[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 2]
[Senate]
[Pages 2567-2575]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                      ASBESTOS IN ATTIC INSULATION

  Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I rise today to share a story with my 
colleagues. It's a true story about a family who happened to live in a 
neighborhood in Spokane, WA. They could have easily been in Memphis or 
Minneapolis or Midland as well. But they lived in my State, in Spokane, 
a typical American city in Eastern Washington.
  Mr. President, as part of realizing their American dream, Ralph Busch 
and his wife Donna bought a house. They were newlyweds, and this was 
the home they bought after getting married. They soon discovered that 
it needed roof repairs, and so Ralph spent quite a bit of time in the 
attic, working on his roof.
  The following year they found they had to renovate an addition that 
was put on the house in the 1950s.
  They both had full-time jobs, so they spent many nights and weekends 
working on their home. They knocked down walls and tore through the old 
insulation, drywall and wood. They sanded and hammered and spent two 
entire years fixing up the place.
  One morning, Ralph was reading the newspaper. Just by chance, he came 
across a story about a company that manufactured a household insulation 
called Zonolite. This insulation, he read, was tainted with deadly 
asbestos.
  Ralph suddenly realized that Zonolite was in his home.
  Ralph Busch was stunned as it dawned on him. He had just spent two 
years in his own home handling Zonolite insulation and he and his wife 
may have unknowingly been exposed to deadly asbestos.
  What would happen from his and his wife's exposure?
  How come no one had told him he had asbestos in his attic?
  The Zonolite insulation was a product from the little town of Libby, 
MT. It was produced by the W.R. Grace Company.
  W.R. Grace mined vermiculite from the hillside near Libby. The 
company turned the ore into insulation known as Zonolite by heating 
vermiculite to expand it into light granules.
  The process was similar to popping popcorn. After sorting the popped 
vermiculite, W.R. Grace poured it into bags and sold it to use as 
insulation.
  The company marketed Zonolite as ``perfectly safe''.  .  .
  But laced throughout the vermiculite in the ground near Libby, 
another mineral was present: asbestos. W.R. Grace's process to make 
Zonolite and other products could not, and did not, remove all the 
asbestos from the end product. Zonolite insulation contains between .5 
percent and 8 percent asbestos.
  The community of Libby has suffered immensely from decades of mining 
the deadly vermiculite ore used to make Zonolite insulation and other 
consumer products.
  At least 200 men and women from Libby have died from diseases caused 
by exposure to asbestos-tainted vermiculite, and hundreds more people 
from the town are sick.
  When inhaled, asbestos can cause deadly diseases, from asbestosis to 
mesothelioma, a deadly cancer of the lining of the lung that is almost 
always fatal. In fact, mesothelioma kills at least 2,000 people each 
year and is caused only by asbestos.
  The diseases induced by exposure to asbestos result in horrible 
deaths and they are nearly always fatal. Treatment is harsh and 
debilitating.
  These diseases can take years to strike. The late Congressman Bruce 
Vento and the father of the modern Navy, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt both died 
from asbestos they had been exposed to years earlier.
  The asbestos-tainted insulation manufactured by the W.R. Grace 
Company was used in homes throughout the country for decades.
  Vermiculite from Libby first started being sold commercially in 1921, 
and W.R. Grace bought the mine in 1963. Reviews of invoices indicate 
that more than 6 million tons of Libby ore was shipped to hundreds of 
sites nationwide for processing over the decades.
  This chart behind me shows more than 300 sites across the Nation, 
where ore was processed, in many cases to make Zonolite insulation.
  In internal memos and e-mails, the Environmental Protection Agency 
has estimated that as many as 35 million homes, schools and businesses 
may still contain this insulation. Moreover, W.R. Grace knew the Libby 
mine contained asbestos when the company purchased it in 1963. But 
Grace made millions of tons of Zonolite anyway and unabashedly marketed 
it as ``safe.''
  If the manufacturer of this insulation knew it was contaminated with 
asbestos, why didn't it or the Federal Government make sure that Ralph 
Busch and millions of others across the country knew to leave it alone?
  The answer to the first question is that W.R. Grace still claims its 
product isn't harmful. The answer to the second question is more 
complicated.
  According to published reports and internal EPA documents, the EPA 
was preparing to tell the American people about the dangers of Zonolite 
insulation. But it didn't happen.
  An investigation by Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter Andrew Schneider 
found that last spring while it was addressing the public health crisis 
in Libby, MT, the EPA was preparing to tell the American people about 
the dangers of Zonolite insulation in millions of homes across this 
country. But first, EPA had to deal with Libby. EPA decided it needed 
to minimize the exposure of Libby residents to asbestos-contaminated 
vermiculite, and the agency drafted a press release announcing its 
decision.
  This document said that EPA:

       . . . will spend $34 million to remove dangerous asbestos-
     contaminated vermiculite insulation from 70 percent of 
     residential and commercial buildings in Libby.
  I am glad that EPA has taken aggressive steps to protect people in 
that small Montana town.
  Senator Baucus deserves tremendous credit for the work he has done to 
bring Federal resources to Montana to help people in Libby.
  And EPA deserves credit for doing the right thing, and going in to 
remove the insulation from Libby.

[[Page 2568]]

  But what about the rest of the country? What about the millions of 
other homes with Zonolite insulation?
  Since EPA decided to help Libby, the agency anticipated the logical 
follow-up question of what about the millions of homes nationwide that 
contain the same Zonolite insulation as homes in Libby.
  According to the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, the EPA had drafted news 
releases, and drawn up lists of public officials to notify. The agency 
was preparing to embark on an outreach and education campaign to let 
people know about this hazard in their homes.
  But what stopped EPA from following through with its warning?
  It may have been the same person or people who blocked another 
government health agency from warning workers about asbestos exposure.
  Last April, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health--NIOSH--was preparing to release new guidance for workers who 
come into contact with insulation in the course of their daily work.
  NIOSH was preparing to alert workers, such as electricians, plumbers 
and maintenance workers, about how they can better protect themselves 
from exposure to asbestos in Zonolite insulation.
  These materials were prepared last April, but they still have not 
been released.
  Let me read from a ``Pre-Decisional Draft'' of a NIOSH Fact Sheet 
dated April 11, 2002.
  I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record in its 
entirety.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

    NIOSH Recommendations for Reducing Risk of Worker Exposures to 
           Vermiculite That May Be Contaminated With Asbestos

       A vermiculite deposit formerly mined in Libby, Montana was 
     contaminated with asbestos, raising concerns about 
     occupational and public health risks to former miners, 
     residents of Libby, and to workers and consumers who come in 
     contact with vermiculite end-products, such as insulation and 
     potting soil. This fact sheet summarizes existing 
     recommendations by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control's 
     (CDC) National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
     (NIOSH) for reducing risk of worker exposures to asbestos or 
     to materials that may be contaminated with asbestos. These 
     recommendations serve as interim guidance from NIOSH for 
     employers and workers involved at sites where vermiculite 
     used as attic insulation or for other purposes may be 
     contaminated with asbestos. NIOSH is conducting further 
     research on vermiculite to provide more information on 
     exposures that may pose the highest risks to workers.
       How can a worker or an employer know if vermiculite they 
     have is contaminated with asbestos?
       The only way to determine conclusively whether vermiculite 
     is contaminated is to have it analyzed by a trained 
     microscopist. (Any suggestions by NIOSH beyond OSHA 1910 
     regarding methods for bulk analysis would be extremely 
     helpful and reduce much of the confusion we are seeing as 
     polarized light microscopy (PLM) has not been useful in 
     evaluating and predicting airborne levels generated from 
     VAI).
       As a rule, we believe that any vermiculite that originated 
     in Libby, Montana, before 1990 should be regarded as 
     potentially contaminated. It is known that vermiculite from 
     Libby was sold as attic insulation under the product name 
     Zonolite Attic Insulation, and that this product is still in 
     homes throughout the United States.
       (Comment: WR Grace estimates several million homes contain 
     VAI, which is most likely very conservative. If we don't wish 
     to provide any indication of the magnitude of the potential 
     VAI exposure in number of homes, we should be clear about the 
     potential situation to provide a more accurate picture and 
     warning. Also, it is uncertain whether other vermiculite 
     products not originating in Libby contain potentially 
     hazardous concentrations of asbestos, until we have 
     definitive information to the contrary these materials should 
     also be treated with caution)
       How can workers be protected from asbestos-contaminated 
     vermiculite?
       They should isolate the work area from other areas in order 
     to avoid spreading fibers, use local exhaust ventilation to 
     reduce dust exposures, and use appropriate respiratory 
     protection. If the employer or worker is concerned about 
     potential exposure, and if at all possible, the vermiculite 
     should not be disturbed.
       Which respirators are appropriate to protect workers from 
     asbestos exposure?
       If asbestos cannot be contained to below 0.1 fibers per 
     cubic centimeter of air (fiber/cm\3\) by engineering controls 
     and good work practices, or when engineering controls are 
     being installed or maintained, appropriate respirators should 
     be provided to workers. When respirators are worn, it is 
     advisable to wear a fit-tested, tight fitting half-mask air-
     purifying particulate respirator (not a disposable dust mask) 
     equipped with an N-100 filter or better, because of the 
     potential for episodic exposure to 1 fiber/cm\3\. A tight-
     fitting powered air-purifying respirator should be provided 
     instead of a negative-pressure respirator whenever an 
     employee chooses to use this type of respirator. Tight 
     fitting respirators should be used in conjunction with a 
     comprehensive respiratory protection program under the 
     direction of a health and safety professional. Further 
     information concerning respirator selection can be found on 
     the NIOSH web site at: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh; or the OSHA 
     web site at: http://www.osha.gov.
       What can workers do to protect themselves from exposure to 
     asbestos-contaminated vermiculite?
       If at all possible, avoid handling or disturbing loose 
     vermiculite that is not contained in a manner that will 
     prevent the release of airborne dust.
       Workers should guard against bringing dust home to the 
     family on clothes by using disposable protective clothing or 
     clothing that is left in the workplace. Do not launder work 
     clothing with family clothing.
       Some measures can be used to avoid spreading potentially 
     contaminated dusts:
       Use vacuum cleaners equipped with High-Efficiency 
     Particulate Air (HEPA) filters to collect asbestos-containing 
     debris and dust;
       Employ wet methods or wetting agents, unless wetting is not 
     feasible or creates a greater hazard (wetting absorbent 
     vermiculite materials in an attic may not be feasible or 
     advisable);
       Use negative pressure air units, which are large mobile 
     units that combine a fan and a HEPA filter critical for 
     preventing other exposures to non-workers, to keep airborne 
     asbestos levels to a minimum. Combined with temporary 
     barriers or enclosures, they can be set up to make sure 
     fibers do not contaminate other areas.
       Dispose of wastes and debris contaminated with asbestos in 
     leak-tight containers;
       Never use compressed air to remove asbestos-containing 
     materials;
       Avoid dry sweeping, shoveling, or other dry clean-up 
     methods for dust and debris containing vermiculite that is 
     potentially contaminated with asbestos without environmental 
     controls to avoid spreading contamination;
       Use proper respiratory protection.
       Are there regulations that pertain to asbestos-contaminated 
     vermiculite?
       Yes, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
     (OSHA) asbestos regulations (29 CFR 1910.1001 and 1926.1101) 
     for general industry and construction should be consulted to 
     determine if there are specific requirements that need to be 
     followed when handling asbestos-contaminated materials or 
     potential asbestos-containing materials. Relevant information 
     is posted on the OSHA Internet page at: http://www.osha.gov/
SLTC/asbestos/index.html.
       What should you do if you believe you have been exposed to 
     asbestos-containing vermiculite?
       Workers who believe they have had significant past exposure 
     to asbestos-containing vermiculite, should consider getting 
     an appropriate medical check up. The appendices to the OSHA 
     asbestos standard describe the types of tests a physician 
     will need to provide.
       What did NIOSH find from past studies at Libby, Montana?
       NIOSH has responded to past and current concerns about 
     worker health by conducting needed research and disseminating 
     its findings. In the 1980s, NIOSH conducted research and 
     communicated findings about job-related exposures and health 
     effects among workers employed in mining and milling 
     vermiculite in Libby, Montana.
       Our past studies identified asbestos contamination in the 
     vermiculite mined and milled in Libby.
       We determined, from examination of x-rays of Libby miners, 
     that the miners showed evidence of adverse health effects 
     associated with asbestos exposure.
       In a review of death certificates of former Libby 
     vermiculite miners, we identified an excess of deaths from 
     lung cancer, and other lung diseases that are known to be 
     related to asbestos exposure.
       We made our findings available in 1985 through meetings in 
     Libby with workers and their representatives, employer 
     representatives, and members of the community. We also 
     published the results in peer-reviewed scientific journals.
       Is NIOSH planning further occupational health research on 
     vermiculite?
       NIOSH is currently conducting research to help determine 
     whether the processing of vermiculite produced by mines other 
     than the Libby mine results in workplace exposure to 
     asbestos. Vermiculite is used in a variety of occupational 
     settings including construction, agriculture, horticulture, 
     and for miscellaneous industrial applications. Through 
     carefully designed sampling, NIOSH will be better able to 
     define the extent to

[[Page 2569]]

     which workers may be occupationally exposed to vermiculite 
     that may be contaminated with asbestos. Current plans are to: 
     (1) conclude field exposure sampling, (2) send company-
     specific reports to each of the surveyed sites, and (3) 
     prepare a summary of the overall result of exposure 
     assessments.
       (Question will NIOSH be performing any field investigations 
     to evaluate the occupational exposures to airborne asbestos 
     associated with Vermiculite Attic Insulation among commonly 
     exposed workers (i.e. home reconstruction workers, 
     electricians, cable TV workers) ?)
       Has NIOSH been involved in the public health response for 
     Libby community?
       NIOSH has been providing technical assistance to the U.S. 
     Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Agency for 
     Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) which are the 
     lead agencies for the Federal government in assessing current 
     concerns about potential community health risks from asbestos 
     exposures in Libby.

  Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, NIOSH recommended that workers:

       . . . should isolate the work area from other areas in 
     order to avoid spreading fibers, use local exhaust 
     ventilation to reduce dust exposures, and use appropriate 
     respiratory protection.
       If the employer or worker is concerned about potential 
     exposure, and if at all possible, the vermiculite should not 
     be disturbed.

  But, astonishingly, this guidance was never released. How many of the 
construction workers, maintenance people, electricians, plumbers and 
homeowners across the country know they should ``avoid spreading 
fibers, use local exhaust ventilation or appropriate respiratory 
protection?''
  I suspect that like Mr. Ralph Busch, thousands of people across the 
U.S. are not taking these important precautions because they are simply 
unaware of the danger.
  I would like to read to my colleagues another section from the never-
released NIOSH Fact Sheet. This was in response to the question about 
how workers can know if the vermiculite they have is contaminated with 
asbestos. It says:

       As a rule, we believe that any vermiculite that originated 
     in Libby, Montana, before 1990 should be regarded as 
     potentially contaminated . . .
       It is known that vermiculite from Libby was sold as attic 
     insulation under the product name Zonolite Attic Insulation 
     and that this product is still in homes throughout the United 
     States.

  But especially interesting is the next section, which is in 
parentheses as a comment by the author:

       W.R. Grace estimates several million homes contain 
     ``vermiculite attic insulation,'' which is most likely very 
     conservative.
       If we don't wish to provide any indication of the magnitude 
     of the potential VAI (or vermiculite attic insulation) 
     exposure in number of homes, we should be clear about the 
     potential situation to provide a more accurate picture and 
     warning.

  I must ask my colleagues, why wouldn't NIOSH or others in the 
Administration--when they are taking great pains to do the job right in 
Libby--want to share with workers and the public an indication of the 
magnitude of the number of homes with asbestos-tainted vermiculite?
  Isn't it our government's job to protect people from risks associated 
with hazardous substances such as asbestos?
  Don't we need to know the scope of the problem in order to help gauge 
the extent of the potential risks?
  Why aren't we warning workers and giving them the new guidance that 
has already been drafted by NIOSH?
  Interestingly enough, on April 10, 2002, the day before the date on 
this NIOSH Fact Sheet, EPA received a letter from W.R. Grace defending 
their harmful product.
  The letter read:

       Zonolite Attic Insulation (ZAI) has been insulating homes 
     for over 60 years and there is no credible reason to believe 
     that ZAI has ever caused an asbestos-related disease in 
     anyone who has used it in his/her home.

  How then does Grace explain the fact that the company has settled at 
least 25 bodily injury claims caused by exposure to Zonolite?
  Make no mistake. W.R. Grace is a company with one of the worst public 
health and environmental records in America. I draw my colleague's 
attention to a 1998 article by Dr. David Egilman, Wes Wallace and 
Candace Hom published in the journal Accountability in Research 
entitled ``Corporate Corruption of Medical Literature: Asbestos Studies 
Concealed by W.R. Grace & Co.''
  I will read briefly from the abstract of this article:

       In 1963, W.R. Grace acquired the mine (in Libby) and 
     employee health problems at the mine became known to W.R. 
     Grace executives and to Grace's insurance company, Maryland 
     Casualty.
       In 1976, in response to tighter federal regulation of 
     asbestos and asbestos-containing products, W.R. Grace funded 
     an animal study of tremolite toxicity.
       They hoped to prove that tremolite did not cause 
     mesothelioma, the cancer uniquely associated with asbestos 
     exposure. However, the study showed that tremolite did cause 
     mesothelioma.
       W.R. Grace never disclosed the results of this animal 
     study, nor did they disclose their knowledge of lung disease 
     in the Libby workers, either to the workers themselves or to 
     regulatory agencies.
       These actions were intentional, and were motivated by 
     Grace's conscious decision to prioritize corporate profit 
     over human health.

  Given the facts that W.R. Grace has knowingly manufactured and sold 
an asbestos-tainted product, has suppressed research findings showing 
that tremolite asbestos causes cancer, and has denied that their 
product is potentially dangerous, the company is woefully lacking for 
credibility.
  Which brings us to our question: If EPA was planning to warn the 
American public about the dangers of Zonolite insulation, what stopped 
EPA from following through with its plan?
  Why aren't we warning homeowners nationwide about Zonolite 
insulation?
  Why aren't we warning workers and giving them new safety guidelines?
  The answers might lie, not with the EPA, but with the White House 
Office of Management and Budget, OMB.
  An internal e-mail from John F. Wood, the Deputy General Counsel at 
OMB, to staff at EPA contained details about finalizing the Action Memo 
for Libby.
  Also copied on the e-mail were OMB Deputy Director Nancy Dorn and 
Associate Director of Natural Resources Programs Marcus Peacock.
  Here's what OMB's lawyer wrote to EPA. I ask unanimous consent that 
this e-mail be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       John--thank you for your efforts to alleviate my concerns. 
     Here are just a few edits, which are necessary to avoid the 
     problems we discussed earlier. Please be sure to observe the 
     deletion of the citation of Sect. 104(a)(4).

  Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, it says:

       Thank you for your efforts to alleviate my concerns. Here 
     are just a few edits, which are necessary to avoid the 
     problems we discussed earlier. Please be sure to observe the 
     deletion of the citation of Sect. 104 (a) (4).

  What is Section 104 (a) (4)?
  It is a clause in the Superfund law, which enables the EPA to declare 
a public health emergency.
  And why did OMB tell the EPA to ``delete the citation'' to Section 
104 (a) (4)?
  We don't know for sure, but if EPA had issued the public health 
emergency for Libby under Superfund, then the agency would have had to 
answer questions about asbestos-tainted insulation from every other 
homeowner in the country.
  Here is what the St. Louis Post-Dispatch investigation concluded:

       The Environmental Protection Agency was on the verge of 
     warning millions of Americans that their attics and walls 
     might contain asbestos-contaminated insulation. But, at the 
     last minute, the White House intervened, and the warning has 
     never been issued.

  The Post-Dispatch got reaction from an EPA staffer about OMB's 
intervention:

       It was like a gut shot,'' said one of those senior staffers 
     involved in the decision. ``It wasn't like they ordered us 
     not to make the declaration, they just really, really 
     strongly suggested against it. Really strongly. There was no 
     choice left.

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the St. Louis Post-
Dispatch article be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

[[Page 2570]]



           [From the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Dec. 29, 2002]

         White House Office Blocked EPA's Asbestos Cleanup Plan

                         (By Andrew Schneider)

       Washington.--The Environmental Protection Agency was on the 
     verge of warning millions of Americans that their attics and 
     walls might contain asbestos-contaminated insulation. But, at 
     the last minute, the White House intervened, and the warning 
     has never been issued.
       The agency's refusal to share its knowledge of what is 
     believed to be a widespread health risk has been criticized 
     by a former EPA administrator under two Republican 
     presidents, a Democratic U.S. senator and physicians and 
     scientists who have treated victims of the contamination.
       The announcement to warn the public was expected in April. 
     It was to accompany a declaration by the EPA of a public 
     health emergency in Libby, Mont. In that town near the 
     Canadian border, ore from a vermiculite mine was contaminated 
     with an extremely lethal asbestos fiber called tremolite that 
     has killed or sickened thousands of miners and their 
     families.
       Ore from the Libby mine was shipped across the nation and 
     around the world, ending up in insulation called Zonolite 
     that was used in millions of homes, businesses and schools 
     across America.
       A public health emergency declaration had never been issued 
     by any agency. It would have authorized the removal of the 
     disease-causing insulation from homes in Libby and also 
     provided long-term medical care for those made sick. 
     Additionally, it would have triggered notification of 
     property owners elsewhere who might be exposed to the 
     contaminated insulation.
       Zonolite insulation was sold throughout North America from 
     the 1940s through the 1990s. Almost all of the vermiculite 
     used in the insulation came from the Libby mine, last owned 
     by W.R. Grace & Co.
       In a meeting in mid-March, EPA Administrator Christie Todd 
     Whitman and Marianne Horinko, head of the Superfund program, 
     met with Paul Peronard, the EPA coordinator of the Libby 
     cleanup and his team of health specialists. Whitman and 
     Horinko asked tough questions, and apparently got the answers 
     they needed. They agreed they had to move ahead on a 
     declaration, said a participant in the meeting.
       By early April, the declaration was ready to go. News 
     releases had been written and rewritten. Lists of governors 
     to call and politicians to notify had been compiled. Internal 
     e-mail shows that discussions had even been held on whether 
     Whitman would go to Libby for the announcement.
       But the declaration was never made.


                        Derailed by White House

       Interviews and documents show that just days before the EPA 
     was set to make the declaration, the plan was thwarted by the 
     White House Office of Management and Budget, which had been 
     told of the proposal months earlier.
       Both the budget office and the EPA acknowledge that the 
     White House agency was actively involved, but neither agency 
     would discuss how or why.
       The EPA's chief spokesman Joe Martyak said, ``Contact OMB 
     for the details.''
       Budget office spokesperson Amy Call said, ``Those questions 
     will have to be addressed to the EPA.''
       Call said the budget office provided wording for the EPA to 
     use, but she declined to say why the White House opposed the 
     declaration and the public notification.
       ``These are part of our internal discussions with EPA, and 
     we don't discuss predecisional deliberations,'' Call said.
       Both agencies refused Freedom of Information Act requests 
     for documents to and from the White House Office of 
     Management and Budget.
       The budget office was created in 1970 to evaluate all 
     budget, policy, legislative, regulatory, procurement and 
     management issues on behalf of the president.


                        office interfered before

       Former EPA administrator William Ruckelshaus, who worked 
     for Presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, called the 
     decision not to notify homeowners of the dangers posed by 
     Zonolite insulation ``the wrong thing to do.''
       ``When the government comes across this kind of information 
     and doesn't tell people about it, I just think it's wrong, 
     unconscionable, not to do that,'' he said. ``Your first 
     obligation is to tell the people living in these homes of the 
     possible danger. They need the information so they can decide 
     what actions are best for their family. What right does the 
     government have to conceal these dangers? It just doesn't 
     make sense.''
       But, he added, pressure on the EPA from the budget office 
     or the White House is not unprecedented.
       Ruckelshaus, who became the EPA's first administrator when 
     the agency was created by Nixon in 1970, said he never was 
     called by the president directly to discuss agency decisions. 
     He said the same held true when he was called back to lead 
     the EPA by Reagan after Anne Gorsuch Burford's scandal-
     plagued tenure.
       Calls from a White House staff member or the Office of 
     Management and Budget were another matter.
       ``The pressure could come from industry pressuring OMB or 
     if someone could find a friendly ear in the White House to 
     get them to intervene,'' Ruckelshaus said. ``These issues 
     like asbestos are so technical, often so convoluted, that 
     industry's best chance to stop us or modify what we wanted to 
     do would come from OMB.''
       The question about what to do about Zonolite insulation was 
     not the only asbestos-related issue in which the White House 
     intervened.
       In January, in an internal EPA report on problems with the 
     agency's much-criticized response to the terrorist attacks in 
     New York City, a section on ``lessons learned'' said there 
     was a need to release public health and emergency information 
     without having it reviewed and delayed by the White House.
       ``We cannot delay releasing important public health 
     information,'' said the report. ``The political consequences 
     of delaying information are greater than the benefit of 
     centralized information management.''
       It was the White House budget office's Office of 
     Information and Regulatory Affairs that derailed the Libby 
     declaration. The regulatory affairs office is headed by John 
     Graham, who formerly ran the Harvard Center for Risk 
     Analysis.
       His appointment last year was denounced by environmental, 
     health and public advocacy groups, who claimed his ties to 
     industry were too strong. Graham passes judgment over all 
     major national health, safety and environmental standards.
       Sen. Dick Durbin, D-Ill., urged colleagues to vote against 
     Graham's appointment, saying Graham would have to recuse 
     himself from reviewing many rules because affected industries 
     donated to the Harvard University Center.
       Thirty physicians, 10 of them from Harvard, according to 
     The Washington Post, wrote the committee asking that Graham 
     not be confirmed because of ``a persistent pattern of 
     conflict of interest, of obscuring and minimizing dangers to 
     human health with questionable cost-benefit analyses, and of 
     hostility to governmental regulation in general.''
       Repeated requests for interviews with Graham or anyone else 
     involved in the White House budget office decision were 
     denied.


                       ``It was like a gut shot''

       Whitman, Horinko and some members of their top staff were 
     said to have been outraged at the White House intervention.
       ``It was like a gut shot.'' said one of those senior 
     staffers involved in the decision. ``It wasn't that they 
     ordered us not to make the declaration, they just really, 
     really strongly suggested against it. Really strongly. There 
     was no choice left.''
       She and other staff members said Whitman was personally 
     interested in Libby and the national problems spawned by its 
     asbestos-tainted ore. The EPA's inspector general had 
     reported that the agency hadn't taken action more than two 
     decades earlier when it had proof that the people of Libby 
     and those using asbestos-tainted Zonolite products were in 
     danger.
       Whitman went to Libby in early September 2001 and promised 
     the people it would never happen again.
       ``We want everyone who comes in contact with vermiculite--
     from homeowners to handymen--to have the information to 
     protect themselves and their families,'' Whitman promised.


                        suits, bankruptcies grow

       Political pragmatists in the agency knew the administration 
     was angered that a flood of lawsuits had caused more than a 
     dozen major corporations--including W.R. Grace--to file for 
     bankruptcy protection. The suits sought billions of dollars 
     on behalf of people injured or killed from exposure to 
     asbestos in their products or workplaces.
       Republicans on Capitol Hill crafted legislation--expected 
     to be introduced next month--to stem the flow of these suits.
       Nevertheless, Whitman told her people to move forward with 
     the emergency declaration. Those in the EPA who respect their 
     boss fear that Whitman may quit.
       She has taken heat for other White House decisions such as 
     a controversial decision on levels of arsenic in drinking 
     water, easing regulations to allow 50-year-old power plants 
     to operate without implementing modern pollution controls and 
     a dozen other actions which environmentalists say favor 
     industry over health.
       Newspapers in her home state of New Jersey ran front page 
     stories this month saying Whitman had told Bush she wanted to 
     leave the agency.
       Spokesman Martyak said his boss is staying on the job.


                         EPA WAS POISED TO ACT

       In October, the EPA complied with a freedom of Information 
     Act request and gave the Post-Dispatch access to thousands of 
     documents--in nine large file boxes. There were hundreds of 
     e-mails, scores of ``action memos'' describing the 
     declaration and piles of ``communication strategies'' for how 
     the announcement would be made.
       The documents illustrated the internal and external battle 
     over getting the declaration and announcement released.

[[Page 2571]]

       One of the most contentious concerns was the anticipated 
     national backlash from the Libby declaration. EPA officials 
     knew that if the agency announced that the insulation in 
     Montana was so dangerous that an emergency had to be 
     declared, people elsewhere whose homes contained the same 
     contaminated Zonolite would want answers or perhaps demand to 
     have their homes cleaned.
       The language of the declaration was molded to stress how 
     unique Libby was and to play down the national problem.
       But many in the agency's headquarters and regional offices 
     didn't buy it.
       In a Feb. 22 memo, the EPA's Office of Pollution Prevention 
     and Toxics said ``the national ramifications are enormous'' 
     and estimated that if only 1 million homes have Zonolite 
     ``(are) we not put in a position to remove their (insulation) 
     at a national cost of over $10 billion?''
       The memo also questioned the agency's claim that the age of 
     Libby's homes and severe winter conditions in Montana 
     required a higher level of maintenance, which in turn meant 
     increased disturbance of the insulation in the homes there.
       It's ``a shallow argument,'' the memo said. ``There are 
     older homes which exist in harsh or harsher conditions across 
     the country. Residents in Maine and Michigan might find this 
     argument flawed.''
       No one knows precisely how many dwellings are insulated 
     with Zonolite. Memos from the EPA and the Agency for Toxic 
     Substances and Disease Registry repeatedly cite an estimate 
     of between 15 million and 35 million homes.
       A government analysis of shipping records from W.R. Grace 
     show that at least 15.6 billion pounds of vermiculite ore was 
     shipped from Libby to 750 plants and factories throughout 
     North America.
       Between a third and half of that ore was popped into 
     insulation and usually sold in 3-foot-high kraft paper bags.
       Government extrapolations and interviews with former W.R. 
     Grace Zonolite salesmen indicate that Illinois may have as 
     many as 800,000 homes with Zonolite, Michigan as many as 
     700,000. Missouri is likely to have Zonolite in 380,000 
     homes.
       With four processing plants in St. Louis, it is estimated 
     that more than 60,000 homes, offices and schools were 
     insulated with Zonolite in the St. Louis area alone.
       Eventually, the internal documents show, acceptance grew 
     that the agency should declare a public health emergency.
       In a confidential memo dated March 28, an EPA official said 
     the declaration was tentatively set for April 5.
       But the declaration never came. Instead, Superfund boss 
     Horinko on May 9 quietly ordered that asbestos be removed 
     from contaminated homes in Libby. There was no national 
     warning of potential dangers from Zonolite. And there was no 
     promise of long-term medical care for Libby's ill and dying. 
     The presence of the White House budget office is noted 
     throughout the documents. The press announcement of the 
     watered-down decision was rewritten five times the day before 
     it was released to accommodate budget office wording changes 
     that played down the changes that played down the dangers.


                          dangers of zonolite

       The asbestos in Zonolite, like all asbestos products, is 
     believed to be either a minimal risk or no risk if it is not 
     disturbed. The asbestos fibers must be airborne to be 
     inhaled. The fibers then become trapped in the lungs, where 
     they may cause asbestosis, lung cancer and mesothelioma, a 
     fast-moving cancer of the lung's lining.
       The EPA's files are filled with studies documenting the 
     toxicity of tremolite, how even minor disruptions of the 
     material by moving boxes, sweeping the floor or doing repairs 
     in attics can generate asbestos fibers.
       This also has been confirmed by simulations W.R. Grace ran 
     in Weed-sport, N.Y. in July 1977; by 1997 studies by the 
     Canadian Department of National Defense; and by the U.S. 
     Public Health Service, which reported in 2000, that ``even 
     minimal handling by workers or residents poses a substantial 
     health risk.''
       Last December, a study by Christopher Weis, the EPA's 
     senior toxicologist supporting the Libby project, reported 
     that ``the concentrations of asbestos fibers that occur in 
     air following disturbance of (insulation) may reach levels of 
     potential human health concerns.''
       Most of those who have studied the needle-sharp tremolite 
     fibers in the Libby ore consider them far more dangerous than 
     other asbestos fibers.
       In October, the EPA team leading the cleanup of lower 
     Manhattan after the attacks of Sept. 11 went to Libby to meet 
     with Peronard and his crew. The EPA had reversed an early 
     decision and announced that it would be cleaning asbestos 
     from city apartments.
       Libby has been a laboratory for doing just that.
       Peronard told the visitors from New York just how dangerous 
     tremolite is. He talked about the hands-on research in Libby 
     of Dr. Alan Whitehouse, a pulmonologist who had worked for 
     NASA and the Air Force on earlier projects before moving to 
     Spokane, Wash.
       ``Whitehouse's research on the people here gave us our 
     first solid lead of how bad this tremolite is,'' Peronard 
     said.
       Whitehouse has not only treated 500 people from Libby who 
     are sick and dying from exposure to tremolite. The chest 
     specialist also has almost 300 patients from Washington 
     shipyards and the Hanford, Wash., nuclear facility who are 
     suffering health effects from exposure to the more prevalent 
     chrysotile asbestos.
       Comparing the two groups, Whitehouse has demonstrated that 
     the tremolite from Libby is 10 times as carcinogenic as 
     chrysotile and probably 100 times more likely to produce 
     mesothelioma than chrysotile.
       W.R. Grace has maintained that its insulation is safe. On 
     April 3 of this year, the company wrote a letter to Whitman 
     again insisting its product was safe and that no public 
     health declaration or nationwide warning was warranted.
       Dr. Brad Black, who runs the asbestos clinic in Libby and 
     acts as health officer for Montana's Lincoln County, says 
     ``people have a right to be warned of the potential danger 
     they may face if they disturb that stuff.''
       Marytak, chief EPA spokesman, argues that the agency has 
     informed the public of the potential dangers. ``It's on our 
     Web site,'' he said.
       Sen. Patty Murray, D-Wash., is sponsoring legislation to 
     ban asbestos in the United States. She said the Web site 
     warning is a joke.
       ``EPA's answer that people have been warned because it's on 
     their Web site is ridiculous,'' she said. ``If you have a 
     computer, and you just happened to think about what's in your 
     attic, and you happen to be on EPA's Web page, then you get 
     to know. This is not the way the safety of the public is 
     handled.
       ``We, the government, the EPA, the administration have a 
     responsibility to at least let people know the information so 
     they can protect themselves if they go into those attics,'' 
     she said.

  Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, because of OMB's involvement, EPA never 
conducted the planned outreach to warn people about Zonolite. NIOSH's 
guidance to workers about how to protect themselves was never 
finalized.
  In response to these shocking reports, on January 3, 2003, I wrote to 
EPA Administrator Whitman and OMB Director Daniels to get some answers.
  Mr. Daniels has not yet responded to the allegations that his office 
blocked the announcement.
  Ms. Whitman wrote that she is responding on behalf of OMB. I can only 
ascribe this to OMB's desire to remain unaccountable and to hide the 
role it played in these decisions.
  Ms. Whitman's response was woefully inadequate. She failed to explain 
the nature or the substance of OMB's involvement. She also wrote that 
it is not possible to know how many homes contain vermiculite 
insulation even though HER OWN AGENCY has estimated it may be between 
15 and 35 million homes, schools, and businesses.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Administrator Whitman's 
letter be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:
                                                U.S. Environmental


                                            Protection Agency,

                                 Washington, DC, January 16, 2003.
     Hon. Patty Murray,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Murray: Thank, you for your letters dated 
     January 3, 2003, to me and Mitch Daniels, Director of the 
     Office of Management and Budget (OMB), regarding EPA's 
     efforts to address asbestos contamination in the town of 
     Libby, Montana. I am responding for both OMB and the 
     Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
       I assure you that since my tenure at the Agency, every 
     action regarding Libby, Montana has been taken with the goal 
     of protecting the health of Libby residents from further 
     harm. After visiting with the residents of Libby Montana in 
     September 2001, I committed to have EPA do everything as 
     quickly and comprehensively as possible to remove the 
     multiple sources of asbestos exposure of Libby residents. The 
     Action Memo signed on May 9, 2002, authorized significant 
     additional measures in Libby, including the removal of attic 
     insulation. Cleanup work has proceeded at an aggressive pace 
     and substantial sources of exposure have already been 
     removed.
       While enclosed are EPA's Office of Solid Waste and 
     Emergency Response detailed responses to your questions, I 
     want to make it clear that neither OMB nor any other Federal 
     agencies directed EPA to take a specific course of action 
     regarding whether to employ the public health emergency 
     provision of the Comprehensive Environmental Response and 
     Liability Act (``CERCLA'', or the Superfund Law). The Agency 
     made its decision regarding the removal of asbestos 
     contaminated vermiculite attic insulation from Libby homes in 
     order to reduce the cumulative exposure to residents as 
     quickly as

[[Page 2572]]

     possible. EPA based this decision on many factors, including 
     legal, scientific, and practical considerations. The Agency 
     concluded that asbestos contaminated vermiculite insulation 
     found in homes in Libby could be removed without a public 
     health emergency. Ultimately, EPA chose not to rely upon 
     CERCLA's health emergency provision, in part, to minimize the 
     possibility of removal work being delayed by possible legal 
     challenges to this untested approach, and instead relied upon 
     more traditional removal authorities.
       Additional, I want to clarify that the decision to proceed 
     with the cleanup in Libby is unrelated to the larger issue of 
     whether asbestos contaminated vermiculite insulation poses a 
     risk outside of Libby, Montana. Several questions in your 
     letter imply that invoking the public health provision in 
     CERCLA for the situation in Libby would give the Agency 
     additional authority or impose additional requirements to 
     inform the public nationwide about the health risks 
     associated with asbestos contaminated vermiculite attic 
     insulation. This is not the case. While the experience and 
     data collected in Libby are important to a larger national 
     evaluation, the Libby cleanup and the Agency's national 
     evaluation of the potential risks of asbestos contaminated 
     attic insulation are on parallel but different tracks.
       Again, thank you for your support of EPA's cleanup efforts 
     in Libby, Montana and your commitment to making sure that 
     people nationwide are not at risk from asbestos. The Agency 
     looks forward to working with you and your staff to continue 
     our mutual goal to protect the health and welfare of the 
     residents of Libby, Montana, and of the United States. If you 
     have further questions or concerns, please contact me, or 
     your staff may contact Betsy Henry in the Office of 
     Congressional and Intergovernmental Relations at (202) 564-
     7222.
           Sincerely yours,
     Christine Todd Whitman.
                                  ____


Enclosure: EPA Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response and Office 
             of Prevention, Pesticides and Toxic Substances


 Detailed Responses to Senator Patty Murray's Questions on Vermiculite 
            Attic Insulation and the Libby, Montana Clean-Up

     1. What were EPA's recommendations on formation of a policy 
         to inform consumers of potential dangers from exposure to 
         Zonolite insulation?
       The Agency's activity in Libby reflects a unique situation 
     where citizens have been exposed for many years to 
     widespread, high levels of asbestos contamination, and suffer 
     unprecedented rates of asbestos related illness. After 
     extensive consideration of scientific and health-related 
     information, the Agency concluded that residents in Libby 
     were a sensitive population, and asbestos exposure which 
     would otherwise present an acceptable risk to a healthy 
     population may cause an increase in disease for a highly 
     impacted community like Libby. EPA decided to remove all 
     potential sources of exposure to asbestos in Libby, including 
     asbestos contamination in yards, playgrounds, parks, 
     industrial sites, the interiors of homes and businesses, and 
     vermiculite attic insulation.
       The Agency's guidance to consumers outside of Libby has 
     consistently been to manage in place asbestos or asbestos 
     containing products found in the home. Based on currently 
     available information and studies the Agency continues to 
     believe that, absent the unique conditions present at Libby, 
     vermiculite insulation poses minimal risk if left 
     undisturbed. If removal of the insulation is desired, the 
     Agency recommends that this work be done professionally.
       To better understand the potential risks of asbestos 
     contaminated vermiculite attic insulation, EPA's Office of 
     Prevention, Pesticides and Toxic Substances (OPPTS) initiated 
     the first phase of a limited study to evaluate the level of 
     asbestos in vermiculite attic insulation in homes in the 
     Spring of 2001. The study included six homes in Vermont and 
     simulations in an enclosure. This preliminary study will be 
     used to help the Agency design the next phase of a more 
     comprehensive study and to help determine whether the 
     Agency's guidance in place for many years--to manage asbestos 
     contaminated material in place or hire professionals to 
     conduct removals--is still appropriate or should be revised. 
     Formal external peer review is finished for the first phase 
     of the study. The Agency's Office of Research and Development 
     (ORD), as well as others, are currently reviewing the 
     preliminary study.
       Based on the findings from this study, EPA will revise or 
     supplement the existing guidance and outreach materials as 
     necessary, and further inform the public about how best to 
     manage vermiculite attic insulation.
     2. To what extent were OMB and other federal agencies and 
         departments involved in the decision whether to declare a 
         public health emergency in Libby or to notify people 
         nationwide of the dangers potentially posed by exposure 
         to Zonolite?
       EPA consulted extensively with other federal and state 
     partners in determining the best course of action to address 
     all sources of asbestos contamination in Libby. This included 
     the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Department of 
     Health and Human Services, the Center for Disease Control, 
     the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, U.S. 
     Geological Survey, Occupational Safety and Health 
     Administration, the State of Montana, and many others. These 
     consultations focused on scientific issues associated with 
     asbestos contaminated vermiculite exposure, not to discuss 
     public health emergency declarations. The Agency was also 
     contacted by several members of Congress who wished to 
     express the depth of their concern and share their views 
     regarding this matter. In general, EPA tries to share 
     information and discuss potential response decisions with 
     interested parties, especially those with expertise in the 
     area, so it can make the most informed decision.
       After consulting broadly with experts in the field, the 
     Agency determined a course of action regarding both the 
     removal of asbestos contaminated vermiculite attic insulation 
     and the public outreach to be conducted beyond Libby, 
     Montana. These decisions were made by the Administrator, in 
     close consultation with the Office of Solid Waste and 
     Emergency Response, the Office of Enforcement and Compliance 
     Assurance, the Office of General Counsel, the Office of 
     Prevention, Pesticides and Toxic Substances, and EPA Region 
     8.
     3. What process did the Administration use in making these 
         decisions? Specifically what roles did individual 
         agencies play and who in these agencies was involved in 
         the process?
       EPA's primary focus was on protecting the residents of 
     Libby by removing the multiple sources of asbestos exposure 
     as quickly as possible. EPA considered many factors, 
     including the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution 
     Contingency Plan. Ultimately, the Agency chose not to rely 
     upon CERCLA's health emergency provision, in part, to 
     minimize the possibility of removal work being delayed by 
     possible legal challenges to this novel approach, and instead 
     relied upon more traditional removal authorities. EPA 
     concluded that homes in Libby contained vermiculite attic 
     insulation that did not constitute a ``product.'' The Agency 
     therefore could clean up the insulation without addressing 
     the question of whether it constituted a public health 
     emergency.
       In making its response decisions in Libby, EPA engaged in a 
     major effort to discuss and consider the issues associated 
     with its approach to cleaning up asbestos contamination, both 
     in Libby and at more than 20 contaminated sites out of the 
     241 domestic vermiculite processing facilities. Although 175 
     of these sites had processed Libby vermiculite, EPA's 
     sampling confirmed that contamination only remained at 22 
     sites. To date, EPA or the responsible parties have cleaned 
     up or have cleanup underway at 10 of these sites and the 
     remaining 12 sites are either being addressed or are under 
     further investigation and response planning. This effort has 
     been one of the most significant actions ever taken under the 
     Superfund program, and has involved the participation and 
     collaboration of a great many people and organizations at the 
     local, state and federal level.
     4. Which outside parties, such as corporations, non-
         governmental organizations or associations, did EPA 
         consult with on these decisions?
       During the more than two years in which EPA has been 
     working on Libby, Agency officials have met with the Libby 
     community and its Technical Assistance Group, other agencies, 
     businesses in Libby and international corporations, various 
     associations, the State and subcommittees of both houses of 
     the U.S. Congress. Community members, the Vermiculite 
     Association, and W.R. Grace Corporation have all corresponded 
     with the Agency to state their opinions or to ask for 
     information about our work at the site.
     5. What was OMB's final recommendation to EPA? What 
         recommendations, if any, did EPA receive from other 
         federal agencies and departments?
       Neither OMB, nor any other federal agency directed EPA to 
     use a specific course of action regarding whether to employ 
     the health emergency provision of CERCLA. As stated 
     previously, EPA consulted extensively with other federal 
     partners, including OMB, in determining the best course of 
     action to address all sources of asbestos contamination.
     6. Who ultimately directed EPA not to issue a public health 
         emergency in Libby last spring nor to proactively notify 
         the public in a proper manner?
       No one directed the Agency. The decision was made by EPA. 
     After searching broadly for input from the many agencies 
     within the Executive Branch with expertise to inform our 
     thinking, the Agency decided to perform the cleanup under 
     traditional Superfund program removal authorities. 
     Furthermore, regarding outreach on the Libby decision, the 
     Agency has conducted many public meetings concerning the 
     Libby cleanup, and testified before Congress in July, 2001. 
     Since the Agency's first removal actions, the On-Scene 
     Coordinator in Libby has been in regular contact with the 
     citizens of Libby discussing the progress of the cleanup and 
     communicating about the issues of the vermiculite attic 
     insulation. The Administrator also

[[Page 2573]]

     spoke extensively on issues concerning vermiculite 
     contamination during her visit to Libby, Montana in September 
     of 2001.
     7. What are EPA's most current estimates of how many homes, 
         businesses and schools still contain Zonolite? How did 
         EPA derive these numbers?
       Over the years several attempts have been made to estimate 
     the number of homes that may contain vermiculite attic 
     insulation. While numbers have been included in at least one 
     study conducted for the Agency in 1985, the Agency does not 
     believe that these estimates are reliable. EPA recently again 
     tried to estimate the number of homes, businesses and schools 
     that may still contain vermiculite attic insulation but again 
     determined that this task was virtually impossible to 
     complete because there is little information about how many 
     homes contain vermiculite insulation (outside of Libby) as 
     well as little data about what happens to homes after they 
     are built. Any numbers derived from such an effort would be 
     inaccurate and misleading.
       In the Libby valley, the Agency is identifying which homes 
     contain asbestos contaminated vermiculite insulation in the 
     attic and wall space by visually inspecting homes. The good 
     news is that EPA is finding vermiculite insulation in fewer 
     homes than the Agency anticipated in this region.

  Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, my colleagues may be curious about why I 
am so interested in EPA's decisions regarding vermiculite from Libby.
  This issue is important to me because residents in my State are being 
exposed to asbestos from Zonolite.
  And, Mr. President, constituents in your state and every other State 
in America may also have this insulation.
  I am deeply concerned that most people with Zonolite in their homes 
are completely unaware of this problem. I am afraid most will not learn 
of it until they have already been exposed to dangerous levels of 
asbestos. And I am most concerned that this administration may be 
stifling EPA's efforts to warn homeowners, consumers, and workers 
because of pressure from W.R. Grace.
  And I must remind my colleagues: there is no safe known level of 
exposure to asbestos. Deadly diseases such as asbestosis, lung cancer 
and mesothelioma can develop decades after just brief exposures to high 
concentrations of asbestos.
  Ultimately, I believe Administrator Whitman wanted to do the right 
thing by warning homeowners nationwide to be careful if they have 
Zonolite in their homes when the agency began removing Zonolite from 
homes in Libby, MT. But she was stopped. The reasons may never be 
known--the excuse may be buried in ``executive privilege.''
  So where do we go from here?
  First, I hope my colleagues will support efforts to get to the bottom 
of what stopped the EPA from warning the public. We have to increase 
pressure on EPA, NIOSH, and other public health agencies to raise 
public awareness about Zonolite.
  Second, I hope my colleagues will support legislation to ban asbestos 
in America and to warn people about the potential dangers posed by 
Zonolite insulation.
  I appreciate the support for this legislation I have received from 
Senators Baucus, Cantwell, Dayton, and our late colleague, Senator 
Wellstone, who were original cosponsors.
  I have been working to raise awareness about the current dangers of 
asbestos for over 2 years.
  In July of 2001, I chaired a Senate Health, Education, Labor and 
Pensions Committee hearing on asbestos and workplace safety.
  In June of 2002, 2 days after introducing the Ban Asbestos in America 
Act, I testified at a Senate Environment and Public Works Committee 
hearing on Libby held by Senator Baucus.
  My colleagues may wonder whatever happened to Ralph Busch and his 
wife Donna.
  After reading about Zonolite in the Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Mr. 
Busch went to get the asbestos removed from his home. He learned it 
would cost $32,000 to do so.
  When he tried to secure compensation from his homeowners insurance to 
pay to clean up the contamination, his insurance company rejected the 
claim.
  He got nowhere with the company that had inspected the home before he 
purchased it. They hadn't known about Zonolite, either.
  When he talked to his realtor about trying to sell his house, Mr. 
Busch's realtor emphasized that Mr. Busch and his wife would be 
responsible under the law for disclosing the presence of Zonolite to 
any potential buyer.
  According to Mr. Busch, even his realtor--and I quote--``. . . 
expressed apprehension over entering the house saying he has young 
children and was fearful of asbestos exposure without a proper 
respirator . . . this about a house we were living in every day.''
  In the end, having exhausted all of his options, Ralph Busch and his 
wife Donna sacrificed their home to foreclosure, having lost thousands 
of dollars and their good credit rating. They didn't feel that it was 
safe to live there anymore, or to bring other people into their home. 
Finally, they decided to move out of their ``dream house'' in Spokane. 
To this day, that home remains vacant.
  Apart from the tremendous economic loss, Mr. Busch and his wife are 
concerned for their health. They are left wondering what long-term 
negative health effects they may suffer as a result of their exposure 
to asbestos fibers from the insulation.
  Mr. Busch has told me, ``I feel like the poster-child for the 
unsuspecting homeowner who unknowingly set off a time bomb in the 
process of remodeling his home.''
  To this day, Mr. Busch is haunted by words he read in the Spokesman-
Review almost three years ago. The March 12, 2000, article, entitled, 
``Zonolite's Effects Outlive Plant,'' said this about mesothelioma.

       [The disease] inflicts one of the most torturous deaths 
     known to humankind. Some people require intravenous morphine 
     to numb mesothelioma's pain. Some need part of their spinal 
     cord severed. Some are driven to suicide.

  If there is a role for Government in people's lives, then it should 
include protecting the public health. We have an opportunity to protect 
the public's health so that Ralph Busch and thousands--perhaps 
millions--of other Americans won't have to be needlessly exposed to the 
time bomb sitting in their homes, schools, and businesses.
  And meanwhile, if you are planning to do work in your attic, look at 
your insulation carefully first to see if it is vermiculite. You can 
see pictures of what this insulation looks like by going to EPA's web 
site, which is www.epa.gov/asbestos/insulation.html.
  If you think you have Zonolite, immediately contact EPA to get 
additional advice about how to handle it. According to EPA's web site, 
if you think you have Zonolite insulation, leave it alone and not 
disturb it. And then contact your Representative in Congress and ask 
him or her to pass legislation to ban asbestos, something we all should 
have done decades ago. We can make a difference, but we must act today.
  Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I would just like to follow up on the 
statements regarding asbestos-contaminated insulation made by my good 
friend from Washington, Senator Murray. The issues she raises are 
extremely important, and I applaud her for her determined efforts on 
behalf of her constituents, and her dedication to raising the profile 
of the continued hazards associated with asbestos.
  I was very moved by Senator Murray's description of what happened to 
her constituent in Spokane, WA. I agree with her 100 percent that the 
Government should not be in the business of keeping important health-
related information from the public, including information about the 
health risks posed by Zonolite insulation. Again, I commend the Senator 
from Washington for her leadership in championing this important public 
health and safety issue.
  I just believe it is important for me to speak directly to the 
experience of my constituents in Libby, MT, to put some of this into 
perspective.
  The experience of the residents of Libby is truly, tragically, 
unique. This little town in northwestern Montana, surrounded by 
millions of acres of Federal forest lands, has lost over 200 people to 
asbestos-related diseases and cancers. Hundreds more are sick, and 
thousands more may become sick. Libby doesn't have that many people.

[[Page 2574]]

The magnitude of this tragedy is staggering.
  The vermiculite mining and milling operations of W.R. Grace belched 
thousands and thousands of pounds of asbestos-contaminated dust into 
the air in and around Libby, coating the town and its inhabitants with 
the deadly substance. Folks used raw vermiculite ore or expanded 
vermiculite to fill their gardens, their driveways, the high school 
track, the little league field, in their homes and attics. W.R. Grace 
mineworkers brought the dust home with them on their clothing and 
contaminated their own families, without knowing the dust was poison. 
Asbestos was absolutely everywhere in Libby, for decades.
  It is also becoming more and more clear that the fibers unique to 
Libby, including tremolite asbestos fibers, are particularly deadly--
more so than other forms of asbestos, such as chrysotile asbestos. 
Senator Murray is absolutely right to be concerned about insulation 
manufactured from vermiculite ore mined and milled in Libby.
  But let me also be clear, that the situation in Libby demanded a 
unique, determined, and coordinated response from the Environmental 
Protection Agency, other Federal agencies, the State, and the community 
itself just to address the enormous task of cleaning up the town 
because, as I just mentioned, the contaminated vermiculite was 
everywhere.
  Because of the extraordinary levels of asbestos contamination in 
Libby, an important part of this clean-up effort included removing 
asbestos-contaminated materials from Libby homes. People in Libby used 
vermiculite insulation, raw vermiculite tailings, or other vermiculite 
material that they brought home from W.R. Grace to fill their walls and 
attics.
  Last year, I personally urged the EPA to leave no stone unturned as 
it sought to determine how to best begin an expeditious removal of 
contaminated materials from homes in Libby, in an effort to continue to 
reduce the exposure of Libby residents to deadly tremolite asbestos. 
The EPA responded admirably to my requests, and as Senator Murray 
mentioned, the agency is currently removing asbestos-contaminated 
vermiculite material from homes in Libby.
  I only highlight these issues because I believe the timing and scope 
of the EPA's decision to go into Libby homes and remove the vermiculite 
in their walls and ceilings was absolutely appropriate and necessary 
given the sheer volume of asbestos to which the people in Libby have 
been exposed.
  Should the EPA have issued a public health emergency declaration in 
Libby prior to taking that action? I don't know. What I do know is that 
the decision was made and the correct on-the-ground result is happening 
in Libby. I have recently written to Administrator Whitman asking her 
to explain to me any health care benefits that may or may not be 
available to the people of Libby in the event that a public health 
emergency is declared in Libby. At this point, that is the most 
important issue to the people in Libby.
  In fact, the Montana delegation, the State of Montana, the community 
of Libby, and many concerned private citizens have been working hard to 
bring new economic development and much-needed health care resources to 
Libby. It is amazing to see how everyone has come together to create 
something positive from a terrible situation.
  The people in Libby are proud folks. They have had more than their 
share of hard knocks, and they just keep on going--getting up and 
trying. They are survivors, and I am privileged to know them so well. 
In January of 2000, I traveled to Libby to meet with 25 extremely ill 
people for the first time.
  I had been briefed a number of times on what I might expect to hear 
that night. These kind men and women--some whom are no longer with us--
gathered to share huckleberry pie and coffee in the home of Gayla 
Benefield. They opened their hearts and poured out unimaginable stories 
of suffering and tragedy on a scale I was absolutely stunned and 
unprepared to hear: entire families--fathers, mothers, uncles, aunts, 
sons, and daughters all dead and all bound by their exposure to 
tremolite asbestos, mined by W.R. Grace in this isolated, community of 
several thousand--located as far away from Washington, DC, as one can 
be, with a foot still in Montana.
  I will never forget meeting another gentleman who has become my dear 
friend, Les Skramstad. Les watched me closely all evening. He was wary 
and approached me after his friends and neighbors had finished 
speaking. He said to me, Senator, a lot of people have come to Libby 
and told us they would help, then they leave and we never hear from 
them again.
  ``Max,'' he said, ``please, as a man like me--as someone's father 
too, as someone's husband, as someone's son, help me. Help us. Help us 
make this town safe for Libby's sons and daughters not even born yet. 
They should not suffer my fate too. I was a miner and breathed that 
dust in. And what happened to me and all the other men who mined wasn't 
right--but what has happened to the others is a sin.
  ``Every day, I carried that deadly dust home on my clothes. I took it 
into our house, and I contaminated my own wife and each of my babies 
with it, too. Just like me, they are sick, and we will each die the 
same way. I just don't know how to live with the pain of what I have 
done to them. If we can make something good come of this, maybe I'll 
stick around to see that, maybe that could make this worthwhile.
  ``Find someone to use me, to study me, to learn something about this 
dust that is still in my lungs right now.'' I told him I would do all 
that I could and that I wouldn't back down and that I wouldn't give up. 
Les accepted my offer and then pointed his finger and said to me, 
``I'll be watching Senator.''
  Les is my inspiration. He is the face of hundreds and thousands of 
sick and exposed folks in this tiny Montana community. When I get 
tired, I think of Les, and I can't shake what he asked me to do. In all 
of my years as an elected official, this issue of doing what is right 
for Libby is among the most personally compelling things I have ever 
been called on to do.
  Doing what is right for the community and making something good come 
of it, is my mission in Libby, and I thank Les Skramstad every day for 
handing me out my marching orders. My staff and I have worked 
tirelessly in Libby--not for thanks or recognition but because the 
tragedy is just that gripping.
  The ``something good,'' Les challenged me to deliver keeps our eye on 
the ball. I secured the first dollars from HHS 3 years ago to establish 
the Clinic for Asbestos Related to Disease, to allow the Agency for 
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry to begin the necessary screening 
of folks who had been exposed to Libby's asbestos. Federal dollars have 
flowed to Libby for cleanup, healthcare, and revitalizing the economy.
  Last Congress, I was pleased to introduce the Libby Health Care Act, 
to secure longterm health funding for sick people in Libby, and I will 
introduce similar legislation this year. We seek ongoing funding for 
asbestos patient care and continue to closely monitor and support 
asbestos cleanup efforts by the Environmental Protection Agency.
  At the first field hearing I held in Libby of the Committee for 
Environment and Public Works, Dr. Blad Black, now the director of the 
Libby Clinic for Asbestos Related Disease, called for developing a 
research facility so that Libby's tragedy could be used to protect the 
health of men, women, and children.
  The wheels are on the cleanup and health screening, and the time for 
making Brad's vision a reality is here. Working together with Montana 
Congressional delegation and our State's Governor to develop a leading 
edge, world class research facility with the mission of one day 
developing cures for asbestos-related disease is exactly what Les 
called for that evening more than 3 years ago as well. He and the 
hundreds and thousands who suffer like Les and his family have my 
commitment.

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