[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 19]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 25749-25750]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




    MOTION TO INSTRUCT CONFEREES ON H.R. 6 ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2003

                                 ______
                                 

                               speech of

                           HON. NITA M. LOWEY

                              of new york

                    in the house of representatives

                       Tuesday, October 21, 2003

  Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the motion offered by 
my colleague and good friend from Massachusetts, Ed Markey. The motion 
instructs the conferees to the Energy bill to adopt the unclear 
security provisions included in the House bill and subsequently dropped 
in the conference report.
  Since September 11, 2001, intelligence officials have amassed a 
critical body of evidence suggesting terrorist intentions to strike our 
nuclear infrastructure. Plans of U.S. nuclear facilities discovered in 
al Qaeda caves during U.S. military operations in Afghanistan provided 
perhaps the earliest indication that terrorists had not casually 
contemplated but rather carefully studied the option of sabotaging a 
nuclear reactor. In early March, 2003 fresh intelligence confirmed our 
worst fears: terrorists continued to plot attacks against nuclear and 
other critical infrastructure. Subsequent reports of a terrorist plan 
to sabotage the Palo Verde nuclear power plants in Arizona were 
sufficiently serious that the National Guard was immediately deployed 
to secure the plant.
  In light of these facts, the conferees' decision to weaken nuclear 
security language included in the House report is incomprehensible. I'd 
like to focus on the two changes that concern me the most:
  (1) Federal Oversight of Emergency Preparedness at Nuclear Power 
Plants--the House bill required the NRC to consult with the Department 
of Homeland Security before issuing or renewing a license to operate a 
new or existing power plant to ensure adequate steps could be taken to 
protect the public in the event of a terrorist strike. Unfortunately, 
the conferees appear ready to eliminate this most basic protective 
standard. Failure to adopt the House language would permit the NRC to 
continue its present neglect of the post-September 11th reality. 
Indeed, the NRC, the agency responsible for assuring the safety and 
security of the country's 103 commercial reactors, has flatly denied 
petitions by citizen groups for reinforcement of the spent fuel pools 
at Millstone Nuclear Power Station in Connecticut, stating ``the 
possibility of a terrorist attack is speculative . . . and simply too 
far removed from the natural or expected consequences of agency 
action.''
  NRC's oversight of emergency preparedness at the Indian Point Energy 
Center, a nuclear facility located just north of my district in 
Buchanan, New York, was wholly inadequate, and demonstrates the need 
for greater consultation with DHS. NRC, defying the opinions of 
numerous experts, insisted that emergency planning for an accidental 
and terrorist-related radiation release were identical. A terrorist 
attack, which could create paranoia, provoke residents to self-
evacuate, and damage evacuation roads and reception centers, would 
surely pose unique planning challenges. The Commission also contended 
that a radiological

[[Page 25750]]

release from a terrorist attack would be no larger and spread no faster 
than that from an accident. Indeed, it incorrectly assumed that any 
radiological plume would develop over 8 hours, even though a terrorist 
attack could result in a radiological release in as little as 40 
minutes. Entergy, which owns Indian Point, has optimistically estimated 
that evacuation of the 10-mile radius around the plants would take 11 
hours, making public exposure to radiation likely. Westchester County 
has publicly stated that mobilizing emergency response teams and 
notifying the public within the new time requirements would be nearly 
impossible. Despite these facts, NRC refused to perform an independent 
review of Indian Point's emergency response plans, instead certifying 
them within one hour of FEMA's approval. I fear that in the absence of 
a legal requirement to consult with DHS, NRC neglect of terrorist 
threats will persist.
  (2) Upgrade of the Design Basis Threat.
  The House bill mandated that the NRC issue regulations, ``including 
changes to the design basis threat, to ensure that licensees address 
the threats'' of a terrorist attack within one year of enactment of the 
bill. The conference report would authorize but not mandate that NRC 
upgrade nuclear security regulations to reflect the findings of a 
comprehensive study on air, land, and water-based threats to nuclear 
reactors. Some 25 months after September 11th, NRC still rejects the 
possibility of a coordinated strike on a nuclear power plant involving 
several large teams of terrorists using sophisticated tactics and 
weaponry. NRC requires that nuclear security personnel be prepared to 
defend against the design basis threat, or DBT, an assumption about the 
size and tactics of an attacking force. While the precise details of 
the DBT are classified, nuclear experts suspect that the NRC continues 
to assume a far smaller and less sophisticated force than the one that 
struck on September 11th.
  While the NRC has required power plants to make cosmetic security 
improvements, such as installation of barb wire fencing, larger threats 
have been neglected. For example, a recent NRC study found spent fuel 
spools adjacent to commercial reactors were highly vulnerable to a 
passenger aircraft crash, which would result in a substantial release 
of radioactive material. Nevertheless, nuclear licensees have not 
required additional hardening of spent fuel pools or the containment 
domes enveloping reactors.
  Nuclear security personnel have consistently complained that they 
lack the weaponry and tactical and physical training to thwart a 
terrorist strike. In the absence of a statutory requirement to upgrade 
security, I question whether NRC will act on the recommendations of the 
vulnerability assessment mandated in this energy bill. Frustrated by 
sub-standard hiring and training standards for guards, I joined 
Congressman Markey in introducing legislation that would federalize the 
guard force at commercial nuclear facilities. In my judgment, energy 
companies chiefly concerned with their bottom lines cannot be trusted 
to secure the nation's nuclear infrastructure. Under the Nuclear 
Security Act, personnel would have to meet strict qualification 
standards, background checks, training requirements, and proficiency 
reviews.
  I once again want to thank my friend from Massachusetts for his 
leadership on this issue. I urge my colleagues to support the motion.

                          ____________________