[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 2]
[Senate]
[Pages 2828-2829]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




          WHY NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE DOES NOT PROTECT HAWAII

  Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, in December 2002 President Bush announced 
his decision to deploy a limited national missile defense system by 
2004. Our distinguished colleague, Senator Levin, detailed the 
limitations of the proposed system and testing procedures in an article 
in the Detroit News on December 29 entitled, ``Untested Missile Defense 
Setup Poses Risks.'' I ask unanimous consent that his entire article be 
placed in the Record following my statement. I would like to elaborate 
on some of the concerns raised by the distinguished ranking member of 
the Armed Services Committee and discuss my concern that this system 
does nothing to protect my State or other parts of the United States 
from attack.
  President Bush's limited national missile defense system, first 
proposed by the administration in March 2001 and called ``the Alaska 
Option,'' consists of 5 to 10 silos/interceptor launchers in Fort 
Greely, AK and an upgraded Cobra Dane radar on Shemya Island, AK.
  At that time, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Missile 
Defense Agency Director Gen Ronald Kadish called the Alaska site a 
``test bed'' that could be transformed into a fully operational 
facility easily. During an Armed Services Committee hearing in July 
2001, Mr. Wolfowitz stated, ``This developmental capability could 
become, with very little modification, an operational capability.'' In 
a later statement, he added that ``it would be essentially a software 
change to turn it into an operational capability.''
  I believe that more than modest modifications would be required. Even 
if the test bed was functioning and proven effective, significant 
changes would be needed to make it an operational system. The changes 
may not be technically difficult but they are very complicated when 
applied as a whole system. They involve many command, control, 
communication issues that will determine who makes the decision to fire 
and when and with how much information. In large and complex research 
and development programs, one should always be wary of anything that is 
described as ``just a software fix.''
  In July 2001 Phil Coyle, former Director of Operational Test and 
Evaluation in the Pentagon testified before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee and defined effective deployment as the fielding of an 
operational system with some military utility that is effective under 
realistic combat conditions, against realistic threats and 
countermeasures, possible without adequate prior knowledge of the 
target cluster composition, timing, trajectory, or direction, and when 
operated by military personnel at all times of the day or night and in 
all weapons.
  Mr. Coyle estimated that it would take a decade, rather than 4 years, 
to produce an effective defense system. As Senator Levin raised in his 
article, no part of the limited missile defense system has been tested 
against realistic targets, and there are no plans to test the 
integrated system as a whole before it is deployed. Senator Levin 
correctly questions whether such a system will be even marginally 
effective.
  One could also question whether this system should be labeled a 
``national'' missile defense. Given the geometry of the Cobra Dane 
radar, the system may be better labeled a continental missile defense. 
The Cobra Dane Radar on Shemya Island was built to detect Soviet 
missile launches. It has a fixed orientation and a narrow field of 
view, northwest from Shemya, towards Russia. This radar cannot see 
missiles launched from North Korea towards Hawaii, and will have only 
marginal capability for southern California. The radar cannot see the 
current missile defense target range between California and Hawaii.
  The administration is well aware of the limitations of the radar and 
exclusion of Hawaii in the proposed deployed system. General Kadish 
referred to this as ``the Hawaii problem'' during a briefing for 
Senator Reed and members of the Armed Services Strategic Subcommittee 
on July 27, 2001. At that time, General Kadish said that they were 
considering using an Aegis cruiser to supplement the Cobra Dane radar. 
Such a cruiser would have to be permanently on station to provide 
adequate coverage.
  Even with upgrades to increase the radar's field of view, the radar 
still will not be capable of discriminating launch characteristics or 
trajectory. An X band radar, such as the one now in Kwajalein, is 
needed. In fact, no radar in Alaska will be able to discriminate launch 
characteristics. The administration has not asked for funding to 
upgrade the existing radar or build a new one.
  The President characterized in December 2002 his initiative to field 
a missile defense system as ``modest.'' The program is less than 
modest. It is inadequate and expensive. The path towards an effective 
and efficient missile defense program is the one outlined by Senator 
Levin.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                 [From the Detroit News, Dec. 29, 2002]

 Levin: Untested Missile Defense Setup Poses Risks; Can Missile Shield 
                               Be Built?

                        (By Senator Carl Levin)

       President Bush's decision to deploy a limited national 
     missile defense system starting in 2004 before it has been 
     tested and shown to work violates common sense. The Pentagon 
     will spend large amounts of money to deploy an unproven 
     defense, money that could be better used to fight more likely 
     and imminent threats of terrorism.
       Many of us have reservations about deployment of a national 
     defense against long-range ballistic missiles because: (1) 
     the intelligence community says such missiles are

[[Page 2829]]

     one of the least likely threats to our security (in part 
     because use of such missiles would leave a ``return address'' 
     that would guarantee a devastating response from the United 
     States); and (2) because deployment of a national missile 
     defense is likely to unleash an arms race with other 
     countries.
       However, even ardent proponents of a national missile 
     defense should not support deployment of an untested, 
     unproven system. The United States may eventually succeed in 
     developing a national missile defense system that will 
     actually work against real world threats, but we have not 
     done so yet. According to the Pentagon, the national missile 
     defense system to be deployed in 2004 requires a new booster 
     rocket that has never been tested against any target.
       The 2004 system would rely on a radar in Alaska built in 
     the 1970's that was never designed for missile defense, that 
     has no capability to differentiate the target warhead from 
     decoys, that has never been tested against a long-range 
     ballistic missile, and that the administration never plans to 
     test against a long-range missile.
       No part of the system has been tested against realistic 
     targets, and there are no plans to test the integrated system 
     as a whole before it is deployed. Secretary of Defense Donald 
     Rumsfeld has said that this is just an ``initial capability'' 
     in a program that ``will evolve over time'' and will 
     ultimately ``look quite different than it begins.''
       What the Pentagon has tried not to emphasize is that this 
     ``initial capability'' is likely to be marginally effective, 
     if it works at all. Declaring this untested, marginal system 
     ready to deploy is like declaring a newly designed airplane 
     ready to fly before the wings have been attached to the 
     airframe and the electronics installed in the cockpit.
       In his previous tenure as Secretary of Defense, Rumsfeld 
     had to preside over the dismantling of the Safeguard missile 
     defense system which he had inherited and which was 
     operational for less than six months because the technical 
     limitations of the system rendered it ineffective. The 
     development, deployment and dismantling of the Safeguard 
     system cost the taxpayers tens of billions of dollars without 
     enhancing our national security in any way. This is an 
     experience that we should not want to repeat.
       Since that time, Congress has instituted reforms in the 
     Defense Department to help prevent the premature and costly 
     fielding of unproven systems. Congress established the 
     Pentagon's Director of Operational Test and Evaluation to 
     oversee major defense programs and ensure they are adequately 
     tested and demonstrated to work before they are deployed--in 
     other words, that any new system is proven to ``fly before we 
     buy.''
       Congress also established the Joint Requirements Oversight 
     Council, which gives the military services oversight over 
     weapons programs to ensure that they perform well enough to 
     be useful on the battlefield.
       The Bush administration, however, has unwisely exempted all 
     missile defense programs from the normal oversight of these 
     important organizations. As a result, these programs are not 
     subject to normal review by senior military and civilian 
     acquisition officials, and they are not subject to the normal 
     operational test and evaluation process.
       Instead, the secretary of defense has delegated many of the 
     functions of these offices to the Missile Defense Agency, 
     effectively making that agency responsible for overseeing 
     itself. History shows that without real oversight, major 
     weapon systems don't work well, suffer serious schedule 
     delays and have major cost overruns.
       The Bush administration should re-establish effective 
     oversight of missile defense programs by the Director of 
     Operational Test and Evaluation, the Joint Requirements 
     Oversight Council, and other oversight organizations with the 
     Department of Defense. Rather than rushing to deploy an 
     unproven national missile defense system, the administration 
     should focus on completing the development of a missile 
     defense that will be effective against likely threats and 
     that is shown to work through proper testing.

                          ____________________