[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 20]
[Senate]
[Pages 28143-28145]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                  THE LONG REACH OF THE HEAVY BOMBERS

  Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. President, I rise today to draw my colleague's 
attention to an article published in the November 2003 edition of Air 
Force Magazine entitled ``The Long Reach of the Heavy Bombers.''
  The article outlines the importance of our Nation's long-range bomber 
fleet, and in particular notes the increasing role the B-1 bomber is 
having in our national security planning.
  I am extremely proud that Ellsworth Air Force Base in my State of 
South Dakota is home to the B-1 bombers and crews of the 28th Bomb 
Wing. Their contributions in Operation Iraqi Freedom were critical to 
our military success. Although B-1s flew fewer than 2 percent of the 
combat sorties in Operation Iraqi Freedom, they dropped more than half 
the satellite guided Air Force Joint Direct Attack Munitions, JDAMs, 
and maintained a 79 percent mission capable rate. The B-1s were 
assigned against a broad range of targets in Iraq, including command 
and control facilities, bunkers, tanks, armored personnel carriers, and 
surface-to-air missile sites. They also provided close air support for 
U.S. forces engaged in the field.
  Given the demonstrated capabilities of the B-1 and its importance to 
our military, we need to continue to invest in the technological 
improvements

[[Page 28144]]

that will maintain the B-1s role as the backbone of our bomber fleet. I 
am pleased that Congress enacted legislation earlier this year that 
will return 23 B-1s to the active inventory, and I look forward to 
working with the Air Force and my colleagues in the Senate to ensure 
that we provide the resources necessary to fully upgrade these planes.
  I close by commending the men and women stationed at Ellsworth Air 
Force Base and thanking all of the members of our Armed Forces for 
their sacrifices on behalf of our Nation's security.
  I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                  The Long Reach of the Heavy Bombers

                          (By Adam J. Hebert)

       In mid-2001, the B-1B was in trouble. Years of fiscal 
     stringencies had left the bomber with a $2 billion 
     modernization backlog, poor reliability, rising upgrade 
     costs, and some major combat deficiencies.
       Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, reflecting the 
     prevailing view, charged the B-1 ``is not contributing to the 
     deterrent or to the warfighting capability to any great 
     extent.'' Indeed, the purported backbone of the Air Force 
     heavy bomber fleet seemed destined for the scrap heap.
       Then, things changed, and, just two years later, the B-1B 
     became one of the star weapon systems in Operation Iraqi 
     Freedom. Just 11 aircraft deployed to the combat theater. 
     However, commanders set up and maintained B-1B ``orbits'' 
     that kept at least one of the B-1Bs in the air around the 
     clock, ready to engage emerging targets with huge loads of 
     precision weapons.
       Mission capable rates soared, and modernization programs 
     were funded and put back on track.
       For the Air Force's long-range bombers, the wars in 
     Afghanistan and Iraq provided some of their finest hours. 
     Their performance in many ways validated the service's bomber 
     investment programs. USAF's B-1, B-2, and B-52 bombers were 
     heavily tasked and proved to be highly effective in the two 
     recent wars--and turned in several combat ``firsts.''
       As Air Force planners describe it, the B-1Bs served as 
     ``roving linebackers,'' circling the battlespace and waiting 
     for a call instructing them to unleash deadly satellite 
     guided Joint Direct Attack Munitions. B-1Bs and B-52Hs 
     performed close air support strikes for ground forces, and 
     the venerable B-52H, the last of which was built in 1962, 
     delivered laser guided bombs using newly installed Litening 
     targeting pods. B-2s used new deployable shelters and were 
     ``turned'' at a forward location to perform additional combat 
     missions.
       At least once, B-7B, and B-52H aircraft all were employed 
     in the same strike package.


                              no Surprise

       ``It is no surprise that those aircraft and platforms were 
     used in the way they were,'' said Maj. Gen. David A. Deptula, 
     Air Combat Command's director of plans and programs. He said 
     that the results of bomber usage over the past two years have 
     confirmed what proponents of long-range strike capabilities 
     had said for a long time: The range, payload, precision 
     capabilities, and flexibility of bombers make them a superb 
     weapon whose uses go well beyond mere ``carpet bombing.''
       Gen. John P. Jumper, the Air Force Chief of Staff, offered 
     one example of the new way of doing business. A combat 
     controller in Afghanistan sent enemy coordinates ``up to a B-
     52 at 39,000 feet, and the B-52 put laser guided munitions 
     down'' on a target that was only 1,000 feet in front of 
     friendly forces.
       ``That's the effect of close air support,'' Jumper said. 
     ``You [didn't] see the airplane or feel the heat from the 
     engines, but the precision was even better than we were able 
     to do in Vietnam.''
       ``This is not a surprise,'' Deptula said, noting that USAF 
     decided years ago to push for improved bomber defensive 
     systems, data links, and the ability to deliver smart 
     weapons, all with an eye to making long-range systems 
     effective in the future.
       In the zero-sum game of defense budgeting, however, long-
     range strike has clearly suffered at times.
       For example, DOD's response to the chronic underfunding of 
     the B-1 fleet was not to fully fund the program but rather 
     was to slash its numbers. USAF announced in 2001 that it 
     would retire one-third of the B-1B fleet--dropping it from 93 
     to 60 aircraft--consolidate what remained at two bases, and 
     use the savings to eliminate the $2 billion modernization 
     backlog.
       Some bomber partisans were up in arms, but the plan has 
     worked, so far as it goes. Within the slimmed-down fleet, 36 
     B-1B aircraft were kept combat ready, with the other 24 in 
     training status, depot maintenance, or test. That has been 
     sufficient for the wars of recent years. Officials have long 
     maintained that they would prefer a small fleet of effective 
     aircraft to a large fleet of deficient systems.
       The B-1B's MC rate--the percentage of aircraft ready to 
     perform their primary mission at any given time--has 
     increased steadily since the decision.
       The Institute for Defense Analyses, a federally funded 
     research center, determined back in 1995 that B-1B MC rates 
     are heavily dependent upon sufficient spare parts, equipment, 
     and personnel. Until the retirements began, the Air Force was 
     never able to give the bomber the sustained support it 
     required.
       The B-1B MC rate has risen from 61 percent in 2001 to 66 
     percent in 2002 and 71 percent this year. For the bombers 
     deployed in support of Gulf War II, the rate was even 
     better--79 percent. (The B-2 and B-52 bombers supporting OIF 
     posted MC rates of 85 percent and 77 percent, respectively).
       This marks a dramatic turnaround. In the 1990s, B-1B 
     mission capability typically slogged around 60 percent.


                            When Lines Blur

       The line between strategic and tactical systems--never as 
     distinct as it may have appeared--forever has been blurred, 
     and the bombers have proved adept at flying ``tactical'' 
     missions (while some fighters have proved equally adept at 
     the ``strategic mission''). Close air support is no longer 
     the exclusive domain of the A-10 tank-killer aircraft. F-117 
     fighters carried out numerous strategic strikes in Baghdad 
     and elsewhere. Officials point to this jumbling of 
     operational use as a success in the shift to effects-based 
     operations.
       At times, B-1s were able to use moving target indicator 
     radars to perform the functions normally reserved for 
     dedicated intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance (ISR) 
     aircraft--an airpower first, according to U.S. Central 
     Command.
       Each bomber in the Air Force fleet now is capable of 
     delivering JDAMs, which offer targeting flexibility. The JDAM 
     cannot only hit fixed targets with near-precision accuracy in 
     all weather conditions but also be quickly programmed to 
     attack a fleeting ``emerging target.'' One strike against 
     Iraq's Republican Guard Medina Division required a B-2 to 
     reprogram its JDAMs, en route to the target, to take 
     advantage of new intelligence coming in from a Global Hawk 
     unmanned aerial vehicle.
       Toward the end of major combat, a B-1B orbiting above 
     western Iraq showed the value of the Air Force's heavy 
     bombers in a new way. Intelligence sources on the ground got 
     a tip on the location of former Iraqi dictator Saddam 
     Hussein. The information was beamed to a B-1B circling in the 
     area. Just 12 minutes later, the target lay in ruins, though 
     Saddam may have gotten out shortly before the roof fell in. 
     After dashing to Baghdad and programming in the coordinates, 
     the B-1B had precisely dropped four 2,000-pound JDAMs where 
     Saddam was thought to be.
       In addition to deploying 11 B-1Bs, Air Force leaders 
     reported they sent to war four B-2s and 28 B-52s. These 43 
     aircraft flew a total of 505 sorties between March 20 and 
     April 18, but, as was true in the Afghan war, the bombers' 
     impact was out of all proportion to their numbers. One 
     official noted that at third of all the aim points struck in 
     Iraq were hit by that small bomber force.
       Jumper made special note of the bomber impact in the now 
     famous sandstorm that struck Iraq March 25. ``You couldn't 
     see your hand in front of your face,'' he said, and war 
     commentators began to ponder the significance of the 
     ``pause'' in the war.
       ``While the commentators were rattling on,'' said Jumper, 
     USAF's bombers and other aircraft were at work. With the Air 
     Force's ISR systems able to see through the sand, and GPS-
     guided weapons unhindered by the weather, ``B-1s and B-52s 
     were up there pounding the heck out of [the Medina 
     Division],'' Jumper said. ``I'd like to ask the commander of 
     the Medina Division when he thought the pause was.''


                           ``amazing'' powers

       Gen. T. Michael Moseley, who led the allied air war, had 
     another anecdote on the effectiveness of long-range systems. 
     From the United States, a B-2 stealth bomber for the first 
     time delivered 80 500-pound bombs in a single run.
       Moseley said the ability to fly from Whiteman AFB, Mo., and 
     drop those 80 weapons against an Iraqi troop concentration 
     was ``an amazing capability to bring the [commander's] 
     quiver.''
       The success of the bombers in Iraq and Afghanistan has not 
     dramatically changed the Air Force's plans for the aircraft. 
     Because the Air Force has used only a small number of bombers 
     in recent wars, USAF planners still say the existing bomber 
     inventory will be adequate until around 2038. Also helpful is 
     the fact that only one bomber was lost in the two major 
     combat operations. In December 2001, a B-1B, doomed by 
     numerous onboard failures, crashed in the Indian Ocean on its 
     way to Afghanistan.
       The Air Force believes an inventory of 60 B-1Bs (36 combat 
     coded); 21 B-2s (16 combat coded); and 76 B-52s (44 combat 
     coded) will suffice.
       ``About 150 bombers is the right number,'' said Brig. Gen. 
     Stephen M. Goldfein, USAF's director of operational 
     capability requirements. There has been ``no sea change in 
     the number of bombers required,'' because of recent 
     experience, Goldfein said. The Air

[[Page 28145]]

     Force's inventory plan ``includes some reserve,'' he added, 
     but the preferred number remains stable.
       In recent years, lawmakers have often disagreed and pushed 
     for larger numbers of bombers. There have been several 
     unsuccessful attempts to restart B-2 production, with 
     proponents saying the aircraft could be produced much less 
     expensively now that the research and development expenses 
     are already paid.
       Citing the lack of any new bomber production, Congress for 
     years has been successful in forcing the Air Force to 
     maintain 18 attrition reserve B-52s that the service 
     considers surplus. A total of 94 B-52Hs remain in service, 
     although only 44 are considered primary mission aircraft.
       Congress, led by North Dakota lawmakers, has added funds 
     needed to keep 18 BUFFs at Minot AFB, N.D., configured 
     exactly the same as the rest of the B-52 fleet. Goldfein 
     noted that, despite the service's interest in retiring the 18 
     aircraft, doing to wouldn't save the Air Force any money. 
     Congress pays the bill, so the savings would be for the 
     taxpayers.
       Congress also may force the Air Force to restore some or 
     all of its recently retired B-1Bs. By late summer, three of 
     the four Congressional defense oversight committees had 
     passed legislation mandating that 23 of the 32 deactivated 
     Bones be restored to service.
       In the bills, lawmakers offered the $20.3 million needed to 
     bring the B-1s back from the boneyard--but not the much 
     larger amount required to keep the B-1Bs in service. 
     Officials say this unfunded mandate threatens to undo the 
     progress the Air Force has made improving the health of the 
     B-1B fleet.
       It would likely cost somewhere between $1.1 billion and $2 
     billion to keep those aircraft in service through the end of 
     the decade. That funding ``has to come from somewhere,'' 
     Goldfein noted.
       The existing arrangement of consolidating the B-1Bs at 
     Ellsworth AFB, S.D., and Dyess AFB, Tex., has enabled the 
     increased mission capable rates through simplified 
     maintenance and parts requirements. Fully funding the smaller 
     fleet's modernization plans brought on a ``host of 
     improvements,'' Goldfein added.


                          incremental upgrades

       With no new bomber production on the books, and old debates 
     over restarting B-2 production or pursuing an FB-22 variant 
     of the F/A-22 Raptor seemingly on the back burner, the 
     current emphasis is on incremental upgrades. Numerous 
     programs to improve bomber effectiveness are ongoing.
       Situational awareness improvements, the Link 16 data link, 
     laser targeting pods, and computer enhancements will continue 
     to make each bomber a more efficient war machine. And 
     upcoming weapons such as the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff 
     Missile and the Small Diameter Bomb will further broaden the 
     range and number of targets bombers can precisely attack.
       ACC officials say that, at this point, almost every 
     improvement serves a dual purpose. Upgrades are expected to 
     both sustain and modernize. Sustainment doesn't just mean 
     keeping the aircraft aloft, either--the aircraft must remain 
     valuable fighting machines. ``We're looking at 2040,'' one B-
     52 official said. ``Unless we can come to the war, they won't 
     need us.''
       The Air Force is trying to get additional targeting pods on 
     its B-52s, Deptula said. ``We're looking at using [Fiscal 
     2003 and 2004 funds] to get as many targeting pods as we 
     can,'' by using money set aside for the war on terrorism.
       Goldfein said the service is interested in increasing the 
     availability of the B-2's deployable shelters. Because of the 
     sensitive low observable finish on the B-2, the bomber must 
     be maintained in a climate-controlled shelter. Deployable 
     shelters, reportedly set up at the Indian Ocean atoll of 
     Diego Garcia, increased the flexibility of the B-2 for Gulf 
     War II. The Air Force is ``looking to expand'' their use, 
     Goldfein said.
       As Air Force officials tell it, existing bombers will 
     continue to get better and there is no urgent need to field a 
     new system. Recapitalization is ``a huge piece'' of force 
     structure planning, Deptula said, but USAF has some time to 
     make proper assessments and make wise decisions.
       The old way of procurement--planning a new system to 
     replace an old one--``isn't completely gone.'' Deptula said, 
     ``but the fact of the matter is, with respect to the long-
     range strike platforms formerly known as bombers, their 
     lifetime is viable for many, many years into the future.''
       The Air Force does not expect to see a dramatic 
     technological breakthrough anytime soon. However Deptula 
     believes that hypersonics research now being done at Air 
     Force Research Laboratory may hold the key to breakthrough 
     strike capabilities in the future.


                           Transition Period

       ``We are in a transition period . . . when it comes to 
     technologies for long-range strike,'' he said. Reusable 
     hypersonic propulsion has been difficult to develop, he 
     noted, but it remains worth the effort because the technology 
     offers revolutionary responsiveness, reach, and range. 
     ``We're not there yet,'' Deptula noted.
       Improvements to existing systems are expected to bridge the 
     gap until scientists ``solve some of these technological 
     challenges that will get us to the next step in potential 
     capability,'' he said.
       In Deptula's view, the break-through will not come until 
     sometime in the next decade. That timing seems to mesh 
     cleanly with financial realities.
       ``Our legacy platforms are viable through 2025,'' said 
     Deptula, ``and when we enhance them with all these 
     modifications, they are going to continue to increase in 
     capability.'' It's a nice fit, he went on, because major 
     funding for future long-range systems probably won't be 
     available ``until the 2010-2020 time frame, because we have 
     such a pressing need to recapitalize our fighter force in the 
     next decade.''
       The Air Force is holding to its November 2001 bomber 
     roadmap, which laid out a notional plan to begin a new long-
     range strike program sometime around 2012-15. Officials say 
     there is no need to rush into a new strike program, because 
     USAF would spend billions developing a system that may not be 
     significantly better than what is available today.
       Features such as stealth, high speed, long loiter time, 
     large payload capacity, and flexibility are well-understood 
     goals for any future strike capability. However, there is 
     great uncertainty. Officials are loath to say a follow-on 
     system will be a ``B-3'' or even a bomber.
       Industry, think tanks, and Air Force officials are all 
     studying what is within the ``art of the possible,'' and USAF 
     wants to keep the broadest possible range of options on the 
     table. These options include traditional bombers, unmanned 
     systems, hypersonic air-space vehicles, conventionally armed 
     ballistic missiles, and even space-based weapons. Current 
     time-lines give the Air Force a decade to explore the 
     options.
       ACC's Long-Range Global Precision Engagement Study--a look 
     at future strike requirements--noted that the US is pushing 
     for a capability to conduct high-speed strikes against 
     emerging targets anywhere in the world on short notice. 
     However, it has limited options in this area. Conventional 
     ballistic attack missiles, derived from the nation's nuclear 
     ICBM force, ``offer increased strike flexibility,'' but the 
     financial and political cost would be high, the report noted.
       Another area for improvement concerns stealth. The B-2 
     bomber's low peacetime MC rates stem from the high-
     maintenance nature of its low observable coatings. The 
     aircraft is also largely relegated to nighttime use in high-
     threat environments. Yet the B-2 remains the only stealthy 
     strike system largely unhindered by distance or basing 
     concerns.
       In the future, the F/A-22 and F-35 fighters will offer 
     around-the-clock stealthy strike capability, noted the study, 
     but the B-2 will continue to be the only stealthy, deep 
     strike penetrator for the foreseeable future. The F/A-22 and 
     F-35 have more limited combat ranges.
       The study did not advocate a specific course. However, it 
     did highlight the importance of speed. The advent of 
     hypersonic weapons and platforms would permit ``prompt global 
     strike from significant ranges and reduce the risks 
     associated with forward basing,'' the report noted. Compared 
     to ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, it went on, 
     reusable platforms have high utility ``in all lesser threat 
     scenarios, enhancing their cost-effectiveness across the 
     spectrum of conflict.''

                          ____________________