[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 22]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 31117-31120]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




           THE LIMITS AND LIABILITY OF POWER: LESSONS OF IRAQ

                                 ______
                                 

                          HON. JAMES A. LEACH

                                of iowa

                    in the house of representatives

                       Friday, November 21, 2003

  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, the issue of our engagement in Iraq demands 
that we as a society probe the question of the limits of a superpower's 
power and the possible anomaly that there are severe liabilities to 
power, particularly for a superpower.
  Does, for instance, overwhelming military might protect us from 
terrorism or, if used unwisely, increase our vulnerability to 
terrorism?
  Likewise, does overwhelming economic power ensure loyalty or buy 
friendship even from the countries most indebted to the U.S.?
  In other words, can military and economic might ever become a 
substitute for sensible and sensitive foreign policy?
  And given the dilemma of Iraq, could it indeed be that the most 
important ``multibillion'' problem America faces is not deficits 
measured in dollars, fiscal or trade, but the antagonism of billions of 
people around the world who object to our current foreign policy?
  Here, let me say that I strongly believe in the need for 
clarification of thought as it applies to policy, and anyone who wishes 
to review the reasoning I have applied to the Iraq issue, ranging from 
a floor explanation of a ``no'' vote on the Congressional resolution 
authorizing war last year to calls for internationalizing the civil 
governance in Iraq last month, to

[[Page 31118]]

a vote in favor of generosity in reconstruction efforts last week, can 
find the explanatory statements on my Congressional web site: 
www.house.gov/leach.
  What I would like to do today is summarize the dilemma we face and 
make the following points about where we might go from here:
  (1) There are no certitudes. Anyone who was not conflicted on the 
original decision to approve intervention or who does not see a 
downside to all courses of action today is not approaching the problem 
with an open mind. America and the world are in a strategic pickle. In 
an era of anger, of divisions in the world based on economics, on color 
of skin, on ethnicity, on religious belief, on happenstance of family 
and place of birth; in a world made smaller by technological 
revolutions in communications and transportation, those who have 
causes--good or bad--have possibilities of being heard and felt around 
the globe that never existed before. Great leaders like Gandhi and 
Martin Luther King appealed to the higher angels of our nature and 
achieved revolutionary change with non-violence. Mendacious leaders 
like Hitler, Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden have sought to impose 
their wills on others through appeals to hate and reliance on 
increasingly wanton instruments of oppression.
  As the world's only superpower, the U.S. has no choice but to display 
firmness of purpose and resolve in deterring inhumane breaches of 
order. Yet, firmness and resolve must be matched by compassionate 
understanding of the reasons people of the world lash out. We have the 
world's greatest armed forces. But these forces cannot successfully be 
deployed to counter international misconduct if we don't also seek to 
undercut the causes of such conduct.
  Reviewing the causes of World War I, historians quickly concluded 
that there was not enough flexibility in the European alliance system 
and that this allowed a rather minor event, the assassination of an 
Austrian archduke, to precipitate a cataclysmic war. With this example 
in mind, political leaders in the 1930s erred on the side of 
irresolution, which led them to Munich and the partition of 
Czechoslovakia. Too much inflexibility caused one war; too little spine 
a greater one.
  The problem today is not whether we should meet problems with 
firmness or compassion. We need both. The problem is determining when 
and how to respond with firmness, when and how to express compassion. 
As in all human conduct, the challenge is wisdom.
  (2) We must listen as well as assert. Four decades ago the British 
author Lawrence Durrell wrote a series of novels called the Alexandria 
Quartet, in which he describes a set of events in Alexandria, Egypt, 
preceding World War II. An experiment in the relativity of human 
perception, each of the four books views the same events through the 
eyes of a different participant. While the events described are the 
same in each book, the stories as told by each of the participants are 
surprisingly different. The reader comes to the realization that a 
broad understanding about events that transpire can only be developed 
by synthesizing the singularly different perceptions of various 
protagonists.
  To understand the Middle East today, we need to listen to everyone's 
story.
  (3) To shape or deter an opponents' actions, we need to understand 
how they think. American policy makers, at their best, reason in a 
pragmatic, future-oriented manner. In much of the rest of the world, on 
the other hand, people reason by historical analogy. Events dating 
centuries back, especially umbrages, dominate thinking about today. 
People in the Middle East, like the Balkans, are oriented to the past 
and are driven by ideas of honor of a different shape and emphasis than 
those we derive from American culture.
  (4) No country can go it alone for long and expect to be respected as 
an international leader. Doctrines of American exceptionalism--the 
precept that we should not be bound by legal or procedural norms that 
bind others--which are now fashionable in certain Washington 
ideological circles have led to intervention in Iraq without full UN 
sanction. Ironically, prior to 9/11 these same notions led to rejection 
of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and of upgraded verification 
provisions for the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention--agreements that 
would have stood in the way of WMD production in Iraq and provided a 
legal basis for possible armed intervention if violations occurred. The 
world is crying out for leadership in restraining weapons development. 
We are not providing it because Washington policy makers prefer that 
restraint on others not apply to ourselves.
  (5) When Washington policy makers speak on foreign policy they must 
understand that their audience is more than one party's political base. 
While Saddam Hussein is widely perceived to be the worst sort of 
tyrant, many people around the world view us as bullies for attacking a 
sovereign country without prior armed provocation. That is why it is so 
critical that a case for intervention should be based on concern for 
the well-being of others as well as the U.S. national interest.
  For foreign policy to be effective, it must be clearly articulated 
and convincing in those parts of the world most affected by it.
  (6) We must rededicate ourselves to building up an intelligence 
capacity that better understands the Middle East and the Islamic world 
and is less susceptible to being politicized. Our inability to 
understand Islamic culture resulted in the greatest intelligence 
failure of our era. It is, however, not the sole intelligence failure. 
In one of the greatest judgmental errors of our time we appear to have 
attempted to combat the ideological posturing of others by slanting our 
own intelligence. Based on what is known today, policy makers not only 
erred in assessing Saddam Hussein's WMD capacities, but put too much 
faith in a narrow cadre of ideologues who suggested the U.S. would be 
welcomed as a liberating rather than conquering or, worse yet, 
colonizing force in Iraq. Estimates of the costs of war, of the 
ramifications of involvement, of the expected reaction of the 
population and of the likelihood of foreign support were dead wrong.
  (7) It is the responsibility of public officials to ensure that no 
American soldier is deployed as a defenseless magnet for terrorist 
attack--or in such a way as to incite foreign radicals to commit 
terrorist acts in America itself.
  American soldiers have been trained to withstand the heat of battle 
in defense of America and American values. For two and a quarter 
centuries no country has been more effectively or more courageously 
served by a citizen soldiery than the United States. In Iraq, our armed 
forces could not have performed more professionally or valiantly than 
in the initial engagement. But the difference between service in combat 
and service in occupation of a foreign land, especially an Islamic 
society, is profound. In Iraq, which is fast becoming for us much like 
Algeria was for the French in the 1950s, our men and women in uniform 
are increasingly facing hit-and-run terrorist assaults, which are much 
more difficult to defend against than traditional military 
confrontations.
  The challenge of policy makers is to recognize that there is a 
distinction between three endeavors: warfare, reconstruction and 
occupation. Our armed forces are trained to prevail in the first; they 
can be helpful in the second; but in the Islamic world no outside power 
is ever going to be well received as an occupying force. Hence, 
strategies that emphasize the first two endeavors and don't lead to 
long-term reliance on the third should be the goal of U.S. policy 
makers.
  (8) Responses to terrorism often lead to escalating action/reaction 
cycles. When our forces become subject to terrorist assaults and the 
perpetrators disappear into their neighborhoods, we, like Israel, will 
inevitably be tempted to retaliate in ways that may intensify rather 
than restrain future violence.
  Calls will be made not only to use air power in urban areas but to 
double or triple troop deployments, perhaps without adequate assessment 
of what such troops will be assigned to do. In conventional warfare, 
the case for overwhelming superiority (sometimes referred to as the 
Powell Doctrine) is compelling. In a terrorist setting, as in modernist 
design, less can often be more. There may be cases where deploying a 
large force to combat terrorism is appropriate. There may also be 
cases--and I believe Iraq is one--where additional soldiers simply 
become additional targets, and a different mix of strategies is both 
preferable and more effective.
  (9) To defend against terrorism, especially when it is fueled by an 
explosive mixture of religious and nationalist sentiments, requires 
frank acknowledgment of the nature and depth of the problem.
  For months, the administration has suggested the problem in Iraq is 
limited to 5,000 dissidents. This is a 5-digit miscalculation. At least 
half the Muslim world--over 500,000,000 people--are outraged by the U. 
S. government's attitudes and action. Long simmering resentment of 
American policies in Muslim countries like Indonesia has in recent 
months metastasized into hatred. And in Europe, including what the 
defense secretary called the ``new Europe,'' as well as in South and 
East Asia, respect for American policy is in steep decline.
  In the Vietnam War we gave a great deal of attention to the notion of 
``winning the hearts and minds'' of the people. We didn't succeed in 
convincing the Vietnamese or world opinion of our good intentions 
despite the horrendous tactics of the Vietcong and the Communist North. 
Today, Americans must understand that in the battle for the minds of 
men, particularly in the Moslem world, we are doing less well

[[Page 31119]]

than even in the most difficult days of the Vietnam War. In this 
context, we would be well-advised to remember America's original 
revolutionary commitment to a decent respect for the opinions of 
mankind.
  (10) While, for the time being, security in Iraq must remain the 
responsibility of U.S. military commanders in the field, we would be 
wise to put an international face on civil governance in the country 
and ask Secretary General Kofi Annan to immediately appoint a top 
civilian administrator to whom Ambassador Bremer and his staff would 
report.
  Transfer of interim civil authority to the UN would provide greater 
legitimacy to the formation of a new Iraqi government and encourage 
other countries to help with economic reconstruction and security 
requirements. We should also work to transfer, as soon as practicable, 
responsibility for internal security to troops of other nations or the 
Iraqis themselves. Transferring the police function to others is a way 
to build up Iraqi's own postwar internal security infrastructure and 
make evident that the U.S. does not desire long term control.
  (11) We should also move forthwith to transfer more political control 
to the Iraqi Governing Council and press for immediate elections and 
constitution writing. Some argue that stability is more likely to be 
achieved with a long U.S. occupation. I believe the reverse is true. 
The longer we are in Iraq, the greater the instability there and the 
greater the likelihood that terrorism will spread to other countries, 
including the United States.
  (12) America cannot cut and run politically, economically or 
militarily, but we would be wise to announce a timetable for troop 
withdrawal, by the end of next year at the latest. Some experts in and 
out of government believe that American troops should stay in and 
control Iraq at least as long as we did in Japan and Germany after 
World War II. Such a time table (a minimum of 5 years) is out of sync 
with the times and the mood in the Islamic world.
  The world is more impatient today and Muslims in particular are more 
history sensitive than ever before. While we assume the Iraqi populace 
should accept the American presence because of our good will, the 
Muslim world sees our forces as a compounding of grievances dating back 
to the crusades and, more recently, to American support of Israel. The 
imagery AlJazeera projects of Baghdad is that of another West Bank. In 
this context, American commitments to ``slog on'' interminably play 
into the hands of extremists. All extremists have to do is continue 
blowing up a vehicle or two every day, thereby eliciting a military 
reaction that we might view as reasonable but that the Islamic world is 
likely to see as heavy-handed, angering the populace and emboldening 
further dissent.
  The longer we stay, the greater the opportunity for al Qaeda and 
radical Baath party supporters to claim that the war is continuing and 
that they are prevailing. To prevent this and to keep control of events 
we would be wise to announce a withdrawal timetable that we, not they, 
control. Setting such a timetable has the effect of asserting that the 
war itself is over and we prevailed, and that Iraqis cannot dither in 
establishing a legitimate, elected government.
  A drawn out occupation plays into the hand of radicals. It gives them 
a rallying cry to keep up resistance in Iraq and expand terrorist 
assaults around the world. It gives them the chance to suggest that 
America is bent on continuing the crusades and, when we eventually 
withdraw, the prospect of claiming that they won the war. On the other 
hand, if we set a firm schedule for drawing down our troops, we define 
the war as being over in its 3rd week, not in its 6th year. An 
announced time table can later be modified to allow, for instance, a 
small force to remain briefly in northern Iraq to maintain sovereign 
cohesion. Timetables can also be abbreviated. But the point is that 
they underscore our reluctance to become an imperial power and, perhaps 
more importantly, our determination to control our own destiny.
  (13) It is critical to the security of our troops, as well as Iraqi 
security, that we create an Iraqi police force as soon as possible. 
Responsibility for domestic security is an internal not external 
matter. We can't be their policemen and if we persist in trying, we 
will make it harder for stability to be established and maintained.
  Students of international politics have for the past generation 
questioned the capacity and moral authority of any country to be 
policeman for the world. But little academic attention was devoted to 
the challenge of being policeman within a country after the conclusion 
of a conflict. We have little experience with such a responsibility. In 
Japan, MacArthur relied on indigenous Japanese police; in Germany, we 
quickly reconstituted a German constabulary at most local levels.
  Common sense would indicate that trying to police a country the size 
of France with soldiers unfamiliar with the language and culture of the 
society, untrained in the art of policing, and unwelcome and resented 
in critical cities and towns must be a nearly impossible task. Hence 
the need to expedite the training of an indigenous Iraqi police force.
  (14) We should announce that we have no intention of establishing 
permanent military bases in Iraq. Some Washington policy makers want 
such bases but they would be a political burden for any new government 
in Baghdad and a constant struggle for the U.S. to defend. Defense of 
American bases in Iraq from terrorism in the 21st century is likely to 
be far more difficult than the challenge we foresaw of maintaining U.S. 
sovereignty over the Panama Canal in the 20th century. The reason the 
Department of Defense concluded in the Carter administration that it 
was wise to transfer control over the Panama Canal to Panamanians was 
the estimation that the Canal could be defended against traditional 
aggression but not sabotage or acts of terrorism. It seemed wiser to 
respect nationalist sentiment and provide for a gradual transfer of the 
canal to local control than to insist on quasi-colonial assertions of 
power.
  There are many reasons why Europeans are so smugly opposed to our 
policy in Iraq. One is historical experience with colonialism. The 
French were chased out of Algeria, the Russians, and earlier the 
British, out of Afghanistan. U.S. intervention in Iraq is seen in 
Europe as not too dissimilar to the British and French effort to re-
establish control over the Suez Canal in 1956. It is noteworthy that 
the Islamic world deeply appreciated President Eisenhower's refusal to 
back the British and French intervention in Egypt. Europeans now think 
that the shoe is on the other foot. We appear insensitive to history.
  (15) Credit will remain the dominant economic issue until Iraq's 
foreign debt is reduced or canceled. Neither significant private nor 
large scale public credit will be made available to Iraqis until the 
burden of old debt is lifted. Accordingly, we should press vigorously 
for Saddam-era debt--which went largely to build palaces for Saddam's 
family and to buy weapons of aggression--to be written off. We should 
also press to establish community-centered banks and credit unions 
where micro credit can be offered. Oil wealth has its advantages only 
if revenues are used for the benefit of society rather than political 
insiders. Increasing petroleum production is not enough. Oil is not a 
labor intensive industry. Jobs matter, and Iraq needs bankers and small 
business entrepreneurs far more than oil barons. We have no choice 
except to help rebuild Iraq's oil infrastructure, but we must make 
clear that we have no intention of controlling Iraq's oil reserves. The 
natural resources of Iraq must be treated as the patrimony of the Iraqi 
people.
  (16) Economic assistance to Iraq should be front-loaded and generous. 
War has been a constant of history, but the concept of reconstruction 
is relatively new. The 20th century gave us two vastly different 
models. At the end of World War 1, the victors imposed retributive 
terms on Germany, which so angered German society that it turned to 
fascism. World War II was the result.
  The allies took a different approach at the end of World War II. 
Generosity was the watchword. The Marshall Plan was adopted to rebuild 
Europe and Gen. MacArthur directed the reform and modernization of 
Japan. Model democracies emerged. The world was made more secure. The 
economic plan for Iraq should be two-pronged: debt forgiveness coupled 
with institution building. A better world is more likely to emerge if 
the American agenda places its emphasis on construction rather than 
destruction.
  Here a note about the other reconstruction model in American history 
is relevant. With his call for malice toward none, Lincoln's second 
inaugural address set the most conciliatory tone in the history of war. 
His successor once removed, U.S. Grant, proved to be a more proficient 
soldier than President and countenanced carpet bagging conflicts of 
interest. Our government today would be well advised to recognize that 
neither history nor the American public approves of war or post-war 
profiteering. Great care has to be taken to ensure transparency and 
integrity in government contracts and common sense would indicate that 
the more Iraqis are involved in rebuilding their own society, the more 
lasting such efforts are likely to be.
  (17) Terrorism affects world economics as well as politics. Markets 
depend on confidence and nothing undercuts confidence more than 
anarchist acts. Policies designed to deter terrorism can be counter-
productive. International disapproval of our actions may jeopardize our

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economy and diminish the credibility of our political leadership in the 
world. Increased terrorism could well have the dual effect of 
precipitating new U.S. military engagements and, ironically, 
strengthening isolationist sentiment--which, in turn could degenerate 
into a disastrous spiral of protectionism.
  (18) The measure of success in reconstruction is not the sum of 
accomplishments. In the Vietnam War the Pentagon gave progress reports 
that came to be symbolized by its body counts. One of the most liberal 
critics of that war, I.F. Stone, once commented that he accepted the 
validity of the body counts but thought that they did not reveal the 
big picture. It would be as if, Stone suggested, he were to be walking 
down the street and bump into a man running out of a bank waving a gun 
and carrying a satchel full of money, and were to ask the man, ``What 
are you doing?'' If the man responded, ``I'm waiting for a car,'' the 
man would be telling the truth but not revealing the big picture.
  Good things are being accomplished in Iraq, particularly in the North 
where an American general has won a measure of popularity through 
progressive stabilization initiatives. Yet terrorism cannot credibly be 
contained in the arms-infested Iraqi environment. American civilians as 
well as armed services personnel who have been posted to Iraq deserve 
to be commended for their commitment and sacrifices, but prudence 
suggests that brevity of service is preferable to a long standing 
presence. Otherwise, in a world where terrorism is a growth industry 
even extraordinary sacrifice and significant accomplishments could be 
for naught.
  (19) We must respect Iraqi culture and work to ensure that the art 
and artifacts of this cradle of civilization are preserved for the 
Iraqi people. There are few umbrages more long lasting than cultural 
theft. Cultural looting must be stopped and the market for stolen 
antiquities squelched. For our part we should ensure that Iraqi 
cultural sites are protected and that our laws are upgraded. Any stolen 
antiquities brought to America must be returned.
  (20) The war in Iraq should not cause us to forget Afghanistan. While 
the center of our military attention may at the moment be Baghdad, we 
must remember that no Iraqi was involved in hijacking the planes that 
struck the World Trade Center and Pentagon on 9/11. Few countries are 
more distant physically or culturally from the United States than 
Afghanistan, yet it is there where the plotting for that terrorist act 
began. The Taliban have been removed and a new, more tolerant 
government has been established, but the world community has not 
fulfilled its commitments to raise that country out of poverty and 
warlordism. The U.S. cannot continue to be complacent about economic 
and social development in that country, where foreigners have never 
been welcome. Failure of the Karzai government and a return of the 
Taliban would be a major setback in the battle with terrorism.
  (21) Lastly, and most importantly, U.S. policy makers should never 
lose sight of the fact that events in Israel and Iraq are intertwined 
and that no challenge is more important for regional and global 
security than resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian dilemma.
  Extraordinarily, administration after administration in Washington 
seems to pay only intermittent attention to this issue. There should be 
no higher priority in our foreign policy than a resolution of the Arab-
Israeli conflict. Attention in Washington should be riveted at all 
times on this singular issue. The current status quo is good neither 
for Israel nor for the Palestinians. Now, for the first time lack of 
progress in establishing a mutually acceptable modus vivendi between 
the parties may be even more damaging to countries not directly 
involved in the conflict. The need for U.S. leadership in pressing for 
peace has never been more urgent. It would be a tragedy if, focussed on 
making war in one part of the Middle East, we neglected to promote 
peace in another.
  In conclusion, the world is noting what we are saying and what we are 
doing. Many are not convinced by our words; many are appalled by our 
actions. Yet nothing would be worse for the world than for us to fail. 
We must not. The key at this point is to recognize the limits as well 
as magnitude of our power and emphasize the most uplifting aspects of 
our heritage: democracy, opportunity, freedom of thought and worship. 
Differences we must respect; intolerance we must reject. But America 
does better as a mediator and multi-party peace maker than as a 
unilateral interventionist. This is the great lesson of the past year.