[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 20]
[Senate]
[Pages 27930-27931]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                     NOMINATION OF WILLIAM H. PRYOR

  Mr. KENNEDY. I urge my colleagues to vote against cloture on the 
nomination of William Pryor. Since President Bush came into office, the 
Senate has confirmed 168 of his nominees and has decided so far not to 
proceed with only 4. That is a 97.7 percent success rate for the 
President. It is preposterous to say that Senate Democrats are 
obstructing the nomination process.
  The few nominees who have not received our support are too extreme 
for lifetime judicial appointments, and Mr. Pryor's nomination 
illustrates the problem. His views are at the extreme of legal 
thinking, and he does not deserve appointment to an appellate Federal 
court that decides so many cases involving basic legal rights and 
constitutional protections. The people of the Eleventh Circuit deserve 
a nominee who will follow the rule of law and not use the Federal bench 
to advance his own extreme ideology.
  The issue is not that Mr. Pryor is conservative. We expect a 
conservative President from a conservative party to select conservative 
nominees. But Mr. Pryor has spent his career using the law to further 
an ideological agenda that is clearly at odds with much of the Supreme 
Court's most important rulings over the last four decades, especially 
in cases that have made our country a fairer and more inclusive nation 
for all Americans.
  Mr. Pryor's agenda is clear. He is an aggressive supporter of rolling 
back the power of Congress to remedy violations of civil rights and 
individual rights. He has urged the repeal of Section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act which helps to ensure that no one is denied the right to 
vote because of their race. He vigorously opposes the constitutional 
right to privacy and a woman's right to choose. He is an aggressive 
advocate for the death penalty, even for persons with mental 
retardation. He dismisses--with contempt--claims of racial bias in the 
application of the death penalty. He is a strong opponent of gay 
rights.
  Somehow, despite the intensity with which Mr. Pryor holds these views 
and the many years he has devoted to dismantling these legal rights, we 
are expected to believe that he will suddenly

[[Page 27931]]

change course and ``follow the law'' if he is confirmed to the Eleventh 
Circuit. Repeating that mantra again and again in the face of his 
extreme record does not make it credible. Actions speak louder than 
words, and I will cast my vote based on what Mr. Pryor does, not just 
on what he says.
  Mr. Pryor's supporters say that his views have gained acceptance by 
the courts, and that his views are well within the legal mainstream. 
But actions paint a different picture. He has consistently tried to 
narrow individual rights, far beyond what any court in this land has 
been willing to hold.
  Just this past term, the Supreme Court rejected Mr. Pryor's argument 
that it was constitutional for Alabama prison guards to handcuff 
prisoners to ``hitching posts'' for hours in the summer heat. The court 
also rejected his argument that States could not be sued for money 
damages when they violate the Family and Medical Leave Act.
  Mr. Pryor's position would have left workers who are fired in 
violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act without a remedy.
  The court rejected his argument that states should be able to 
criminalize private sexual conduct between consenting adults.
  The court rejected his far-reaching argument that counties should 
have the same immunity from lawsuits that States have.
  The court rejected his argument that the right to counsel does not 
apply to defendants with suspended sentences of imprisonment.
  The court rejected Mr. Pryor's view on what constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment in the context of the death penalty. The court held, 
contrary to Mr. Pryor's argument, that subjecting mentally retarded 
persons to the death penalty violated the Constitution.
  Just this spring, even the Eleventh Circuit, a court already 
dominated by conservative Republican appointees, rejected Mr. Pryor's 
attempt to evade the Supreme Court's decision. Mr. Pryor tried to 
prevent a prisoner with an IQ of 65 from raising a claim that he should 
not be executed, when even the prosecution agreed he was mentally 
retarded.
  This is not a nominee even close to the legal mainstream. His actions 
in seeking to evade the Supreme Court's decision speak volumes about 
whether he will obey its decisions if confirmed to the Eleventh 
Circuit.
  Mr. Pryor and his supporters keep saying that he is ``following the 
law,'' but repeatedly he attempts to make the law, using the Attorney 
General's office in his state to advance his own personal ideological 
platform.
  If, as his supporters urge, we look to Mr. Pryor's words in 
considering his nomination, we must review more than just his words 
before the committee at his confirmation hearing. We have a duty to 
consider what Mr. Pryor has said about the Supreme Court and the rule 
of law in other context as well.
  Mr. Pryor ridiculed the Supreme Court of the United States for 
granting a temporary stay of execution in a capital punishment case. 
Alabama is one of only two States in the Nation that uses the electric 
chair as its only method of execution. The Supreme Court had agreed to 
hear the case to decide whether use of the electric chair was cruel and 
unusual punishment. Mr. Pryor, however, said the court should have 
refused to consider this constitutional issue. He said the issue 
``should not be decided by nine octogenarian lawyers who happen to sit 
on the Supreme Court.'' Those are his words, and they don't reflect the 
thoughtfulness that we want and expect in our judges. If Mr. Pryor does 
not have respect for the Supreme Court, how can we possibly have any 
confidence that he will respect that court's precedents if he is 
confirmed to the Court of Appeals?
  Finally, Mr. Pryor's nomination does not even belong on the Senate 
floor at this time. His nomination was rushed through the Judiciary 
Committee in clear violation of our committee rules on ending debate.
  An investigation into Mr. Pryor's controversial role in connection 
with the Republican Attorney Generals Association was interfered with 
and cut short by the committee majority and has never been completed. 
Most of our committee members agreed that the investigation raised 
serious questions which deserved answers in the committee, and they 
deserve answers now, before the Senate votes. The Senate is entitled to 
wonder what the nominee's supporters have to fear from the answers to 
these questions.
  The fundamental question is why--when there are so many qualified 
attorneys in Alabama--the President chose such a divisive nominee? Why 
choose a person whose record casts so much doubt as to whether he will 
follow the rule of law? Why choose a person who can muster only a 
rating of partially unqualified from the American Bar Association? Why 
support a nominee who is unwilling to subject key facts in his record 
to the light of day?
  We count on Federal judges to be open-minded and fair and to have the 
highest integrity. We count on them to follow the law.
  Mr. Pryor has a first amendment right to pursue his agenda as a 
lawyer or an advocate, but he does not have the open-mindedness and 
fairness essential to be a Federal judge. I urge my colleagues to vote 
against ending debate on this nomination.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. ENSIGN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Murkowski). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.

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