[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 20]
[Senate]
[Pages 27128-27130]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                    CREATION AND USE OF INTELLIGENCE

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, early this morning there was a discussion 
on the floor of a staff memo from some Intelligence Committee staffers 
which had not either been authorized or indeed shared by members of the 
Intelligence Committee. But it was characterized--and I think 
mischaracterized, quite clearly--as a Democratic plan relative to the 
review of the intelligence that was created and used prior to the Iraqi 
war.
  The only thing that Democratic members of the Intelligence Committee 
have pressed is for a full investigation, a full inquiry into not just

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the creation of the intelligence but the use of that intelligence.
  Without looking at the use of intelligence that was created by the 
intelligence community, there would only be half a picture painted. 
Hopefully, that half of a picture will be fully explored on a 
bipartisan basis. I think the first half of the picture, indeed, is 
being fully explored on a bipartisan basis. That is the part of the 
picture that looks at the intelligence community's production of 
intelligence and as to whether or not that intelligence community in 
some way either shaped or exaggerated that intelligence for whatever 
purpose. It has also been now added that if any of the administration 
put pressure on the intelligence community that would also be included 
in the review.
  But what is left out is the critical half of the picture which the 
American public hears, which is the use of the intelligence given to 
the policymakers by those policymakers. Now, the word ``use'' of 
intelligence, that word ``use'' actually appears in the resolution 
creating the Intelligence Committee and identifying the oversight role 
of the Intelligence Committee. So the word ``use'' is actually embedded 
in the very document creating the Intelligence Committee that sets 
forth what its role will be and what its oversight responsibilities 
are. Yet so far the majority of the Intelligence Committee has said: We 
will not look at the use of the intelligence which was given to the 
policymakers.
  Now, that is a huge gap. That means we will be walking up to the 
water's edge and stopping there. That means instead of letting the 
chips fall where they may, the chips will only be allowed to fall on 
the intelligence community's side of the fence. They will not be 
allowed to fall on the policymakers' role and responsibility.
  We were told by the policymakers, prior to the war, that--this is 
Secretary Rumsfeld--

       We know where the weapons of mass destruction are.

  We were told, before the war, by the Vice President:

       Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now 
     has weapons of mass destruction.

  We were told, before the war, by the President, himself, that:

       Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves 
     no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and 
     conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised.

  So the heart of the problem that we have at the Intelligence 
Committee is whether or not we are going to stop at that water's edge 
or look at the use of the intelligence, whether a critique will be made 
of the intelligence community's shaping or exaggeration, to the extent 
that existed, or whether or not the same searchlight will be placed 
upon the policymakers as to whether they exaggerated or shaped or 
misstated what was given to them by the intelligence community.
  The Department of State had a Web site. On December 19 of last year, 
that Web site said:

       Why is the Iraqi regime hiding their uranium procurement?

  This is months after the CIA apparently told the State Department 
that there was no such effort on the part of Iraq to obtain uranium, or 
at least that they had not reached that conclusion. Yet in December--
and by the way, much later--the State Department's Web site still is 
representing to the public that the Iraqi regime is hiding uranium 
procurement.
  Why should we not look into that Web site? How does that Web site get 
created, despite what we now believe was the intelligence community's 
conclusion or lack of conclusion relative to uranium acquisition?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has used 5 minutes.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.
  Mr. CORZINE. I thank the Chair. I appreciate very much the comments 
of the Senator from Michigan, particularly in informing the Senate that 
the charge of the Intelligence Committee includes the use of 
intelligence as part of its mission.
  Frankly, this whole discussion of this leaked memo today only 
reinforces my own view that we need an independent, bipartisan 
commission because it is now becoming a political debate about whether 
there is politics inside the Intelligence Committee.
  I listened to the earlier discussion on the floor. People are talking 
about Presidential politics and talking about how inappropriate it is 
for people to talk in a thoughtful manner about how processes may occur 
over a period of time. We are missing the point.
  There are men and women who are dying in Iraq because either the 
development or the use of our intelligence is not at a level where we 
are protecting the people of America and the men and women in uniform.
  The issue is not whether this is a political debate. The issue is 
whether Iraq possessed chemical or biological weapons.
  It is whether Iraq had links to al-Qaida or whether Iraq attempted to 
acquire uranium. It is an issue of whether we are going to turn loose 
the names of our intelligence operatives because there is political use 
of the need or want to discredit someone who might challenge some of 
the answers to the questions I just raised.
  We have a fundamental question right here and now of whether we are 
going to have an intelligence operation that informs policymakers so 
they can make good decisions or whether we are going to have an 
intelligence operation that is used to justify policy decisions already 
taken.
  The idea that we are going to debate whether this is a political 
issue or not really does argue in the strongest terms that we need to 
have an independent, bipartisan approach to understanding whether the 
development of our intelligence was appropriate and whether the use of 
that was even consistent or whether it was designed to justify as 
opposed to inform.
  When men and women are dying, I don't understand why we are even 
thinking about this in the context of politics on either side of the 
aisle. The real issue is, we ought to get to the bottom of it. What led 
to decisions that don't match the reality we have come to find on the 
ground in Iraq?
  I have over and over again--and will again--asked for an independent 
investigation, a bipartisan investigation, a commission to understand 
why we don't know what we should have known when we entered into this. 
It seems to me that is the essence and the most important issue we 
ought to be discussing, not some memo that wasn't seen by anybody else 
in the committee, developed by a staffer as a concept memo. That really 
diverts from the fundamental issue of protecting our men and women, 
protecting the people of the United States.
  By the way, there is some reason to believe we are not getting all 
the information, whether it is in the Intelligence Committee. We know 
the independent commission studying 9/11 has said they have been 
stonewalled. People from both sides of the commission, as far as 
political background, have said that. They had to subpoena information 
from the FAA to be able to get information to move forward to 
investigate.
  We are missing the point. One of the reasons I do believe we need an 
independent, bipartisan commission is so we don't have the kind of 
discussion we had on the floor today, so we can get to the facts that 
actually will protect the American men and women in uniform. It is high 
time we put our priorities right, which is understanding how our 
intelligence operations develop and how they are used, not whether we 
have a political issue that can be talked about on the talk shows at 
night.
  I find it very hard when senior people in the State Department, who 
have worked there 25 or 30 years, say, speaking about folks, that we 
have a faith-based approach to intelligence, that we are developing 
intelligence to show what we want to conclude.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. CORZINE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

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  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BENNETT. Parliamentary inquiry: What is the pending business?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 8 minutes remaining in morning 
business that the Senator may consume or yield back.
  Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, given that opportunity, I will consume a 
few of those minutes to respond to the conversations about Iraq.
  I was in this body when we went to S-407 and heard the intelligence 
community brief us on the manufacture of chemical weapons taking place 
at what appeared to be a pharmaceutical factory in the Sudan. We were 
told repeatedly by high officials of the administration this was a 
plant producing weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons; it had 
to be taken out by a cruise missile. Some of us asked to see the 
intelligence. We asked to know exactly what it was that led the 
administration to believe this was in fact a chemical plant.
  As we were given that intelligence, I found myself questioning it. I 
walked away from that meeting saying to myself: This is a little bit 
thin. There is not a lot of substance here. But administration 
officials were very emphatic in saying, no, we have gone through the 
intelligence. It is very firm. We have to take this out.
  The administration in this instance, of course, was the Clinton 
administration. The intelligence being presented to us was being 
presented by Secretary Cohen, the Secretary of Defense. We now know the 
intelligence was wrong. This was not, in fact, a factory for weapons of 
mass destruction. It was, rather, a pharmaceutical plant, just as the 
people said it was.
  We blew it up nonetheless. We killed some people with the cruise 
missiles we threw in there. After recognizing the intelligence was 
wrong, we apologized, as indeed we should.
  The question I would ask those who are now raising the issue about 
intelligence in Iraq would be this: Would they suggest the result of 
our actions in Iraq called for an American apology? Are they suggesting 
we should apologize to the people of Iraq for having taken out Saddam 
Hussein and, when we find him, replace him in power?
  This is a man who killed 300,000 of his own people. We have uncovered 
the mass graves. This is a man responsible for over 1 million 
additional deaths in the two wars he started with his neighbors.
  This is a man who has destroyed his own country. This is a man who 
has raped and brutalized those of his citizens whom he has not killed. 
This is a man who was willing to pay $25,000 to anyone who would wrap 
himself in dynamite and blow himself up, as long as he took some others 
with him. This is a man who had weapons of mass destruction and has 
used them against his own people. This is a man whose actions are 
clearly in violation of the U.N. Resolution 1441.
  Am I supposed to apologize for having supported an effort to remove 
him just because some people are challenging the details of the 
intelligence that led us to this action? I do not apologize for one 
moment for supporting the war or for supporting the supplemental to pay 
for the war, because the consequences of the action we have taken have 
liberated over 20 million people and made the neighborhood in which 
Saddam Hussein lived substantially safer for all of the neighbors 
around him.
  This is not similar to the case of the blowing up of a pharmaceutical 
plant in Sudan because the intelligence was faulty, which took place in 
the Clinton administration. This is an action that history will look 
back upon and say we did the right thing.
  With that, I yield back the remainder of morning business time.

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