[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 19]
[Senate]
[Pages 26710-26712]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                         RECALL THE IRAQI ARMY

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, last week a memorandum on the war on 
terrorism from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to his top subordinates 
was leaked to the press. In that memo, Secretary Rumsfeld asked a 
number of questions, including the following: Is our current situation 
such that ``the harder we work, the behinder we get?'' Then he asked: 
``What else should we be considering?''
  Well, I am dismayed that Secretary Rumsfeld says publicly something 
so differently than what he has said privately. I am glad he is looking 
for new direction since our post-Saddam policy is not working well, 
given the sustained and increasing attacks on our forces.
  Secretary Rumsfeld asked--again--``What else should we be 
considering?'' Well, the President of the Iraqi Governing Council has 
made a specific recommendation for us to consider: that the regular 
Iraqi Army units be called up to assist our troops in providing 
security for the reconstruction of their country.
  Surely it is worthy of our consideration, when Iyad Alawi, this 
month's serving President of the Iraqi Governing Council--the 25-member 
body selected by the United States to represent the Iraqi people--is 
making a suggestion to change course.
  He wrote an important opinion piece entitled ``America Must Let Iraq 
Rebuild Itself,'' which was published by the New York Times on October 
19. The main premise of the article is that ``ultimately, only Iraqis 
themselves can restore security, rebuild national institutions, enact a 
constitution and elect a democratic government.''
  I believe all of us would agree with that premise. For Mr. Alawi, the 
vital step is to ``call up the Iraqi Army and the national police force 
[for] at least up to the mid-officer level'' to deal with the 
insecurity and chaos in the country.
  Mr. Alawi believes the Iraqi officer corps will have to be vetted to 
remove those who have committed crimes under the old regime. He points 
out that most of the Iraqi Army's soldiers are ``Iraqi patriots who 
chose not fight for Saddam Hussein'' and ``would probably return to 
their units and contribute to their country's future.'' He argues that 
it would be ``much easier and quicker to retrain and reequip them 
within their existing organizational structure than to start from 
scratch.''
  Mr. Alawi argues that these steps would not only relieve the burden 
on American troops but also would gain substantial good will among 
Iraqis.
  Tom Friedman, writing in the New York Times, on October 23, is of a 
similar mind. He urges the administration to declare the following: 
``We thank all the nations who offered troops, but we think the Iraqi 
people can and must secure their own country. So we're inviting all 
former Iraqi Army soldiers (not Republican Guards) to report back to 
duty. For every two Iraqi battalions that return to duty (they can weed 
out their own bad apples), we will withdraw an American one. So Iraqis 
can liberate themselves. Our motto is Iraq for the Iraqis.''
  That is from Tom Friedman, who has been a very strong supporter of 
the administration's military actions in Iraq and the decision to 
attack Iraq.
  The administration and the Coalition Provisional Authority have taken 
a different tack in reorganizing Iraqi security, particularly with 
regard to the Iraqi Army. They are essentially starting from scratch to 
build a completely new Army of 40,000 people who are being trained and 
equipped as a motorized infantry.
  The goal is to form nine brigades by the end of 2004, but thus far 
only one battalion of 750 soldiers has been trained and equipped.
  Additionally, the Coalition Provisional Authority is creating an 
Iraqi border patrol force, only 5,000 to date, with the need to expand 
to more than 20,000 sometime in the future. A 20,000-person Facilities 
Protection Service is intended to take over security at fixed site 
locations from coalition forces, and an Iraqi civil defense corps of 
6,600, expanding to more than 15,000 in 2004, is being integrated into 
coalition military units to provide local intelligence and help with 
security patrolling.
  While I have some questions regarding the need for four distinct 
security forces, including a new Iraqi Army, in addition to a new 
national police force, I am open to arguments that this approach to 
building a new army may be desirable in the long run. A better 
educated, trained, equipped, and motivated army, whose members are more 
representative of the diverse Iraqi population, and which was created 
expressly to serve the people of the new Iraqi state, may be more 
ideal.
  However, in the short term, I believe Mr. Alawi's recommendation to 
reconstitute units of the old regular army is surely worthy of 
consideration. No one, including Mr. Alawi, argues for a continued role 
for those portions of the old army that were part of the repressive 
security apparatus of the Saddam regime--units such as the Special 
Security Guards, the Special Republican Guards, and the Fedayeen 
Saddam.
  In fact, those units were created by Saddam because he did not trust 
his regular army. In that portion of the State Department-sponsored 
``The Future of Iraq Project,'' dealing with Iraqi Armed Forces, the 
Working Group that wrote this part of the report, discussed this issue.
  They noted the following: ``Saddam Hussein realized, with his sense 
of security, that he will not be able to earn the loyalty and trust of 
the army with its varied character in spite of many attempts to purify 
or clean the army

[[Page 26711]]

from the disloyal elements--as he called them--in order for the army to 
become an army of ideology to protect the party and the revolution and 
defend the nation's values.'' They added that ``Thus the army remained 
a source of worry, suspicion and threat to Saddam; in spite of the fact 
that the army got into its many wars because Saddam desired it. There 
are some who think that the army was pushed into these wars to keep it 
continuously busy confronting outside aggressions.'' Finally and in 
view of these findings, the Woking Group concluded that ``In any event 
we think it necessary to keep the basic structure of the army, which 
can be easily rehabilitated. . . .''
  That regular army, below the midofficer level, after vetting, could 
serve a useful role by putting trained Iraqi forces into the field to 
more quickly enhance overall security. The regular Iraqi Army was a 
sizable force of approximately 80,000 officers, 130,000 noncommissioned 
officers, and 400,000 conscript soldiers.''
  We probably made a mistake in formally disbanding the Iraqi army in 
May. I wonder if Ambassador Bremer doesn't tacitly believe the same, 
given the quick decision that was made by him shortly thereafter by 
agreeing to pay monthly allowances to officers and noncommissioned 
officers after the unrest that was unleashed by that decision.
  Beginning in July, monthly payments were made according to a rank-
based scale, ranging from $50 for a noncommissioned officer to $150 for 
a general, somewhat below the base pay for the various ranks. 
Additionally, a one-time $40 stipend was paid to former conscripts. 
Since July, the Coalition Provisional Authority has paid from Iraqi 
funds approximately $78 million to about 260,000 individuals and just 
over $15 million to approximately 375,000 conscripts. The estimated 
cost for the stipend during the next year will be $190 million, if 
payments continue throughout the year.
  In other words, we know where the men and women--mainly men--in the 
Iraqi regular army are located. They came for those payments, and we 
know how to locate them, should we make a decision to reconstitute 
units of that Iraqi army.
  That money was well spent. There is ample evidence from other 
conflicts that unemployed former soldiers can be a destabilizing and a 
disruptive influence, as some believe is currently the case in Iraq 
today. In view of the $156 billion that is likely to be appropriated 
for U.S. military forces in Iraqi reconstruction in fiscal years 2003 
and 2004, paying those sums to members of the old regular Iraqi army 
would be a modest expenditure.
  But would it not make more sense to pay those sums to soldiers who 
are actually doing something? Would it not make sense to quickly 
reconstitute recently disbanded Iraqi regular army units to take on 
security tasks that are within their capabilities? Would it not be 
possible that recently disbanded Iraqi army units would be able to more 
quickly assume duties for which the border patrol, the facilities 
protection service, and the civil defense corps are intended, including 
patrolling Iraqi streets with our own soldiers? Would this not more 
quickly give Iraqis the responsibility for and a stake in securing 
their own country? And, more importantly, wouldn't it be better for all 
concerned if primarily Iraqi soldiers and not Americans were acting to 
restore security in Iraq and dealing with those who would seek to 
disrupt it?
  The Governing Council President thinks so.
  I ask unanimous consent that an article written by the current 
President of the Iraqi Governing Council, Iyad Alawi, entitled 
``America Must Let Iraq Rebuild Itself,'' which appeared in the New 
York Times on October 19, be printed in the Record at the conclusion of 
my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Dole). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. LEVIN. I asked Ambassador Bremer when we met with him: At a 
minimum, would he not raise this issue with the Governing Council to 
see whether or not the views of the President of the Governing Council, 
that the Iraqi army regular units should be reconstituted, represent 
the views of the Governing Council itself. We surely should listen to 
those views. These are the folks we put in office there as representing 
the Iraqi people. At a minimum, I urged Ambassador Bremer to find out 
formally from that Governing Council whether or not the President's 
views, as represented by this article in the New York Times--that the 
regular units of the army, properly vetted to make sure we don't hire 
old members of the Saddam leadership--should be reconstituted to help 
us maintain order and security in Iraq.
  I believe Ambassador Bremer will in fact make that request of the 
Governing Council--not the request to reconstitute the army, because I 
don't think Ambassador Bremer is there yet, but the request of the 
Governing Council to see if they agree that it would be wise for those 
units below the mid-level officer level to be reconstituted, properly 
vetted, to help us on the streets of Baghdad and in the areas which are 
very dangerous, and to take some of the pressure off our troops to make 
us less of a target and to have Iraqis gradually but more quickly take 
over their own security so that we are not a lightning rod for the 
folks who are trying to destroy us.
  I look forward to the response of the Governing Council of Iraq to 
Ambassador Bremer's request. We know that as a new Iraqi army is 
formed, some of the existing units will be retrained and equipped to 
expand that army. But it is critically important that we have this 
question put before that Governing Council. The creation of a new Iraqi 
army is going very slowly. We are at less than a thousand. We must move 
more quickly.
  The question is, since most of the members who we are hiring for that 
new army are members of the old army in any event, would it not be much 
quicker to reconstitute the units of that old army--again, below the 
mid-officer level, so we don't have the Saddam regime involved--would 
it not be much quicker to follow the suggestion of the President of the 
Governing Council, reconstitute the units and move on from there?
  The Secretary of Defense asked, in his leaked memorandum, if what the 
U.S. is doing is enough and what else should be considered. I am glad 
he asked those questions. As I said before, I am sorry he has not said 
publicly what he said privately in terms of his doubts and concerns. 
But having said that, I am glad he is raising questions. I am glad he 
is asking questions about whether we should change course in some way.
  I have written to the Secretary of Defense to solicit his views on 
Mr. Alawi's proposal. Again, I hope Ambassador Bremer does consult with 
the Iraqi Governing Council, seek their recommendations on this issue, 
and not only solicit their recommendations but seriously consider ways 
to formulate an integrated and comprehensive plan to move more quickly 
to involve Iraqis in their own security and in their overall 
governance.

                               Exhibit 1

                [From the New York Times, Oct. 19, 2003]

                  America Must Let Iraq Rebuild Itself

                            (By Iyad Alawi)

       Baghdad, Iraq.--No Iraqi will ever forget the momentous 
     April day when a crowd of hundreds of cheering Baghdadis, 
     helped by an American armored vehicle, pull the huge statue 
     of Saddam Hussein to the ground. With this act, we tore down 
     three decades of tyranny and repression and began building in 
     its place a foundation for freedom, democracy and a better 
     future for our children.
       To see that this goal is achieved, the Bush administration 
     has challenged me and my colleagues on the Iraqi Governing 
     Council to draft a permanent constitution within six months 
     and to move as quickly as possible to hold internationally 
     monitored, free elections. We gladly accept that challenge, 
     and welcome the vital assistance of the United Nations, 
     through the Security Council resolution passed on Thursday, 
     to see through to completion the enormous task ahead.
       But we also realize that there are obstacles on Iraq's 
     march toward democracy. In the months since Iraq was 
     liberated, jubilation has given way to insecurity and chaos. 
     When my fellow Iraqis finally go to the polls to elect their 
     government, they must have confidence that state institutions 
     are not only

[[Page 26712]]

     legitimate and independent, but robust enough to guarantee 
     safety and civil rights. That is why the coalition and the 
     council must take several immediate steps to establish these 
     necessary conditions for the constitutional process to 
     succeed.
       First, it is vital to call up the Iraqi Army and the 
     national police force, at least up to mid-officer level. The 
     coalition's early decision to abolish the army and police was 
     well intended, but it unfortunately resulted in a security 
     vacuum that let criminals, die-hards of the former regime and 
     international terrorist flourish. And the coalition's plan to 
     build a 20,000-member lightly armed force mostly responsible 
     for security and border control could make poor use of a 
     valuable resource: the 300,000 Iraqi soldiers who simply went 
     home with their weapons in the face of the American-led 
     invasion.
       Most of these soldiers are Iraqi patriots who chose not to 
     fight for Saddam Hussein. Americans should not confuse the 
     Iraqi Army with the hated Republican Guard, which Saddam 
     Husseim created precisely because he distrusted the 
     legitimate military. In one simple process, the coalition 
     authority can support the governing council to call the army 
     back to its barracks for retraining and, ultimately, for 
     redeployment. Most soldiers and their officers will proudly 
     return to their units and contribute to their country's 
     future.
       The coalition and the Iraqi Interior Ministry can vet 
     officers to remove those who committed crimes under the old 
     regime, and then rapidly redeploy the most capable units to 
     work with, and progressively relieve, American troops of 
     security duties. Iraqi Army units have an established chain 
     of command and esprit de corps. Not only can they be recalled 
     to barracks immediately, but it would be much easier and 
     quicker to retrain and re-equip them within their existing 
     organizational structure than to start from scratch.
       By supporting the recall of army units, the United States 
     would not only speed the process of relieving the burden on 
     its troops, it would also gain substantial good will in Iraq. 
     In contrast, any American-led military presence, even if 
     complemented by the United Nations, will never have the 
     credibility and legitimacy that the Iraqi Army has among the 
     people.
       In addition, the Iraqi national police must also be 
     recalled. Most Iraqi policemen--as opposed to Saddam 
     Hussein's feared intelligence and security organs--are 
     dedicated to law and order. The United States does not have 
     the time or money to create a police force from the ground 
     up, nor is it necessary, because we have a large, organized 
     force that is ready and willing to serve.
       Many other Iraqi governing institutions should also be 
     reactivated by the governing council, with the support of the 
     coalition authority. Special priority must be given to the 
     Ministries of Interior, Justice, Finance, Oil and Education. 
     The Iraqi bureaucracy must also be called back to work, 
     although of course after screening to disqualify serious 
     offenders of the former regime. Together, the council and the 
     coalition leaders can modernize the state apparatus, phase 
     out obsolete policies and practices, and encourage a new 
     mindset of transparency and efficiency.
       Finally, as security improves, Iraqi institutions are re-
     established and the constitutional drafting process is 
     completed, the United States should support international 
     recognition of Iraqi sovereignty. Then a recognized interim 
     government could quickly present a popular referendum, under 
     United Nations monitoring, on the new national constitution. 
     It would be a grave mistake for the United States to hold out 
     sovereignty and international recognition as the reward for 
     passage of a constitution. Rather, making Iraqis once again a 
     part of the international system is the prerequisite of 
     successful reconstruction and a durable democratic system.
       Iraqis are grateful for the tremendous efforts and 
     sacrifices the United States is making on our belief. Yet, 
     ultimately, only Iraqis themselves can restore security, 
     rebuild national institutions. enact a constitution and elect 
     a democratic government. America must not rebuff Iraqis who 
     are eager to have a stake in this intimate national process. 
     Like any free people, we want to ensure that we are in 
     control of our own destiny.
  Mr. LEVIN. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DeWINE. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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