[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 20]
[Senate]
[Pages 27933-27936]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




        CARE AND TREATMENT OF RETURNING GUARD AND RESERVE FORCES

  Mr. BOND. Madam President, a couple of weeks ago we received reports 
from inquiring UPI reporter Mark Benjamin and a very active veterans 
advocate Steve Robinson, director of the National Gulf War Resource 
Center, that there was a significant problem with the care and 
treatment of returning guardsmen and reserves coming back from Iraq and 
Afghanistan to Fort Stewart, GA. There were, at the time, indications 
that some of the Guard and Reserve perceived they were not getting the 
same priority of care, treatment, and housing as was received by those 
who had been on active duty before they were sent to the combat 
theater.
  So working with my colleague, Senator Leahy, with whom I cochair the 
National Guard caucus, we sent our military LAs to visit Fort Stewart, 
GA, and on to Fort Knox and Fort Campbell, KY. We wanted to visit other 
sites and will continue to visit other sites to see if the problems at 
Fort Stewart were isolated or were they present at other Army 
mobilization and demobilization sites.
  What Senator Leahy and I found is detailed in the report. I ask 
unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record following my 
remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. BOND. Madam President, I don't have time to go over the entire 
report, but I think many colleagues will find it of interest to know 
what we experienced.
  First, let me say that the Army was very open and responsive to our 
staff when they came to review the situation. They were most anxious to 
have us get a complete look at the situation and to offer to help in 
any way they could. So they recognized there was a problem.
  Basically, there are not enough medical personnel--doctors, 
clinicians, support staff, specialists--available during ``peak'' 
mobilization and demobilization phases at a number of mobilization 
sites. Consequently, injured and ill soldiers have a difficult time 
scheduling appointments with medical care providers and seeing the 
specialists required to get the best possible care. Some of them had 
been waiting literally months to get the kind of care they deserve.
  Compounding the problem, large numbers of soldiers either mobilizing 
or demobilizing created shortages of available housing at mobilization 
sites, which resulted in some of the returning guards and reservists 
being placed in housing totally inadequate for their medical condition. 
Some of these Guard and Reserve members who had been activated and were 
coming back were put in temporary barracks, with outside latrines, 
where they normally would house Guard or Reserve members called up for 
summer maneuvers.
  We could neither confirm nor deny that there was any difference in 
medical treatment between the returning formerly Active and Guard and 
Reserve soldiers coming back, but one of the things that was different 
when the Active came back to the bases from which they had been 
mobilized was that they already had their housing, so they could go 
back to the housing from which they started. The Guard and Reserve 
coming back from service had to be put in some form of temporary 
housing, which, in some instances, was clearly inadequate for people 
with injuries or illnesses.
  So what is being done? Senator Leahy and I issued the report to 
highlight the problems to senior leaders at the Army, National Guard, 
and the Army Reserve. I was very encouraged by the response the 
military gave us. The Acting Secretary of the Army, Les Brownlee, 
visited Fort Stewart on Saturday, the weekend after we sent our teams 
there. He met with me last week to lay out his plans for dealing with 
the situation. He recounted what he discovered at Fort Stewart and 
promised swift support and changes, where necessary.
  Specific issues addressed by Secretary Brownlee included the adequacy 
of facilities and where they would get treatment. He said, if 
appropriate, soldiers will be moved to facilities where they can 
provide more timely care. We suggested that if they don't have the 
medical personnel available there, why not send them someplace else. He 
said he would encourage the commands to contract out for special 
services, such as MRIs, for example. If they don't have the equipment, 
they can contract out.
  I also asked the Secretary to allow soldiers in a medical hold status 
to be moved to facilities closer to their home, using military, 
veterans health administration, or civilian providers, as necessary. 
Secretary Brownlee told me some of the soldiers at Fort Stewart had 
already been moved to nearby

[[Page 27934]]

Fort Gordon, where the medical staff was not so badly overworked. Also, 
at his direction, the Army Medical Command is transferring medical care 
clinicians to mobilization sites that need them.
  The Secretary has also established minimum standards for housing in 
medical hold status. He said, No. 1, facilities will be climate 
controlled, meaning air-conditioned and heated. Some of the facilities 
didn't have that. Second, facilities must have showers and restrooms 
indoors, and not a path in the back, and facilities must be clean and 
in good repair. The Secretary also indicated he is considering erecting 
prefab facilities to alleviate the housing shortages during 
mobilization and demobilization surges that could be used to house 
medical hold soldiers.
  Secretary Brownlee has issued policy guidance that allows the Army to 
deactivate Guard and Reserve personnel who do not meet the physical 
requirements for deployment due to a preexisting condition. One of the 
problems at Fort Stewart was the fact that some 10 percent of the Guard 
and Reserve called up had not had adequate pre-callup medical care, a 
situation we are addressing with the TRICARE measures, and they could 
not be deployed. They were then the responsibility of the Army at Fort 
Stewart, and at the time we were there, a third of the 650 soldiers on 
medical hold had never even been deployed because they did not meet the 
standards for deployment. Those people will be sent home rather than 
kept on medical hold.
  Also, after meeting with Secretary Brownlee, I followed up with LTG 
Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau and LTG James Helmly, 
Chief of the Army Reserve, asking them to work with the Army in 
resolving these issues. Specifically, we asked their cooperation:
  No. 1, by doing a better job medically prescreening Guard and Reserve 
soldiers so they do not activate soldiers who cannot serve.
  No. 2, to coordinate the callup and retention of medical personnel--
clinicians, support staff, specialists--to ensure the Army mobilization 
sites have sufficient medical personnel onsite.
  I saw in the news today where the Department of Defense is looking to 
call up certain support personnel from other Reserve units, other than 
the Army, to provide perhaps naval medical personnel to assist with 
caring for the sick and injured soldiers.
  No. 3, we asked them to check on Guard and Reserve soldiers who are 
on medical hold, making sure somebody was looking after them, to let 
them know they have not been forgotten, or to find out if they have 
other needs.
  Further, Senator Leahy and I have asked the GAO to conduct a survey 
into the Army's medical hold process to ascertain the breadth of the 
problems that we saw at Fort Stewart and Fort Knox, and to determine if 
there is any disparity in medical treatment of returning guardsmen and 
reservists who come back in demobilization and have health care 
problems.
  It is our understanding that the Senate Armed Services Committee, as 
well as its House counterpart, is going to conduct hearings into the 
conditions uncovered by Mark Benjamin and confirmed by Senator Leahy's 
and my investigation, but I regret very much, as all of us do, that 
this situation has occurred. It is unacceptable to all of us to think 
that injured, ill soldiers returning from the theater of battle would 
not get the medical care they need, would not be placed in appropriate 
housing.
  Once it came to our attention and we brought it to the Army's 
attention, we are very encouraged by the way everybody is handling 
this, from the garrison commanders and medical directors to 
mobilization staff to the Acting Secretary of the Army. This is a 
matter of taking care of our soldiers regardless of whether they are 
traditional active-duty soldiers or National Guard and Army Reserve 
soldiers.
  Senator Leahy and I are going to continue to monitor the progress of 
the Army in addressing these issues. We plan on sending staff to 
additional mobilization sites in the next few weeks and months to make 
sure there are no problems. We know that in the next few months the 
National Guard and Reserve will be mobilizing thousands of additional 
troops. We want to make sure the Army gets it right and keeps it right. 
The next mobilization schedule is to begin in the January-April 
timeframe, which means when they go, we want to make sure soldiers get 
timely care and housing, suitable to getting well, no exceptions.
  We know the Army knows of the problems and is aggressively tackling 
them. We expect garrison commanders at mobilization sites to continue 
to do their best, and we will continue to support them, as well as 
every soldier in the war on terrorism. We owe a great debt of gratitude 
to our fighting men and women. They have and deserve our highest regard 
and respect. We will do all we can to ensure they get the kind of care 
we would expect for them.
  I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.

                               Exhibit 1

                U.S. Senate National Guard Caucus Report

       Senators Kit Bond and Patrick Leahy, co-chairs of the U.S. 
     Senate National Guard Caucus, dispatched their aides to Ft. 
     Stewart to investigate reports that activated Guard and 
     Reserve members were being poorly housed, with inadequate 
     medical attention, while on ``medical hold.''


                                Summary

        Approximately 650 members of the National Guard and the 
     Army Reserve who have answered the call-to-duty and in many 
     cases were wounded, injured or became ill while serving in 
     Iraq, are currently on medical hold at Ft. Stewart, GA. Army 
     base. As a result of an investigation by a reporter and 
     expeditious follow-up by a veteran service organization 
     representative it has come to our attention that these 
     National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers have been receiving 
     inadequate medical attention and counsel while being housed 
     in living accommodations totally inappropriate to their 
     condition. Of the roughly 650 injured soldiers currently 
     awaiting medical care and follow-up evaluations, 
     approximately one-third of these soldiers were found not 
     physically qualified for deployment and therefore never 
     deployed overseas. The remaining two-thirds deployed overseas 
     and were returned to Ft. Stewart as a result of wounds or 
     injuries sustained while serving or as the result of illness 
     encountered either before or after deployment. Regardless of 
     the nature of the medical malady, these soldiers have been 
     enduring unacceptable conditions for as many as 10 months.
       The return of the 3rd Infantry Division from the Middle 
     East (18,000-strong which is permanently stationed at the 
     base), has forced commanders to lease barracks from the 
     Georgia National Guard that were designed as temporary 
     quarters for National Guard soldiers undergoing annual 
     training. They are not designed to accommodate wounded, 
     injured or ill soldiers awaiting medical care and evaluation. 
     The Army has designed a Disability Evaluation System that is 
     purposely slow to ensure that National Guard and Army Reserve 
     citizen-soldiers who are found not physically qualified for 
     duty receive a fair and impartial review when undergoing a 
     medical evaluation board. The process, similar in many 
     respects to the workmen's compensation process, requires that 
     these soldiers be given every opportunity to recover. If full 
     recovery is not possible, the system works to establish a 
     baseline condition before the soldier is evaluated by a 
     medical evaluation board.
        The situation at Ft. Stewart unfortunately was, and 
     remains, hampered by an insufficient number of medical 
     clinicians and specialists, which has caused excessive delays 
     in the delivery of care. Exacerbating the situation, was the 
     Army's placement of wounded and injured soldiers in housing 
     totally unsuitable for their medical condition. Additionally, 
     these soldiers were placed under the leadership of soldiers 
     who were also injured, resulting in a situation where the 
     sick and injured were leading the sick and injured. 
     Furthermore, the perception among these soldiers is that the 
     traditional active duty soldier is receiving better care, 
     compounding an already deteriorating situation that had a 
     devastating and negative impact on morale. Most of the 
     soldiers in the medical hold battalion, which was established 
     administratively to provide a military structure for the 
     soldiers, have families living within hundreds of miles; yet 
     they have been unable to join their families while awaiting 
     the final deliberation of their cases.
        In the short term, we must alleviate the unacceptable 
     conditions at Ft. Stewart and determine if the problem is 
     isolated to Ft. Stewart alone or part of a larger system wide 
     problem.
        Alleviating the problem at Ft. Stewart will require the 
     immediate assignment of additional medical clinicians, 
     specialists and medical support personnel and/or the 
     transfer, where appropriate, of our National

[[Page 27935]]

     Guard and Army Reserve soldiers to faculties close to their 
     families so they can continue to receive quality care and 
     await further medical reviews if necessary in an environment 
     conducive to healing. We must also ensure that the conditions 
     at Ft. Stewart are not replicated elsewhere, while ensuring 
     the fixes we install at Ft. Stewart are applied throughout 
     the Army if necessary. In the long term, the Congress must 
     address the physical readiness of the National Guard and the 
     Reserve by passage of a pending bill, TRICARE for Guard and 
     Reservists, to ensure that every member of the Guard and 
     Reserves has adequate health insurance coverage and is 
     medically ready to deploy.


                          Fundamental Problem

        More than 650 members of the National Guard and Army 
     Reserve, who have been activated and put on active duty (some 
     of whom have already served in Iraq or Afghanistan) are 
     currently on medical hold at Ft. Stewart, GA. These numbers 
     change almost daily as some soldiers are returned to duty, 
     others receive medical evaluations for medical conditions 
     that prohibit their continued service on active duty, while 
     more soldiers are brought into the system (the result of 
     sustaining injuries, wounds or falling ill overseas; or 
     failing to qualify for deployment after being mobilized 
     because of injuries or preexisting conditions.)
        About one-third of the citizen-soldiers currently in the 
     disability evaluation system at Ft. Stewart could not 
     originally deploy with their units because they were not 
     medically fit, while approximately two-thirds were injured, 
     wounded or fell ill while on deployment overseas and were 
     returned stateside to receive special medical attention. When 
     the 3rd Infantry Division, which is based at Ft. Stewart, 
     returned from its deployment in Iraq, available housing was 
     in short supply which resulted in those on medical hold being 
     moved from one barracks to another in a form of musical 
     housing. The U.S. Army resorted to leasing open-bay barracks 
     with detached restroom facilities and no air-conditioning in 
     most cases, which are normally used to house Georgia National 
     Guard troops during their two weeks of annual training.
        These National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers have been 
     kept in place at Ft. Stewart according to standard Army 
     policy while they await medical care and work-ups, which 
     senior officials say is designed to protect their careers and 
     ensure they receive the best medical care. The goal is to put 
     these medically held Reserve soldiers in a holding pattern 
     until they are healthy enough to return to duty and go back 
     to their units or to prevent soldiers from being permanently 
     discharged from service until the nature of their conditions 
     have been fully assessed and optimal treatment regime 
     prescribed. When soldiers cannot return to duty, a final 
     determination about their status is made by a Medical 
     Evaluation Board (MEB). The MEB process can take anywhere 
     from an average of 42 days to 76 days after the soldier's 
     treatment has been ``optimized.'' That is when a sufficient 
     diagnosis and treatment regime has been put in place to 
     establish enough confidence to make a decision. Some troops 
     have been on medical hold for more than 10 months.
       The primary task of the Army Medical Department is to 
     return these soldiers to duty. While undergoing medical care 
     and reviews they can be assigned light duty around the post. 
     Adequate convalescence requires a great deal of rest in most 
     cases and cannot be properly pursued if there are unnecessary 
     life stressors, such as placement in housing that is designed 
     to house ``healthy'' National Guard forces on annual 
     training--not injured, wounded or ill soldiers.
       The barracks for these medically held National Guard and 
     Army Reservists are totally inappropriate for soldiers 
     injured, wounded or ill who are in need of quality care and 
     are garrisoned in a stateside Army installation. The worst 
     accommodations to which these medically challenged soldiers 
     were subjected are 1950s-style, concrete-foundation barracks 
     with no air-conditioning or insulation and detached toilets 
     and shower facilities, though they do have heat. On a 
     relatively cooler day in the area (October 22nd), the 
     temperature in one of these huts was noticeably warm if not 
     stifling. Bunks sit in open bays, no more three feet apart. 
     In some cases, there are no footlockers for the troops to 
     store their gear. In a few of the better barracks, for 
     soldiers with more severe medical conditions, there is air 
     conditioning, indoor-plumbing, and storage space.
       The fundamental problem, as summarized colorfully by one of 
     the base commanders, is that soldiers are going through a 
     ``go slow medical review system while living in `get them the 
     hell out of here barracks.''' Many of the medically held 
     reservists--mostly from Southern states like Georgia, 
     Alabama, and Florida--expressed frustration and anger over 
     the duration of their medical hold and the quality of their 
     housing while in this seemingly interminable holding pattern.


                          complicating factors

       Feeding these justifiable frustrations are several real and 
     perceived considerations regarding their medical care and 
     treatment on the base.
       There has been a shortage of clinicians and specialists to 
     see the medically held Reservists and to accelerate the 
     review and treatment process. At various points over the past 
     several months there may have been only a handful of doctors 
     to care for these hundreds of troops, as well as to assist 
     with regular forces and their families. Most reserve doctors 
     called to active duty were deployed forward, and those 
     remaining in the states can stay on duty for only 90 days 
     before returning to their civilian practices. One soldier on 
     medical hold said it took him almost three weeks to get a 
     follow-on appointment necessary to optimize his care.
       Further feeding the anger and frustration is inadequate 
     leadership. Typically, a soldier will receive advice, 
     counsel, and assistance in accessing the military's health 
     system from the soldiers's unit or from upper echelon chain-
     of-command. The units of the medically held reservists, 
     however, have deployed abroad in most cases, and their 
     commanders are focused on their operational mission overseas. 
     The Reservists at Ft. Stewart have been grouped together in a 
     ``medical hold'' battalion for administrative purposes but 
     the effectiveness of the unit chain of command is suspect.
       Additionally, many of the battalion leaders--at the officer 
     and NCO level--are sick themselves, raising the question of 
     whether these leaders are capable to care for themselves, let 
     alone hundreds of their comrades. Without a familiar advisor 
     and leader, deployed away from home and their parent National 
     Guard or Army Reserve commands, and lacking experience 
     dealing with a huge bureaucracy like the Army, these 
     Reservists were left without the leadership to which they 
     were accustomed.
       Moreover, many of the medically held Reservists perceive 
     bias against them on the post. Whenever they go the hospital, 
     PX, or dining hall, they are asked whether they are a 
     Reservist or a traditional active duty service member. This 
     question is made for accounting purposes, but it makes the 
     Reservists--many of whom are likely disappointed about being 
     on sick call in the first place--feel like they are being 
     singled out. Similarly, many of the medically held 
     Reservists, lacking sufficient knowledge of the military's 
     medical bureaucracy, chalk up delays in treatment to 
     preferential treatment for active forces.


                         an avoidable situation

       This situation could have been avoided. In early June, 
     medical and garrison staff realized that there would be a 
     surge in housing needs when the 3rd Infantry Division 
     returned from Iraq. The division was manned at over 115 
     percent authorized strength, which would force commanders to 
     use triple bunks to accommodate 6500 troops in their barracks 
     that usually hold about 4300. These commanders recognized 
     then that these permanently assigned troops would have to 
     take priority over the troops temporarily at the post on 
     medical hold. Six weeks ago, medical staff submitted a 
     request up the chain-of-command for 18 additional care 
     providers who could help manage and accelerate the reviews of 
     the medical holds. No action was taken on the request.
       At about the same time, the garrison commander submitted a 
     request to 1st Army Headquarters at Ft. MacPherson, Georgia, 
     for additional funds to renovate the barracks that are leased 
     from the Georgia National Guard. The command provided $4 
     million, divided into two parts, but the prospective 
     contractors could not begin work until this week. That 
     project, which would have taken 90 days at the very least, 
     was postponed pending the outcome of the investigations the 
     Army has currently undertaken after media reports about the 
     medical hold situation surfaced.
       Additionally, it is reported that the Army had the 
     opportunity in the initial stages of the mobilization process 
     to provide for rear-detachment elements staffed by National 
     Guard personnel. These elements are designed to provide 
     stateside oversight and support to National Guard personnel 
     and units deployed overseas. Had they been present it is 
     possible the conditions described herein might have been 
     identified and rectified before they reached a crisis point.


              medical readiness of the guard and reserves

       It is clear that part of the situation was created by the 
     fact that some of the mobilized reservists were not as 
     healthy as possible. Almost ten percent of Guard/Reserve 
     personnel mobilized for duty at Ft. Steward could not deploy 
     because of a medical condition and were put on medical hold 
     status for some period of time.
       In the barracks visits, there were also troubling 
     indications that a handful of Reservists were knowingly 
     activated and sent to mobilize with medical conditions that 
     would preclude them from actually deploying. Such an 
     unjustified deployment might have been designed to take 
     advantage of the fact that once soldiers are activated (put 
     on active duty orders) they become the full-scale 
     responsibility of the U.S. Army. The service is then charged 
     with their care and feeding to include medical care and 
     medical evaluations.
       The hundreds of Reservists who could not deploy because 
     they were medically unready raises a number of larger 
     questions, which the caucus has already begun to address

[[Page 27936]]

     through its effort to ensure every member of the Guard and 
     Reserves has adequate health insurance. The caucus will 
     continue to address the issue in detail during its ongoing 
     investigation of the medical readiness and mobilizations, 
     examining questions like whether the resources and process 
     for screening at the unit level within the National Guard and 
     Army Reserve ranks are sufficient, and how to explain the 
     recall of soldiers to active duty who are not fit for duty.


                            recommendations

       There are a number of actions that the Army must take to 
     address this situation at Ft. Stewart and the larger issue of 
     ``medical holds,'' which will continue to arise as the 
     country pursues the war against terrorism and sustains 
     operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and other areas where 
     military forces are operating.
       In the short term, the Army National Guard and the Army 
     Reserve must jointly provide for the leadership, guidance and 
     medical care our Reservists require to operate at maximum 
     proficiency. These dedicated and loyal soldiers need to know 
     what to expect in the medical review process. They need to 
     understand thoroughly the Army's health care system, warts 
     and all. This strong, steady leadership must have the goal of 
     reaffirming the Army's seamless support for the ``Army of 
     One'' and the country's gratitude for their service and 
     sacrifice, reassuring them that they are not forgotten 
     despite the fact they are separated from their units.
       To move the Reservists along to a Medical Evaluation Board 
     if required, many more doctors need to be assigned to Ft. 
     Stewart and, specifically, to these cases. The biggest delay 
     in getting the Reservists off medical hold is the wait to 
     optimize care. Many soldiers are seeing a different doctor 
     every time they enter the hospital, each of whom may 
     prescribe a different remedy. Additional doctors and 
     specialists, who could help coordinate care, would provide 
     greater continuity-of-care, one of the central reasons to 
     keep them at their mobilization station in the first place.
       It is unacceptable to have these citizen-soldiers--every 
     one of whom answered the call-to-duty--living in such 
     inadequate housing. However, more adequate barracks cannot be 
     completed quickly because it will take almost three months to 
     complete any upgrades. Other 3rd Infantry Division barracks 
     are unlikely to become available soon.
       It would be far better to send these troops back home. They 
     could be assigned to another Military Treatment Facility 
     (MTF), a State Area Command (STARC) or possibly a VHA medical 
     facility closer to their families. Liaisons from the TRICARE 
     management authority could ensure that they are receiving 
     adequate care and that they would be available to return to 
     Ft. Stewart if they get better and can return to duty. The 
     benefit to morale among the medically held Reservists would 
     far outweigh any of the unlikely risks that might go along 
     with moving troops away from their mobilization station. 
     Current Army Regulation 40-501 directs medically held 
     soldiers to remain near their mobilization post, but there is 
     no statutory restriction against assigning them to another 
     facility close to home.
       In the longer-term, the Army, working together with the 
     leadership of the National Guard and the Army Reserve, must 
     ensure that our citizen-soldiers who are identified for 
     activation are medically ready to deploy. Enactment of the 
     cost-share TRICARE proposal for Reservists, currently 
     attached to the Senate version of the Fiscal Year 2004 
     Supplemental Spending Bill for Iraq and Afghanistan, would 
     ensure that every member of the Reserves has access to health 
     insurance and would increase the likelihood that citizen-
     soldiers are medically and physically ready for duty.
       Currently, reservists are required to complete a physical 
     once every five years. The high percentage of reservists 
     found to be physically unable to deploy raises the questions 
     of whether this five-year interval is too long. Another 
     question the Caucus may want to raise, is the Army's 
     mobilization and demobilization policy sufficient in 
     providing a housing standard for soldiers on medical hold? 
     Furthermore, is the working relationship between the Army's 
     medical department and the Veterans Health Administration 
     (VHA) structured to allow for the transfer of soldiers on 
     medical hold from Army military facilities to VHA facilities? 
     Also, new medical case management software included in the 
     second version of the military's Composite Health Care System 
     (CHCS II) will permit continuity-of-care wherever a soldier 
     accesses care. Guard and Reserve units across the country 
     could assign liaisons to help manage a Reservist's care and 
     maintain contact with their mobilization base at any point.
       Lastly, it has been reported that architectural hardware 
     and software exist that will allow the Army to equip its 
     hospitals, dining halls, and commissaries with scanners that 
     could read an ID that can show whether a member of the 
     service is from the active component or the Reserves. Perhaps 
     the Caucus should look at such systems as a means of 
     addressing the perceived bias that exists when reservists are 
     queried about their service status.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Madam President, I thank Senator Bond for his 
leadership on veterans issues throughout this Congress, as he always 
does. I have been over to Walter Reed Army Hospital on three different 
occasions. Families tell me they are being treated extremely well. The 
soldiers are very complimentary of the health care they have received, 
but there have been some problems.
  It is important we make sure every soldier injured in the service of 
the United States of America be given the best medical care, wherever 
he or she is in this country.
  I salute Senator Bond for his work in that regard. We want to make 
sure that happens. I believe it is happening, at least in the areas I 
have personally examined. We will continue to monitor them.

                          ____________________