[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 2]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 1783-1784]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




   THREATS AND RESPONSES: TRACKING TERRORISM; 9/11 REPORT SAYS SAUDI 
                      ARABIA LINKS WENT UNEXAMINED

                                 ______
                                 

                           HON. MARCY KAPTUR

                                of ohio

                    in the house of representatives

                        Monday, January 27, 2003

  Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Speaker, I submit the following for the Record.

                  (By David Johnston and James Risen)

       A draft report by the joint Congressional committee looking 
     into the Sept. 11 attacks has concluded that the F.B.I. and 
     the C.I.A., in their investigations, did not aggressively 
     pursue leads that might have linked the terrorists to Saudi 
     Arabia, senior government officials said today.
       The report charged among other things that the authorities 
     had failed to investigate the possibility that two of the 
     hijackers, Saudis named Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaq Alhazmi, 
     received Saudi money from two Saudi men they met with in 
     California in the year before the attacks. The committee's 
     preliminary findings, which also accuse the Saudi government 
     of a lack of cooperation with American investigators, have 
     caused a bitter behind-the-scenes dispute between the panel's 
     staff and officials at the F.B.I. and the C.I.A. At each 
     agency, officials have disagreed with draft findings, saying 
     investigators vigorously pursued all available information 
     related to Saudi Arabia.
       Fifteen of the 19 hijackers were Saudi citizens, but little 
     is known about their backgrounds and how they were recruited 
     for the attacks. Most of the Saudis were part of a group that 
     investigators refer to as the ``muscle.'' These were men 
     recruited late in the planning for the operation, not as 
     pilots, but as an unskilled security force for the hijacking 
     operation. Their job was to keep passengers at bay as the 
     planes were commandeered and flown to their intended targets.
       In a rebuttal report sent to the committee in recent days, 
     the F.B.I. has tried to disprove several specific allegations 
     by the committee. One of them was about Mr. Midhar and Mr. 
     Alhazmi, who lived in Sand Diego a year before the attacks.
       While in California, the two met with Omar al-Bayoumi and 
     Osama Bassnan, each of whom was receiving financial support 
     from the Saudi government. The men were receiving stipends, 
     although officials said it was not exactly clear what kind. 
     The committee staff concluded in its draft findings that 
     investigators should have followed up on the meetings of the 
     four men to determine whether there might have been a Saudi 
     link to the hijacking plot.
       The F.B.I. is still investigating how much financial 
     support, if any, was provided by Mr. Bayoumi and Mr. Bassnan 
     to the two men who later turned out to be hijackers. The 
     bureau is also looking into whether senior Saudi officials in 
     the United States may have played some role in distributing 
     funds to Mr. Bayoumi and Mr. Bassnan.
       Today, the F.B.I. said in a statement that it had 
     ``aggressively pursued investigative leads regarding 
     terrorist support and activity.'' It added that Mr. Bayoumi 
     and Mr. Bassnan had both been charged with visa fraud after 
     the attacks.
       But by that time, Mr. Bayoumi was already in Britain, where 
     he was temporarily detained and then released because visa 
     fraud was not an extraditable offense. The F.B.I. statement 
     did not say where the two men were now or clarify the status 
     of the cases against them.
       Although the disagreement has not been publicly disclosed 
     until now, the debate over possible Saudi connections raises 
     a very sensitive political issue for the Bush administration. 
     Saudi Arabia is the largest oil producer in the world and one 
     of the United States' closest and most important allies in 
     the Persian Gulf at a time when the administration is 
     preparing for a possible war with Iraq.
       In its report to the committee, the F.B.I. said that it was 
     no uncommon for Saudis in the United States to receive 
     financial support from their government and that an inquiry 
     into the two me after the attacks had failed to produce 
     evidence that they had any link to the Sept. 11 plot. A 
     C.I.A. spokesman declined to comment about the joint 
     inquiry's investigation of the Saudi matter.
       Counterterrorism officials have said Mr. Midhar and Mr. 
     Alhazmi had paid for more of their expenses with cash, which 
     has made the investigation more difficult. They have also 
     denied finding any evidence that funds for the attacks were 
     channeled through Saudi Arabia or that the Riyadh government 
     had any connection to the hijackers.
       It remains unclear whether the draft conclusions about 
     Saudi Arabia will be included in the joint committee's final 
     report, which is to be completed in December in classified 
     form. An edited version is not expected to be made public 
     until next year, officials said.
       The Bush administration has sought to maintain close ties 
     with Riyadh even as investigators examining the backgrounds 
     of the hijackers have complained that they have received 
     little cooperation from the Saudi government.
       Investigators have yet to determine how the Saudi hijackers 
     were selected for the plot, who chose them or whether they 
     had help inside Saudi Arabia. Some American officials have 
     theorized that Mr. Midhar and Mr. Alhazmi may have returned 
     to Saudi Arabia from the United States to pick the Saudi 
     hijackers, but investigators have no firm conclusions.
       For their part, Saudi officials have said that they have 
     assisted in important aspects of the investigation--for 
     instance, providing confirmation of the identities of the 
     Saudi hijackers. The officials have also said the hijackers' 
     anti-American extremism did not represent mainstream thinking 
     in the kingdom, even though some American officials have long 
     regarded Islamic militancy as a serious problem that could 
     destabilize the authoritarian government.
       The tension between the joint inquiry staff and the F.B.I. 
     and C.I.A. is the latest to evolve from the inquiry into 
     lapses by intelligence and law enforcement agencies related

[[Page 1784]]

     to the Sept. 11 attacks. In a series of interim reports 
     released during committee hearings in recent months, the 
     joint panel had repeatedly criticized the performance of the 
     two agencies.
       Those sometimes scathing reports prompted officials at both 
     the F.B.I. and the C.I.A., including the director of central 
     intelligence, George J. Tenet, to criticize the joint panel's 
     methods. Officials have complained that it reached 
     conclusions based on scant evidence and that it took evidence 
     out of context.
       The joint committee has already held at least one closed 
     hearing on the F.B.I.'s relationship with a San Diego 
     informer, the landlord of Mr. Midhar and Mr. Alhazmi a year 
     before the attacks. The informer's role has become important 
     because his former tenants are the hijackers who have come 
     under the most intense scrutiny in the joint inquiry.
       Mr. Midhar and Mr. Alhazmi, who were aboard the American 
     Airlines plane that crashed into the Pentagon, were 
     identified as Qaeda operatives by the C.I.A. in January 2001. 
     But the C.I.A. did not ask the State Department to place 
     their names on a watch list intended to prevent entry into 
     the United States until late August. By then, they were both 
     in the country. The C.I.A. sent information about the two men 
     to the F.B.I. in late August, but by then there was little 
     time left for the bureau to track them down.
       The committee investigating the hijackers was also told by 
     a retired F.B.I. agent who was the bureau's contact with the 
     San Diego informer that he might have uncovered a hint of the 
     plot through his informer network if the C.I.A. had provided 
     the F.B.I. with more information earlier about the two men. 
     http://www.nytimes.com

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