[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 2]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 2626-2627]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                ASYLUM: AN IDEA IN SEARCH OF A STRATEGY

                                 ______
                                 

                          HON. JAMES A. LEACH

                                of iowa

                    in the house of representatives

                      Wednesday, February 5, 2003

  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, below are two op-ed articles written on the 
subject of possible abdication and asylum for Saddam Hussein and his 
cohorts.

                Asylum: An Idea in Search of a Strategy

                   (By Representative James A. Leach)

       Monday Hans Blix will present the report of the U.N. 
     weapons inspectors in Iraq to the U.N. Security Council. 
     Absent a surprise, the report is likely to offer a mixed 
     judgment: no smoking gun, but no assumption that Saddam 
     Hussein has sincerely cooperated with the inspectors or 
     provided credible rationale for his nuclear program or 
     convincing evidence of disarming once held bio-chemical 
     weapons.
       Tuesday evening the President will give his annual State of 
     the Union address in which he will undoubtedly make his case 
     for why the U.S. military may be called upon to intervene in 
     Iraq--with or without further U.N. approval.
       At this juncture there appears to be only one scenario 
     which has the potential of being a win/win situation for 
     America, the Iraqi people and the world community. That is 
     for Saddam Hussein, his family and cohorts to abdicate power 
     and accept asylum outside Iraq.
       The possibility of such an outcome was implicitly 
     contemplated by Secretary Rumsfeld last week when he said 
     that the United States would not seek a trial before a war 
     crimes tribunal if Saddam steps aside peacefully.
       There are three existing precedents for such a course. The 
     Ethiopian war lord Mengestu Haile Mariam agreed to asylum and 
     is currently living in Zimbabwe; the notorious African 
     Dictator Idi Amin is currently living in exile in Saudi 
     Arabia; and the former Haitian dictator Jean-Claude ``Baby 
     Doc'' Duvalier is living in the south of France.
       The possibility that Saddam Hussein would find attractive a 
     life of ease in a dacha on the Black Sea or in a villa on the 
     French Riviera may seem improbable. On the other hand, in the 
     face of the overwhelming force being marshaled against his 
     regime, a survivalist might conclude that abdication could be 
     rationalized for the good of his people and for the good life 
     the resources he has absconded with would make possible.
       From America's perspective five central conditions for 
     asylum would have to be met: (1) That Saddam's abdication be 
     permanent; (2) that his extended family and cohorts go with 
     him; (3) that he and they commit themselves to abstaining 
     from complicity in future anarchistic or terrorist acts in or 
     outside Iraq; (4) that processes be established for the 
     creation of a more benign, democratic government in Iraq; and 
     (5) that, following the Ferdinand Marcos asylum model, no 
     commitment be made precluding a successor Iraqi government 
     from seeking international legal recourse to recover Saddam's 
     kleptocratic wealth.
       From a humanitarian perspective the choice would seem to be 
     a no-brainer. While the motivations of individuals are always 
     difficult to fathom, clearly a U.S.-led intervention would 
     imply a short life expectancy for Saddam, as well as the 
     potential of loss of life for innocent civilians and military 
     personnel on both sides. Equally clearly, Saddam faces the 
     possibility of an embarrassing erosion of his personal power 
     base, with a castle coup increasingly conceivable.
       The question with which Saddam is confronted is whether he 
     would rather be a survivor or a failed martyr, whether his 
     legacy in the end will include sacrificing power for his 
     people or sacrificing his people and national spirit on the 
     altar of his egomania.
       To increase the possibility that a rational choice be made 
     by an irrational leader, the United States should precipitate 
     the presentation of an abdication option in a carefully 
     modulated way. Asylum must be more than an abstract concept. 
     There must be a strategy, public and private, for its 
     presentation and implementation.
       As distrustful as this Administration is of the U.N., there 
     is no more appropriate figure than U.N. Secretary General 
     Kofi Annan to speak on behalf of the world community 
     regarding such a prospect. The Security Council should ask 
     Annan to make a formal offer to Saddam to accept asylum with 
     clear conditions and possibly alternative destinations. 
     Preferably the request should be made with the active support 
     of the Arab League and a commitment of financial support 
     (already hinted at) from countries like Saudi Arabia to fund 
     asylum for the coterie of regime insiders, some of whom might 
     find attractive different destinations than Saddam.
       Such as approach may be the only way to avoid a potentially 
     catastrophic conflict while bringing about progressive change 
     in Iraq and the region. It is the only strategy in which the 
     world community and the American government may at this time 
     find common ground. While the chance of Saddam's acquiescence 
     to the asylum concept may be limited (perhaps 10 to 20 
     percent), failure to press the offer would unconscionable.
                                  ____


            Asylum II: An Idea Still in Search of a Strategy

                   (By Representative James A. Leach)

       Now that Secretary Powell has laid down convincing evidence 
     of the Iraqi weapons program and the United States and 
     Britain have massed a significant force in the Middle East to 
     address the threat these weapons represent, it is apparent 
     that the only way the bloodshed of war and the countervailing 
     possibility of terrorist reaction can be avoided is if Saddam 
     Hussein abdicates and accepts an offer of asylum.
       Absent the will to use force, asylum is conceptually a non-
     starter. With the mobilization that has occurred and the case 
     that Secretary Powell has presented to the U.N., Saddam must 
     understand that he has a narrow window, a week or two at 
     most, in which to decide whether he would rather be a 
     survivor or a humiliated military leader subject to a war 
     crimes tribunal in the unlikely event he lives through the 
     next month.
       The prospect of asylum may seem unlikely, but it 
     nonetheless deserves pursuing. What is needed is a precise 
     presentation and implementation strategy. Otherwise asylum 
     will remain an abstract concept, unaccepted because it has 
     never been appropriately developed and proffered.
       Substantively, asylum demands a host country and a series 
     of quid pro quos, the most important being an agreement of 
     the international community not to prosecute in return for 
     peaceful abdication and credible assurances of non-
     participation in future violence in or outside Iraq. 
     Initiative for a proposal at this time would, most 
     appropriately, come from the Secretary General of the U.N., 
     preferably with Arab League support.
       Given that American military leaders assume a short, 
     decisive conflict, it is fair to ask why a U.S. strategist 
     should not prefer a military to a diplomatic victory. The 
     answer relates precisely to the case Secretary Powell 
     presented to the Security Council. The assumption in 
     Washington that I find credible is that Iraq is unlikely to 
     be the kind of conventional warfare quagmire Vietnam was. The 
     assumption, however, that is more conjectural is the belief 
     of many that Iraq will react to American intervention in 2003 
     similarly to the hapless defensive way it did in the 1991 
     Gulf War.
       In 1991 Saddam survived by failing to mount much more than 
     token resistance. He recognized that allied goals were 
     limited to rolling back Iraqi aggression in Kuwait. Now our 
     goals are different and his non-conventional war capacities 
     enhance. When a cornered tyrant is confronted with a ``lose 
     or use'' option with his weapons of mass destruction, and in 
     the Arab world is isolated unless he launches a ``jihad'' 
     against Israel, we must assume that more than a slight 
     possibility exists that he may consider unleashing bio-
     chemical weapons against Israel or even American troops or an 
     American city. We also must assume that Moslem radicals 
     around the world might view an American-led intervention 
     against a state that has not attacked us or a neighbor as the 
     opening shot of a war between the Judeo-Christian and Moslem 
     civilizations. The implications, short and long-term, for 
     terrorism against American interests could be large.
       Precision of strategy is in order. What is at issue are 
     four goals: (1) The removal of Saddam Hussein and his 
     cohorts; (2) the elimination of weapons of mass destruction 
     in Iraq; (3) the building of a stable Iraqi government 
     capable of being a model civil society in the region; and (4) 
     the continuing effort to thwart terrorism around the globe.
       While military intervention may accomplish these purposes, 
     it might also precipitate great loss of life in Iraq and 
     elsewhere. A wiser approach would be to incentivize Saddam to 
     step aside. The challenge is to put as much effort into 
     causing this to happen as we have to preparing for war 
     itself.

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