[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 19]
[Senate]
[Pages 26884-26888]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                       SUPPORT OF AMERICAN TROOPS

  Mr. BOND. Madam President, I rise this morning in support of the U.S. 
forces in Iraq and all our forces engaged in the war on terrorism. I am 
delighted and very pleased that the vast majority of this body voted 
overwhelmingly in support of the supplemental and our ongoing efforts 
to protect our troops to finish the job so we can bring our troops 
home.
  Last week, I had the honor of going out to Walter Reed to visit a 
number of our wounded soldiers recently returned from Iraq. The spirit 
and enthusiasm of our service men and women serving in the war on 
terror is inspiring. It should remind all of us that our warfighters 
have the will to win as long as the American people have the will to 
win.
  We cannot be defeated by Saddam Hussein or Osama bin Laden 
militarily. They are engaged in a psychological war to break our will. 
This past weekend brought news of the tragic loss of 16 soldiers in a 
Chinook helicopter mishap. No one in this body takes that current 
conflict lightly. Any loss of life is difficult to bear, particularly 
this tragic situation. Yet we must not forget the losses incurred in 
the United States on 9/11, and the loss of innocent lives in other 
terrorist attacks, from the marine barracks in Lebanon to the disco 
bombing in Bali.
  The message we must send, if we are to avoid future catastrophic 
attacks, is that no price is too great for the freedoms we and other 
freedom-loving peoples now hold dear. The message we need to send our 
enemies is that we will not cut and run.
  There are critics of U.S. foreign policy who now want us to pull out. 
They are just dead wrong. Do they think Saddam Hussein was not really 
evil, was not really a threat?
  Last week, I talked a little bit about the unclassified report 
released by Dr. David Kay, the head of the Iraqi Survey Group, who has 
been over there looking. He has found a tremendous record of denial, 
deception, and destruction, which among other things is likely the 
reason we have not found the storehouses of weapons of mass 
destruction.
  Dr. Kay believes that people have been distorting his record. I will 
submit for the record a copy of his November 1, 2003, piece in the 
Washington Post. It begins:

       The October 26 front-page article ``Search in Iraq Fails to 
     Find Nuclear Threat,'' is wildly off the mark.

  I ask unanimous consent that this be printed in the Record after my 
remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. BOND. I am going to quote from just pieces of his report, because 
apparently a lot of my colleagues who are saying it confirms that there 
were no weapons of mass destruction have not read the report.
  Here is what Dr. Kay said:

       With regard to biological warfare activities, which has 
     been one of our two initial areas of focus, ISG teams are 
     uncovering significant information, including research and 
     development of BW-applicable organisms, the involvement of 
     Iraqi intelligence service in possible BW activities, and 
     deliberate concealment activities. All of this suggests Iraq, 
     after 1996, further compartmentalized its program and focused 
     on maintaining smaller, covert capabilities that could be 
     activated quickly to surge the production of BW agents. 
     Debriefings of IIS officials and site visits have begun to 
     unravel a clandestine network of laboratories and facilities 
     within the security service apparatus. This network was never 
     declared to the U.N. and was previously unknown.

  Again, he said two key former BW scientists confirmed that Iraq, 
under the guise of legitimate activity, developed refinements of 
processes and products relevant to BW agents. Iraq concealed equipment 
and materials from U.N. inspectors when they returned in 2002. One 
noteworthy example is a collection of referenced strains that ought to 
have been declared to the U.N. Among them was a vial of live C. 
botulinum Okra B from which a biological agent can be produced.
  ISG teams have developed multiple sources that indicate that Iraq 
explored the possibility of CW production in recent years, possibly as 
late as 2003.
  Information obtained since OIF has identified several key areas in 
which Iraq may have engaged in proscribed or undeclared activities 
since 1991, including research on a possible VX stabilizer, research 
and development for CW-capable munitions, and procurement concealment 
of dual-use materials and equipment.
  Officials assert Saddam would have resumed nuclear weapons 
development at some future point. Iraq did take steps to preserve some 
capability from the pre-1991 nuclear weapons program.
  Detainees and cooperative sources indicate that beginning in 2000, 
Saddam ordered the development of ballistic missiles with ranges of at 
least 400 kilometers and up to 1,000 kilometers, and that measures to 
conceal these projects from UNMOVIC were initiated in late 2002, ahead 
of the arrival of inspectors.
  Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Kay report be 
printed in the Record. It talks about several revelations of his 
efforts to obtain ballistic missiles and unmanned air vehicles.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       What have we found and what have we not found in the first 
     3 months of our work?
        We have discovered dozens of WMD-related program 
     activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq 
     concealed from the United Nations during the inspections that 
     began in late 2002. The discovery of these deliberate 
     concealment efforts have come about both through the 
     admissions of Iraqi scientists and officials concerning 
     information they deliberately withheld and through physical 
     evidence of equipment and activities that ISG has discovered 
     that should have been declared to the UN. Let me just

[[Page 26885]]

     give you a few examples of these concealment efforts, some of 
     which I will elaborate on later:
       A clandestine network of laboratories and safehouses within 
     the Iraqi Intelligence Service that contained equipment 
     subject to UN monitoring and suitable for continuing CBW 
     research.
       A prison laboratory complex, possibly used in human testing 
     of BW agents, that Iraqi officials working to prepare for UN 
     inspections were explicitly ordered not to declare to the UN.
       Reference strains of biological organisms concealed in a 
     scientist's home, one of which can be used to produce 
     biological weapons.
       New research on BW-applicable agents, Brucella and Congo 
     Crimean Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF), and continuing work on 
     ricin and aflatoxin were not declared to the UN.
       Documents and equipment, hidden in scientists' homes, that 
     would have been useful in resuming uranium enrichment by 
     centrifuge and electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS).
       A line of UAVs not fully declared at an undeclared 
     production facility and an admission that they had tested one 
     of their declared UAVs out to a range of 500 km, 350 km 
     beyond the permissible limit.
       Continuing covert capability to manufacture fuel propellant 
     useful only for prohibited SCUD variant missiles, a 
     capability that was maintained at least until the end of 2001 
     and that cooperating Iraqi scientists have said they were 
     told to conceal from the UN.
       Plans and advanced design work for new long-range missiles 
     with ranges up to at least 1000 km--well beyond the 150 km 
     range limit imposed by the UN. Missiles of a 1000 km range 
     would have allowed Iraq to threaten targets throughout the 
     Middle East, including Ankara, Cairo, and Abu Dhabi.
       Clandestine attempts between late 1999 and 2002 to obtain 
     from North Korea technology related to 1,300 km range 
     ballistic missiles--probably the No Dong--300 km range anti-
     ship cruise missiles, and other prohibited military 
     equipment.
       In addition to the discovery of extensive concealment 
     efforts, we have been faced with a systematic sanitization of 
     documentary and computer evidence in a wide range of offices, 
     laboratories, and companies suspected of WMD work. The 
     pattern of these efforts to erase evidence--hard drives 
     destroyed, specific files burned, equipment cleaned of all 
     traces of use--are ones of deliberate, rather than random, 
     acts. For example,
       On 10 July 2003 an ISG team exploited the Revolutionary 
     Command Council (RCC) Headquarters in Baghdad. The basement 
     of the main building contained an archive of documents 
     situated on well-organized rows of metal shelving. The 
     basement suffered no fire damage despite the total 
     destruction of the upper floors from coalition air strikes. 
     Upon arrival the exploitation team encountered small piles of 
     ash where individual documents or binders of documents were 
     intentionally destroyed. Computer hard drives had been 
     deliberately destroyed. Computers would have had financial 
     value to a random looter; their destruction, rather than 
     removal for resale or reuse, indicates a targeted effort to 
     prevent Coalition forces from gaining access to their 
     contents.
       All IIS laboratories visited by IIS exploitation teams have 
     been clearly sanitized, including removal of much equipment, 
     shredding and burning of documents, and even the removal of 
     nameplates from office doors.
       Although much of the deliberate destruction and 
     sanitization of documents and records probably occurred 
     during the height of OIF combat operations, indications of 
     significant continuing destruction efforts have been found 
     after the end of major combat operations, including entry in 
     May 2003 of the locked gated vaults of the Ba'ath party 
     intelligence building in Baghdad and highly selective 
     destruction of computer hard drives and data storage 
     equipment along with the burning of a small number of 
     specific binders that appear to have contained financial and 
     intelligence records, and in July 2003 a site exploitation 
     team at the Abu Ghurayb Prison found one pile of the 
     smoldering ashes from documents that was still warm to the 
     touch.
       I would now like to review our efforts in each of the major 
     lines of enquiry that ISG has pursued during this initial 
     phase of its work.
       With regard to biological warfare activities, which has 
     been one of our two initial areas of focus, ISG teams are 
     uncovering significant information--including research and 
     development of BW applicable organisms, the involvement of 
     Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) in possible BW activities, 
     and deliberate concealment activities. All of this suggests 
     Iraq after 1996 further compartmentalized its program and 
     focused on maintaining smaller, covert capabilities that 
     could be activated quickly to surge the production of BW 
     agents.
       Debriefings of IIS officials and site visits have begun to 
     unravel a clandestine network of laboratories and facilities 
     within the security service apparatus. This network was never 
     declared to the UN and was previously unknown. We are still 
     working on determining the extent to which this network was 
     tied to large-scale military efforts or BW terror weapons, 
     but this clandestine capability was suitable for preserving 
     BW expertise, BW capable facilities and continuing R&D--all 
     key elements for maintaining a capability for resuming 
     BW production. The IIS also played a prominent role in 
     sponsoring students for overseas graduate studies in the 
     biological sciences, according to Iraqi scientists and IIS 
     sources, providing an important avenue for furthering BW-
     applicable research. This was the only area of graduate 
     work that the IIS appeared to sponsor.
       Discussions with Iraqi scientists uncovered agent R&D work 
     that paired overt work with nonpathogenic organisms serving 
     as surrogates for prohibited investigation with pathogenic 
     agents. Examples include: B. Thurengiensis (Bt) with B. 
     anthracis (anthrax), and medicinal plants with ricin. In a 
     similar vein, two key former BW scientists, confirmed that 
     Iraq under the guise of legitimate activity developed 
     refinements of processes and products relevant to BW agents. 
     The scientists discussed the development of improved, 
     simplified fermentation and spray drying capabilities for the 
     simulant Bt that would have been directly applicable to 
     anthrax, and one scientist confirmed that the production line 
     for Bt could be switched to produce anthrax in one week if 
     the seed stock were available.
       A very large body of information has been developed through 
     debriefings, site visits, and exploitation of captured Iraqi 
     documents that confirms that Iraq concealed equipment and 
     materials from UN inspectors when they returned in 2002. One 
     noteworthy example is a collection of reference strains that 
     ought to have been declared to the UN. Among them was a vial 
     of live C. botulinum Okra B. from which a biological agent 
     can be produced. This discovery--hidden in the home of a BW 
     scientist--illustrates the point I made earlier about the 
     difficulty of locating small stocks of material that can be 
     used to covertly surge production of deadly weapons. The 
     scientist who concealed the vials containing this agent has 
     identified a large cache of agents that he was asked, but 
     refused, to conceal. ISG is actively searching for this 
     second cache.
       Additional information is beginning to corroborate 
     reporting since 1996 about human testing activities using 
     chemical and biological substances, but progress in this area 
     is slow given the concern of knowledgeable Iraqi personnel 
     about their being prosecuted for crimes against humanity.
       We have not yet been able to corroborate the existence of a 
     mobile BW production effort. Investigation into the origin of 
     and intended use for the two trailers found in northern Iraq 
     in April has yielded a number of explanations, including 
     hydrogen, missile propellant, and BW production, but 
     technical limitations would prevent any of these processes 
     from being ideally suited to these trailers. That said, 
     nothing we have discovered rules out their potential use in 
     BW production.
       We have made significant progress in identifying and 
     locating individuals who were reportedly involved in a mobile 
     program, and we are confident that we will be able to get an 
     answer to the questions as to whether there was a mobile 
     program and whether the trailers that have been discovered so 
     far were part of such a program.
       Let me turn now to chemical weapons (CW). In searching for 
     retained stocks of chemical munitions, ISG has had to contend 
     with the almost unbelievable scale of Iraq's conventional 
     weapons armory, which dwarfs by orders of magnitude the 
     physical size of any conceivable stock of chemical weapons. 
     For example, there are approximately 130 known Iraqi 
     Ammunition Storage Points (ASP), many of which exceed 50 
     square miles in size and hold an estimated 600,000 tons of 
     artillery shells, rockets, aviation bombs and other 
     ordinance. Of these 130 ASPs, approximately 120 still remain 
     unexamined. As Iraqi practice was not to mark much of their 
     chemical ordinance and to store it at the same ASPs that held 
     conventional rounds, the size of the required search effort 
     is enormous.
       While searching for retained weapons, ISG teams have 
     developed multiple sources that indicate that Iraq explored 
     the possibility of CW production in recent years, possibly as 
     late as 2003. When Saddam had asked a senior military 
     official in either 2001 or 2002 how long it would take to 
     produce new chemical agent and weapons, he told ISG that 
     after he consulted with CW experts in OMI he responded it 
     would take six months for mustard. Another senior Iraqi 
     chemical weapons expert in responding to a request in mid 
     2002 from Uday Husayn for CW for the Fedayeen Saddam 
     estimated that it would take two months to produce mustard 
     and two years for Sarin.
       We are starting to survey parts of Iraq's chemical industry 
     to determine if suitable equipment and bulk chemicals were 
     available for chemical weapons production. We have been 
     struck that two senior Iraqi officials volunteered that if 
     they had been ordered to resume CW production Iraq would have 
     been willing to use stainless steel systems that would be 
     disposed of after a few production runs, in place of 
     corrosive-resistant equipment which they did not have.
       We continue to follow leads on Iraq's acquisition of 
     equipment and bulk precursors

[[Page 26886]]

     suitable for a CW program. Several possibilities have emerged 
     and are now being exploited. One example involves a foreign 
     company with offices in Baghdad, that imported in the past 
     into Iraq dual-use equipment and maintained active contracts 
     through 2002. Its Baghdad office was found looted in August 
     2003, but we are pursuing other locations and associates of 
     the company.
       Information obtained since OIF has identified several key 
     areas in which Iraq may have engaged in proscribed or 
     undeclared activity since 1991, including research on a 
     possible VX stabilizer, research and development for CW-
     capable munitions, and procurement/concealment of dual-use 
     materials and equipment.
       Multiple sources with varied access and reliability have 
     told ISG that Iraq did not have a large, ongoing, centrally 
     controlled CW program after 1991. Information found to date 
     suggests that Iraq's large-scale capability to develop, 
     produce, and fill new CW munitions was reduced--if not 
     entirely destroyed--during Operations Desert Storm and Desert 
     Fox, 13 years of UN sanctions and UN inspections. We are 
     carefully examining dual-use, commercial chemical facilities 
     to determine whether these were used or planned as 
     alternative production sites.
       We have also acquired information related to Iraq's CW 
     doctrine and Iraq's war plans for OIF, but we have not yet 
     found evidence to confirm pre-war reporting that Iraqi 
     military units were prepared to use CW against Coalition 
     forces. Our efforts to collect and exploit intelligence on 
     Iraq's chemical weapons program have thus far yielded little 
     reliable information on post-1991 CW stocks and CW agent 
     production, although we continue to receive and follow leads 
     related to such stocks. We have multiple reports that Iraq 
     retained CW munitions made prior to 1991, possibly including 
     mustard--a long-lasting chemical agent--but we have to date 
     been unable to locate any such munitions.
       With regard to Iraq's nuclear program, the testimony we 
     have obtained from Iraqi scientists and senior government 
     officials should clear up any doubts about whether Saddam 
     still wanted to obtain nuclear weapons. They have told ISG 
     that Saddam Husayn remained firmly committed to acquiring 
     nuclear weapons. These officials assert that Saddam would 
     have resumed nuclear weapons development at some future 
     point. Some indicated a resumption after Iraq was free of 
     sanctions. At least one senior Iraqi official believed that 
     by 2000 Saddam had run out of patience with waiting for 
     sanctions to end and wanted to restart the nuclear program. 
     The Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) beginning around 
     1999 expanded its laboratories and research activities and 
     increased its overall funding levels. This expansion may have 
     been in initial preparation for renewed nuclear weapons 
     research, although documentary evidence of this has not been 
     found, and this is the subject of continuing investigation by 
     ISG.
       Starting around 2000, the senior Iraqi Atomic Energy 
     Commission (IAEC) and high-level Ba'ath Party official Dr. 
     Khalid Ibrahim Sa'id began several small and relatively 
     unsophisticated research initiatives that could be applied to 
     nuclear weapons development. These initiatives did not in-
     and-of themselves constitute a resumption of the nuclear 
     weapons program, but could have been useful in developing a 
     weapons-relevant science base for the long-term. We do not 
     yet have information indicating whether a higher government 
     authority directed Sa'id to initiate this research and, 
     regretfully, Dr. Sa'id was killed on April 8th during the 
     fall of Baghdad when the car he was riding in attempted to 
     run a Coalition roadblock.
       Despite evidence of Saddam's continued ambition to acquire 
     nuclear weapons, to date we have not uncovered evidence that 
     Iraq undertook significant post-1998 steps to actually build 
     nuclear weapons or produce fissile material. However, Iraq 
     did take steps to preserve some technological capability from 
     the pre-1991 nuclear weapons program.
       According to documents and testimony of Iraqi scientists, 
     some of the key technical groups from the pre-1991 nuclear 
     weapons program remained largely intact, performing work on 
     nuclear-relevant dual-use technologies within the Military 
     Industrial Commission (MIC). Some scientists from the pre-
     1991 nuclear weapons program have told ISG that they believed 
     that these working groups were preserved in order to allow a 
     reconstitution of the nuclear weapons program, but none of 
     the scientists could produce official orders or plans to 
     support their belief.
       In some cases, these groups performed work which could help 
     preserve the science base and core skills that would be 
     needed for any future fissile material production or nuclear 
     weapons development.
       Several scientists--at the direction of senior Iraqi 
     government officials--preserved documents and equipment from 
     their pre-1991 nuclear weapon-related research and did not 
     reveal this to the UN/IAEA. One Iraqi scientist recently 
     stated in an interview with ISG that it was a ``common 
     understanding'' among the scientists that material was being 
     preserved for reconstitution of nuclear weapons-related work.
       The ISG nuclear team has found indications that there was 
     interest, beginning in 2002, in reconstituting a centrifuge 
     enrichment program. Most of this activity centered on 
     activities of Dr. Sa'id that caused some of his former 
     colleagues in the pre-1991 nuclear program to suspect that 
     Dr. Sa'id, at least, was considering a restart of the 
     centrifuge program. We do not yet fully understand Iraqi 
     intentions, and the evidence does not tie any activity 
     directly to centrifuge research or development.
       Exploitation of additional documents may shed light on the 
     projects and program plans of Dr. Khalid Ibrahim Sa'id. There 
     may be more projects to be discovered in research placed at 
     universities and private companies. Iraqi interest in 
     reconstitution of a uranium enrichment program needs to be 
     better understood through the analysis of procurement records 
     and additional interviews.
       With regard to delivery systems, the ISG team has 
     discovered sufficient evidence to date to conclude that the 
     Iraqi regime was committed to delivery system improvements 
     that would have, if OIF had not occurred, dramatically 
     breached UN restrictions placed on Iraq after the 1991 Gulf 
     War.
       Detainees and co-operative sources indicate that beginning 
     in 2000 Saddam ordered the development of ballistic missiles 
     with ranges of at least 400km and up to 1000km and that 
     measures to conceal these projects from UNMOVIC were 
     initiated in late 2002, ahead of the arrival of inspectors. 
     Work was also underway for a clustered engine liquid 
     propellant missile, and it appears the work had progressed to 
     a point to support initial prototype production of some parts 
     and assemblies. According to a cooperating senior detainee, 
     Saddam concluded that the proposals from both the liquid-
     propellant and solid-propellant missile design centers would 
     take too long. For instance, the liquid-propellant missile 
     project team forecast first delivery in six years. Saddam 
     countered in 2000 that he wanted the missile designed and 
     built inside of six months. On the other hand several sources 
     contend that Saddam's range requirements for the missiles 
     grew from 400-500km in 2000 to 600-1000km in 2002. ISG has 
     gathered testimony from missile designers at Al Kindi State 
     Company that Iraq has reinitiated work on converting SA-2 
     Surface-to-Air Missiles into ballistic missiles with a range 
     goal of about 250km. Engineering work was reportedly underway 
     in early 2003, despite the presence of UNMOVIC. This program 
     was not declared to the UN. ISG is presently seeking 
     additional confirmation and details on this project. A second 
     cooperative source has stated that the program actually began 
     in 2001, but that it received added impetus in the run-up to 
     OIF, and that missiles from this project were transferred to 
     a facility north of Baghdad. This source also provided 
     documentary evidence of instructions to convert SA-2s into 
     surface-to-surface missiles.
       ISG has obtained testimony from both detainees and 
     cooperative sources that indicate that proscribed-range 
     solid-propellant missile design studies were initiated, or 
     already underway, at the time when work on the clustered 
     liquid-propellant missile designs began. The motor diameter 
     was to be 800 to 1000mm, i.e. much greater than the 500-mm 
     Ababil-100. The range goals cited for this system vary from 
     over 400km up to 1000km, depending on the source and the 
     payload mass.
       A cooperative source, involved in the 2001-2002 
     deliberations on the long-range solid propellant project, 
     provided ISG with a set of concept designs for a launcher 
     designed to accommodate a 1m diameter by 9m length missile. 
     The limited detail in the drawings suggest there was some way 
     to go before launcher fabrication. The source believes that 
     these drawings would not have been requested until the 
     missile progress was relatively advanced, normally beyond the 
     design state. The drawings are in CAD format, with files 
     dated 09/01/02.
       While we have obtained enough information to make us 
     confident that this design effort was underway, we are not 
     yet confident which accounts of the timeline and project 
     progress are accurate and are now seeking to better 
     understand this program and its actual progress at the time 
     of OIF.
       One cooperative source has said that he suspected that the 
     new large-diameter solid-propellant missile was intended to 
     have a CW-filled warhead, but no detainee has admitted any 
     actual knowledge of plans for unconventional warheads for any 
     current or planned ballistic missile. The suspicion expressed 
     by the one source about a CW warhead was based on his 
     assessment of the unavailability of nuclear warheads and 
     potential survivability problems of biological warfare agent 
     in ballistic missile warheads. This is an area of great 
     interest and we are seeking additional information on warhead 
     designs.
       While I have spoken so far of planned missile systems, one 
     high-level detainee has recently claimed that Iraq retained a 
     small quantity of Scud-variant missiles until at least 2001, 
     although he subsequently recanted these claims, work 
     continues to determine the truth. Two other sources contend 
     that Iraq continued to produce until 2001 liquid fuel and 
     oxidizer specific to Scud-type systems. The cooperating 
     source claims that the al Tariq Factory was used to 
     manufacture Scud oxidizer (IRFNA) from 1996 to 2001, and that 
     nitrogen tetroxide, a chief ingredient of IRFNA was collected 
     from a

[[Page 26887]]

     bleed port on the production equipment, was reserved, and 
     then mixed with highly concentrated nitric acid plus an 
     inhibitor to produce Scud oxidizer. Iraq never declared its 
     pre-Gulf War capability to manufacture Scud IRFNA out of 
     fear, multiple sources have stated, that the al Tariq Factory 
     would be destroyed, leaving Baghdad without the ability to 
     produce highly concentrated nitric acid, explosives and 
     munitions. To date we have not discovered documentary or 
     material evidence to corroborate these claims, but continued 
     efforts are underway to clarify and confirm this information 
     with additional Iraqi sources and to locate corroborating 
     physical evidence. If we can confirm that the fuel was 
     produced as late as 2001, and given that Scud fuel can only 
     be used in Scud-variant missiles, we will have strong 
     evidence that the missiles must have been retained until that 
     date. This would, of course, be yet another example of a 
     failure to declare prohibited activities to the UN.
       Iraq was continuing to develop a variety of UAV platforms 
     and maintained two UAV programs that were working in 
     parallel, one at Ibn Fernas and one at al-Rashid Air Force 
     Base. Ibn Fernas worked on the development of smaller, more 
     traditional types of UAVs in addition to the conversion of 
     manned aircraft into UAVs. This program was not declared to 
     the UN until the 2002 CAFCD in which Iraq declared the RPV-
     20, RPV-30 and Pigeon RPV systems to the UN. All these 
     systems had declared ranges of less than 150km. Several Iraqi 
     officials stated that the RPV-20 flew over 500km on autopilot 
     in 2002, contradicting Iraq's declaration on the system's 
     range. The al-Rashid group was developing a competing line of 
     UAVs. This program was never fully declared to the UN and is 
     the subject of on-going work by ISG. Additional work is also 
     focusing on the payloads and intended use for these UAVs. 
     Surveillance and use as decoys are uses mentioned by some of 
     those interviewed. Given Iraq's interest before the Gulf War 
     in attempting to convert a MIG-21 into an unmanned aerial 
     vehicle to carry spray tanks capable of dispensing chemical 
     or biological agents, attention is being paid to whether any 
     of the newer generation of UAVs were intended to have a 
     similar purpose. This remains an open question.
       ISG has discovered evidence of two primary cruise missile 
     programs. The first appears to have been successfully 
     implemented, whereas the second had not yet reached maturity 
     at the time of OIF.
       The first involved upgrades to the HY-2 coastal-defense 
     cruise missile. ISG has developed multiple sources of 
     testimony, which is corroborated in part by a captured 
     document, that Iraq undertook a program aimed at increasing 
     the HY-2's range and permitting its use as a land-attack 
     missile. These efforts extended the HY-2's range from its 
     original 100km to 150-180km. Ten modified missiles were 
     delivered to the military prior to OIF and two of these were 
     fired from Umm Qasr during OIF--one was shot down and one hit 
     Kuwait. The second program, called the Jenin, was a much more 
     ambitious effort to convert the HY-2 into a 1000km range 
     land-attack cruise missile. The Jenin concept was presented 
     to Saddam on 23 November 2001 and received what cooperative 
     sources called an ``unusually quick response'' in little more 
     than a week. The essence of the concept was to take an HY-2, 
     strip it of its liquid rocket engine, and put in its place a 
     turbine engine from a Russian helicopter--the TV-2-117 or 
     TV3-117 from a Mi-8 or Mi-17 helicopter. To prevent discovery 
     by the UN, Iraq halted engine development and testing and 
     disassembled the test stand in late 2002 before the design 
     criteria had been met.
       In addition to the activities detailed here on Iraq's 
     attempts to develop delivery systems beyond the permitted UN 
     150km, ISG has also developed information on Iraqi attempts 
     to purchase proscribed missiles and missile technology. 
     Documents found by ISG describe a high level dialogue between 
     Iraq and North Korea that began in December 1999 and included 
     an October 2000 meeting in Baghdad. These documents indicate 
     Iraqi interest in the transfer of technology for surface-to-
     surface missiles with a range of 1300km (probably No Dong) 
     and land-to-sea missiles with a range of 300km. The document 
     quotes the North Koreans as understanding the limitations 
     imposed by the UN, but being prepared ``to cooperate with 
     Iraq on the items it specified''. At the time of OIF, these 
     discussions had not led to any missiles being transferred to 
     Iraq. A high level cooperating source has reported that in 
     late 2002 at Saddam's behest a delegation of Iraqi officials 
     was sent to meet with foreign export companies, including one 
     that dealt with missiles. Iraq was interested in buying an 
     advanced ballistic missile with 270km and 500km ranges.
       The ISG has also identified a large volume of material and 
     testimony by cooperating Iraq officials on Iraq's effort to 
     illicitly procure parts and foreign assistance for its 
     missile program. These include:
       Significant level of assistance from a foreign company and 
     its network of affiliates in supplying and supporting the 
     development of production capabilities for solid rocket 
     propellant and dual-use chemicals.
       Entities from another foreign country were involved in 
     supplying guidance and control systems for use in the Al-
     Fat'h (Ababil-100). The contract was incomplete by the time 
     of OIF due to technical problems with the few systems 
     delivered and a financial dispute.
       A group of foreign experts operating in a private capacity 
     were helping to develop Iraq's liquid propellant ballistic 
     missile RDT&E and production infrastructure. They worked in 
     Baghdad for about three months in late 1998 and subsequently 
     continued work on the project from abroad. An actual contract 
     valued at $10 million for machinery and equipment was signed 
     in June 2001, initially for 18 months, but later extended. 
     This cooperation continued right up until the war.
       A different group of foreign experts traveled to Iraq in 
     1999 to conduct a technical review that resulted in what 
     became the Al Samoud 2 design, and a contract was signed in 
     2001 for the provision of rigs, fixtures and control 
     equipment for the redesigned missile.
       Detainees and cooperative sources have described the role 
     of a foreign expert in negotiations on the development of 
     Iraq's liquid and solid propellant production infrastructure. 
     This could have had applications in existing and planned 
     longer range systems, although it is reported that nothing 
     had actually been implemented before OIF.
       Uncertainty remains about the full extent of foreign 
     assistance to Iraq's planned expansion of its missile systems 
     and work is continuing to gain a full resolution of this 
     issue. However, there is little doubt from the evidence 
     already gathered that there was substantial illegal 
     procurement for all aspects of the missile programs.
       I have covered a lot of ground today, much of it highly 
     technical. Although we are resisting drawing conclusions in 
     this first interim report, a number of things have become 
     clearer already as a result of our investigation, among them:
       1. Saddam, at least as judged by those scientists and other 
     insiders who worked in his military-industrial programs, had 
     not given up his aspirations and intentions to continue to 
     acquire weapons of mass destruction. Even those senior 
     officials we have interviewed who claim no direct knowledge 
     of any on-going prohibited activities readily acknowledge 
     that Saddam intended to resume these programs whenever the 
     external restrictions were removed. Several of these 
     officials acknowledge receiving inquiries since 2000 from 
     Saddam or his sons about how long it would take to either 
     restart CW production or make available chemical weapons.
       2. In the delivery systems area there were already well 
     advanced, but undeclared, on-going activities that, if OIF 
     had not intervened, would have resulted in the production of 
     missiles with ranges at least up to 1000 km, well in excess 
     of the UN permitted range of 150 km. These missile activities 
     were supported by a serious clandestine procurement program 
     about which we have much still to learn.
       3. In the chemical and biological weapons area we have 
     confidence that there were at a minimum clandestine on-going 
     research and development activities that were embedded in the 
     Iraqi Intelligence Service. While we have much yet to learn 
     about the exact work programs and capabilities of these 
     activities, it is already apparent that these undeclared 
     activities would have at a minimum facilitated chemical and 
     biological weapons activities and provided a technically 
     trained cadre.
       Let me conclude by returning to something I began with 
     today. We face a unique but challenging opportunity in our 
     efforts to unravel the exact status of Iraq's WMD program. 
     The good news is that we do not have to rely for the first 
     time in over a decade on the incomplete, and often false, 
     data that Iraq supplied the UN/IAEA;
       Data collected by UN inspectors operating with the severe 
     constraints that Iraqi security and deception actions 
     imposed;
       Information supplied by defectors, some of whom certainly 
     fabricated much that they supplied and perhaps were under the 
     direct control of the IIS;
       Data collected by national technical collections systems 
     with their own limitations.
       The bad news is that we have to do this under conditions 
     that ensure that our work will take time and impose serious 
     physical dangers on those who are asked to carry it out. Why 
     should we take the time and run the risk to ensure that our 
     conclusions reflect the truth to the maximum extent that is 
     possible given the conditions in post-conflict Iraq? For 
     those of us that are carrying out this search, there are two 
     reasons that drive us to want to complete this effort.
       First, whatever we find will probably differ from pre-war 
     intelligence. Empirical reality on the ground is, and has 
     always been, different from intelligence judgments that must 
     be made under serious constraints of time, distance and 
     information. It is, however, only by understanding precisely 
     what those difference are that the quality of future 
     intelligence and investment decisions concerning future 
     intelligence systems can be improved. Proliferation of 
     weapons of mass destruction is such a continuing threat to 
     global society that learning those lessons has a high 
     imperative.
       Second, we have found people, technical information and 
     illicit procurement networks

[[Page 26888]]

     that if allowed to flow to other countries and regions could 
     accelerate global proliferation. Even in the area of actual 
     weapons there is no doubt that Iraq had at one time chemical 
     and biological weapons. Even if there were only a remote 
     possibility that these pre-1991 weapons still exist, we have 
     an obligation to American troops who are now there and the 
     Iraqi population to ensure that none of these remain to be 
     used against them in the ongoing insurgency activity.
       Mr. Chairman and Members I appreciate this opportunity to 
     share with you the initial results of the first 3 months of 
     the activities of the Iraqi Survey Group. I am certain that I 
     speak for Major General Keith Dayton, who commands the Iraqi 
     Survey Group, when I say how proud we are of the men and 
     women from across the Government and from our Coalition 
     partners, Australia and the United Kingdom, who have gone to 
     Iraq and are carrying out this important mission.
       Thank you.

  Mr. BOND. We are engaged in a monumental fight against terrorism and 
tyranny on a global scale, one in which all freedom-loving people have 
a stake. Other free countries ought to realize this is a battle in 
which we all have a stake. The Middle East region has long been marked 
by instability and marred by war, the threat of war and torture, 
terrorism, and ruthless dictators. Saddam Hussein was at the heart of 
it. On September 11 we lost close to 3,000 citizens when foreign 
terrorists attacked innocent civilians. It is a miracle we did not lose 
more. But we are now fighting that battle against terrorism in Baghdad, 
not in Boston or Boise or Baldwin, MO.
  As I said earlier, some argue that Saddam has not been linked to 
terrorism. Well, what David Kay has already described puts the lie to 
that. Also, tell that to the thousands of Israeli families who have 
lost innocent relatives at the hands of Hamas suicide bombers whose 
families received $25,000 from the Iraqi dictator for each successful 
attack on innocent men, women, and children.
  Today, on the good-news side, there are close to 100,000 Iraqis who 
are assuming control of essential civil responsibilities such as border 
police, civil defense, police facilities protection, and as soldiers. 
With each passing day, more and more Iraqis are taking the lead in 
security and in protecting Iraq. Over 85 percent of Iraq is relatively 
stable, with the exception of the troubled Sunni Triangle.
  It is no surprise the Sunni Baathists are putting up the most 
resistance, for they have the most to lose. We have seen recently 
declassified reports of the Iraqi-sponsored torture, which are too 
disturbing even to watch. We found mass graves. We know Saddam 
conducted mass chemical attacks against his own people and launched 
chemical attacks against Iran.
  I believe the President was correct when he said we must take on the 
war on terrorism, which would take years, not months. This is a global 
conflict against terrorism. The will of the American people is being 
tested. We cannot flinch. If we do not pursue terrorists where they 
live now, then we will continue to invite more attacks any time U.S. 
interests collide with the interests of terrorists.

                               Exhibit 1

       The Oct. 26 front-page article ``Search in Iraq Fails to 
     Find Nuclear Threat'' is wildly off the mark. Your reporter, 
     Barton Gellman, bases much of his analysis on what he says 
     was told to him by an Australian brigadier, Stephen D. 
     Meekin. Gellman describes Meekin as someone ``who commands 
     the Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center, the largest 
     of a half-dozen units that report to [David] Kay.''
       Meekin does not report, nor has he ever reported, to me in 
     any individual capacity or as commander of the exploitation 
     center. The work of the center did not form a part of my 
     first interim report, which was delivered last month, nor do 
     I direct what Meekin's organization does. The center's 
     mission has never involved weapons of mass destruction, nor 
     does it have any WMD expertise.
       Gellman's description of information provided by Mahdi 
     Obeidi, chief of Iraq's pre-1991 centrifuge program, relies 
     on an unnamed ``U.S. official'' who, by the reporter's own 
     admission, read only one reporting cable. How Gellman's 
     source was able to describe reporting that covered four 
     months is a mystery to me. Furthermore, the source 
     mischaracterized our views on the reliability of Obeidi's 
     information.
       With regard to Obeidi's move to the United States, Gellman 
     writes, ``By summer's end, under unknown circumstances, 
     Obeidi received permission to bring his family to an East 
     Coast suburb in the United States.'' The reader is left with 
     the impression that this move involved something manipulative 
     or sinister. The ``unknown circumstances'' are called Public 
     Law 110. This mechanism was created during the Cold War to 
     give the director of central intelligence the authority to 
     resettle those who help provide valuable intelligence 
     information. Nothing unusual or mysterious here.
       When the article moves to describe the actual work of the 
     nuclear team, Gellman states that `'frustrated members of the 
     nuclear search team by late spring began calling themselves 
     the `book of the month club.' ``But he fails to note that 
     this was before the establishment of the Iraq Survey Group. 
     In fact, the team's frustration with the pace of the work is 
     what led President Bush to shift the responsibility for the 
     WMD search to the director of central intelligence and to 
     send me to Baghdad.
       One would believe from what Gellman writes that I have sent 
     home the two leaders of my nuclear team, William Domke and 
     Jeffrey Bedell, and abandoned all attempts to determine the 
     state of Iraq's nuclear activities. Wrong again, Domke's 
     assignment had been twice extended well beyond what the 
     Department of Energy had agreed to. He and Bedell were 
     replaced with a much larger contingent of experts from DOE's 
     National Labs.
       Finally, with regard to the aluminum tubes, the tubes were 
     certainly being imported and were being used for rockets. The 
     question that continues to occupy us is whether similar 
     tubes, with higher specifications, had other uses, 
     specifically in nuclear centrifuges. Why anyone would think 
     that we should want to confiscate the thousands of aluminum 
     tubes of the lower specification is unclear. Our 
     investigation is focused on whether a nuclear centrifuge 
     program was either underway or in the planning stages, what 
     design and components were being contemplated or used in such 
     a program if it existed and the reason for the constant 
     raising of the specifications of the tubes the Iraqis were 
     importing clandestinely.
       We have much work left to do before any conclusions can be 
     reached on the state of possible Iraqi nuclear weapons 
     program efforts. Your story gives the false impression that 
     conclusions can already be drawn.
                                  ____

       When Barton Gellman interviewed me last month I stressed on 
     a number of occasions that my remarks related to Iraqi's 
     conventional weapons program. I am responsible for aspects of 
     that program as the commander of the coalition Joint Captured 
     Materiel Exploitation Center. I did not provide assessments 
     or views on Iraq's nuclear program or the status of 
     investigations being conducted by the Iraq Survey Group.
       On the issue of Iraq's use of aluminum tubes, I did 
     confirm, in response to a question by Gellman, that aluminum 
     tubes form the body of Iraqi 81mm battlefield rockets and 
     that my teams had recovered some of these rockets for 
     technical examination. Further, I stated that the empty tubes 
     were innocuous in view of the large quantities of lethal 
     Iraqi conventional weapons such as small arms, explosive 
     ordnance and man-portable air defense systems in this 
     country. I did not make any judgment on the suitability of 
     the 81mm aluminum tubes as components in a nuclear program.
       In discussing the disbanding of the Joint Captured Materiel 
     Exploitation Center, I told your reporter that the center's 
     work was largely complete, and I made clear that its role was 
     in the realm of Iraq's conventional weapons and technologies.
       Gellman attributed to me comments about the effect of U.N.-
     imposed sanctions. Again, I referred to Iraqi efforts to 
     acquire conventional military equipment. I made no assessment 
     about the effect of U.N. sanctions on Iraq's nuclear program.

  Mr. CRAIG. Madam President, I will claim no more than 5 minutes of 
the time of the Senator from Texas.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________