[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 4]
[Senate]
[Pages 5248-5250]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




              THE TREATY ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS

  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I understand that the remaining time is 
Republican time. I am going to go ahead and start making some comments. 
We are doing some checking. Maybe I will ask unanimous consent to get 
some time for my colleague from Oregon. In the meantime, I will go 
ahead and start my comments.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado is recognized.
  Mr. ALLARD. I thank the Chair. I appreciate the opportunity to add my 
thoughts to this body's consideration of the Treaty on Strategic 
Offensive Reductions, otherwise known as the Moscow Treaty. My 
understanding is that this afternoon it will be brought before the 
Senate. We are at a pivotal moment in our country's history. In many 
ways, the Senate's advise and consent to this treaty will mark the end 
of an era of hostility and the beginning of an age of cooperation.
  It is more than a document; it is a signal to the world that the 
United States and Russia have moved beyond a relationship of conflict 
and brinkmanship to a relationship of mutual respect and shared values.
  We all remember the super-power rivalry between the United States and 
the Soviet Union, which lasted over 45 years. I believe it is important 
for this debate to recall the tension and hostility that accompanies 
that time so that we may fully appreciate what this treaty symbolizes 
for the future of U.S.-Russian relations.
  In 1947, a little-known foreign service officer named George Kennan 
under the pseudonym `X' wrote an essay that was published in Foreign 
Affairs journal that was to define our approach to the Soviet Union for 
the next fifty years. In his essay, he described the Soviet ideology as 
the belief in the ``basic badness of capitalism, in the inevitability 
of its destruction, in the obligation of the proletariat to assist in 
that destruction and to take power into its own hands.''
  This ideological bent would manifest itself, Mr. Kennan predicted, in 
an ``innate antagonism'' between the Soviet Union and Western world. He 
said that we should expect secretiveness, a lack of frankness, 
duplicity, a wary suspiciousness, and the basic unfriendliness of 
purpose. Mr. Kennan warned us that the Soviet government might sign 
documents that might indicate a deviation from this ideology, but that 
we should regard such actions as a ``tactical maneuver permissible in 
dealing with the enemy (who is without honor) and should be taken in 
the spirit of caveat emptor''. As we discovered in the decades 
following, Mr. Kennan was right.
  The Soviet Union did indeed devote itself to exporting its ideology 
around the world. Its foreign policy was marked by antagonistic 
rhetoric and provocative actions. It signed arms control agreements and 
then violated them. The Soviet Union invaded its neighbors, launched 
proxy wars, and encouraged revolution and instability. It repeatedly 
proved capable of exploiting weakness and political divisions. And it 
was successful at taking advantage of geopolitical realities. As a 
result, Angola, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Cuba, Nicaragua, El Salvador, 
Honduras, Granada, Vietnam, Korea, Somalia, Yemen, Greece, and Turkey 
all became Cold War battlegrounds.
  For the most part, the United States followed Mr. Kennan's advice. We 
strove to contain Soviet expansionist tendencies. We forced back Soviet 
advances. We were firm. We were patient. And, in 1991, with the fall of 
the Soviet Union, our patience paid off.
  It is important that we recognize that the Russia of today is nothing 
like the Soviet Union of yesterday. Under the leadership of President 
Putin, economic and political reforms are being enacted. Russia is no 
longer bound by a defunct ideology. The country has stepped away from 
its past and has worked with sincerity to help resolve many of the 
challenges facing the international community.
  Russia has also sought to improve its relationship with the Western 
world. It went eventually along with inclusion of the Baltic states 
into the NATO Alliance, despite harboring deep concerns. Russia 
accepted our withdrawal from the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty. After 
September 11, Russia assisted the United States in the war against 
terrorism by sharing intelligence information and raising no objection 
to the stationing of U.S. troops in the former Soviet states in Central 
Asia. Once inconceivable, it is now possible to imagine Russia joining 
the World Trade Organization and even NATO in the near future.
  Another sign of improved relations between the U.S. and Russia is the 
treaty currently before us. The Treaty on Strategic Offensive 
Reductions is much different from arms control treaties agreed to 
during the Cold War. The text of treaty epitomizes this new 
relationship. Both parties pledge to:

       Embark upon the path of new relations for a new century and 
     committed the goal of strengthening their relationship 
     through cooperation and friendship.
       Believe that new global challenges and threats require the 
     building of a qualitatively new foundation for strategic 
     relations between the Parties.
       Desire to establish a genuine partnership based on the 
     principles of mutual security, cooperation, trust, openness, 
     and predictability.

  The Joint Declaration by Presidents Bush and Putin that accompanied 
the treaty further expounds upon this new relationship. Let me read a 
couple of pertinent sections from that declaration:

       We are achieving a new strategic relationship. The era in 
     which the United States and Russia saw each other as an enemy 
     or strategic threat has ended. We are partners and we will 
     cooperate to advance stability, security, and economic 
     integration, and to jointly global challenges and to help 
     resolve regional conflicts.
       We will respect the essential values of democracy, human 
     rights, free speech and free media, tolerance, the rule of 
     law, and economic opportunity.
       We recognize that the security, prosperity, and future 
     hopes of our peoples rest on a benign security environment, 
     the advancement of political and economic freedoms, and 
     international cooperation.

  What is most notable about the Moscow Treaty as submitted to this 
body is the absence of certain provisions that normally marked Cold War 
era arms control treaties. Those provisions were based on distrust and 
antagonism. Instead, this treaty utilizes confidence-building measures 
based on trust and friendship.

[[Page 5249]]

  For instance, the treaty does not establish interim warhead reduction 
goals or provide a detailed schedule for the reductions. The absence of 
such goals or schedules gives both sides flexibility over the next nine 
years to reduce their warheads at a pace of their own choosing.
  Another missing element is precise counting rules. The Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty of 1991 provided such complex counting rules that it 
frequently resulted in overcounting and undercounting. Minor 
disparities in deployed and ``counting'' forces are no longer a 
significant issue given the confidence building measures included in 
the treaty and our positive relationship with Russia.
  It should be noted that the Moscow Treaty does continue the START I 
verification regime, which permits on site inspections and continuous 
monitoring. The Moscow treaty also creates a new Bilateral 
Implementation Commission that will be used to any raise concerns that 
might arise about treaty compliance and transparency. These measures, 
plus our own technical means, will provide the U.S. government with 
significant confidence that it can monitor Russia's activities.
  The Moscow Treaty is similar to previous arms control agreements in 
one significant way: it does not require the dismantlement of warheads. 
Neither Russia nor the United States sought the dismantlement for two 
reasons. First, the dismantlement in the past has been considered 
inherently unverifiable. There is no established process for 
dismantling warheads that can provide assurance to each party.
  Second, the U.S. intends to keep some warheads in ``ready reserve.'' 
Such a reserve is essential if we are to retain the capability to 
respond to changes in the security environment and quickly replace 
dysfunctional warheads.
  I also think it is instructive to look at the process by which the 
Moscow Treaty was put together and how different these negotiations 
were from negotiations that occurred during the cold war. Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld remarked on the difference during a Senate 
Armed Services Committee hearing last July. Here is what he said:

       . . . it's significant that while we consulted closely and 
     engaged in a process that had been open and transparent, we 
     did not engage in lengthy adversarial negotiations in which 
     U.S. and Russia would keep thousands of warheads that we 
     didn't need, as bargaining chips. We did not establish 
     standing negotiating teams in Geneva with armies of arms 
     control aficionados ready to do battle over every colon and 
     every comma. . . . An illustration of how far we have come is 
     the START treaty. . . . It is 700 pages long, and it took 
     nine years to negotiate. . . . The Moscow treaty . . . is 
     three pages long and it took five or six months to negotiate.

  Let's take a few moments to review some of the Moscow treaty's 
provisions. The treaty requires the reduction of strategic nuclear 
warheads by each party to a level of 1,700-2,200 by the end of 2012. 
Each side currently has about 6,000 warheads. This treaty means a 
reduction of over 8,000 nuclear warheads.
  The treaty allows both parties to restructure their offensive forces 
as each sees fit, within the prescribed numerical limit. This provision 
gives each flexibility to meet the deadline and permit each party to 
determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic 
offensive arms.
  The Treaty mandates that the parties will meet at least twice a year 
as part of a Bilateral Implementations Commission.
  The Treaty allows each party, in exercising national sovereignty, the 
ability to withdraw from the treaty upon three months written notice.
  As you can see, the treaty is simple, straight-forward, and gives 
each party maximum flexibility.
  Last summer, the Senate Armed Services Committee held two important 
hearings on the national security implications of the treaty. Witnesses 
included: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld; Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers; Combatant Commander, U.S. 
Strategic Command, Admiral James Ellis; and Deputy Administrator of the 
National Nuclear Security Administration of the Department of Energy, 
Dr. Everet H. Beckner. The witnesses at the Committee hearings 
unanimously supported ratification of the Moscow Treaty. The Chairman 
of the Joint chiefs, General Myers said,

       The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I all support 
     the Moscow Treaty. We believe it provides for the long-term 
     security interests of our nation. We also believe that it 
     preserves our flexibility in an uncretain strategic 
     environment.

  Admiral Ellis added that,

       This treaty allows me, as the Commander of the nation's 
     Strategic Forces, the latitude to structure our strategic 
     forces to better support the national security pillars of 
     assuring our allies, dissuading those who might wish us ill, 
     deterring potential adversaries and, if necessary, defending 
     the nation. . . . [I]n my judgment, this treaty provides me 
     the ability to prudently meet those national security needs 
     and to provide a range of deterrent options to the Secretary 
     and the President for their consideration should the need 
     arise. . . .

  I believe it is important to recognize the flexibility that this 
treaty gives the United States. While the U.S. nuclear stockpile may 
contain a large number of warheads, we only have six types of warheads, 
and none of these have been tested in over a decade. The average age of 
warheads in the U.S. stockpile is approaching 20 years--and some 
warheads are much older. Despite the improved effectiveness of the 
stockpile stewardship program, problems in the stockpile do occur. 
Having the responsive reserve, as envisioned by the administration, 
enables us to address problems in the stockpile without compromising 
our national security interests. This treaty is simple, flexible, and 
makes sense. It is a signal that the hostility of the cold war has been 
buried and forgotten. It has been 12 years since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, and clearly it is time to move one.
  As we consider this treaty, we should also keep the future in mind. I 
share Secretary Rumsfeld's vision for future negotiations with Russia 
as he described it at July 26 Armed Services Committee hearing. He 
said,

       We are working towards the day when the relationship 
     between our two countries is such that no arms control 
     treaties will be necessary. that's how normal countries deal 
     with each other. The United States and Britain both have 
     nuclear weapons, yet we do not spend hundreds of hours 
     negotiating the fine details of mutual reductions in our 
     offensive systems. We do not feel the need to preserve the 
     balance of terror between us. It would be a worthy goal for 
     our relationship with Russia to evolve along that path.

  I could not agree more with the Defense Secretary's vision. Russia 
and the United States are no longer adversaries and therefore should 
not treat each other as such.
  I understand that my good friend, Senator John Warner, Chairman of 
the Armed Services Committee, has written to the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee expressing his strong support for the Moscow 
treaty. I join him in that support. I believe the Senate should provide 
its advice and consent to the ratification of the treaty with no 
further changes or additional conditions to the resolution of 
ratification.
  Some of my colleagues may offer well-intentioned amendments that 
might attempt to add reservations, understandings, or declarations. I 
appreciate their desire to amend the treaty, but I think we should keep 
in mind that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously 
approved this treaty without amendment, and the resolution of 
ratification before us today has only tow modest conditions. The 
President has indicated his opposition to any amendment to the 
resolution. Therefore, I encourage my colleagues to oppose all 
amendments. I believe it would be best for our nation security 
interests if this treaty remained unencumbered by items that will 
complicate the treaty and reduce our flexibility.
  Mr. President, I thank you for the opportunity to share my views on 
this important treaty. I look forward to a healthy debate on this 
issue. I yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

[[Page 5250]]


  Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Allard). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for up to 
15 minutes on the time the Democrats have with respect to the Estrada 
nomination.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WYDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. President, for your courtesy 
earlier in the morning.

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