[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 2]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 2054-2055]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




 AN EXCELLENT ARTICLE OUTLINING THE GREATER SIGNIFICANCE OF A SOLUTION 
                         TO THE CYPRUS QUESTION

                                 ______
                                 

                         HON. ROBERT E. ANDREWS

                             of new jersey

                    in the house of representatives

                       Tuesday, January 28, 2003

  Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Speaker, I rise before you today to bring to the 
attention of my colleagues an article that appeared in the National 
Review Online on January 14, 2003. This article, written by Nikolas K. 
Gvosdev, artfully details the greater significance of a solution to the 
division of Cyprus. I ask that my colleagues please review this 
article, and keep it in mind as we continue our efforts in the 108th 
Congress.

            [From the National Review Online, Jan. 14, 2003]

                 Cyprus, Iraq, and the War on Terrorism

                        (By Nikolas K. Gvosdev)

       At first glance, Cyprus would appear to have little 
     connection to either the forthcoming clash with Iraq or the 
     ongoing war against international terrorism. Yet, the fate of 
     this divided Mediterranean isle is closely linked with both. 
     British Defense Minister Geoff Hoon, visiting Turkey in an 
     effort to enlist Ankara's full participation in any potential 
     military action against Iraq, said on January 8th that it was 
     critical to demonstrate to Baghdad that the international 
     community was ``not simply going to pass resolutions and not 
     see them enforced'' and that ``we restore Iraq to the 
     international community as a peaceful neighbor of Turkey, 
     that we work together to ensure a peaceful outcome to the 
     present difficulties.'' Both outcomes are far more likely if 
     a U.N.-drafted peace plan for Cyprus is accepted as the basis 
     for a final agreement that would end a longstanding source of 
     instability and tension in the Eastern Mediterranean.
       Much attention has been rightfully focused on the February 
     28th deadline for a settlement. If an agreement cannot be 
     reached, only the portion of the island controlled by the 
     internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus will be 
     admitted, leaving the unrecognized ``Turkish Republic of 
     North Cyprus'' outside of the common European home, and 
     further impeding the eventual accession of the Turkish 
     mainland into the EU.
       But there are more immediate consequences. Carl Bildt, 
     former U.N. Special Envoy for the Balkans, observed that a 
     settlement for Cyprus ``concerns not only a divided island in 
     the eastern Mediterranean, or the relationship between two 
     important countries straddling the divide between Europe and 
     the Middle East. It is of key importance in the quest for 
     peace and stability in the entire post-Ottoman area that 
     stretches from Bihac in Bosnia in the north-west to Basra at 
     the Persian Gulf in the south-east.''
       The peace plan put forward by Kofi Annan envisions a bi-
     zonal, bi-communal federation for the island. Admittedly, it 
     is not a perfect solution, for it tries to balance between 
     the competing and clashing claims to self-determination of 
     Cyprus's Greek majority and Turkish minority. What it 
     attempts to do is to provide a workable mechanism for two 
     communities to live and co-exist in shared geographic space 
     within the framework of the internationally recognized 
     Cypriot state and under the rubric of a common Cypriot 
     nationality that does not require ethnic homogenization. At 
     the same time, it hopes to prevent the opening of a Pandora's 
     box that could plague the entire Eastern Mediterranean: 
     revising state boundaries; a plague that many fervently hoped 
     the 1975 Helsinki Final Act had banished from Europe once and 
     for all.
       Iraq faces many of the same issues that bedevil Cyprus. Its 
     current solution has been to subordinate all regional and 
     ethnic groups to the personal, dictatorial tyranny of Saddam 
     Hussein. When his regime falls, however, something must take 
     its place. Simply dividing Iraq into three ``cantons'' (a 
     Shiite province in the south, a Sunni center, and a Kurdish 
     statelet in the north) is a recipe for disaster. Not only 
     does such a ``solution'' fail to consider that populations 
     are not neatly segmented (Baghdad, after all, has a largely 
     Shiite population) and ignore other ethnic minorities 
     dispersed throughout the country, it would preclude any 
     central ``Iraqi'' identity from developing. This, in turn, 
     would increase the risk of regional strife that would draw in 
     neighboring states. (I commend readers to Dan Byman's 
     excellent essay on this subject.)
       On the other hand, a functioning Cypriot bi-zonal, bi-
     communal federation could serve as a model for reconstructing 
     postwar Iraq in a fashion that respects local autonomy yet 
     permits freedom of movement and investment across Iraq, 
     allows for the creation of a durable Iraqi ``identity'' and 
     maintains a viable Iraqi state within its current boundaries.
       Another reason for making a settlement on Cyprus an urgent 
     priority is that it can produce momentum toward solving other 
     lingering conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus that have 
     produced ``brown zones'' (whether unrecognized statelets like 
     Abkhazia or ill-defined international protectorates like 
     Kosovo) where definitive state authority is lacking. Such 
     ``holes'' in the international system help to facilitate the 
     activities of terrorists, organized crime factions and drug 
     smugglers. If a workable bicommunal, bi-zonal federation can 
     be created for Cyprus, it could then serve as a

[[Page 2055]]

     model upon which solutions for ethno-separatist conflicts 
     such as Nagorno-Karabakh or TransDniestria could be crafted. 
     It might also help to redefine and strengthen currently weak 
     states such as Bosnia, which endures largely because of the 
     ongoing infusion of outside capital and troops to sustain the 
     Dayton Accords. Crafting more viable states throughout the 
     arc of Eurasia serves long-term American interests as well. 
     After all, the best means for weakening international 
     terrorist networks are effective governments that can police 
     their borders and exercise supervision over their 
     territories.
       Cyprus is not simply a ``European'' problem. It requires 
     continued American effort as well. It is not a 
     ``distraction'' from the larger problems that beset the 
     United States. Rather, Cyprus may provide a way to deal with 
     larger headaches in the years ahead.

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