Moscow Treaty. I would like to begin by thanking Senators Lugar and 
Biden who have done very good work in this instance, and I believe they 
are going to provide very dynamic leadership on the Foreign Relations 
Committee in the Senate. These Senators have been working in this area 
for many years.
  I remember specifically the work of the distinguished Senator from 
Indiana after the dissolution of the Soviet Union as we had Russia and 
other countries grow out of that. We had the Nunn-Lugar legislation. 
Quite frankly, some of us were a little leery of how that program would 
work and whether it was the right thing to do. But looking back on that 
time in history, there is no question but that was a really dynamic 
leadership effort that needed to be made. It has been helpful. It has 
not been perfect, of course. But I think it has helped our relationship 
with Russia, and I think it has also helped to control the escape of 
and the misuse of some of those nuclear weapon capabilities. I want to 
recognize Senator

[[Page 5283]]

Lugar's past leadership in this area and thank him for working to get 
this Moscow Treaty ready.
  I had occasion last year to go to Russia, to St. Petersburg and 
Moscow, with a delegation of Senators to meet with foreign policy 
leaders, defense leaders, members from the Duma, members of the Russian 
Federation Council, and the chairman of the foreign relations committee 
there in the Federation Council. It was very interesting and very 
informative.
  I believe there is a growing opportunity for the United States to 
have a close working relationship with Russia. It has to be one of 
truths. It has to be one that covers the entire sphere of not only 
trusting each other when it comes to arms and treaties but also the 
economy and trade, foreign policy, and international issues such as the 
one we are working on right now.
  We see today that the vote of Russia and what they do at the Security 
Council is going to be important as we prepare to deal with the 
situation in Iraq. So we need to have a growing relationship and 
friendship with this important country.
  I think this treaty is a good one. It is one that certainly is 
timely.
  Russia's transformation to a market economy still faces a number of 
challenges, obviously--its interests, and the people there. Also, the 
United States is working to get through problems. There are still 
problems we are trying to deal with. But our strategic relationship 
with Russia provides a strong foundation of cooperation on issues 
regarding nuclear weapons reduction and security.
  Since 1992, the United States has spent over $3 billion in 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program funds to help Russia dismantle 
nuclear weapons and ensure the security of its nuclear weapons, 
weapons-grade fissile material, and other weapons of mass destruction. 
This has been a very big program. It is one that I think has been very 
important.
  In 1998, both countries agreed to share information upon detection of 
a ballistic missile launch anywhere in the world and to reduce each 
country's stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium. As Russia and the 
United States continue to reduce the stockpile, we must stay vigilant 
in our collective effort to ensure that weapons-grade nuclear materials 
stay under lock and key. It is easy to say, but it is not a question of 
just turning the lock. There has to be an ongoing effort, there has to 
be verification, and there has to be a lot of cooperation.
  The Moscow treaty builds upon the spirit of cooperation between the 
United States and Russia. It serves the interests of both nations and 
both peoples, and makes the world a safer place. The treaty is just one 
element of a growing relationship between the U.S. and Russia that 
includes several new opportunities for cooperation including trade, 
energy, and economic development.
  There has been some concern, noted by the opposition, that the Moscow 
Treaty is not substantive enough--that it is only 3 pages long--much 
shorter than the several hundred pages of the START treaty--that is 
doesn't deal with actual warheads. First, we need to recognize that the 
Moscow Treaty does not take the place of the START treaty. The Moscow 
Treaty is separate from the START treaty--the START treaty is still in 
full force and effect.
  Perhaps more important than laying out comprehensive steps of 
reduction, these important three pages of the Moscow Treaty 
fundamentally approach Russia as a friend, not as an adversary. I 
believe that is a relationship that is going to grow and become more 
and more important in the years ahead.
  This is a historic achievement. With the document we will be voting 
on in the next day or two, both the United States and Russia will be 
making a commitment to reduce the quantity of operationally deployed 
warheads. Undeniably, it is in the best interests of both of our 
countries to destroy as many warheads as possible. Both sides continue 
to be challenged by warhead destruction in any given year because it is 
a very complex process. It is not a matter of just using a bulldozer.
  However, we must also not allow the complexity of the process to 
prevent us from our commitment to progress in this warhead reduction. 
Although not intended to be a detailed roadmap to accomplish that 
reduction, the Moscow Treaty lays out a high-level framework that is 
both workable and flexible.
  I am greatly encouraged by the level of developing cooperation 
between the United States and Russia that is embodied in this treaty. I 
am encouraged by the prospect now of having exchanges between leaders 
of the Duma and the Federation Council and leaders of the House and the 
Senate. I think it is important that we have those ongoing 
relationships. Under the leadership of Senator Lugar and Senator Biden, 
I believe we will see that continue to develop.
  By bringing forth the ratification of this treaty, I think it makes 
good sense for our Nation. It is important for the future security of 
the world, and I think it will help our friendship grow so that we will 
have not an adversary, as we had for so many years, but a friend in 
Russia.
  I wanted to come to the floor and endorse this treaty. I think it is 
an important signal of our feelings, and it is very important in a 
timely sense also.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, if it is agreeable to the managers of 
the bill, I would be pleased to address my remarks at this time to the 
important matter before the Senate--the treaty between the United 
States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive 
Reduction.
  I rise to express my strong support for the ratification of the 
treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation 
on Strategic Offensive Reduction, more commonly known as the Moscow 
Treaty.
  In my career as a public servant, I have had a number of 
opportunities to work with the former Soviet Union and with the current 
Russian Federation.
  I remember when I was Secretary of the Navy, I was asked to negotiate 
over a period of 2 years an executive agreement in the years 1970 to 
1972 between the United States of America and the then Soviet Union. 
That executive agreement applied to the naval forces which I was 
privileged to be associated with at that time as Secretary of the Navy. 
It was a very important executive agreement. It is still in existence 
today. It has been used as a pattern for other nations for executive 
agreements between themselves and other countries. It related to how we 
operated our ships and aircraft in the international waters of the 
world--operated them in a manner that provided the maximum degree of 
safety to the vessel or aircraft itself and, of course, the crews who 
operated those platforms.
  We had experienced, in those days, incidents not unlike the one 
provoked by North Korea just days ago--where one of our aircraft, on a 
routine mission, in international airspace, operating under clearances 
given by the international programmers of airspace--when we were 
broached upon, as we use that phrase in the military, by North Korea's 
fighter aircraft. And, indeed, that broaching took the form of actions 
that bordered on literally hostile actions, in my judgement. But time 
will settle out that event.
  I just mention this chapter of history as showing my support for the 
people of Russia and the need for our two nations to work together. I 
still look upon Russia as a superpower, certainly in the arena of 
diplomacy, the arena of world economics. Indeed, I have profound 
respect for their armed forces today, even though those armed forces 
are somewhat significantly reduced in size.
  But against that background, I remember so well a number of trips to 
the Soviet Union. I remember so well one with the distinguished senior 
Senator from West Virginia, Robert Byrd, when he put together a 
delegation. We were the first Members of Congress to meet with then-
President Gorbachev. It was a momentous day for all of us, having 
traveled those long distances, and then waiting in the anteroom, and 
then being escorted in to see that figure of history, a very important 
figure

[[Page 5284]]

of history for Russia. I have a lot of respect for President Gorbachev.
  I remember another codel with Robert Dole, again, leader of the 
Senate, as was Senator Byrd. We went to visit President Yeltsin. At 
this time, I note, the delegations to visit President Putin certainly 
have not been large in number. I am not so sure that is for the good of 
our two nations. I would hope that Russia might look more favorably 
upon delegations of the Senate to come and visit with their leaders of 
today.
  In any event, I commend Senators Lugar and Biden for their leadership 
on this issue. It has been exemplary. I think this Chamber can take 
rightful pride in each of those individuals--one the former chairman 
and one, of course, Senator Lugar, the current chairman of the 
distinguished Foreign Relations Committee.
  I certainly commend President Bush for his vision and leadership in 
negotiating this treaty and establishing a new strategic relationship 
with Russia. It is truly remarkable how our country's relations with 
Russia have evolved and deepened over the past 2 years. Groundbreaking 
U.S.-Russian cooperation on the war on terrorism has been critical to 
our success in Afghanistan and more broadly in our efforts to root out 
terrorism and deny terrorist groups safe havens and access to money and 
destructive weapons.
  On the subject of destructive weapons, the Nunn-Lugar program, I have 
had a strong interest and support for that program from the very day it 
was conceived. I remember Sam Nunn had a small breakfast and sat down. 
What an audacious concept. We stood there in awe, as the cold war was 
very much in evidence in those days. But I think the bold foresight of 
Senators Nunn and Lugar to envision this program has reaped a great 
deal of mutual benefit for both nations and, indeed, perhaps the world 
at large, to further limit the proliferation of not only weapons of 
mass destruction but the materials by which those weapons are made.
  Equally remarkable is President Bush's success in implementing the 
bold vision he set forth in his May 2001 speech at the National Defense 
University for a new strategic relationship with Russia. President Bush 
decided to move the U.S.-Russian relationship beyond the cold war not 
incrementally, but in a bold leap. He articulated the controversial 
view that it would be possible to pursue a vigorous missile defense 
program to respond to the growing proliferation threats of the post-
cold-war world, and at the same time dramatically reduce the numbers of 
nuclear weapons in the U.S. and Russian arsenals.
  President Bush set out to break the cold war linkage of restraints on 
missile defense to reductions in nuclear weapons, and he did so in a 
way that caused no harm to U.S. relations with Russia. No harm--I would 
say, indeed, it brought about a strengthening of those relations. This 
was a remarkable accomplishment. There were many who thought it could 
not be done. But their fears proved unfounded. President Bush deserves 
our respect and admiration for leading the world out of its 
conventional cold war mindset.
  Russian President Putin shares in that credit. He, too, exercised 
admirable vision and leadership when he understood and convinced 
doubters in his own country that U.S.-Russian relations had evolved to 
the point where the ABM Treaty was no longer critical to Russian 
security. Because the United States and Russia no longer threatened 
each other, the ABM Treaty was no longer a necessary linchpin in 
regulating what used to be a U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race.
  If I might just digress a minute, again, in my years of 1969 to 1974, 
being the Navy Secretary, and my early years in the Senate, when we 
experienced so many periods of tension with regard to the cold war, 
there was always an underlying theme, which I will describe as follows. 
I remember President Reagan used to say, ``Trust but verify''--a very 
magical phrase that captured the relationship between our two nations. 
But there was the feeling among the professional military who were 
responsible for these awesome weapons of mass destruction--and I think 
a feeling among those who negotiated, as did I in a very minor way on 
the Incidents at Sea Agreement--that the bottom line, the Russian 
Government, the Russian military were always there with a measure of 
prudent, sensible realization of these weapons, and there was an 
inherent responsibility in all of those individuals, both in Russia and 
in the United States, and their respective Governments, to exercise 
that judgment.
  The concept of deterrence, the concept of massive retaliation always 
had the underlying theme that individuals had sound judgment as to any 
final decision, and that sound judgment would be exercised.
  That is not true today with Saddam Hussein. We cannot find, in the 
history of his dictatorship over Iraq, that level of sensible 
responsibility as it relates to weapons of mass destruction. And I 
question whether that exists with North Korea today. I am not here to 
use any words of condemnation, but underlying the cold war period was 
that sense of some security with regard to the ability of those in 
possession of weapons to use good judgment, even in the times of the 
greatest of tensions.
  President Bush's readiness to negotiate a legally binding nuclear 
reduction agreement was instrumental in persuading President Putin that 
the new strategic framework proposed by President Bush--including 
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty--would serve Russian interests. The 
result: A treaty that was negotiated in record-breaking time, will 
bring sweeping mutual reductions in deployed nuclear weapons, and will 
enhance the national security of both the United States and Russia.
  The Moscow Treaty is unlike any treaty we have had before. It is the 
first arms control treaty to embrace the new Russian-U.S. strategic 
relationship. In negotiating this treaty, both sides consciously 
rejected the cold war mentality of distrust and hostility that 
previously had required lengthy negotiations and extensive legal 
structures and detailed verification regimes to ensure that both sides 
would abide by their treaty obligations.
  This simplicity puts the focus where it belongs--quickly achieving 
deep, equitable reductions in deployed nuclear weapons.
  This breakthrough treaty will reduce the United States and Russian 
nuclear arsenals from their present levels of approximately 6,000 
strategic warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 operationally deployed 
strategic nuclear warheads over the next decade. These reductions, 
which amount to about two-thirds of the warheads in the Russian-United 
States arsenals, are the most dramatic in the history of arms control 
agreements. Such reductions are clearly in our national security 
interest. Russia is no longer perceived, or in actuality, an enemy. Our 
strategic arsenals, swollen by the cold war, no longer need to be 
sustained at such high levels.
  Another great strength of this treaty is the flexibility it accords 
our leaders to meet the uncertainties both in the international 
security environment and in the technological status of our nuclear 
stockpile. September 11 was a vivid reminder that we are vulnerable to 
attack in ways we never imagined. It is critical to our national 
security that our leaders retain the maximum flexibility to respond to 
emerging threats and changes on the world scene.
  The witnesses who testified before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee during our committee's review of the military implications of 
the treaty unanimously supported ratification of the Moscow Treaty. 
General Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated:

       The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I all support 
     the Moscow Treaty. We believe it provides for the long-term 
     security interests of our nation. We also believe that it 
     preserves our flexibility in an uncertain strategic 
     environment.

  Throughout its history, the Senate Armed Services Committee has 
played a critical role in assessing the national security impact and 
military implications of arms control agreements negotiated by the 
executive branch. Based on the hearings conducted by the Armed Services 
Committee and subsequent analysis, I am convinced that

[[Page 5285]]

the Moscow Treaty advances the national security interests of the 
United States and deserves the Senate's unqualified support.
  I strongly urge my colleagues to join all of us in giving our advice 
and consent favorably to ratification of the Moscow Treaty.
  Mr. President, I see others about to address the Senate. I am happy 
to yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from 
Virginia, the senior Senator, who is a gentleman. The old saying is: 
``He is a gentleman and a scholar.'' I have known him and worked with 
him, confided in him and with him for these many years. I cherish his 
friendship.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
  Mr. BYRD. Yes.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank him for those remarks. I made reference to my 
distinguished colleague from West Virginia moments ago in addressing 
this treaty and recalled when he led a delegation of which I was 
privileged to be a member----
  Mr. BYRD. Yes.
  Mr. WARNER [continuing]. To meet with President Gorbachev. I remember 
that day as if it were yesterday.
  Mr. BYRD. Yes.
  Mr. WARNER. And President Gorbachev said, we have this amount of 
time. And you very graciously, as the leader of the delegation--Senator 
Thurmond was with us as well----
  Mr. BYRD. Yes.
  Mr. WARNER. Anyway, it was a brilliant dissertation between yourself 
and at that time President Gorbachev, and it was a historic meeting. I 
said on the floor moments ago, I only wish we could do more of that 
with President Putin because I felt those delegations--I went on two 
delegations to the Soviet Union with the distinguished senior Senator 
from West Virginia.
  Mr. BYRD. The Senator is correct, yes.
  Mr. WARNER. They were very meaningful and helpful.
  Mr. BYRD. Yes. I believe on that occasion former Senator Sam Nunn was 
with us.
  Mr. WARNER. Yes. The Senator from Rhode Island, Mr. Pell.
  Mr. BYRD. Yes. And Senator Mitchell.
  Mr. WARNER. Senator Mitchell, Senator Sarbanes.
  Mr. BYRD. Yes. It was a fine delegation.
  Mr. WARNER. Yes, it was, but it was under your leadership. You were 
the first Member of Congress to go and meet with President Gorbachev.
  Mr. BYRD. That was the first Senate delegation to go and meet with 
him, yes, it was.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleague.
  Mr. BYRD. I thank the Senator for remembering that occasion.


                              north korea

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, while the United States continues its 
relentless march to war against Iraq, a crisis that is potentially far 
more perilous is rapidly unfolding halfway around the world on the 
Korean peninsula.
  While Saddam Hussein hunkers down in Baghdad, under the thumb of the 
United Nations weapons inspectors, and is being forced to begin 
destroying some of his most prized missiles, North Korean leader Kim 
Jong Il is aggressively taunting the United States and moving full 
speed ahead toward restarting his nuclear weapons program.
  Over this past weekend, the North Koreans took their defiance and 
contempt of the United States to a new level when four North Korean 
fighter jets intercepted an unarmed U.S. reconnaissance plane in 
international airspace over the Sea of Japan.
  According to news reports, the armed North Korean jets came within 50 
feet of the American plane and shadowed it for 22 minutes. Initial 
reports suggest that one of the North Korean pilots may have engaged 
his radar in preparation for firing an air-to-air missile moments 
before the U.S. aircraft aborted its mission and returned safely to its 
home base in Kadena, Japan.
  This latest action by North Korea is a marked escalation of the 
recent tensions between the U.S. and North Korea. Not since it shot 
down an unarmed U.S. surveillance plane in 1969--more than 30 years 
ago--has North Korea engaged in aerial confrontation with the United 
States. That last weekend's provocation by the North Koreans ended 
without incident is a relief, but it is not a reprieve from concern. 
Given the hostility and volatility of the North Korean government, this 
latest confrontation could easily have ended in disaster--a major 
disaster.
  The White House branded North Korea's actions as ``reckless 
behavior,'' and the Pentagon promptly dispatched 24 long-range bombers 
to Guam in a move that was seen by some as a not-so-subtle warning to 
Kim Jong Il that a military response to North Korea's increasing 
bellicosity is not outside the realm of possibility. But the President 
has given no indication that he is willing to address the North Korean 
crisis head-on by engaging North Korea diplomatically in an effort to 
defuse tensions. To the contrary, the White House appears determined to 
continue to proceed in its no-talk policy toward North Korea while it 
focuses the vast weight of its energy and resources on preparing for 
war with Iraq.
  I am increasingly alarmed that this administration's military and 
diplomatic fixation on waging war with Iraq is serving to overshadow 
and possibly eclipse the mounting crisis in North Korea.
  Benign neglect is a dangerous policy to apply to North Korea. The 
nation is isolated and its people are starving. Kim Jong Il is hostile, 
erratic, and desperate for cash. He is also armed and heavily 
fortified. In open testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee 
on February 12, CIA Director George Tenet noted that ``the United 
States faces a near-term ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile) 
threat from North Korea.''
  According to intelligence estimates, North Korea already has one to 
two nuclear weapons and continues to develop the Taepo Dong-2 missile, 
which has the capability of reaching the United States with a nuclear-
weapon-sized payload.
  Recent relations between the United States and North Korea were far 
from good to begin with, but since October, when it was revealed that 
North Korea had a secret program to produce enriched uranium, the 
resulting nuclear standoff between the United States and North Korea 
has gone from bad to worse.
  In a period of just over 4 months, North Korea has moved swiftly and 
boldly to take the necessary steps to resume the production of nuclear 
weapons. Following the disclosure of its covert nuclear program in 
October, North Korea in December expelled U.N. inspectors from its 
nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, removed U.N. monitoring seals and 
cameras, and announced it would reactivate the facilities. In January, 
a month before last, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and appeared to begin moving its 
stockpile of nuclear fuel rods out of storage. Just last week, on 
February 27, American intelligence sources concluded that North Korea 
had, indeed, reactivated the Yongbyon facility. The significance of 
starting up the reactor is that it could, over time, provide a 
continuing source of plutonium for nuclear weapons, which North Korea 
could either stockpile or sell. If North Korea also begins reprocessing 
its nuclear fuel rods, some U.S. intelligence officials have concluded 
that it could begin producing bomb-grade plutonium within a matter of 
weeks, a process that could yield enough plutonium for five to seven 
bombs by this summer.
  In other words, North Korea could begin grinding out the essential 
components of nuclear weapons for its own use or for sale to the 
highest bidder even before the first volley is fired in Iraq.
  At the same time that it has been ratcheting up its nuclear activity, 
North Korea has also been ratcheting up its rhetoric and its military 
saber-rattling. In February, a North Korean MiG fighter jet crossed 
briefly into South Korean air space for the first time in 20 years. On 
February 24, North Korea rattled the inauguration of

[[Page 5286]]

South Korea's new president by test firing an anti-ship missile into 
the sea. Earlier, North Korea threatened to abandon the armistice that 
ended the Korean War.
  And just this week on March 3, Kim Jong Il warned that nuclear war 
could break out if the U.S. Government attacks North Korea's nuclear 
program, while President Bush explicitly raised the possibility of 
using military force against North Korea as a ``last resort'' if 
diplomacy fails.
  The pattern of increasingly hostile words and actions on the part of 
North Korea, coupled with the moves it appears to be taking toward 
building up its nuclear arsenal, make North Korea one of the most 
volatile and dangerous spots on Earth today. The Bush Administration's 
inattention to the problem and its unwillingness to engage in diplomacy 
with North Korea are only exacerbating an already precarious situation.
  Under the circumstances, North Korea presents a far more imminent 
threat than Iraq to the security of the United States. It is ironic 
that the President has made it clear that a military response to the 
crisis in North Korea would be considered only as a last resort at the 
same time that he is massing forces in the Persian Gulf region to 
launch a preemptive military strike, possibly within a matter of weeks, 
if not days, against a much less potent threat to the United States.
  What is particularly frustrating is that the North Korean crisis 
might never have reached the proportions it has reached had President 
Bush taken a different tack with respect to North Korea when he came 
into office. Today's nuclear standoff with North Korea is, in many 
ways, a replay of a similar crisis in 1994, when North Korea pushed the 
envelope on its nuclear program, nearly precipitating a military 
response from the United States. That crisis was resolved when the 
Clinton administration reached an agreement, called the Agreed 
Framework, to freeze nuclear production in North Korea in exchange for 
fuel oil and light-water reactors. Unfortunately, when he took office, 
President Bush put relations with North Korea in the deep freeze by 
heaping suspicion and disdain on the North Korean Government, branding 
Kim Jong Il a ``pygmy'' and including North Korea in the ``axis of 
evil.''
  Even so, the current crisis might well have been defused weeks ago, 
before the two leaders started exchanging threats of war, had the 
United States agreed to talk directly to North Korea, as our allies in 
the region have been pleading with us to do. Instead, the 
administration drew a line in the sand, insisting that the United 
States would not be blackmailed into one-on-one talks with North Korea. 
As a result, the Americans and the North Koreans have been talking past 
one another for the past 4 months, and the progress has been all 
downhill.
  It has come to the point that, whether by accident or design, the 
situation in North Korea could rapidly disintegrate from a war of words 
and gestures into a war of bullets and bombs perhaps even nuclear 
bombs. As it stands now, North Korea has shown no evidence that it is 
willing to back down from its nuclear confrontation with the United 
States, and the United States has shown no evidence that it is willing 
to talk to North Korea.
  Stalemate and neglect are not effective tools of foreign policy. 
Wishful thinking is not an effective tool of foreign policy. The 
situation in North Korea is a crisis, and the United States must come 
to grips with it. We must open a dialog with North Korea.
  To ignore the peril presented by North Korea and its nuclear 
ambitions is to court--to court--disaster.
  Frankly, the longer the United States procrastinates and lets North 
Korea set the agenda, the harder it will be to deal with the situation 
diplomatically. If we do not act quickly, we may inadvertently paint 
ourselves into a corner as we have done in Iraq.
  It does not have to be that way. It is time for both nations to stop 
posturing and start talking. It is time for the United States to deal 
with the crisis in North Korea. I call on this administration to 
address the growing peril in North Korea, and to fully engage in a 
diplomatic effort to resolve what may well become an international 
problem of epic proportions. We can, and must, be firm, but we cannot 
remain aloof. We can, and should, insist that other nations with a 
stake in the future of North Korea be at the table, including China, 
Russia, Japan, and South Korea, but we can wait no longer for those 
nations to take the lead.
  The situation in North Korea is serious, but it is not yet desperate. 
The window to initiate diplomacy is not yet closed, but the longer the 
United States drags its feet, the narrower that window becomes. It is 
time to start talking to the North Koreans. If the United States takes 
the lead, our allies in the region are likely to follow. But it is the 
United States that must lead the way. The only practical way to solve 
the crisis in North Korea, before it erupts into chaos, is with 
patience, skill, and determination at the negotiating table. Let us 
begin now, before it is too late.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator entertain a question?
  Mr. BYRD. I would be glad to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, over my years in the Senate, I have had 
the privilege many times of working with my distinguished colleague. I 
have listened very carefully to his remarks. The bulk of the facts the 
Senator relates with regard to how North Korea has violated the 
framework agreement are accurate. I think his assessment of the 
potential threat as to how they address the serious issue of nuclear 
weapons is correct. But I respectfully say I believe this 
administration has been pursuing a policy--now my colleague may 
differ--of diplomacy to resolve this dispute. Our President recognizes 
the seriousness.
  As the Senator said, the bombers were promptly dispatched. My 
understanding was that that mission of those bombers had been in the 
planning for some time and, coincidentally, they were dispatched right 
after the eve of this very serious incident by which the hostile 
aircraft broached our unarmed aircraft. The Senator was dead accurate 
in his characterization of that serious incident.
  The point I wish to make is that I think our President has taken the 
correct tack at this time in diplomacy of saying that there may come a 
time in the future on bilateral talks, but at this juncture of this 
serious situation--and our President fully recognizes and I think 
shares with my colleague from West Virginia the seriousness of it--the 
multilateral approach; namely, that the talk should initiate with a 
table at which Russia, of course, South Korea, Japan, and China are 
there to participate. That is the way this administration quite 
appropriately desires to approach it.
  I believe Secretary of State Powell, in his most recent trip to the 
region not more than 10 days to 2 weeks ago, clearly said that out of 
that multilateral approach could evolve the situation whereby bilateral 
talks between the United States and North Korea would follow.
  Am I correct in my summary of how the President is approaching this? 
The Senator may have differences with it, but at least for the basis of 
our debate, I think I am correct.
  Mr. BYRD. I think the Senator is correct.
  Mr. WARNER. We have clearly not had the opportunity to fully exhaust 
the potential of a preliminary round of multinational talks such that 
these nations believe they are a partner with the United States. Now we 
may take the lead, but so often our Nation is criticized that we are 
the ones who are saying, you do this, you do that. Rather, in this 
crisis I think our country is saying that we want to work together with 
other nations as partners in addressing this issue before the 
possibility of bilateral talks.
  Mr. BYRD. I think that is a good approach normally, if there is time 
and if there is an indication that those other nations are going to 
take that lead. That is one thing. But there is not time here. There is 
not the indication that the other nations are going to take that lead.
  So I say we need to act more expeditiously. I do not think we can 
afford to

[[Page 5287]]

wait. This is a crisis that is developing, and developing quickly, and 
there is every indication that if we continue to wait, Kim Jong Il is 
going to take additional steps. I understand he may have one or two 
nuclear weapons now, and he is fast getting into the position where he 
will be able to manufacture a weapon a month and then faster. We do not 
have the luxury of waiting until these other nations finally decide 
they want to do this.
  They seem to be reluctant. They have not shown any dexterity in 
moving in to fill this void up to now. I do not think we can afford to 
wait.
  In addition, yes, other nations have thought we acted too fast. They 
have done that in spades with respect to Iraq. We have gone hellbent 
into that. It seems the President has been determined to conduct a war 
in Iraq from the beginning almost. I would say as far back as last 
August he had said there were no plans. That was the response we 
received from all of the people in the administration. I know once 
before the Appropriations Committee, Secretary of State Powell, in 
answer to a question from me, said: There are no plans.
  The administration and its functionaries must have taken Members of 
Congress as fools when the administration continued to at that time 
say, well, the President has no plans. Anybody could see through that. 
He may not have plans today. He may not have plans on his desk. That 
was the way it was phrased: He had no plans on his desk. It takes only 
a fool not to be able to see through that. Perhaps he does not have 
plans on his desk, but there may be plans on some other desk somewhere 
that the President knows about, or the President may have plans 
tomorrow. He is certainly not immune to knowledge of what is going on 
all around him. After all, he is the Commander in Chief, the top man in 
the executive branch; he is supposed to know what is going on.
  So while we were fed that line by the administration, they simply did 
not want to tell us, and they do not want to tell us yet. It is not 
that they do not want to--that other nations have a right to complain 
about this administration moving pellmell into a situation without 
waiting for other nations, without wanting to wait for other nations. 
Not only that, but the administration treats us the same way in the 
Congress.
  The administration does not want to tell us what the cost of this was 
is going to be. They say it is such a range of costs that it might 
change from day to day. They do not want to say what it will be now 
because, who knows, maybe tomorrow it will be different. Well, of 
course, that is to be expected. But I think the administration ought to 
be honest, upfront, and sincere with the elected representatives of the 
people in Congress, and say now this is the situation today, Senator, 
as we see it. We think the range would be somewhere between A and B. 
That can change, Senator. Mr. Chairman, that can change. It can change 
tomorrow. But as of today, we cannot pinpoint the exact figure, but it 
would appear that it would be thus and so.
  Now, if the war lasts longer than a week, lasts longer than 2 weeks, 
10 days, or 3 weeks, it may cost more. Of course, if we win the war, 
and win it quickly, it will not cost much. But then there is the 
problem of the morning after. What is the cost going to be in helping 
to rebuild Iraq? If we are going to be responsible for destroying a 
great portion of it, we have a responsibility of rebuilding it. So, the 
cost would be, the estimate would be, thus and so.
  If the administration would come before the Appropriations Committee 
and address it like that--we understand that any administration would 
find it difficult; it would be impossible to be sure as to what the 
costs would be. But if an administration sits down with the 
congressional committee and says: Here is the situation; we estimate it 
to be thus and so, because we think the war will not last more than a 
week, or 10 days, or 2 weeks, or a month; if it lasts longer, it will 
cost more--that is being honest and forthright with the elected 
representatives of the people. We understand that. We were not born 
yesterday. But to just say, ``We do not know exactly,'' what does the 
administration think that Members of Congress are fools?
  We can see all that. We know all that. We know these things are 
difficult to figure. But when we also know that estimates are being 
kicked around internally, we believe we are entitled, on behalf of the 
people, to know what those estimates are.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I might reply to my good friend, first 
on the issue of diplomacy, I do believe our President has worked very 
hard with the Prime Minister of Great Britain and other heads of state 
of the nations willing to proceed on the diplomatic route.
  Today we had a speech by the Secretary of State. I don't know if my 
colleagues had an opportunity to read it as I have. But it clearly says 
we are on a diplomatic course. No decision has been made to go to war.
  What little success the diplomats have had to date--and I frankly 
think Resolution 1441 was a high water mark of this whole controversy--
is owing to the fact that this President had the courage to put our 
troops in forward deployments to back up the words of the diplomats and 
to send a signal to Saddam Hussein and others that we have a commitment 
to those men and women there, 200,000 of them in that gulf region. I 
visited the gulf region just 10 days ago. They are there as a symbol of 
our commitment to make diplomacy work.
  I recognize the Senator and I were with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld 
the other day when my good friend from West Virginia expressed, as he 
has done now, the question of cost estimates. But the Secretary of 
Defense said he believed at this time he could not give those 
projections which would enable, I think, some very serious and finite 
parameters to be established.
  My good friend might recall President Clinton one time--I am not here 
to be political--said about the Balkans, we would be home in a year. I 
think the Senator remembers that because he and I collaborated on an 
amendment to require the other nations to come forward with their 
allocation of commitments to try to resolve some of the problems in 
that region. I remember we stood toe to toe on that.
  Here we are, 8 years later, and we are still in the Balkans with a 
not insignificant force. We have learned from that and experienced the 
need to exercise caution with regard to the question of casualties. How 
well I remember being in the Chamber in 1991. The projected casualties 
we might encounter in the gulf war of 1991 were in the estimates of the 
tens of thousands. We thank the dear Lord that it did not in any way 
near approach that amount, although this country did lose brave 
soldiers, sailors, and airmen, and experienced the wounding of others 
in that very important conflict.
  The better side of prudence is being demonstrated here by the 
President and his Secretaries who are entrusted with dealing with the 
Congress. I printed in the Record earlier today, I say to my good 
friend, a recitation of a number of hearings the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, on which I am privileged to say my colleague serves, has 
conducted. That committee has, in connection with our debates on Iraq, 
held a number of briefings and so forth, in which I have been in 
attendance, on Iraq. Those are helpful for the public in its important 
debate now, and which I respect the diversity of opinions on Iraq, as I 
respect the opinions of my colleague from West Virginia. Nevertheless, 
I think our Senate has taken a constructive role in addressing that 
conflict.
  Mr. BYRD. I thank the Senator.
  I think we are going pretty far from the subject that I started out 
with today. I was talking about the fact that we are not paying the 
kind of attention that should be paid; we are not addressing the real 
crisis that is developing. We are not looking at the real peril that is 
facing this country; namely, North Korea. We are being distracted by 
the developing situation in Iraq, which, as far as I am concerned, does 
not present to this country anything near the peril, the danger, that 
we are confronted with in North Korea.

[[Page 5288]]

  Now, if the distinguished Senator wishes to engage in a freewheeling 
debate on the whole subject matter, fine, we will do that another day. 
But I am addressing the Senate on the need to open talks with North 
Korea and not wait for other nations to take the lead. We need to take 
the lead ourselves. Every day counts. Every 24 hours counts. We are 
already seeing this situation advance quickly. As long as Kim Jong Il 
thinks we are going to be distracted with Iraq, he is likely to take 
further advantage of the situation. That is the issue I am addressing.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the Senator. We did start out on that subject, 
but I wished to make reference to other statements the Senator made.
  Going back to the question of Korea, I think your concerns are 
important, as are mine. I simply say I think our President is 
vigorously trying to exercise leadership in world diplomacy with a 
multilateral approach with the nations of Russia, China, South Korea, 
and Japan at this point, and I have not read into any of the statements 
or actions that would say that after the full exploration of the 
multilateral approach, hopefully participation by those nations as 
partners, possibly of a bilateral approach--indeed, the Secretary of 
State has made an offering of food to care for the tragic situation of 
starvation in the North Korean section of that peninsula.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I say to my friend, I hope the President 
will display this kind of desire to engage in multilateralism more so 
than he has with respect to Iraq. This is the approach I favored all 
along. We should get the United Nations, be sure the opinion of the 
world is with us in Iraq, and get the support of the United Nations.
  I have a resolution I introduced some time ago urging we seek a 
second U.N. resolution. If the President would show more interest in a 
multilateral approach to that situation, I think many would feel 
better. I recall his saying, I think, to the U.N.: If you don't do it, 
we will. If the U.N. doesn't do this, I will--or we will.
  That kind of an attitude has not been to my liking, certainly, and it 
does not show enough concern about the opinions of other nations, and 
it does not show enough desire to have the support of other nations. 
But this President is determined, apparently, to have a war in Iraq, 
even if he has to go it alone. That has been the impression I received 
thus far. When he says to the U.N., if you don't do it, I will, or we 
will, that doesn't show any great inclination to wait on other nations 
to help join in that situation.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I think we have somewhat debated this 
issue. I believe the President has made strong overtures to the 
international community. Certainly he gave a brilliant speech in the 
U.N. He is working within the Security Council. Our Secretary of State 
has addressed the issue today. Perhaps at another time I would very 
much be privileged to engage our distinguished colleague in a debate on 
the subject. I thank my colleague.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator. I think 
we certainly need, more and more, to debate this situation. I think we 
have not debated it enough. I believe that where we missed the boat was 
last fall when this Congress turned over to the executive branch the 
authority, by a resolution, virtually to declare war. I think Congress 
was wrong in doing that. I voted against that resolution. I am proud of 
the vote that I cast at that point. I think Congress, under the 
Constitution, has the authority to declare war, and I think we shift 
aside our responsibilities and our duties under the Constitution when 
we attempt to shift that duty and that responsibility and that 
authority over to the Chief Executive of the United States.
  The time for debate was then. It is not too late to debate it now. I 
have been attempting to say a good bit from time to time on this 
matter, and will continue to, if we have much time left. But time is 
closing in on us, as I see our troops massing on the borders of Iraq. I 
don't think there is much time left to debate. But as long as that time 
remains, I think we ought to utilize it. We ought to tell the American 
people what their losses are going to be and what the cost is going to 
be to them.
  That is where I think the administration is falling down. It ought to 
let the American people know the sacrifices they may have to make and 
what the cost of this war is going to be in terms of money, in terms of 
lives, and in terms of our image before the world--what it is costing 
us there. So let's have more from the administration on this point.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I might say in conclusion, to those who 
perhaps take views different from I and others, I hope that debate 
would include very clearly a message to Saddam Hussein in Iraq that his 
lack of cooperation is the root cause of the problem today.
  So I thank my colleague for this opportunity. Maybe at a later date 
we can get into a further discussion.
  Mr. BYRD. Of course there are always two sides to issues. Preston 
County, WV, is a great buckwheat flour-growing area. They make fine 
buckwheat cakes. But there is no buckwheat cake so thin that there 
isn't two sides to it. So there are two sides.
  It seems to me we have just been recreant in not telling the American 
people what this is going to cost. I have a feeling they don't know 
very much, from the lack of debate that has gone forward, and from the 
fact that this administration has not come forward with the facts and 
told the American people what the cost may be to them. And all the 
while we see our young men and women being shipped out, as the National 
Guard goes forth and takes our schoolteachers, our policemen, our 
firefighters, our lawyers, and our churchmen. It takes people from all 
walks of life and sends them overseas--for how long we do not know. We 
don't know. They don't know what the duration will be. They don't know 
whether they will come back, of course. And I am sure their salaries 
are suffering when they go over as National Guardsmen.
  The people are entitled to know more than this administration has 
been willing to tell them. So I hope the Senator will join me in urging 
the administration to come forward with the facts and tell the American 
people, his constituents and mine, what they may have to pay.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I share those concerns. My State has 
likewise contributed many reservists and guardsmen. As a matter of 
fact, I have been working with colleagues today on a question relating 
to that.
  Were it not for the sacrifices of those individuals, the reservists, 
active duty, and many others, we would not be where we are trying to 
solve this problem diplomatically.
  Say what you want about this President, I have seen a measure of 
courage in this fine man that I have not seen in others. He has all 
along said: The buck stops on my desk, and I accept responsibility.
  I thank my colleague.
  Mr. BYRD. I say to the Senator, courage is fine. I don't think the 
President lacks courage. Nobody is questioning his courage. But whether 
he has wisdom or vision or exercises good judgment along with courage 
is something else. I am simply saying this administration has not been 
forthright with the American people and has not been forthright with 
the Congress. We can debate that as long as you wish, but that is the 
way I see it. At some future time, if the distinguished Senator wishes 
to debate that, I will be happy to accommodate him.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I accept that challenge. I thank my 
friend.
  Mr. BYRD. I thank the Senator.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Crapo). The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Alexander). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for 10 
minutes.

[[Page 5289]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I acknowledge my friend, the chairman of 
the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Lugar, who is in the Chamber.
  Today the Senate is engaged in an important and historic debate on 
the Moscow Treaty. President Bush and President Putin signed the Moscow 
Treaty on May 24, 2002, to limit strategic offensive nuclear weapons. 
Unlike arms control treaties of the past, this treaty does not include 
definitions of terms, counting rules, elimination procedures, or 
monitoring and verification provisions--all conditions considered in 
the past as essential to an effective agreement. As President Reagan 
once said, ``trust but verify.''
  The administration believes that the lack of these features is an 
asset and indicative of a new age in American-Russian relations. In the 
words of President Bush, it is time that the United States ``complete 
the work of changing our relationship from one based on nuclear balance 
of terror to one based on common responsibilities and common 
interests.''
  The treaty reflects American and Russian intent to reduce strategic 
nuclear warheads to between 1,700 to 2,200 by December 31, 2012. Each 
party is free to define for itself its ``strategic nuclear warheads'' 
and to determine how to reduce them. The treaty does not provide for 
the destruction of warheads or delivery systems. Nor does it place any 
restrictions on either party's force structure over the next ten years. 
Both sides can keep warheads for testing, spare parts, and possible 
redeployment.
  The administration plans to meet treaty requirements by moving an 
undefined number of warheads to a reserved force, some to storage, and 
dismantling others. The Russians will make similar force structure 
changes. Russia intends to continue to reduce weapon platforms and 
warhead levels and dismantle weapon systems with U.S. assistance under 
the important Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.
  However, the Moscow Treaty leaves many issues unresolved and many 
questions unanswered. For example, Article I of the treaty specifies 
that each party shall ``determine for itself the composition and 
structure of its strategic offensive arms.''
  The United States has defined this to be ``operationally deployed 
strategic nuclear warheads,'' and has defined operationally deployed to 
mean ``reentry vehicles on intercontinental ballistic missiles in their 
launchers, reentry vehicles on submarine-launched ballistic missiles in 
their launchers onboard submarines, and nuclear armaments loaded on 
heavy bombers or stored in weapons storage areas of heavy bomber 
bases.''
  Congress will have to wait to see how many warheads are destroyed and 
stored. Likewise, we will have to wait to see how Russia defines 
``strategic offensive arms.'' Russia may move to redeploy multiple 
independently-targetable reentry vehicles, or MIRVs.
  Article II of the treaty states that the Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty, START, will remain in force. During the signing of the Joint 
Declaration, Presidents Bush and Putin stated that the provisions of 
START ``will provide the foundation for providing confidence, 
transparency, and predictability in further strategic offensive 
reductions.''
  But START expires in 2009. If START is not extended, we do not know 
how the parties will provide confidence and transparency between 2009 
and 2012.
  Article III of the treaty establishes a Bilateral Implementation 
Commission but does not establish guidelines, procedures, or even 
responsibilities of the Commission. We do not know if the Commission 
will focus on monitoring and verification of agreed reductions.
  When President Bush signed the Moscow Treaty nearly a year ago, he 
assured the American people that he would continue to work on a 
separate political declaration that would create a strategic framework 
for the United States and Russia.
  This document was to be broader in scope and would address other 
security and arms control issues aside from strategic reduction, 
including non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, anti-terrorism, and 
missile defenses. We have yet to receive that document.
  We need a better vision and a better strategy of how to make America 
safer and more secure from attack with weapons of mass destruction.
  I fear that the President is moving us toward a world of greater 
insecurity besieged by fears of nuclear weapons proliferation. Today's 
Washington Post indicates that the administration is willing to accept 
a North Korea with nuclear weapons. This is astounding, and, if true, 
threatens stability in northeast Asia. In addition, the administration 
has sought funding for new battlefield nuclear weapons that are more 
``useable.''
  Until now, U.S. non-proliferation policy has been based on reducing 
the number of nuclear weapons states, controlling the spread of nuclear 
weapons technology, and eliminating nuclear weapons. We need to prevent 
the spread of weapons of mass destruction and establish with the rest 
of the world a system that deters both countries and terrorist groups 
from gaining access to these dangerous technologies.
  The resolution intended to be introduced by Senator Daschle and 
others, which I am proud to cosponsor, lays out the type of 
comprehensive non-proliferation policy that we need to make the world a 
safer place for future generations. I urge my colleagues to support it, 
and I urge the administration to adopt its recommendations.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a 
quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the 
order for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Florida is recognized.
  Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, I rise today to address the 
Senate on the treaty being considered for ratification, the Moscow 
Treaty. I want to praise the hard work of our chairman, Senator Lugar, 
and the ranking member, Senator Biden, and their staffs, for the 
diligent efforts on this treaty. Their hard work on this treaty will 
ultimately enhance U.S. security.
  This treaty describes what both the United States and Russia hope to 
do in a new era, and that is to reduce our respective strategic 
offensive nuclear weapons stockpile and to reduce it quite 
dramatically. Considering how strategic nuclear weapons policy has 
changed since the time I first came to Capitol Hill, to the House of 
Representatives, way back in 1978, this new Moscow Treaty is a 
significant accomplishment but one that failed to maximize the 
opportunity to provide the world with the real destruction of weapons. 
It is clearly a major step in the right direction, but I do not think 
it has gone far enough.
  During this debate today, we have heard about the weaknesses of this 
treaty, and there are some. I regret, for example, that the treaty 
merely de-alerts nuclear weapons. It does not require their 
destruction.
  The treaty also is weak in its timetable for reaching the lowering of 
the target inventories, the inventories of warheads on top of the 
ICBMs. The treaty brings the target down from multiples of thousands to 
a range between 1,700 and 2,200 weapons. But it does not offer a 
specific timetable for how that will occur over these next several 
years. I believe we can remove these weapons more rapidly, and I hope 
the administration will do so.
  I also regret the treaty does not address tactical nuclear weapons, 
nor does it include verification procedures beyond those of the START I 
treaty.
  I remember when I was in the House of Representatives at the time 
President Reagan was President, he kept saying over and over: ``Trust 
but verify.'' I think we could have some more of that in this treaty.
  Despite all of those weaknesses, reductions in our strategic 
offensive weapons are appropriate, and are a major step in the right 
direction. Our relationship with Russia has evolved into an important 
partnership, and we hope that partnership is going to be

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strengthened. As we continue to move in this century to develop a 
relationship under the premise that Russia is not an enemy, then that 
is a step in the right direction.
  The Presiding Officer is from the South. I am from the South. We are 
accustomed to seeing two strange dogs approach each other. They are 
very leery of each other. And pretty soon they are sniffing around each 
other, and pretty soon those dogs decide it is OK, they can be friends. 
So as we start sniffing around with this former adversary, one that we 
hope will be a future solid partner, we must work to build mutual trust 
so our nations can cooperate on other important issues of common 
concern to our collective security, such as fighting terrorism, and 
such as economic reform and development.
  Clearly, one of the areas we have had a very cooperative relationship 
in is our respective space programs.
  I will never forget in the midst of the cold war there was a little 
bit of thought when an American astronaut crew rendezvoused and docked 
with a Soviet crew of cosmonauts. They lived together in space for 9 
days in the Apollo-Soyuz historic mission of 1975. That started the 
contacts between our two space programs. That ultimately led to the 
joint venture we have now where the Russians are a partner of ours and 
they are helping us. They are our partner as we build the International 
Space Station. By virtue of this recent tragedy with the Space Shuttle 
Columbia, the way we can save those three humans on board should we not 
be able to get another space shuttle to the space station is the fact 
that there is a former Soviet--now Russian--spacecraft, Soyuz, that is 
docked to the International Space Station that can bring that crew of 
two Americans and one Russian home if they need to.
  This relationship with Russia has extended to NATO. We look forward 
to cooperating with Russia on issues affecting the security of Europe 
and our allies. But there is one area in which the United States can 
provide assistance to Russia while enhancing U.S. security. In this 
context of the Moscow Treaty, this is critically important. Earlier 
today Senator Biden said we must continue to move forward and provide 
adequate funding to the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program 
and related nonproliferation programs in the Departments of Energy and 
State.
  These programs collectively facilitate the destruction of nuclear 
weapons. They bolster the security of the facilities containing 
weapons-usable and fissile material. And these programs provide for 
retraining of scientists.
  These programs are very valuable. Yet they have not been adequately 
funded. This administration has not come forward with the adequate 
request for funding for the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction 
program.
  I will tell you, there is no one I have a greater respect for than my 
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Dick Lugar. I 
think he will tell you the same thing. The spread of nuclear weapons 
and associated materials is a real threat. It is one particularly 
evident as we weigh the options available to us to deal with so many of 
the threats around the globe. Look at North Korea. It is one of those 
threats.
  We must provide resources to these programs to try to stop the spread 
and the proliferation of nuclear materials because they enhance our 
security by ensuring the adequate disposal of these weapons and their 
fissile material.
  Certainly now when we are engaged in this war against terrorists, 
when we are trying to prevent al-Qaida sympathizers and other 
terrorists from acquiring such deadly weapons, we should not lack in 
any resources.
  I again make a pitch to my colleagues in the Senate to adequately 
fund the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction program.
  These programs were evaluated in a report released in January 2001 by 
our former colleague and now the Ambassador to Japan--Howard Baker from 
the State of the Presiding Officer--and his partner in that report, 
Lloyd Cutler. Their report clearly said these threat reduction programs 
are being underfunded. They call the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and weapons-usable material to be ``the most urgent unmet 
national security threat to the United States today.''
  That is what Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler said in their report to 
the Congress in 2001.
  That report was before an agreement was reached on the Moscow Treaty 
for reducing our nuclear arsenals.
  Now with so many new nuclear weapons coming out of service, we must 
consider significant action to reduce proliferation to ensure that the 
American people and our friends and allies around the world will be 
safe. The most obvious way is to bolster the Nunn-Lugar programs.
  I want to also speak on the subject of nuclear weapons, and I want to 
mention North Korea.
  I was very troubled to see the report that the Bush administration is 
slowly accepting North Korea's status as a nuclear power. This is an 
unconscionable abdication of leadership by this administration. North 
Korea has taken provocative steps. I don't know why we weren't raising 
Cain--I mean shaking the rafters--when those fighter aircraft buzzed 
our observation aircraft--our surveillance aircraft--just 2 days ago. 
North Korea has taken some very provocative steps hostile to the United 
States.
  It is likely they already have, according to our estimates, between 
one and three nuclear weapons because North Korea cheated on several 
international and bilateral agreements over the past decade. Since that 
time, they have renounced the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. They 
have renounced the International Atomic Energy Agency and their 
monitors who were there present by international agreements. They have 
renounced the 1994 Agreed Framework with the United States. They have 
been moving spent fuel rods to a reprocessing plant. Then, of course, 
this inexcusable incident with fighter jets to harass a U.S. 
reconnaissance flight in international airspace.
  Now, lo and behold, the President of North Korea is overtly 
threatening a nuclear war if the United States leads any effort to 
isolate them.
  With all of this belligerence, we have to have a plan. I would 
suggest that the Bush administration start working to diplomatically 
sit down with North Korea to start reducing tensions. We cannot and 
must not allow the North Koreans to develop an effective nuclear 
weapons arsenal.
  A year ago, the President, in his State of the Union Address, 
referred to North Korea as an ``Axis of Evil.'' Does he think that they 
are evil? I think he does. Do I think that they are evil? I certainly 
do.
  But is this the best way, diplomatically, to approach someone that we 
are trying to contain from becoming a nuclear power? We want them to 
stop their brutal actions against their own population, and we want to 
stop their proliferating technologies relating to weapons of mass 
destruction.
  So in that regard, the President was correct. But we have started to 
see what the consequences of that speech are. Instead of, as Theodore 
Roosevelt would say, ``speaking softly and carrying a big stick,'' the 
President made a judgment to speak harshly. And I want to know, where 
is the policy to back it up?
  This pronouncement did not cause the North Koreans to begin bad 
behavior and cheat on their agreements with the U.S. and the 
international community, but it did embolden them to harden their 
position and to spurn the international community and begin in earnest 
to openly pursue more nuclear weapons. This is now the situation in 
which we find ourselves. And we have to get out of it.
  I want this administration to have success because I think North 
Korea, with, a short way behind them, the country of Iran, poses the 
next major threat behind the threat that we are engaged in, which is, 
the war against terrorists.
  I think the United States needs some clear action. U.S. leadership is 
needed to get the world's declared nuclear powers to work together 
through the

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United Nations Security Council on a common response to the danger, not 
only in North Korea, but in Iran as well. If we fail to do so, the 
nightmare scenario of North Korea selling its nuclear weapons to 
terrorist groups and other rogue states, even their enriched uranium 
that they are trying to produce, all of that could become a reality. 
That is not good for anybody on planet Earth.
  I believe we ought to approach a policy where we must make North 
Korea understand that building an arsenal of nuclear weapons will not 
be tolerated and that all options to combat this threat, including the 
military options, have to be on the table. At the same time, we must 
work to form a viable regional solution with China and Russia and Japan 
and South Korea, but not to the exclusion of bilateral dialog with 
North Korea.
  I think all of us here are disappointed that China did not respond 
favorably to Secretary of State Colin Powell's recent appeals for 
assistance and involvement during his recent trip there. China, and 
other members of the Security Council, have a lot at stake. They must 
live up to their commitments of trying to prevent nuclear 
proliferation.
  No policy that we pursue can possibly work unless it is carried out 
in concert with key countries. But we are getting to the point that we 
cannot wait. We are going to have to devise workable policy options 
that the United States and North Korea may take to de-escalate this 
situation.
  So I call upon our colleagues here and our friends in the 
administration to begin a dialog with North Korea immediately. Each day 
that passes is a day that the danger notches up one more level.
  Again, I thank Senators Lugar and Biden for their strong leadership 
on these critical security issues facing our Nation. I thank them for 
their sponsorship of this Moscow Treaty. I will support the Moscow 
Treaty on the final result at the end of the day when we pass it. It is 
clearly in the interests of the United States. Indeed, it is in the 
interests of planet Earth.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah.

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