[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 19]
[House]
[Pages 26394-26398]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]


                              {time}  2145
          HOW WILL YOU KNOW YOUR VOTE COUNTED ON ELECTION DAY?

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Bishop of Utah). Under the Speaker's 
announced policy of January 7, 2003, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. 
Holt) is recognized for 30 minutes as the designee of the minority 
leader.


                             General Leave

  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may 
have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks 
and insert extraneous material on the subject of this special order.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from New Jersey?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to be joined this evening by my 
colleague the gentlewoman from Ohio (Ms. Kaptur) and my colleague the 
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Brown).
  Let me begin with a question. On Election Day, how will you know if 
your vote is properly counted? In many precincts, in many States around 
this country, the answer is you will not. Imagine, it is election day 
and you enter your polling place to cast your vote on a brand new 
electronic touch-screen voting machine. The screen is large; it is well 
lit; it is accessible if you have physical disabilities. Your choices 
are clearly spelled out before you. In fact, it looks as easy to use as 
the ATM at your bank. You breathe a sigh of relief that you no longer 
have to figure out a complicated butterfly ballot. It seems more modern 
than the old lever machines.
  So you make your choice and you touch the submit button and cast your 
vote. The screen says your vote has been counted. You exit the polling 
place with a sense of satisfaction, and then you begin to wonder. How 
do I know if the machine actually recorded my vote the way I intended? 
The fact is you do not. You have to trust the software in the machine 
to be error free.
  After the 2000 election, we in Congress recognized that we had to act 
to restore the integrity and reliability of our electoral system by 
making dimpled chads and other voting irregularities things of the 
past. Last October, we passed the Help America Vote Act, known as HAVA. 
It is groundbreaking election reform legislation that is currently 
helping States throughout the country replace antiquated and unreliable 
punch cards and other machines.
  However, HAVA is having an unintended consequence. HAVA has done some 
good things. It is giving people with disabilities access, access that 
they have been denied for years. In fact, they have always been denied. 
HAVA is doing some great things, but it is leading a headlong rush by 
States and localities to purchase computer voting systems that suffer 
from a serious flaw. All models, even the most convenient and 
accessible, have the problem that once the voter touches the button, 
the voter has no way of knowing whether the vote has been counted as 
the voter intended. No one will ever know. It is a secret ballot and 
must be secret.
  This uncertainty, this lack of confidence can be disastrous to voter 
confidence and can prevent an accurate recount and can be a step on the 
way to the undoing of our democracy. I am not an anti-technology 
Luddite. I am a physicist. I am something of a techie. I see real 
advantages in these electronic machines.
  There are several important advantages such as their accessibility if 
you have physical disabilities. Their speed and efficiency, so that the 
results will be communicated to the county clerk quickly. They are 
probably more reliable than the county clerk. I certainly had an 
experience with the clerk in my county when she awarded one precinct to 
my opponent by a margin of 9,000 votes when there were not 9,000 people 
who lived in that precinct. It was a simple pencil and paper clerical 
area. The electronic machines will do away with that, but there is one 
fundamental problem. They are inherently unverifiable.
  To again make the point that this is not the concern of an anti-
technology Luddite, I would say that hundreds of nationally renowned 
computer scientists have raised a cry of alarm, saying that unless 
there is an independent verification method to safeguard the accuracy 
and the integrity of the voting process there will be, might not might 
be, these computer scientists say there will be problems. There might 
be accidental software errors. There might be, God forbid, malicious 
hacking, and if there are concerns, if the voter is uncertain, if the 
candidate is uncertain whether the votes have been recorded the way 
they were cast, a recount is meaningless. The computer that has a 
faulty tally 2 minutes after the polls closed will have the same faulty 
tally a day later when the recount is held or the next month when the 
judge opens it up. If there are errors, they will go unnoticed and 
unknown.
  The history of progress in our system of self-government here in 
America is in many ways a history of increasing the franchise, 
extending the right to vote and the ability to vote, increasing 
accessibility and reliability of the

[[Page 26395]]

process of voting, but we still have some problems. We see declining 
voter turnout, and we have all heard, my colleagues here from Ohio I am 
sure have heard, constituents say, well, my vote does not count. Some 
people when they say that mean that special interests dominate the 
process and overwhelm my vote in secret back room deals. And we all 
work hard to see that that concern is removed, but they often mean 
something else when they say my vote does not count. They mean, 
literally, my vote does not count, my vote will not be counted.
  The level of concern around the country is astounding. The Internet 
is burning up with back and forth chat of concerns about our voting 
process, and the loss of confidence in the process leads to a loss of 
failure to vote, leads to a cheapening and eventual breakdown of our 
democracy.
  Every voter who stays home, whether it is because the voting places 
are physically inaccessible to them or because of a lack of trust in 
the voting process is a loss to democracy. We must find, we must find a 
way to keep the voter directly connected to the verification process so 
the voter knows that her vote or his vote is the vote that is counted.
  It is not good enough to give them reassurance that the manufacturer 
says the machine works fine. Without taking steps to return the 
verification to the voter and to restore trust in the process, we face 
a crisis, pure and simple.
  I have with me someone who has paid close attention to the electoral 
process. My colleague, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Brown), was the 
Secretary of State of Ohio, and one of his responsibilities, as I 
believe, was to ensure the accuracy and the reliability of the voting 
system. And I think he understands, as well as anyone, the potential 
crisis we face or maybe it is not even potential anymore. I would be 
pleased to yield to my friend from Ohio (Mr. Brown).
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from New Jersey. I 
do not have the technical expertise that the gentleman, the physicist, 
has.
  I, for 8 years, ran Ohio's election system, then the sixth largest 
election system in the country, an election system where we saw in 
Presidential elections 4.6 million Ohioans go to the polls. In 
gubernatorial years, we might see 3.2, 3.3 million people go to the 
polls. In primary and special elections, elections in odd number, 
mayoral years, township trustee year, we would see fewer people, but 
what underlined all of that, and I think my friend from New Jersey (Mr. 
Holt) spoke this very well, was how important confidence in the system 
is and whether it is everyone for everyone, confidence in an accurate 
count is paramount.
  The confidence as far as the voter is concerned that my vote will be 
counted is paramount. Confidence that the candidates running for office 
or the advocates for the issues on the ballot or the opponents to the 
issues on the ballot, but all of the stakeholders, the players, the 
candidates, the participants they must be confident that the elections 
are held fairly and honestly. The media which cover the elections, 
which write about the elections, which analyze the elections, it is 
equally as important that the media have full confidence in the 
electoral process, that every vote is counted.
  While the technology is different from my career in the 1980s, from 
1983 up through 1990, certainly the technology is different, I also saw 
technology evolve during those 8 years I was Secretary of State. In 
some counties, when I began, they used a simple paper ballot. Some 
counties used a machine. Some counties used that punch card. We began 
to see new technologies, counties using different methods of casting 
votes and counting votes, but in every one of those cases, in every one 
of those counties, what stayed paramount was the confidence that the 
votes would be counted properly so that the voter had confidence, the 
candidates had confidence and the media had confidence that this was a 
fair operation.
  They were confident because we, as election officials, there were 
people that ran the State election system, that ran each local 
precinct, each polling place, each local board of election, we could 
show to them that votes, in fact, were counted fairly. We had paper 
trails. No matter how they were voting we were able to show that, yes, 
the votes were counted correctly.
  We had plenty of people protest. We would have recounts, but during 
the recounts, people would be able to watch representatives of both 
sides to make sure the votes were counted fairly, and they always were 
in the end, and this is what my concern is.
  I am not a Luddite anymore than my physicist friend from New Jersey 
is. I am not against progress. I do not have any of those fears, but I 
am concerned as I hear people in my District in both parties express 
those concerns that we are voting on computers, and we do not have 
paper trails in some of this equipment.
  Then I hear some sort of irresponsible statements made by some 
executives from some companies who are active participants in these 
elections, and I hear comments from people I know around my State that 
that scares a little bit, and I do not think this is a question of 
fear, but it is a question of concern, and I am just asking this 
Congress to pay special attention to this whole process so that people 
can continue to have confidence in the election system.
  Every election is a big election. This election next year, I think we 
will see the highest voter turnout we have had in decades because I 
think people have such strong feelings on all sides about the way the 
country is being run today, and I want to be able to say in good 
conscience, say next October as we lead into the November election, 
that I have full confidence in the way that votes will be cast and full 
confidence in the way that votes will be counted. It is what we owe the 
people. It is what our republic is based on, one person, one vote, and 
one person, one vote only works if every one of those one voters have 
the confidence in the election that they need to have.
  So I thank my friend from New Jersey for his yeoman's work and 
leadership on this.
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for his insight, and he 
makes this important distinction about having confidence in the way the 
votes are cast and having confidence in the way the votes are counted, 
and it is not necessarily the same thing. It is the electronics inside 
the machine that connects those two, and it is that gap which makes 
them inherently unverifiable.

                              {time}  2200

  I have legislation that would, I believe, overcome this shortcoming. 
But before I talk about the details, and I will not go through all the 
details, but before I outline that legislation, I would be pleased to 
yield to my friend, the gentlewoman from Ohio (Ms. Kaptur), who has 
deep and strong concerns about this.
  Ms. KAPTUR. I want to thank the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt) 
for his extraordinary leadership on this very, very important piece of 
legislation that he has introduced, H.R. 2239, taking his great 
intelligence and experience as a physicist and wedding it to his 
legislative experience here in the Congress and trying to help our 
Nation improve on the voting systems that we have, but to do so in a 
way that every voter will be confident that when they cast their ballot 
that their vote is really in there, in that machine.
  In fact, I begin with that statement because one of the leading 
election officials in my own district said to me, Congresswoman, I do 
not have confidence that in what is being done right now that I can 
answer to the citizens of this county that their vote will be in there. 
How do they know it's in there? Give me the confidence that I know it's 
in there. I said, I am supporting Congressman Holt's bill so that we 
get an auditable paper trail at every precinct.
  I would say that in addition to being a U.S. Representative, which I 
was elected to rather later in life, the very first office I was ever 
elected to and still hold is precinct committeewoman in my own home 
precinct. Ohio is unlike some of the other States in the Union, but we 
value every vote at the

[[Page 26396]]

precinct level. We count the votes at the precinct level. Under Ohio 
law when you cast your vote and there is a paper trail currently in 
every precinct in our county, over 500 of these precincts, the votes in 
that precinct are counted right there. They are not taken to another 
location. Both Democrats and Republicans count these votes together, 
and there are actual documents that they have to handle, physically 
handle and then tally and then those votes are both sent to the board 
of elections in a central location, but also posted on the door outside 
that precinct. Any voter can go and take that tally at the end of the 
day. We have a very transparent system, one in which our major parties 
have confidence. Every tally that is done in the voting logs that are 
assembled in every precinct, they are added up. Sometimes mistakes are 
made in the precincts in terms of the tallies but then those are caught 
at the central board of elections, and we try to really assure that the 
count is as fair as possible. If it is not, if people have any concern, 
if there is a one-vote margin in an election, you can go back to the 
paper trail and you can go back and see what was done in every single 
precinct in the county.
  I wanted to say to the gentleman, I think that this verification is 
so extraordinarily important. What happened in Florida at the moment 
could not happen in Ohio because in Florida they move their ballots to 
a counting station. They do not count in every precinct. Speaking as a 
Buckeye, speaking as an Ohioan, I do not want our rights taken away 
from us at the precinct level. I also would, if the gentleman will 
allow me, wish to place in the Record this evening for every election 
official in this country, at every county in the country, at every 
precinct, at every board of election, I have found great confusion as 
to what the Help America Vote Act actually requires and the Federal 
Election Commission on its Web site has what is required by the Federal 
law, every single year.
  And indeed it is not until January 1, 2006, that every State and 
jurisdiction is required to comply with the voting systems requirements 
of the Help America Vote Act that we passed last year. Some people are 
under the impression that they have to have everything done by next 
year. They do not. They can get a waiver that they have to file with 
the Federal Election Commission this coming January. The secretaries of 
state of our country should have notified counties of this. But I can 
tell you, as I go out into my Ohio counties, the local boards of 
election simply do not know this. There is great concern and there is 
great consternation. I will place this in the Record.
  I would also like to say to the gentleman from New Jersey, in 
addition to his bill which I hope we can pass expeditiously, I would 
urge our State legislatures to adopt no-fault absentee voting, that if 
there is any concern next year at any precinct or a doubt about the 
integrity of that machine, that voters can have an alternate way of 
casting a vote in that county through no-fault absentee voting or 
indeed even paper ballots at the same precincts, so that people have 
confidence that their vote will be counted.
  Mr. HOLT. So that the voter can vote. If there is any question about 
eligibility or other questions about the vote, those will be settled 
later and the voter will be able to cast the vote on election day. That 
is what the gentlewoman means, I believe, by no-fault voting.
  Ms. KAPTUR. That is what I mean. If I might just take one additional 
moment of the gentleman and then complete my remarks. One of the 
reasons I think this is important is when we passed the Help America 
Vote Act, the Bush administration was to have appointed an election 
commission that would set Federal standards for the development of the 
technologies that you know are so critical. They have not done that. In 
fact, the commission does not even exist, so there are no Federal 
regulations.
  Mr. HOLT. The appointments have been made, but the other body has not 
acted and the commission does not yet exist.
  Ms. KAPTUR. So there are no Federal standards. I can tell the 
gentleman that in Ohio our secretary of state displayed five different 
technologies in our State House. I sent down a computer security team 
from our region in the State from all of our major universities and 
said, please assess the machines. These were all people involved in 
computer security. They came back and reported to me that of the five 
systems under review in Ohio, not a single one they would rate either 
excellent or very good in terms of both ease of use to the voter and 
security. That was a devastating finding to me.
  Even though I voted for HAVA, I went back to the drawing boards and 
looked at what was going on in my State. My State at this point has 
received the $41 million to buy machines, to buy technology which is 
probably not enough money to get an optical scanner and a paper trail, 
but it has not received the larger amount of money it should have 
received, $117 million, to do the voter education and all of the work 
that is necessary to bring up these new systems. So even though we 
voted for this law, just Ohio is $66 million short in trying to bring 
these technologies up by next year. I wanted to place this on the 
Record.
  Timing is vital.
  While communities are waiting to find out exactly how much money they 
may be getting, and some others do not want to move on acquiring 
equipment until they are sure of how much money they will be receiving, 
it is important to keep in mind:
  While HAVA does state that new election machines should be in place 
for 2004; it is possible to get an extension until the first federal 
election held after January 1, 2006;
  But in order to get this extension, an application must be submitted 
no later than January 1, 2004, at this point, to the General Services 
Administration, providing good cause for why the exemption should be 
granted;
  GSA did send a letter to every governor and state election director 
when the initial Title I money was provided last year. However, they 
have not yet sent out a reminder of the impending deadline.
  So far, only Illinois has applied for the extension, and this request 
was approved last week.
  Other reasons why the extension should be requested:
  Gives more time to make sure that the right machines are acquired, if 
new machines are acquired;
  Gives more time to test and verify the machines;
  More importantly, it gives more time for the vote verification 
provisions of the Holt bill to be implemented in a fashion that will be 
the most efficient with respect to any new voting machine system.
  And it gives more time for people to decide whether or not they 
actually want to buy new machines, because while HAVA provides for new 
machines, it does not mandate them if current voting systems can 
demonstrate that they meet the integrity requirements of HAVA.

                                         HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT TIMELINE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Days/months after enactment                        Date                                    Activity
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
45 days......................  December 13, 2002.............................  Section 101: GSA establish grant
                                                                                program for payments to States
                                                                                to improve election
                                                                                administration.
45 days......................  December 13, 2003.............................  Section 102: GSA establish grant
                                                                                program for payments to States
                                                                                to replace punch card or lever
                                                                                voting machines.
                               January 1, 2003...............................  States must be ready to accept
                                                                                materials from individuals who
                                                                                register by mail. Section
                                                                                303(b).
90 days......................  January 27, 2003..............................  Chief State election officials
                                                                                transmit notice to FEC Chair
                                                                                (and/or EAC) containing name of
                                                                                State election official and
                                                                                local election official selected
                                                                                to serve on Standards Board.
120 days.....................  February 26, 2003.............................  Appointment of 4 EAC
                                                                                Commissioners.
                               March 31, 2003................................  State NVRA Reports for 2001-2002
                                                                                due to FEC.
6 months.....................  April 29, 2003................................  Last date on which States may
                                                                                submit certification to GSA for
                                                                                Section 101 payments.
6 months.....................  April 29, 2003................................  Last date on which States may
                                                                                submit certification to GSA for
                                                                                Section 102 payments.
                               June 30, 2003.................................  2001-2002 NVRA report submitted
                                                                                to Congress.
                               October 1, 2003...............................  EAC adopts recommendations and
                                                                                voluntary guidance on Section
                                                                                302 Provisional Voting
                                                                                Requirements.

[[Page 26397]]

 
                               October 1, 2003...............................  EAC adopts recommendations and
                                                                                voluntary guidance on Section
                                                                                303 provisions on computerized
                                                                                statewide voter registration
                                                                                list requirements and mail
                                                                                registration requirements.
12 months....................  October 29, 2003..............................  EAC submits Human Factors Report
                                                                                to the President and Congress.
                                                                                (Section 243).
12 months....................  October 29, 2003..............................  EAC submits to Congress report on
                                                                                free absentee ballot postage.
                                                                                (Section 246).
                               January 1, 2004...............................  Deadline for States to qualify
                                                                                for waiver of computerized
                                                                                statewide voter registration
                                                                                databases.
                               January 1, 2004...............................  Last date for States applying for
                                                                                waiver of deadline for
                                                                                replacement of punchcard or
                                                                                lever voting machines using
                                                                                Section 102 payments.
                               January 1, 2004...............................  States not participating in the
                                                                                grant programs shall certify to
                                                                                the EAC that the State has
                                                                                established an administrative
                                                                                complaint procedures (Section
                                                                                402), or has submitted a
                                                                                compliance plan to the U.S.
                                                                                Attorney General.
                               January 1, 2004...............................  Effective date for Section 302
                                                                                provisional voting and voting
                                                                                information requirements.
                               January 1, 2004...............................  States and jurisdictions required
                                                                                to comply with Section 303
                                                                                requirements pertaining to
                                                                                computerized statewide voter
                                                                                registration lists (unless
                                                                                qualified for a waiver) and 1st
                                                                                time voters who register by
                                                                                mail.
                               January 1, 2004...............................  EAC adopts voluntary guidance
                                                                                recommendations relating to
                                                                                Section 301 Voting Systems
                                                                                Standards requirements.
                               January 1, 2004...............................  Effective date of new Section 706
                                                                                UOCAVA amendments prohibiting
                                                                                States from refusing to accept
                                                                                registration and absentee ballot
                                                                                applications on grounds of early
                                                                                submission.
                               January 1, 2004...............................  EAC submits first Annual Report
                                                                                to Congress.
18 months....................  March 29, 2004................................  EAC (in conjunction with FVAP)
                                                                                submits to the President and
                                                                                Congress a report and
                                                                                recommendations for facilitating
                                                                                military and overseas voting.
                                                                                (Section 242).
20 months....................  May 29, 2004..................................  EAC submits to House and Senate a
                                                                                report on the issues and
                                                                                challenges presented by
                                                                                incorporating communication and
                                                                                internet technology into the
                                                                                election process. (Section 245).
                               November 2, 2004..............................  All punchcard and lever machines
                                                                                replaced in States accepting
                                                                                Section 102 payments, unless
                                                                                qualified for waiver.
                               March 31, 2005................................  State NVRA Reports for 2003-2004
                                                                                due to EAC.
                               June 1, 2005..................................  EAC submits report to President
                                                                                and Congress on voters who
                                                                                register by mail. (Section 244).
                               June 1, 2005..................................  EAC (in conjunction with SSA)
                                                                                reports to Congress on the
                                                                                feasibility and advisability of
                                                                                using SSN or other such
                                                                                information to establish
                                                                                registration or other election
                                                                                eligibility and ID requirements.
                                                                                (Section 244).
                               June 30, 2005.................................  2003-2004 NVRA report submitted
                                                                                to Congress.
                               January 1, 2006...............................  Each State and jurisdiction
                                                                                required to comply with the
                                                                                voting systems requirements in
                                                                                Section 301.
                               January 1, 2006...............................  Deadline for States to implement
                                                                                computerized Statewide voter
                                                                                registration database if
                                                                                qualified for waiver.
                               First election for Federal office after         All punchcard and lever machines
                                January 1, 2006.                                replaced in States accepting
                                                                                Section 102 payments who
                                                                                qualified for a waiver of the
                                                                                original deadline.
                               January 1, 2007...............................  Voting systems purchased with
                                                                                Title II requirements payments
                                                                                must meet disability access
                                                                                standards in section 201.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                                                                
                                  ____
               [From the Washington Times, Oct. 29, 2003]

                Touch-Screen Voting Ready, Officials Say

                            (By Arlo Wagner)

       Officials overseeing four of the five municipal elections 
     Tuesday in Montgomery and Prince George's counties said 
     yesterday they are confident that their electronic touch-
     screen voting machines are secure, despite lingering concerns 
     that the machines are vulnerable to hackers and tampering.
       ``It's actually more secure than it was before,'' said 
     Barry Smith, manager of election technology for Gaithersburg, 
     one of the cities that used the Diebold AccuVote-TS in its 
     elections two years ago.
       Voters in Gaithersburg had an opportunity to try out the 
     machines yesterday at three of the city's five polling 
     places. Few voters, however, came out to the Asbury Methodist 
     Village polling place, where, historically, the highest 
     percentage of voters cast paper ballots.
       Election officials said the low turnout could indicate that 
     voters in that precinct were satisfied with the touch-screen 
     machines last time.
       ``This is better than the old system,'' said Sarah Paxton, 
     administrative secretary to Gaithersburg's city manager. ``It 
     may take a voter only 30 seconds to vote.''
       Registered voters must show identification to get a 
     computerized card, which they then insert into the base of 
     the machine. Once the card is in the machine, the names of 
     all candidates are displayed on the screen.
       Voters touch the names they are selecting. If they touch 
     too many names, the screen will go blank and voters will have 
     to start over. Once the preferred candidates are chosen, the 
     machine will eject the card. The voters then must turn the 
     card over to one of the judges who is overseeing the process.
       Montgomery was one of three counties in Maryland to use the 
     computerized voting machines in 2001. In July, a team of 
     researchers at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore found 
     that the underlying computer code in the machines was 
     vulnerable to outside parties.
       After the Hopkins analysis, Gov. Robert L. Ehrlich Jr., a 
     Republican, ordered San Diego-based Science Application 
     International Corp. (SAIC) to review the system. Last month, 
     SAIC reported that the system, ``as implemented in policy, 
     procedure and technology, is at high risk of compromise.''
       Mr. Ehrlich and state election officials decided the flaws 
     identified by SAIC could be corrected before the presidential 
     primary election in March. Maryland agreed to purchase $55.6 
     million worth of machines just days before SAIC released its 
     findings this summer. The machines are expected to be 
     installed in 19 of Maryland's 23 counties.
       Last week, several members of the Maryland's General 
     Assembly asked for its own ``independent'' analysis that 
     would, among other things, examine issues about the 
     electronic voting machines. That report is scheduled to be 
     concluded before the General Assembly convenes in January.
       Despite prior reviews of the system, officials in the four 
     of the five cities that will be using the machines Tuesday 
     say they had no problems with them last Election Day. Those 
     cities holding elections are Takoma Park, Rockville, 
     Gaithersburg, Greenbelt and College Park.
       ``We had no problems in the last election,'' said Catherine 
     Waters, city clerk of Takoma Park, where voters next week 
     will use the touch-screen machines to select a mayor and six 
     city Council members.
       Voters in Greenbelt will use a different computerized 
     voting machine when they elect all five members to the City 
     Council.
       ``I don't think anyone is batting an eye,'' Greenbelt City 
     Clerk Kathleen Gallagher said.
       However, voters in College Park will not use the touch-
     screen machines when they go to the polls to choose a mayor 
     and four council members.
       ``We will be using paper ballots,'' which might be old-
     fashioned but are familiar to about 10,000 registered voters, 
     said Yvette Allen, of the City Clerk's Office.
       The municipal elections in Montgomery and Prince George's 
     counties are dominated by unopposed incumbents.
       In Rockville, voters will decide whether to elect a mayor 
     and City Council every four years, instead of two. This will 
     be the 59th city election in the city's 116-year history, 
     said Neil Greenberger, the city's public information officer.
       Voters in Gaithersburg will be electing three of the five 
     council members.

  Mr. HOLT. I thank the gentlewoman, and I think her insertions in the 
Record will be very useful to people. I thank her for her insightful 
comments.
  I would make the point that even though HAVA does not require action 
immediately, the sooner we implement HAVA, the better. There are many 
people with physical disabilities who have been denied the privilege 
and the satisfaction of voting in person and in private. HAVA would 
correct that. But we must not let HAVA lead us to unverifiable voting. 
That is why I am proposing legislation that would, I think, correct 
this problem. It would require that all voting systems produce a paper 
record, an audit trail that is verified by the voter. In other words, 
each voter will see and verify a paper record of the vote. That will 
allow manual audits. It will mean that recounts actually mean 
something. This would be the vote of record. It would be kept safely 
with the election records for recounts.
  My legislation would do some other things such as banning undisclosed 
software and would accelerate the date by which the provisions for 
people with disabilities would have to be met. But the fundamental 
point I wanted to make is that voting should not be an act of faith as 
my colleagues have said. It should be an act of record. It is also 
important to make the point that what I am talking about here is 
nonpartisan. It is preserving the sanctity of the ballot. This is not a 
Republican matter or a Democratic matter. It is fundamental to the 
American system.
  I am sorry to say that the Internet is buzzing with conspiracy 
theories. In other words, voters are afraid that something is afoot. It 
was reported in this week's Newsweek by Steven Levy that suspicions, as 
he says, run even higher when people learn that some of those in charge 
of the voting technology, the manufacturers of the voting machines, are 
themselves partisan. The CEO of a major company is a major fund-raiser 
for the Presidential reelection campaign. He recently said that he was 
``committed to helping

[[Page 26398]]

Ohio deliver its electoral votes for the President next year.'' 
According to this article, he later clarified that he was not talking 
about rigging the machines.
  Whew. That is actually Mr. Levy's expression. Whew.
  By the proposal that I have, the legislative proposal I have, the 
printout would be at the voting machine at the time that the voter 
votes, available for the voter's inspection and verification. And it 
would go into a secure lockbox. If there is a need for a recount, the 
paper ballots would be tallied. It may not be a perfect system, but it 
is a way to assure the voters that the process is honest.
  It is troubling that this is not getting as much attention here in 
this body as it should. An article appeared in the New Zealand Herald a 
few days ago. The article begins, ``The possibility of flaws in the 
electoral process is not something that gets discussed much in the 
United States Congress. The attitude seems to be, we are the greatest 
democracy in the world, so the system must be fair.''
  That is not good enough. We are a great country because we constantly 
try to do better, because we constantly try to increase the franchise, 
increase accessibility to democracy, increase the reliability of the 
process. That is what we need to do. Yet from all over the country, I 
get e-mails. For instance, from Georgia: ``If we can't verify our 
elections, then we can't verify our freedom.''
  From Idaho someone writes: ``Those who cast the votes decide nothing. 
Those who count the votes decide everything.''
  From Michigan: ``The act of voting is the most essential issue. This 
issue is the most essential issue our representatives will vote on and 
they should be judged accordingly.''
  From North Carolina: ``A paper trail is the only reasonable solution 
to any computer-mediated transaction. As a corporate system security 
analyst, I find the electronic devices as they now stand without this 
verifiable backup simply irresponsible.''
  From North Dakota: ``There is no confidence nor integrity without 
it.''
  From Ohio: ``I work with computers every day. We need to check that 
what goes in is what comes out.''
  From Oregon: ``Without this, I will no longer view this country as a 
democracy.''
  From Tennessee: ``If there is no accountability in election, there is 
no reason to vote and we descend into anarchy.''
  From Wisconsin: ``If voters perceive,'' the key word here is 
perceive, ``that their votes are being miscounted and are meaningless, 
they will simply stop voting.''
  That gives you some sense of the seriousness that voters assign to 
this issue. It is very important. This body should turn its attention 
to restoring the voters' trust in every way we can. One important way 
we can do that is by making sure that they have confidence in the 
process that makes this democracy work, the process of voting and then, 
of course, the process by which we fulfill the trust that they place in 
us.
  As I have talked about this with people, I have run into a number of 
opinions. I was talking with an election official from another State 
who said, Well, we've had these electronic machines for several years 
now and we've had no problems. To which I said, How do you know?

                              {time}  2215

  He did not have an answer. We have to help him get that answer.
  Mrs. JONES of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of every 
American's basic right to vote and to have that voted counted.
  As it stands, voters have no way of knowing what is actually 
recorded, once they vote. H.R. 2239, the bill introduced by my 
colleague from New Jersey, would make certain the process of voting is 
not in any way a leap of faith.
  This act would ensure our constituents see a record of verification 
for the votes they cast. When Americans go to the bank, they receive 
some manner of documented record, ensuring that their money is going 
where they intended. Likewise, Americans who use voting machines 
deserve a documented record confirming their vote was recorded 
correctly.
  Nine percent of the U.S. population records their votes 
electronically. These numbers greatly vary from State to State. Twelve 
percent of Ohio votes are recorded electronically. Eighty percent of 
Kentucky voters use electronic ballots. Without an adequate 
confirmation method, mechanical misvotes could have a drastic impact on 
close elections. The problem would go unnoticed.
  H.R. 2239 would also accelerate the deadline for compliance with 
voting systems standards from January 1, 2006 to the regularly 
scheduled November 2004 general Federal election. In order to guarantee 
accurately recorded votes for next year's election cycle, Congress must 
act now. We cannot put the basic rights of our constituents on hold.
  The right to vote is a right every citizen of this country deserves. 
As Members of Congress, we all have an obligation to make sure all of 
our constituents' votes are counted through the most fair and accurate 
means available. Not just the blacks. Not just the whites. Not just the 
browns. Not just the yellows. Not just the Christians. Not just the 
Jews. Not just the Muslims. Not just the Atheists. Not just the 
Republicans. Not just the Democrats. The right to vote should not be 
reserved for just most of our constituents, but for all of our 
constituents.

                          ____________________