[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 23]
[Senate]
[Pages 31864-31867]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS'S NEW AMERICAN STRATEGIES FOR SECURITY AND 
                            PEACE CONFERENCE

  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, in the end of October, the Center for 
American Progress, in conjunction with The American Prospect magazine 
and The Century Foundation, held a conference on U.S. national security 
titled, ``New American Strategies for Security and Peace.'' Three of my 
fellow senators--Senator Hillary Clinton, Senator Joe Biden, and 
Senator Chuck Hagel--and Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski made incisive remarks 
at this conference about the direction of our country's foreign policy 
and its effects on Americans at home and abroad. They also spoke about 
how to restore America to respected international leadership. I ask 
unanimous consent that the remarks of Senator Clinton and Dr. 
Brzezinski be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               Remarks of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton

       Washington, Oct. 29, 2003.--Thank you, John for that 
     introduction. I want to compliment you for all the hard work 
     that you have put into the creation of the Center for 
     American Progress, an institution that I am convinced will be 
     a tremendous force in engaging in the war of ideas so 
     critical to our country's future. And there is no better 
     leader for that effort than John Podesta who has the warrior 
     spirit and strategic mind needed for such an endeavor. I also 
     want to thank Bob Kuttner at the American Prospect and Dick 
     Leone at the Century Foundation for their work on this 
     conference.
       Today's conference, ``New American Strategies for Security 
     and Peace'' comes at a critical point in our nation's history 
     and I commend the Center for American Progress, the American 
     Prospect and the Century Foundation for putting together from 
     what is, by all accounts, an outstanding program.
       Today is a critical moment, not just in our history, but in 
     the history of democracy. As we seek to build democratic 
     institutions in Iraq, and we in this room push for us to 
     reach out to our global partners in this endeavor, this 
     nation must remember the tenets of the democratic process 
     that we advocate.
       The issue I'd like to address is whether we apply the 
     fundamental principles of democracy--rule of law, 
     transparency and accountability, informed consent--not only 
     to what we do at home but to what we do in the world. There 
     can be no real question that we must do so because foreign 
     policy involves the most important decisions a democracy can 
     make--going to war, our relations with the world, and our use 
     of power in that world.
       But the fact is that new doctrines and actions by the Bush 
     administration undermine these core democratic principles--
     both at home and abroad. I believe they do so at a severe 
     cost.
       In our efforts abroad, we now go to war as a first resort 
     against perceived threats, not as a necessary final resort. 
     Preemption is an option every President since Washington has 
     had and many have used. But to elevate it to the organizing 
     principle of American strategic policy at the outset of the 
     21st century is to grant legitimacy to every nation to make 
     war on their enemies before their enemies make war on them. 
     It is a giant step backward.
       In our dealings abroad, we claim to champion rule of law, 
     yet we too often have turned our backs on international 
     agreements. The Kyoto Treaty, which represents an attempt by 
     the international community to meaningfully address the 
     global problem of climate change and global warming. The 
     biological weapons enforcement protocol. The Comprehensive 
     Test Ban Treaty. This unwillingness to engage the 
     international community on problems that will require 
     international cooperation sends a clear signal to other 
     nations that we believe in the rule of law--if it is our law 
     as we interpret it. That is the antithesis of the rule of 
     law. The administration argues that international agreements, 
     like the Kyoto Treaty, are flawed. And the fact is they have 
     some good arguments. When the Clinton administration signed 
     the Kyoto Protocol it said that, working, inside the tent, it 
     would try to make further improvements. But rather than try 
     to make further improvements from inside the process, the 
     Bush administration stomped out in an effort to knock over 
     the tent. That is not the prudent exercise of power. It is 
     the petulant exercise of ideology.
       In our dealings abroad, we more often than not have 
     promoted, not the principles of international cooperation, 
     but the propensity for an aggressive unilateralism that 
     alienates our allies and undermines our tenets. It deeply 
     saddens me, as I speak with friends and colleagues around the 
     world, that the friends of America from my generation tell me 
     painfully that for the first time in their lives they are on 
     the defensive when it comes to explaining to their own 
     children that America truly is a good and benign nation. 
     Their children, too often, have seen an America that 
     disregards their concerns, insists they embrace our concerns 
     and forces them to be with us or against us. Our Declaration 
     of Independence calls for `` a decent respect for the 
     opinions of mankind,'' yet this administration quite simply 
     doesn't listen to our friends and allies. From our most 
     important allies in Europe to relations with our neighbors in 
     this hemisphere, this administration has spanned the range of 
     emotions from dismissive to indifferent. Ask President 
     Vincente Fox, who staked his Presidency on a political 
     alliance with Mexico's historically controversial ally to the 
     north, only to discover that he got no farther north than 
     Crawford, Texas.
       If we are to lead this world into a wholly democratic 
     future, we must first be consistent in the principles we 
     champion and the ones we pursue.
       Nowhere is this more apparent than in the transparency of 
     government decisions. Without such transparency, how can 
     leaders be accountable? How can the people by informed? 
     Without such transparency--openness and information--the 
     pillars of democracy lose their foundation.
       Of course in a democracy, there always is tension between 
     the information that the Executive Branch needs to keep 
     secret and the information that must be provided to the 
     public to have an informed citizenry. There are no easy 
     answers to striking the right balance. But we must always be 
     vigilant against letting our desire to keep information 
     confidential be used as a pretext for classifying information 
     that is more than political embarrassment than national 
     security. Let me be absolutely clear. This is not a 
     propensity that is confined to one party or the other. It is 
     a propensity of power that we must guard against. Because 
     when that happens, we move away from the bedrock principle of 
     informed consent that governs all State actions in a 
     democracy. Getting back, once again, to our founders who I 
     think were not only extraordinary statesmen, but brilliant 
     psychologists--they understood profoundly the dangers and 
     temptations of power. The balance of power that they 
     enshrined in our Constitution and our system of government 
     was a check on all of our human natures and the propensity 
     for anyone, no matter how convinced they are of the 
     righteousness of their cause and view of the world, to be 
     held in a check and a balance by other institutions.
       Since 9/11, this question has much more salience since the 
     War on Terror will often be fought in the shadows outside the 
     public limelight. New doctrines of preemption raise profound 
     questions about democratic oversight by making decisions 
     effecting war and peace. They also raise profound questions 
     about the quality of the intelligence information that is not 
     open to public scrutiny. One of the most critical issues that 
     we confront is what is wrong with our intelligence, the 
     gathering and the analysis and the use?
       Anybody who follows what is going on on Capitol Hill is 
     aware that we are locked in a partisan conflict as to how far 
     to go in analyzing the intelligence with respect to Iraq--
     with the other side complaining that we can look to the 
     intelligence community, but we cannot look at the decision 
     makers. We can't look at the uses to which the intelligence 
     was put and we can't look at the particular viewpoint that 
     was brought to that analysis. I think that is a profound 
     error and undermining to our democratic institutions.
       The American people, and indeed the international 
     community, need to have confidence that when the U.S. 
     government acts, it is acting in good faith--sharing 
     information where appropriate and developing appropriate 
     mechanisms to insure that power is not being abused. A 
     perception that our government is not providing honest 
     assessments of the rationale for war or is unwilling to admit 
     error will diminish the support for U.S. foreign policy of 
     the American people and the international community. The 
     American people will be far more willing to accept the 
     administration's statement's about what is going right in 
     Iraq if they believe that the administration is more 
     forthright about what is going wrong. It is difficult to 
     convince people that everything is fine when we are asking 
     them to essentially shelve their common sense and human 
     experience.
       An example that hits close to home for me can be found in 
     the administration's approach to the investigation 
     surrounding 9/11. As Senator of New York, there is no more 
     searing event than what happened to us on September 11th. My 
     constituents have a right to know all the facts of how our 
     government was prepared--or not--for the attacks. Yet, over 
     the weekend, we learned that the 9/11 Commission, charged 
     with the important task of investigating how 9/11 happened, 
     complains that it isn't getting access

[[Page 31865]]

     to all the documents that it needs. This is a hugely 
     important issue and one that must be addressed. The lack of 
     transparency on the part of the Bush administration has 
     forced Governor Kean, the former Republican governor of New 
     Jersey, to threaten subpoenas. This should not be happening.
       As bad as it was for Vice President Cheney to keep secret 
     how the administration developed its energy policy--this is 
     far worse. The 9/11 commission is not trying to embarrass the 
     President, any former Presidents, or anyone else. It is 
     trying to learn what happened--what went wrong--in hopes that 
     we can become better prepared to protect ourselves from 
     future attacks. In taking this action, the administration 
     unnecessarily raises suspicions that it has something to 
     hide--that it might use national security to hide mistakes. 
     That is not necessary or appropriate.
       Meanwhile, on Iraq, the Bush administration describes 
     progress on many fronts in direct contravention to what we 
     are hearing every day. There undoubtedly are many instances 
     where U.S. efforts in Iraq are successful. But what is going 
     right should not delude us about what is going wrong. There 
     is too much at stake to treat war as a political spin zone.
       We need to level with the American people--the good, the 
     bad and the ugly. For the simple fact is that we cannot fail 
     in Iraq. On that fundamental principle, I am in full and 
     profound agreement with the President. The stakes are simply 
     too high. That means we need to improve our transparency and 
     credibility in Iraq. In the recent $87 billion supplemental 
     appropriations bill passed by the Senate, an amendment that I 
     offered, and which was included in the final bill, would 
     require GAO audits of these opaque supplemental 
     appropriations. Another amendment that I co-sponsored with 
     Senator Harkin would require the GAO to examine the level of 
     profits being made by U.S. contractors in Iraq. This is a 
     historic mission that our government has encouraged, going 
     back to George Washington, to make sure that no private 
     company profited off the spoils of war. We need to assure the 
     American people that their money is being spent wisely, 
     assure the Iraqi people that it is being spent in their 
     interest and assure the world that it is not being spent for 
     profiteering by American companies. I understand both of 
     these amendments, my amendment and the one I co-sponsored 
     with Senator Harkin, are the subject of some dispute by the 
     administration. And in fact, I understand that the majority 
     party has been advised to ensure the final package doesn't 
     include those amendments. I can only hope that they have a 
     change of mind. They are creating a level of mistrust in our 
     government by our citizens for which we will reap the 
     consequences for years to come.
       As we discuss and debate these issues, let us remember the 
     simple fact that we remain at war. That is not a fact lost on 
     the men and women stationed in Iraq. It is not a fact lost on 
     their families who sit at home worrying about their well-
     being. It should not lead to the administration refusing to 
     release injury figures. We should be willing to admit the 
     price that is being paid by these brave young men and women 
     to pursue this policy. I believe that the Executive Branch 
     has a strong prerogative on national security issues. As 
     Senator, I have supported that prerogative. But the men and 
     women elected to serve in the Congress also have a great deal 
     of wisdom to bring to bear. And quite honestly, my friends, 
     things, have not gone so well in Iraq that we have a single 
     mind to waste.
       Recent articles in The New York Times and Newsweek report 
     that many Republicans share the frustration that comes from 
     lack of genuine consultations--failure to construct a genuine 
     bipartisan consensus for the sacrifices we are asking 
     Americans to make. My Republican colleagues Senator McCain 
     and Senator Hagel, who is speaking at this conference, have 
     cautioned the administration of the dangers of a failure to 
     be open and honest with the American people on the situation 
     in Iraq.
       As Senator Hagel and others have suggested, Congress needs 
     to be more than just a rubber stamp for the administration's 
     policies. Tell me what war America has won without seeking, 
     achieving, and maintaining a bipartisan consensus.
       President Truman worked closely with Senator Vandenberg 
     after WWII to secure U.S. support for the United Nations. 
     President George H.W. Bush consulted closely with Democratic 
     congressional leaders during the first Gulf War. My husband 
     consulted closely with Senator Dole and other Republican 
     leaders during the military action in Bosnia and Kosovo.
       In giving Iraqis more of a say and in making transactions 
     and contracting more open, the U.S. simply is practicing the 
     habits of democracy--inclusion, empowerment and openness. 
     Fundamentally, this is about trust--winning and earning the 
     trust of the Iraqi people and trusting in the Iraqi people 
     who eventually are going to be left to govern themselves and 
     keeping the trust of the American people. I cannot stress 
     strongly enough how significant it is that the American 
     people across the board, are beginning to ask such serious 
     questions about our direction in our efforts to pursue a 
     course in Iraq, but also from the Middle East to North Korea 
     as well. An unwillingness of the administration to be more 
     forthright can undermine the greatest capital we have, the 
     capital of human trust between a government and the governed. 
     I think we're on the edge of losing both the confidence of 
     the Iraqi people and of the American people. We can prevent 
     that from happening with a heavy dose of straight talk.
       At the same time that we are trying to build a democratic 
     society in Iraq, we must abide by those basic principles that 
     we hold dear and demonstrate that we are willing to be open 
     and have partnerships and build coalitions that are more than 
     just in a name.
       I think this moment in American history is wrought with 
     danger and challenge. If you look back at our security and 
     goals in WWII they were clear, the Cold War was clear, the 
     post Cold War era, prior to 9/11, was a little more muddy 
     because it wasn't as obvious what our strategic objectives 
     were and how we would achieve them.
       Now we do have, once again, a very clear adversary. But 
     just proclaiming the evil of our adversary is not a strategy; 
     just assuming that everyone will understand that we are well 
     motivated and people to be trusted is beyond the range of 
     human experiences that I understand. This administration is 
     in danger of squandering not just our surplus which is 
     already gone in financial terms, but the surplus of good 
     feeling and hopefulness and care and that we had in almost 
     global unanimity after 9/11. We are a resilient, optimistic 
     and effective people and I'm confident that we can regain our 
     footing, but it needs to be the first order of business, not 
     only for the administration, but also for Congress and the 
     American public. It is my hope this conference will provide 
     more ammunition and more support for those of us who are 
     trying to get back on track and to give America the chance to 
     lead consistent with our values and ideals. Thank you very 
     much.
                                  ____


                     Remarks of Zbigniew Brzezinski

       Washington, Oct. 28, 2003.--Ladies and gentlemen, 40 years 
     ago almost to the day an important Presidential emissary was 
     sent abroad by a beleaguered President of the United States. 
     The United States was facing the prospect of nuclear war. 
     These were the days of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
       Several emissaries went to our principal allies. One of 
     them was a tough-minded former Secretary of State, Dean 
     Acheson whose mission was to brief President De Gaulle and to 
     solicit French support in what could be a nuclear war 
     involving not just the United States and the Soviet Union but 
     the entire NATO Alliance and the Warsaw Pact.
       The former Secretary of State briefed the French President 
     and then said to him at the end of the briefing, I would now 
     like to show you the evidence, the photographs that we have 
     of Soviet missiles armed with nuclear weapons. The French 
     President responded by saying, I do not wish to see the 
     photographs. The word of the President of the United States 
     is good enough for me. Please tell him that France stands 
     with America.
       Would any foreign leader today react the same way to an 
     American emissary who would go abroad and say that country X 
     is armed with weapons of mass destruction which threaten the 
     United States? There's food for thought in that question. 
     Fifty-three years ago, almost the same month following the 
     Soviet-sponsored assault by North Korea on South Korea, the 
     Soviet Union boycotted a proposed resolution in the U.N. 
     Security Council for a collective response to that act.
       That left the Soviet Union alone in opposition, stamping it 
     as a global pariah. In the last three weeks there were two 
     votes on the subject of the Middle East in the General 
     Assembly of the United Nations. In one of them the vote was 
     133 to four. In the other one the vote was 141 to four, and 
     the four included the United States, Israel, Marshall Islands 
     and Micronesia.
       All of our NATO allies voted with the majority including 
     Great Britain, including the so-called new allies in Europe--
     in fact almost all of the EU--and Japan. I cite these events 
     because I think they underline two very disturbing 
     phenomena--the loss of U.S. international credibility, the 
     growing U.S. international isolation.
       Both together can be summed up in a troubling paradox 
     regarding the American position and role in the world today. 
     American power worldwide is at its historic zenith. American 
     global political standing is at its nadir. Why? What is the 
     cause of this? These are facts. They're measurable facts. 
     They're also felt facts when one talks to one's friends 
     abroad who like America, who value what we treasure but do 
     not understand our policies, are troubled by our actions and 
     are perplexed by what they perceive to be either demagogy or 
     mendacity.
       Maybe the explanation is that we are rich, and we are, and 
     that we are powerful, and we certainly are. But if anyone 
     thinks that this is the full explanation I think he or she is 
     taking the easy way out and engaging in a self-serving 
     justification. I think we have to take into account two 
     troubling conditions.
       Since the tragedy of 9/11 which understandably shook and 
     outraged everyone in this country, we have increasingly 
     embraced at

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     the highest official level what I think fairly can be called 
     a paranoiac view of the world. Summarized in a phrase 
     repeatedly used at the highest level, ``he who is not with us 
     is against us.'' I say repeatedly because actually some 
     months ago I did a computer check to see how often it's been 
     used at the very highest level in public statements.
       The count then quite literally was 99. So it's a phrase 
     which obviously reflects a deeply felt perception. I strongly 
     suspect the person who uses that phrase doesn't know its 
     historical or intellectual origins. It is a phrase 
     popularized by Lenin when he attacked the social democrats on 
     the grounds that they were anti-Bolshevik and therefore he 
     who is not with us is against us and can be handled 
     accordingly.
       This phrase in a way is part of what might be considered to 
     be the central defining focus that our policy-makers embrace 
     in determining the American position in the world and is 
     summed up by the words ``war on terrorism.'' War on terrorism 
     defines the central preoccupation of the United States in the 
     world today, and it does reflect in my view a rather narrow 
     and extremist vision of foreign policy of the world's first 
     superpower, of a great democracy, with genuinely idealistic 
     traditions.
       The second condition, troubling condition, which 
     contributes in my view to the crisis of credibility and to 
     the state of isolation in which the United States finds 
     itself today is due in part because that skewed view of the 
     world is intensified by a fear that periodically verges on 
     panic that is in itself blind. By this I mean the absence of 
     a clearly, sharply defined perception of what is transpiring 
     abroad regarding particularly such critically important 
     security issues as the existence or the spread or the 
     availability or the readiness in alien hands of weapons of 
     mass destruction.
       We have actually experienced in recent months a dramatic 
     demonstration of an unprecedented intelligence failure, 
     perhaps the most significant intelligence failure in the 
     history of the United States. That failure was contributed to 
     and was compensated for by extremist demagogy which 
     emphasizes the worst case scenarios which stimulates fear, 
     which induces a very simple dichotomic view of world reality.
       I think it is important to ask ourselves as citizens, not 
     as Democrats attacking the administration, but as citizens, 
     whether a world power can really provide global leadership on 
     the basis of fear and anxiety? Can it really mobilize support 
     and particularly the support of friends when we tell them 
     that if you are not with us you are against us?
       I think that calls for serious debate in America about the 
     role of America in the world, and I do not believe that that 
     serious debate is satisfied simply by a very abstract, vague 
     and quasi-theological definition of the war on terrorism as 
     the central preoccupation of the United States in today's 
     world. That definition of the challenge in my view simply 
     narrows down and over-simplifies a complex and varied set of 
     challenges that needs to be addressed on a broad front.
       It deals with abstractions. It theologizes the challenge. 
     It doesn't point directly at the problem. It talks about a 
     broad phenomenon, terrorism, as the enemy overlooking the 
     fact that terrorism is a technique for killing people. That 
     doesn't tell us who the enemy is. It's as if we said that 
     World War II was not against the Nazis but against 
     blitzkrieg. We need to ask who is the enemy, and the enemies 
     are terrorists.
       But not in an abstract, theologically-defined fashion, 
     people, to quote again our highest spokesmen, ``people who 
     hate things, whereas we love things''--literally. Not to 
     mention the fact that of course terrorists hate freedom. I 
     think they do hate. But believe me, I don't think they sit 
     there abstractly hating freedom. They hate some of us. They 
     hate some countries. They hate some particular targets. But 
     it's a lot more concrete than these vague quasi-theological 
     formulations.
       I think in the heat of debate Democrats should not be nay-
     sayers only, criticizing. They certainly should not be 
     cheerleaders as some were roughly a year ago. But they should 
     stress a return to fundamentals in so far as American foreign 
     policy is concerned. Above all else in stressing these 
     fundamentals, Democrats particularly should insist that the 
     foreign policy of a pluralistic democracy like the United 
     States should be based on bipartisanship because 
     bipartisanship is the means and the framework for formulating 
     policies based on moderation and on the recognition of the 
     complexity of the human condition.
       That has been the tradition since the days of Truman and 
     Vandenberg all the way until recent times. That has been the 
     basis for American foreign policy that has been remarkably 
     successful and has led us not only to a triumph in the Cold 
     War but to emerging as the only global superpower with 
     special responsibilities.
       Bipartisanship helps to avoid extremes and imbalances. It 
     causes compromises and accommodations. So let's cooperate. 
     Let's cooperate and challenge the administration to cooperate 
     with us because within the administration there are also 
     moderates and people who are not fully comfortable with the 
     tendencies that have prevailed in recent times.
       That has a number of specific implications that are of a 
     policy type. The first and most important is to emphasize the 
     enduring nature of the alliance relationship particularly 
     with Europe which does share our values and interests even if 
     it disagrees with us on specific policies. But the sharing of 
     values and interests is fundamental, and we partake of the 
     same basic beliefs.
       We cannot have that relationship if we only dictate or 
     threaten and condemn those who disagree. Sometimes we may be 
     right. Sometimes they may be right. But there is something 
     transcendental about shared values that shouldn't be 
     subordinated to tactical requirements. We should seek to 
     cooperate with Europe, not to divide Europe to a fictitious 
     new and a fictitious old.
       And we should recognize that in some parts of the world 
     Europeans have more experience and more knowledge than we and 
     certain interests as important as ours. I think particularly 
     of the Middle East. We should be therefore supporting a 
     larger Europe, and in so doing we should strive to expand the 
     zone of peace and prosperity in the world which is the 
     necessary foundation for a stable international system in 
     which our leadership could be fruitfully exercised.
       Part of the process of building a larger zone of peace 
     involves also engaging Russia and drawing it into a closer 
     relationship simultaneously with Europe and with the Euro-
     Atlantic community. But we can only do that if we are clear 
     as to what we are seeking in pursuing that strategy. I would 
     say that what we ought to be seeking unambiguously is the 
     promotion of democracy and decency in Russia and not tactical 
     help of a very specific and not always all that very useful 
     type purchased at the cost of compromising even our own 
     concept of what democracy is.
       I am troubled by the unqualified endorsements of a 
     government in which former KGB types are preponderant as a 
     successful democracy. That has been the judgment rendered at 
     the highest levels again within the last few weeks without 
     any qualification. But in fairness we have to say that some 
     of that happened before this administration assumed office as 
     well.
       We should be aware of that. If we are going to pursue a 
     bipartisan policy let's be willing also to accept some 
     shortcomings on our part. But if Russia is to be part of this 
     larger zone of peace it cannot bring into it its imperial 
     baggage. It cannot bring into it a policy of genocide against 
     the Chechens, and cannot kill journalists, and it cannot 
     repress the mass media.
       I think we should be sensitive to that even if they do 
     arrest oligarchs with whom some of our friends on K Street 
     have shared interests. That is not to be approved. It is to 
     be condemned, but surely there are deeper causes for 
     emphasizing that it is important that Russia should move 
     towards democracy.
       To increase the zone of peace is to build the inner core of 
     a stable international zone. While America is paramount it 
     isn't omnipotent. We need the Europeans. We need the European 
     Union. (Applause) We have to consistently strive to draw in 
     Russia while at the same time being quite unambiguous in what 
     it is that disqualifies Russia still from genuine membership 
     in the community of democratic, law abiding states.
       Secondly, we have to deal with that part of the world which 
     is a zone of conflict and try to transform it into a zone of 
     peace, and that means above all else the Middle East. In Iraq 
     we must succeed. Failure is not an option. But once we say 
     that we have to ask ourselves what is the definition of 
     success? More killing, more repression, more effective 
     counter-insurgency, the introduction of newer devices of 
     technological type to crush the resistance or whatever one 
     wishes to call it--the terrorism?
       Or is it a deliberate effort to promote by using force a 
     political solution? And if there's going to be a political 
     solution in Iraq, clearly I think it is obvious that two 
     prerequisites have to be fulfilled as rapidly as feasible 
     namely the internationalization of the foreign presence in 
     Iraq regarding which too much time has been lost and which is 
     going to be increasingly difficult to accomplish in spite of 
     the somewhat dialectical successes with which we are defining 
     progress in Iraq lately.
       In addition to the internationalization of Iraq we have to 
     transfer power as soon as is possible to a sovereign Iraqi 
     authority. Sovereignty is a word that is often used but it 
     has really no specific meaning. Sovereignty today is nominal. 
     Any number of countries that are sovereign are sovereign only 
     nominally and relatively. Ultimately even the United States 
     is not fully sovereign as we go around asking for more men 
     and money to help us in Iraq.
       Therefore there's nothing to be lost in prematurely 
     declaring the Iraqi authority as sovereign if it helps it to 
     gain political legitimacy in a country which is searching to 
     define itself, which has been humiliated, in which there is a 
     great deal of ambivalence, welcoming on the one hand the 
     overthrow of Saddam as the majority does, and on the other 
     hand resenting our presence and our domination.
       The sooner we do that the more likely is an Iraqi authority 
     under an international umbrella that becomes itself more 
     effective in dealing with the residual terrorism and

[[Page 31867]]

     opposition that we continue to confront. We will not 
     understand what is happening right now in Iraq by analogies 
     to Vietnam because I think they are all together misplaced, 
     and one could speak at length about it.
       If you want to understand what is happening right now in 
     Iraq I suggest a movie that was quite well known to a number 
     of people some years ago. Maybe not many in this audience, 
     given the age of some present, but it's a movie which deals 
     with a reality which is very similar to that that we confront 
     today in Baghdad. It's called ``The Battle For Algiers.'' It 
     is a movie that deals with what happened in Algeria after the 
     Algerian Liberation Army was defeated in the field by the 
     French army and the resistance which used urban violence, 
     bombs, assassinations, and turned Algiers into a continuing 
     battle that eventually wore down the French.
       I do not expect we'll be worn down, but I think we want to 
     understand the dynamics of the resistance. This provides a 
     much better analogy for grappling with what is becoming an 
     increasingly painful and difficult challenge for us. A 
     challenge which will be more successful in meeting if we have 
     more friends engaged in meeting it and if more Iraqis begin 
     to feel that they are responsible for the key decisions 
     pertaining to their country.
       We will not turn the Middle East into a zone of peace 
     instead of a zone of violence unless we more clearly identify 
     the United States with the pursuit of peace in the Israeli/
     Palestinian relationship. Palestinian terrorism has to be 
     rejected and condemned, yes. But it should not be translated 
     de facto into a policy of support for a really increasingly 
     brutal repression, colonial settlements and a new wall.
       Let us not kid ourselves. At stake is the destiny of a 
     democratic country, Israel, to the security of which, the 
     well-being of which, the United States has been committed 
     historically for more than half a century for very good 
     historical and moral reasons. But soon there will be no 
     option of a two-state solution.
       Soon the reality of the settlements which are colonial 
     fortifications on the hill with swimming pools next to 
     favelas below where there's no drinking water and where the 
     population is 50 percent unemployed, there will be no 
     opportunity for a two-state solution with a wall that cuts up 
     the West Bank even more and creates more human suffering.
       Indeed as some Israelis have lately pointed out, and I 
     emphasize some Israelis have lately pointed out, increasingly 
     the only prospect if this continues is Israel becoming 
     increasingly like apartheid South Africa--the minority 
     dominating the majority, locked in a conflict from which 
     there is no extraction. If we want to prevent this the United 
     States above all else must identify itself with peace and 
     help those who are the majority in Israel, who want peace and 
     are prepared to accept peace.
       All public opinion polls show that and the majority of the 
     Palestinians, and I believe the majority of the Jewish 
     community in this country which is liberal, open-minded, 
     idealistic and not committed to extremist repressions.
       The United States as the government, but all of us as 
     citizens and Democrats particularly, will soon have an 
     opportunity to underline their commitments to a peaceful 
     solution in the Middle East because in the next two weeks a 
     group of Israelis and Palestinians are going to unveil a 
     detailed peace plan on which they have been working for 
     months and months. It's a fifty-page document with maps and 
     detailed compromise solutions for all of the major 
     contentious issues, solutions which opinion shows 70 percent 
     of the Israelis would accept.
       When that happens what will be the stance of the United 
     States? Sharon has already condemned it, and not 
     surprisingly. I hope we do not decide to condemn it. I hope 
     we will show at least a positive interest, and many of us as 
     citizens, as people concerned, should I think endorse it 
     because if we count on the people who want peace eventually 
     we will move towards peace. But they have to be mobilized and 
     given support.
       I think one of the reasons that that support from the 
     United States has not been forthcoming is in fact political 
     cowardice which I think is unjustified because I have real 
     confidence in the good judgment, both of the Israeli people 
     and of the American Jewish community and more basically of 
     the basic American preference for a moderate peaceful 
     solution.
       The last third area pertains more broadly to strategic 
     doctrine and to strategic commitment. It involves trying to 
     deal with nuclear proliferation, and we are learning 
     fortunately that we can only deal with that problem when it 
     comes to North Korea or to Iran by cooperation with other 
     major powers.
       That we have to support, and if the administration moves in 
     that direction or is prodded to move in that direction that 
     is all to the good because there is no alternative. If we to 
     resolve the North Korean problem by arms alone we will 
     produce a violent reaction against the United States in South 
     Korea--and don't underestimate the growing anti-American 
     tendencies in South Korean nationalism--and will precipitate 
     a nuclear armed Japan and thereby create a whole duel 
     strategic dynamic in the Far East.
       In the case of Iran it is also in our interest that the 
     theocratic despotism fade. It is beginning to fade. It is in 
     its thermidorian phase. The young people of Iran are 
     increasingly alienated. The women of Iran are increasingly 
     assertive and bold. Notice the reception given to the Nobel 
     Peace Prize winner when she returned to Tehran. That is a 
     symptom of things to come.
       And if we take preemptory action we will reinforce the 
     worst tendencies in the theocratic fundamentalist regime, not 
     to speak about the widening of the zone of conflict in the 
     Middle East. But beyond that we still have one more challenge 
     in the area of strategic doctrine which is how to respond to 
     the new conditions of uncertainty of weapons of mass 
     destruction perhaps eventually being available to terrorist 
     groups.
       Here I think it is terribly important not to plunge 
     headlong into the tempting notion that we will preempt 
     unilaterally on suspicion which is what the doctrine right 
     now amounts to. The reason for that being we simply do not 
     know enough to be able to preempt with confidence. That to me 
     involves one fundamentally important lesson. We have to 
     undertake a genuine national effort to revitalize and 
     restructure our intelligence services.
       For four years I was the principal channel of intelligence 
     to the President of the United States. We had a pretty good 
     idea of the nature of the security challenge that we faced 
     because the challenge itself was based on a highly advanced 
     scientific technological system of arms. Today the problem is 
     much more difficult.
       It's more elusive. We're not dealing with nuclear silos and 
     coordinated structures necessary for an effective assault on 
     American security, structures that we could begin to decipher 
     and also technologically seek to undermine or in the event of 
     warfare paralyze. We were really remarkably well informed and 
     in some respects prepared for a central nuclear war to a 
     degree to which we certainly are not today in dealing with 
     the new challenges of security.
       These can only be addressed if we have what we do not have, 
     a really effective intelligence service. I find it appalling 
     that when we went into Iraq we did not know if they had 
     weapons of mass destruction. We thought they had weapons of 
     mass destruction based largely on extrapolation. But that 
     also means that our commanders in the field went into battle 
     without any knowledge of the Iraqi WMD order of battle.
       They did not know what units, brigades or divisions in the 
     Iraqi armed forces were equipped with what kind, allegedly, 
     of weapons of mass destruction. Were there chemical weapons 
     on the battalion level or on the brigade level or were there 
     special units in the different divisions that were supposed 
     to use chemical weapons?
       What about the alleged existence of bacteriological 
     weapons? Who had them? Who had the right to dispose of them? 
     What about the allegedly reconstituted nuclear program? At 
     what level of development was it? Where were these weapons to 
     be deployed? The fact is none of that was known regarding a 
     country that was permeable, that was not as isolated as the 
     Soviet Union.
       All of that cumulatively testifies to a fundamental 
     shortcoming in our national security policy. If we want to 
     lead we have to have other countries trust us. When we speak 
     that have to think it is the truth. This is why DeGaulle said 
     what he did. This is why others believed us. This is why they 
     believed us prior to the war in Iraq.
       It isn't that the Norwegians or the Germans or whoever else 
     had their own independent intelligence services. They 
     believed us, and they no longer do. To correct that we have 
     to have an intelligence that speaks with authority, that can 
     be trusted, and if preemption becomes necessary can truly 
     tell us that as a last resort preemption is necessary. Right 
     now there's no way of knowing.
       Ultimately at issue, and I end on this, is the relationship 
     between the new requirements of security and the traditions 
     of American idealism. We have for decades and decades played 
     a unique role in the world because we were viewed as a 
     society that was generally committed to certain ideals and 
     that we were prepared to practice them at home and to defend 
     them abroad.
       Today for the first time our commitment to idealism 
     worldwide is challenged by a sense of security vulnerability. 
     We have to be very careful in that setting not to become 
     self-centered, preoccupied only with ourselves and 
     subordinate everything else in the world to an exaggerated 
     sense of insecurity.
       We are going to live in an insecure world. It cannot be 
     avoided. We have to learn to live in it with dignity, with 
     idealism, with steadfastness. Thank you.

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