[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 17]
[Senate]
[Pages 24084-24094]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




          STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

      By Mr. FEINGOLD:
  S. 1701. A bill to delay notice of search warrants; to the Committee 
on the Judiciary.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, today I will introduce in the Senate the 
Reasonable Notice and Search Act. This bill addresses the provision of 
the USA PATRIOT Act that has caused perhaps the most concern among 
Members of Congress. Section 213 of the PATRIOT Act, sometimes referred 
to as the ``delayed notice search provision'' or the ``sneak and peek 
provision,'' authorizes the Government in limited circumstances to 
conduct a search without immediately serving a search warrant on the 
owner or occupant of the premises that have been searched.
  Prior to the PATRIOT Act, secret searches for physical evidence were 
performed in some jurisdictions under the authority of Court of Appeals 
decisions, but the Supreme Court never definitively ruled whether they 
were constitutional. Section 213 of the Patriot Act authorized delayed 
notice warrants in any case in which an ``adverse result'' would occur 
if the warrant were served before the search was executed. Adverse 
result was defined as including: 1. Endangering the life or physical 
safety of an individual; 2. flight from prosecution; 3. destruction of 
or tampering with evidence; 4. intimidation of potential witnesses; or 
5. otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying 
a trial. These circumstances went beyond what court decisions had 
authorized before the PATRIOT Act. In addition, while some courts had 
required the service of the warrant within a specified period of time, 
the PATRIOT Act simply required that the warrant specify that it would 
be served within a ``reasonable'' period of time after the search.
  It is interesting to note that this provision of the PATRIOT Act was 
not limited to terrorism cases. Nor was it made subject to the sunset 
provision that will cause most of the new surveillance provisions of 
the act to expire at the end of 2005 unless Congress reenacts them. So 
Section 213 was pretty clearly a provision that the Department of 
Justice wanted regardless of the terrorism threat after 9/11.
  Perhaps that is why this provision has caused such controversy since 
it was passed. Just over 2 months ago, by a wide bipartisan margin, the 
House passed an amendment to the Commerce-Justice-State appropriations 
bill offered by Representative Otter from Idaho, a Republican, to stop 
funding for delayed notice searches authorized under section 213. The 
size of the vote took the Department by surprise, and it immediately 
set out to defend the provision aggressively. Clearly, this is a power 
that DOJ does not want to lose.
  I raised concern about the sneak and peek provision when it was 
included in the Patriot Act and even considered offering an amendment 
at that time to strip it out. I did not believe there had been adequate 
study and analysis of the justifications for these searches and the 
potential safeguards that might be included. I did not argue then, 
however, and I am not arguing now that there should be no delayed 
notice searches at all and that the provision should be repealed. I do 
believe, however, that it should be modified to protect against abuse. 
My bill will do four things to accomplish this.
  First, my bill would narrow the circumstances in which a delayed 
notice warrant can be granted to the following: potential loss of life, 
flight from prosecution, or destruction or tampering with evidence. The 
``catch-all provision'' in section 213, allowing a secret search when 
serving the warrant would ``seriously jeopardize an investigation or 
unduly delay a trial'' is too easily susceptible to abuse.
  Second, I believe that any delayed notice warrant should provide for 
a specific and limited time period within which notice must be given--7 
days. This is consistent with some of the pre-PATRIOT Act court 
decisions and will help to bring this provision in closer accord with 
the fourth amendment to the Constitution. Under my bill, prosecutors 
will be permitted to seek 7-day extensions if circumstances continue to 
warrant that the subject not be made aware of the search. But the 
default should be a week, unless a court is convinced that more time 
should be permitted.
  Third, Section 213 should be brought into the group of PATRIOT Act 
provisions that will sunset at the end of 2005. This will allow 
Congress to reexamine this provision along with the other provisions of 
the act, which was passed within 6 weeks of the 9/11 attacks, to 
determine if the balance between civil liberties and law enforcement 
has been correctly struck.
  Finally, the bill requires a public report on the number of times 
that section 213 is used and the number of times that extensions are 
sought beyond the 7-day notice period. This information will help the 
public and Congress evaluate the need for this authority and determine 
whether it should be retained or modified after the sunset.
  These are reasonable and moderate changes to the law. They do not gut 
the provision. They do not make it worthless. They do recognize the 
growing and legitimate concern from across the political spectrum that 
this provision was passed in haste and presents the potential for 
abuse. They also send a message that fourth amendment rights have 
meaning and potential violations of those rights should be minimized if 
at all possible. I urge my colleagues to support this bill and I ask 
unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

[[Page 24085]]

  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1701

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Reasonable Notice and Search 
     Act''.

     SEC. 2. LIMITATION ON AUTHORITY TO DELAY NOTICE OF SEARCH 
                   WARRANTS.

       Section 3103a of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in subsection (b)--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``may have an adverse 
     result (as defined in section 2705)'' and inserting ``will 
     endanger the life or physical safety of an individual, result 
     in flight from prosecution, or result in the destruction of 
     or tampering with the evidence sought under the warrant''; 
     and
       (B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``a reasonable period'' 
     and all that follows and inserting ``7 calendar days, which 
     period, upon application of the Attorney General, the Deputy 
     Attorney General, or an Associate Attorney General, may 
     thereafter be extended by the court for additional periods of 
     up to 7 calendar days each if the court finds, for each 
     application, reasonable cause to believe that notice of the 
     execution of the warrant will endanger the life or physical 
     safety of an individual, result in flight from prosecution, 
     or result in the destruction of or tampering with the 
     evidence sought under the warrant.''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(c) Reports.--
       ``(1) In general.--On a semiannual basis, the Attorney 
     General shall transmit to Congress and make public a report 
     concerning all requests for delays of notice, and for 
     extensions of delays of notice, with respect to warrants 
     under subsection (b).
       ``(2) Contents.--Each report under paragraph (1) shall 
     include, with respect to the preceding 6-month period--
       ``(A) the total number of requests for delays of notice 
     with respect to warrants under subsection (b);
       ``(B) the total number of such requests granted or denied; 
     and
       ``(C) for each request for delayed notice that was granted, 
     the total number of applications for extensions of the delay 
     of notice and the total number of such extensions granted or 
     denied.''.

     SEC. 3. SUNSET ON DELAYED NOTICE AUTHORITY.

       (a) PATRIOT Act.--Section 224(a) of the USA PATRIOT Act of 
     2001 (Public Law 107-56; 115 Stat. 295) is amended by 
     striking ``213,''.
       (b) Amendments.--The amendments made by this Act shall 
     sunset as provided in section 224 of the USA PATRIOT Act of 
     2001.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. SMITH (for himself, Mr. Graham of Florida, Mrs. Boxer, Mr. 
        Chafee, Mr. Corzine, and Mr. Wyden):
  S. 1702. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to extend 
the exclusion from gross income for employer-provided health coverage 
to designated plan beneficiaries of employees, and for other purposes; 
to the Committee on Finance.
  Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I rise today to speak about the need for 
consistent tax treatment of employer-provided health insurance for 
domestic partners. Today, Senator Bob Graham and I are introducing the 
Domestic Partner Health Benefits Equity Act, a bill that seeks to 
simplify the tax code and address the growing trend among both public 
and private employers who have decided to provide domestic partner 
benefits to their employees.
  More than one-third of Fortune 500 companies, as well as numerous 
State and local governments, are providing health insurance benefits to 
the domestic partners of their employees. This is a clear trend in the 
American workplace. However, Federal tax law has not kept pace with 
corporate changes in this area and employers who offer such benefits 
and the employees who receive them are taxed inequitably. Our 
legislation would provide consistent tax treatment for employer-
provided health insurance for domestic partners.
  Currently, the tax code provides that the employer's contribution of 
the premium for health insurance for an employee's spouse is excluded 
from the employee's taxable income. An employer's contribution for the 
domestic partner's coverage, however, is included in an employee's 
taxable income as a fringe benefit. In addition, the employer's payroll 
tax liability is increased. This forces businesses to create a two-
track payroll system for benefits provided to spouses and those 
provided to domestic partners, an administrative burden that this 
legislation would eliminate.
  I believe that by passing this legislation and changing current law, 
we will increase the number of Americans covered by health insurance by 
providing employers with a tax incentive. The tax code should not 
penalize employers for offering these benefits to their employees.
  I urge my colleagues to join me and support the Domestic Partner 
Health Benefits Equity Act. I ask unanimous consent that the text of 
this legislation be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1702

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

        This Act may be cited as the ``Domestic Partner Health 
     Benefits Equity Act''.

     SEC. 2. EXTENSION OF EXCLUSION FOR AMOUNTS RECEIVED BY AN 
                   EMPLOYEE THROUGH ACCIDENT OR HEALTH INSURANCE 
                   AS REIMBURSEMENT FOR EXPENSES FOR MEDICAL CARE.

       (a) In General.--Section 105(b) of the Internal Revenue 
     Code of 1986 (relating to amounts expended for medical care) 
     is amended--
       (1) by striking ``Except in the case'' and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(1) In general.--Except in the case'',
       (2) by adding at the end of paragraph (1) as redesignated 
     in paragraph (1) the following new sentence: ``For the 
     purposes of this subsection, the term `dependents' shall 
     include any individual who is an eligible beneficiary as 
     defined in the employer's accident or health insurance 
     arrangement.'', and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(2) Applicable percentage of exclusion for certain 
     amounts.--
       ``(A) In general.--In the case of taxable years beginning 
     after December 31, 2004, and before January 1, 2011, the 
     exclusion from income applicable by reason of the third 
     sentence of paragraph (1) shall be equal to the applicable 
     percentage of the amount which would (but for this paragraph) 
     be the amount of such exclusion.
       ``(B) Applicable percentage.--For purposes of subparagraph 
     (A), the applicable percentage shall be determined in 
     accordance with the following table:

``For taxable years beginning in calendarThe applicable percentage is--
  2005, 2006, or 2007...........................................25 ....

  2008, 2009, 2010...........................................50.''.....

       (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 
     2004.

     SEC. 3. EXTENSION OF EXCLUSION FOR CONTRIBUTIONS BY EMPLOYER 
                   TO ACCIDENT AND HEALTH PLANS.

       (a) In General.--Section 106 of the Internal Revenue Code 
     of 1986 (relating to contributions by employer to accident 
     and health plans) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new subsection:
       ``(d) Coverage Provided for Eligible Beneficiaries of 
     Employees.--
       ``(1) In general.--Subsection (a) shall not fail to apply 
     by reason of the coverage of an eligible beneficiary as 
     defined in the employer's accident or health plan.
       ``(2) Applicable percentage of exclusion for certain 
     coverage.--
       ``(A) In general.--In the case of taxable years beginning 
     after December 31, 2004, and before January 1, 2011, the 
     exclusion from income applicable by reason of paragraph (1) 
     shall be equal to the applicable percentage of the amount 
     which would (but for this paragraph) be the amount of such 
     exclusion.
       ``(B) Applicable percentage.--For purposes of subparagraph 
     (A), the applicable percentage shall be determined in 
     accordance with the following table:

``For taxable years beginning in calendarThe applicable percentage is--
  2005, 2006, or 2007...........................................25 ....

  2008, 2009, 2010...........................................50.''.....

       (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 
     2004.

     SEC. 4. EXTENSION OF DEDUCTION FOR HEALTH INSURANCE COSTS OF 
                   SELF-EMPLOYED INDIVIDUALS.

       (a) In General.--Paragraph (1) of section 162(l) of the 
     Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to special rules for 
     health insurance costs of self-employed individuals) is 
     amended to read as follows:
       ``(1) Allowance of deduction.--
       ``(A) In general.--In the case of an individual who is an 
     employee within the meaning of section 401(c)(1), there shall 
     be allowed as a deduction under this section an amount equal 
     to the amount paid during the taxable year for insurance 
     which constitutes medical care for the taxpayer, his spouse, 
     and dependents. For the purposes of this subparagraph, the 
     term `dependents' shall include any individual who is an 
     eligible beneficiary as defined in the insurance arrangement 
     which constitutes medical care.

[[Page 24086]]

       ``(B) Applicable percentage of deduction for certain 
     amounts.--
       ``(i) In general.--In the case of taxable years beginning 
     after December 31, 2004, and before January 1, 2011, the 
     deduction applicable by reason of the second sentence of 
     subparagraph (A) shall be equal to the applicable percentage 
     of the amount which would (but for this subparagraph) be the 
     amount of such deduction.
       ``(ii) Applicable percentage.--For purposes of clause (i), 
     the applicable percentage shall be determined in accordance 
     with the following table:

``For taxable years beginning in calendarThe applicable percentage is--
  2005, 2006, or 2007...........................................25 ....

  2008, 2009, 2010...........................................50.''.....

       (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section 
     shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 
     2004.

     SEC. 5. EXTENSION OF SICK AND ACCIDENT BENEFITS PROVIDED TO 
                   MEMBERS OF A VOLUNTARY EMPLOYEES' BENEFICIARY 
                   ASSOCIATION AND THEIR DEPENDENTS.

       (a) In General.--Section 501(c)(9) of the Internal Revenue 
     Code of 1986 (relating to list of exempt organizations) is 
     amended by adding at the end the following new sentence: 
     ``For purposes of providing for the payment of sick and 
     accident benefits to members of such an association and their 
     dependents, the term `dependents' shall include any 
     individual who is an eligible beneficiary as determined under 
     the terms of a medical benefit, health insurance, or other 
     program under which members and their dependents are entitled 
     to sick and accident benefits.''.
       (b) Applicable Percentage of Payment of Certain Sick and 
     Accident Benefits.--Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code 
     of 1986 (relating to exemption from tax on corporations, 
     certain trusts, etc.) is amended by redesignating subsection 
     (p) as subsection (q) and by inserting after subsection (o) 
     the following new subsection:
       ``(p) Applicable Percentage of Payment of Certain Sick and 
     Accident Benefits.--
       ``(1) In general.--In the case of taxable years beginning 
     after December 31, 2004, and before January 1, 2011, the 
     exemption from tax applicable by reason of the second 
     sentence of subsection (c)(9) shall be equal to the 
     applicable percentage of the amount which would (but for this 
     subsection) be the amount of such exemption.
       ``(2) Applicable percentage.--For purposes of paragraph 
     (1), the applicable percentage shall be determined in 
     accordance with the following table:

``For taxable years beginning in calendarThe applicable percentage is--
  2005, 2006, or 2007...........................................25 ....

  2008, 2009, 2010...........................................50.''.....

       (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 
     2004.

     SEC. 6. AMENDMENTS TO VARIOUS DEFINITIONS.

       (a) FICA.--
       (1) In general.--Section 3121 of the Internal Revenue Code 
     of 1986 (relating to definitions) is amended by adding at the 
     end the following new subsection:
       ``(z) Exclusion of Certain Amounts from Wages.--
       ``(1) In general.--For purposes of applying subsection (a) 
     with respect to expenses described in paragraph (2)(B) of 
     such subsection, the term `dependents' shall include any 
     individual who is an eligible beneficiary as defined in the 
     plan or system established by the employer.
       ``(2) Applicable percentage of exclusion from wages.--
       ``(A) In general.--In the case of taxable years beginning 
     after December 31, 2004, and before January 1, 2011, the 
     exclusion from wages applicable by reason of paragraph (1) 
     shall be equal to the applicable percentage of the amount 
     which would (but for this paragraph) be the amount of such 
     exclusion.
       ``(B) Applicable percentage.--For purposes of subparagraph 
     (A), the applicable percentage shall be determined in 
     accordance with the following table:

``For taxable years beginning in calendarThe applicable percentage is--
  2005, 2006, or 2007...........................................25 ....

  2008, 2009, 2010...........................................50.''.....

       (2) Conforming Amendment.--Section 209 of the Social 
     Security Act (42 U.S.C. 409) is amended by adding at the end 
     the following new subsection:
       ``(l)(1) For purposes of applying subsection (a) with 
     respect to medical or hospitalization expenses described in 
     paragraph (2) thereof, the term `dependents' shall include 
     any individual who is an eligible beneficiary as defined in 
     the plan or system established by the employer.
       ``(2)(A) In the case of taxable years beginning after 
     December 31, 2004, and before January 1, 2011, the exclusion 
     from wages applicable by reason of paragraph (1) shall be 
     equal to the applicable percentage of the amount which would 
     (but for this paragraph) be the amount of such exclusion.
       ``(B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), the applicable 
     percentage shall be determined in accordance with the 
     following table:

``For taxable years beginning in calendarThe applicable percentage is--
  2005, 2006, or 2007...........................................25 ....

  2008, 2009, 2010...........................................50.''.....

       (b) Railroad Retirement.--
       (1) In general.--Section 3231(e) of the Internal Revenue 
     Code of 1986 (defining compensation) is amended by adding at 
     the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(11) Treatment of certain dependents.--
       ``(A) In general.--For purposes of applying this subsection 
     with respect to medical or hospitalization expenses described 
     in paragraph (1)(i), the term `dependents' shall include any 
     individual who is an eligible beneficiary as defined in the 
     plan or system established by the employer.
       ``(B) Applicable percentage of exclusion from 
     compensation.--
       ``(i) In general.--In the case of taxable years beginning 
     after December 31, 2004, and before January 1, 2011, the 
     exclusion from compensation applicable by reason of 
     subparagraph (A) shall be equal to the applicable percentage 
     of the amount which would (but for this subparagraph) be the 
     amount of such exclusion.
       ``(ii) Applicable percentage.--For purposes of clause (i), 
     the applicable percentage shall be determined in accordance 
     with the following table:

``For taxable years beginning in calendarThe applicable percentage is--
  2005, 2006, or 2007...........................................25 ....

  2008, 2009, 2010...........................................50.''.....

       (2) Conforming Amendment.--Section 1(h) of the Railroad 
     Retirement Act of 1974 (45 U.S.C. 231(h)) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(9)(A) For purposes of applying this subsection, with 
     respect to medical or hospitalization expenses described in 
     paragraph (6)(v), the term `dependents' shall include any 
     individual who is an eligible beneficiary as defined in the 
     plan or system established by the employer.
       ``(B)(i) In the case of taxable years beginning after 
     December 31, 2004, and before January 1, 2011, the exclusion 
     from compensation applicable by reason of subparagraph (A) 
     shall be equal to the applicable percentage of the amount 
     which would (but for this subparagraph) be the amount of such 
     exclusion.
       ``(ii) For purposes of clause (i), the applicable 
     percentage shall be determined in accordance with the 
     following table:

``For taxable years beginning in calendarThe applicable percentage is--
  2005, 2006, or 2007...........................................25 ....

  2008, 2009, 2010...........................................50.''.....

       (c) FUTA.--Section 3306 of the Internal Revenue Code of 
     1986 (relating to definitions) is amended by adding at the 
     end the following new subsection:
       ``(v) Exclusion of Certain Amounts from Wages.--
       ``(1) In general.--For purposes of applying subsection (b) 
     with respect to expenses described in paragraph (2)(B) of 
     such subsection, the term `dependents' shall include any 
     individual who is an eligible beneficiary as defined in the 
     plan or system established by the employer.
       ``(2) Applicable percentage of exclusion from wages.--
       ``(A) In general.--In the case of taxable years beginning 
     after December 31, 2004, and before January 1, 2011, the 
     exclusion from wages applicable by reason of paragraph (1) 
     shall be equal to the applicable percentage of the amount 
     which would (but for this paragraph) be the amount of such 
     exclusion.
       ``(B) Applicable percentage.--For purposes of subparagraph 
     (A), the applicable percentage shall be determined in 
     accordance with the following table:

``For taxable years beginning in calendarThe applicable percentage is--
  2005, 2006, or 2007...........................................25 ....

  2008, 2009, 2010...........................................50.''.....

       (d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     shall apply to remuneration paid after December 31, 2004.

   Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. Mr. President, I am pleased to join my 
colleague from Oregon, Senator Smith, in introducing the Domestic 
Partner Health Benefits Equity Act, which corrects an inequity in our 
current tax law. Employees who receive health benefits from their 
employers are not taxed on the value of this benefit. The tax benefit 
also applies to health care that covers the employee's spouse and 
dependents.
   In growing numbers, both public and private sector employers are 
providing domestic partner benefits to employees. For example, more 
than one-third of the Fortune 500 companies and 146 State and local 
governments provide such benefits. Unlike health benefits provided to 
their other employees, however, health care that covers a domestic 
partner is taxable to both the employee and the employer.
   An employer's payroll tax liability is calculated based on its 
employees' taxable incomes. When contributions for domestic partner 
benefits are included

[[Page 24087]]

in employees' incomes, employers pay higher payroll taxes. This 
provision also places an administrative burden on employers by 
requiring them to identify those employees utilizing their benefits for 
a partner rather than a spouse. Employers must then calculate the 
portion of their contribution that is attributable to the partner, and 
create and maintain a separate payroll function for these employees' 
income tax withholding and payroll tax. Thus, the employer is penalized 
for making a sound business decision that contributes to stability in 
the workforce.
   Senator Smith and I have drafted legislation to amend the tax law to 
allow health benefits to domestic partners to be received by employees 
on the same tax-free basis as ``spouses.'' Specifically, the bill 
changes the definition of ``dependent'' in the code--for purposes of 
employer-provided health benefits only--to be any beneficiary allowed 
by the health plan.
   Although the primary beneficiaries of this legislation will be 
employees with domestic partners, the change will also benefit 
employees who provide health insurance to family members who may not 
qualify as a ``dependent'' under current law. For example, the change 
would make it easier for an employee to include a brother, sister or 
parent on an employer's health plan even if the employee does not 
provide more than one-half of the support for that individual, a 
requirement for a person being a ``dependent''.
   I commend Senator Smith for his leadership in correcting this 
inequity in our tax laws. I also thank Senators Chafee, Wyden, Corzine 
and Boxer for joining us in this effort. I urge my colleagues to 
cosponsor our bill.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. SMITH:
  S. 1703. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide 
a credit against income tax for expenditures for the maintenance of 
railroad tracks of Class II and Class III railroads; to the Committee 
on Finance.
  Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I rise today with Senators Wyden, Brown-
back, Specter, and Burns to introduce the Local Railroad Rehabilitation 
and Investment Act. The bill provides a Federal tax credit for short 
line railroad rehabilitation and addresses a critical need in small 
town America.
  There are some 500 short line railroads serving large areas of the 
country that are no longer served by the large Class I railroads. These 
railroads keep our farmers and our small businesses connected to the 
national main line railroad system and are the only alternative to 
increasing truck traffic on local roads.
  Many of today's short lines were once the light density branch lines 
of the large Class I railroads. As Class I systems began to lose money, 
these branch lines received little investment and were gradually 
abandoned. As an alternative to abandonment, the Federal Government 
encouraged spinning off these lines to form new local railroads that 
would preserve service and jobs.
  Today, this local service is threatened due to the introduction of 
the new, heavier 286,000-pound railcar that the Class I's are making 
the new in-
dustry standard. Because of the interconnectivity of our Nation's rail 
network, short lines are forced to use these heavier cars. This places 
an added strain on track structure and makes rehabilitation even more 
important and more urgent. Studies indicate that it will take $7 
billion in new investment for our nation's short lines to accommodate 
these heavier rail cars.
  My legislation is not intended to fund this entire rehabilitation. 
Rather, it is intended to help small railroads make the improvements 
required to grow traffic so they can earn the additional investment 
income needed to complete the $7 billion capital upgrade.
  Short lines operate 50,000 miles of track in 49 states, employ over 
23,000 workers at an average wage of $47,000, and earn $3 billion in 
annual revenue. Railroading is one of the most capital-intensive 
industries in the country. That capital effort is also labor intensive 
and my legislation will result in the immediate creation of jobs needed 
to undertake these rehabilitation projects.
  The major provisions of the Local Railroad Rehabilitation and 
Investment Act include:
  Authorization of a federal tax credit against qualified railroad 
track maintenance expenditures paid or incurred by a taxpayer during 
taxable years 2004 to 2008.
  The qualified railroad track maintenance expenditures include 
expenditures, whether or not otherwise chargeable to capital account, 
for maintaining or upgrading railroad track, including roadbed, bridges 
and related structures, owned or leased by the taxpayer of a Class II 
or Class III railroad.
  The total tax credit is capped at $10,000 for every mile of railroad 
track owned or leased by a Class II or Class III railroad, provided 
that the expenditure is certified by the State as part of an essential 
rail upgrade. For example, a 20-mile railroad qualifies for a $200,000 
credit.
  And, to maximize private investment in this critical infrastructure, 
the bill allows railroads that are unable to fully utilize credits 
earned to transfer such credits to other railroads, railroad shippers, 
or railroad suppliers and contractors.
  For rural America, the specter of losing rail access is a serious 
matter. As characterized in the American Association of State Highway 
Transportation Officials' (AASHTO) recent Freight-Rail Bottom Line 
Report, short lines ``often provide the first and last service miles in 
the door-to-door collection and distribution of railcars.'' The 
Association of American Railroads estimates that short lines originate 
or terminate one out of every four carloads moved by the domestic 
railroad industry. Preserving short line rail service is important to 
the national transportation system; it is absolutely critical to the 
rural transportation system. This legislation provides a modest and 
efficient way to help the short line industry help itself.
  I urge my colleagues to join me and support this important 
legislation. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the legislation 
be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1703

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Local Railroad 
     Rehabilitation and Investment Act of 2003''.

     SEC. 2. CREDIT FOR MAINTENANCE OF RAILROAD TRACK.

       (a) In General.--Subpart D of part IV of subchapter A of 
     chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to 
     business-related credits) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new section:

     ``SEC. 45G. RAILROAD TRACK MAINTENANCE CREDIT.

       ``(a) General Rule.--For purposes of section 38, the 
     railroad track maintenance credit determined under this 
     section for the taxable year is the amount of qualified 
     railroad track maintenance expenditures paid or incurred by 
     the taxpayer during the taxable year.
       ``(b) Limitation.--The credit allowed under subsection (a) 
     shall not exceed the product of--
       ``(1) $10,000, and
       ``(2) the number of miles of railroad track owned or leased 
     by the taxpayer as of the close of the taxable year.
       ``(c) Qualified Railroad Track Maintenance Expenditures.--
     For purposes of this section, the term `qualified railroad 
     track maintenance expenditures' means expenditures (whether 
     or not otherwise chargeable to capital account) for 
     maintaining railroad track (including roadbed, bridges, and 
     related track structures) owned or leased by the taxpayer of 
     Class II or Class III railroads (as determined by the Surface 
     Transportation Board).
       ``(d) Controlled Groups.--For purposes of subsection (b), 
     rules similar to the rules of paragraph (1) of section 41(f) 
     shall apply for purposes of this subsection.
       ``(e) Basis Adjustment.--For purposes of this subtitle, if 
     a credit is allowed under this section with respect to any 
     railroad track, the basis of such track shall be reduced by 
     the amount of the credit so allowed.
       ``(f) Application of Section.--This section shall apply to 
     qualified railroad track maintenance expenditures paid or 
     incurred during taxable years beginning after December 31, 
     2003, and before January 1, 2009.
       ``(g) Credit Transferability.--
       ``(1) In general.--Any credit allowable under this section 
     may be transferred as provided in this subsection, and the 
     determination as to whether the credit is allowable

[[Page 24088]]

     shall be made without regard to the tax-exempt status of the 
     transferor.
       ``(2) Transfer to eligible taxpayer.--Any credit 
     transferred under paragraph (1) shall be transferred to an 
     eligible taxpayer. Any credit so transferred shall be allowed 
     to the transferee, but the transferee may not assign such 
     credit to any other person.
       ``(3) Eligible taxpayer.--For purposes of this subsection, 
     the term `eligible taxpayer' means--
       ``(A) any person who transports property using the rail 
     facilities of the taxpayer or who furnishes railroad-related 
     property or services to the taxpayer, and
       ``(B) any Class II or Class III railroad.
       ``(4) Minimum price for transfer.--No transfer shall be 
     allowed under this subsection unless the transferor receives 
     compensation for the credit transfer equal to at least 50 
     percent of the amount of credit transferred. The excess of 
     the amount of credit transferred over the compensation 
     received by the transferor for such transfer shall be 
     included in the gross income of the transferee.''.
       (b) Limitation on Carryback.--Section 39(d) of the Internal 
     Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to transition rules) is 
     amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(11) No carryback of railroad track maintenance credit 
     before effective date.--No portion of the unused business 
     credit for any taxable year which is attributable to the 
     railroad track maintenance credit determined under section 
     45G may be carried to a taxable year beginning before January 
     1, 2004.''.
       (c) Conforming Amendments.--
       (1) Section 38(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 
     (relating to general business credit) is amended by striking 
     ``plus'' at the end of paragraph (14), by striking the period 
     at the end of paragraph (15) and inserting ``, plus'', and by 
     adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(16) the railroad track maintenance credit determined 
     under section 45G(a).''.
       (2) Subsection (a) of section 1016 of such Code is amended 
     by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (27), by striking 
     the period at the end of paragraph (28) and inserting ``, 
     and'', and by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(29) in the case of railroad track with respect to which 
     a credit was allowed under section 45G, to the extent 
     provided in section 45G(e).''.
       (d) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections for subpart 
     D of part IV of subchapter A of chapter 1 of the Internal 
     Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 45F the following new item:

``Sec. 45G. Railroad track maintenance credit.''.

       (e) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 
     2003.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Ms. COLLINS (for herself, Mr. Pryor, Mr. Coleman, and Mr. 
        Bingaman):
  S. 1704. A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act to establish a 
State family support grant program to end the practice of parents 
giving legal custody of their seriously emotionally disturbed children 
to State agencies for the purpose of obtaining mental health services 
for those children; to the committee on Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I am pleased to join my colleagues 
Senators Pryor, Coleman and Bingaman in introducing the ``Keeping 
Families Together Act.'' Among other provisions, our bill authorizes a 
new, competitive State grant program to support statewide systems for 
care for children with serious mental illness so that parents are no 
longer forced to give up custody of their children solely for the 
purpose of securing mental health treatment.
  Serious mental illness afflicts millions of our Nation's children and 
adolescents. It is estimated that as many as 20 percent of American 
children under the age of 17 suffer from a mental, emotional or 
behavioral illness. Of these, nearly half have a condition that 
produces a serious disability that impairs the child's ability to 
function in day-to-day activities. What is even more disturbing is the 
fact that two-thirds of all young people who need mental health 
treatment are not getting it.
  Behind each of these statistics is a family that is struggling to do 
the best it can to help a son or daughter with a serious mental illness 
to be just like every other kid--to develop friendships, to do well in 
school, and to get along with their siblings and other family members. 
These children are almost always involved with more than one social 
service agency, including the mental health, special education, child 
welfare, and juvenile justice systems. Yet no one agency, at either the 
State or the Federal level, is clearly responsible or accountable for 
helping these children.
  Recent news reports in more than 30 States have highlighted the 
difficulties that parents of children with serious mental illness have 
in getting the coordinated mental health services that their children 
need. My interest in this issue was triggered by a compelling series of 
stories by Barbara Walsh in the Portland Press Herald last summer which 
detailed the obstacles that many Maine families have faced in getting 
care for their children.
  Too many families in Maine and elsewhere have been forced to make 
wrenching decisions when they have been advised that the only way to 
get the care that their children so desperately need is to relinquish 
custody and place them in either the child welfare or juvenile justice 
system.
  Yet neither system is intended to serve children with serious mental 
illness. Child welfare systems are designed to protect children who 
have been abused or neglected. Juvenile justice systems are designed to 
rehabilitate children who have committed criminal or delinquent acts 
and to prevent such acts from occurring. While neither of these systems 
is equipped to care for a child with a serious mental illness, in far 
too may cases, there is nowhere else for the family to turn.
  Earlier this year, the General Accounting Office (GAO) completed a 
report that I requested with Representatives Pete Stark and Patrick 
Kennedy titled ``Child Welfare and Juvenile Justice: Federal Agencies 
Could Play a Stronger Role in Helping States Reduce the Number of 
Children Placed solely to Obtain Mental Health Services.''
  The GAO surveyed child welfare directors in all States and the 
District of Columbia, as well as juvenile justice officials in the 33 
counties with the largest number of young people in their juvenile 
justice systems. According to the GAO survey, in 2001, parents placed 
more than 12,700 children into the child welfare or juvenile justice 
systems so that these children could receive mental health services.
  Moreover, the GAO estimate is likely just the tip of the iceberg, 
since 32 States--including the five States with the largest populations 
of children--did not provide the GAO with any data.
  There have been other studies indicating that the custody 
relinquishment problem is pervasive. In 1999, the National Alliance for 
the Mentally Ill released a survey which found that 23 percent--or one 
in four of the parents surveyed--had been told by public officials that 
they needed to relinquish custody of their children to get care, and 
that one in five of these families had done so.
  While some States have passed laws to limit or prohibit custody 
relinquishment, simply banning the practice is not a solution, since it 
can leave mentally ill children and their families without services and 
care. Custody relinquishment is merely a symptom of the much larger 
problem, which is the lack of available, affordable and appropriate 
mental health services and support systems for these children and their 
families.
  In July, I chaired a series of hearings in the Committee on 
Governmental Affairs to examine the difficult challenges faced by 
families of children with mental illnesses. We heard compelling 
testimony from families who told the Committee about their personal 
struggles to get mental health services for their severely ill 
children. The mothers who testified told us they were advised that the 
only way to get the intensive care and services that their children 
needed was to relinquish custody and place them in the child welfare 
system. This is a wrenching decision that no family should be forced to 
make. No parent should have to give up custody of his or her child just 
to get the services that the child needs.
  The legislation that we are introducing today was developed in 
response to concerns raised by both the GAO report and in the 
Governmental Affairs Committee hearings.

[[Page 24089]]

  First, the legislation authorizes $55 million for competitive grants 
to States that would be payable over six years to create an 
infrastructure to support and sustain statewide systems of care to 
serve children who are in custody or at risk of entering custody of the 
State for the purpose of receiving mental health services. These grants 
are intended to help states serve these children more effectively and 
efficiently, while keeping them at home with their families.
  States would use funds from these Family Support Grants to foster 
interagency cooperation and cross-system financing among the various 
State agencies with responsibilities for serving children with mental 
health needs. The funds would also support the purchase and delivery of 
a comprehensive array of community-based mental health and family 
support services for children who are in custody, or at risk of 
entering into the custody of the State for the purpose of receiving 
mental health services. This will allow States, which already dedicate 
significant dollars to serving children in state custody, to use those 
resources more efficiently by delivering care to children while 
allowing them to remain with their families.
  In response to recommendation made by the GAO report, the Keeping 
Families Together Act will also establish a Federal interagency task 
force to examine mental health issues in the child welfare and juvenile 
justice systems and the role of their agencies in promoting access by 
children and youth to mental health services.
  And finally, the legislation will remove a current statutory barrier 
that prevents more states from using the Medicaid home and community-
based services waiver to serve children with serious mental health 
conditions. The Medicaid home and community-based services waiver is a 
promising way for States to reduce the incidence of custody 
relinquishment and address the underlying lack of mental health 
services for children. While a number of States have requested these 
waivers to serve children with developmental disabilities, to date very 
few have done so for children with serious mental health conditions. 
That is because, under current law, States can only offer home- and 
community-based services under these waivers as an alternative to care 
in hospitals, nursing facilities, or intermediate care facilities for 
the mentally retarded. Our legislation will correct this omission and 
provide parity to children with mental illness by including inpatient 
psychiatric hospitals and residential treatment facilities on the list 
of institutions for which alternative care through the Medicaid home- 
and community-based services waivers may be available.
  The legislation we are introducing today will help to reduce the 
barriers to care for children who suffer from mental illness and will 
assist States in eliminating the practice of parents relinquishing 
custody of their children to State agencies solely for the purpose of 
securing mental health services.
  Our legislation has been endorsed by a number of mental health and 
children's groups including the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, 
the Federation of Families for Children's Mental Health, the National 
Child Welfare League, the Bazelon Center, the Children's Defense Fund, 
and the National Mental Health Association. I urge all of my colleagues 
to join us as cosponsors.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. KENNEDY (for himself, Mr. Jeffords, Mr. Chafee, Mr. 
        Lieberman, Mr. Akaka, Mr. Baucus, Mr. Bayh, Mr. Biden, Mr. 
        Bingaman, Mrs. Boxer, Mr. Breaux, Ms. Cantwell, Mr. Carper, 
        Mrs. Clinton, Ms. Collins, Mr. Corzine, Mr. Daschle, Mr. 
        Dayton, Mr. Dodd, Mr. Dorgan, Mr. Durbin, Mr. Edwards, Mr. 
        Feingold, Mrs. Feinstein, Mr. Graham of Florida, Mr. Harkin, 
        Mr. Inouye, Mr. Kerry, Mr. Kohl, Ms. Landrieu, Mr. Lautenberg, 
        Mr. Leahy, Mr. Levin, Ms. Mikulski, Mrs. Murray, Mr. Nelson of 
        Florida, Mr. Reed, Mr. Reid, Mr. Sarbanes, Mr. Schumer, Mr. 
        Smith, Mr. Specter, Ms. Stabenow, and Mr. Wyden):
  S. 1705. A bill to prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation; to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, it's a privilege to join my colleagues in 
introducing the Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2003.
  Civil rights is the unfinished business of our nation. Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 gives all Americans--without regard to 
race, ethnic background, gender, or religion--the opportunity to obtain 
and keep a job. The Employment Non-Discrimination Act is an essential 
additional step in preventing job discrimination.
  The act is straightforward and limited. It prohibits discrimination 
based on sexual orientation in making decisions about hiring, firing, 
promotion, and compensation. It makes clear that there is no right to 
preferential treatment, and that quotas are prohibited. It does not 
apply to employers with less than 15 employees. It does not apply to 
the armed forces, religious organizations, or such volunteer positions 
as troop leaders in the Boy Scouts or Girl Scouts.
  In fact, this fundamental additional protection for America's 
workforce is long overdue. Too many hardworking Americans are being 
judged on their sexual orientation, rather than their ability and 
qualifications.
  Consider the example of Kendall Hamilton in Oklahoma City. After 
working at Red Lobster for several years and receiving excellent 
reviews, he applied for promotion at the urging of the general manager, 
who knew he was gay. His application was rejected after a co-worker 
revealed his sexual orientation to the upper management team, and the 
promotion was given instead to another employee who had been on the job 
for only 9 months--and whom Mr. Hamilton had trained. He was told that 
his sexual orientation ``was not compatible with Red Lobster's belief 
in family values,'' and that being gay had destroyed any chance of 
becoming a manager. As a result, Hamilton left the company.
  Consider the example of Steve Morrison, a firefighter in Oregon. His 
co-workers saw him on the local news protesting an anti-gay initiative, 
and incorrectly assumed he was gay himself. He began to lose workplace 
responsibilities and was the victim of harassment, including hate mail. 
After a long administrative proceeding, the trumped-up charges were 
removed from his record, and he was transferred to another fire 
station.
  The overwhelming majority of Americans believe that this kind of 
discrimination is wrong. According to a 2003 Gallup study, 88 percent 
of Americans believe that gays and lesbians should have equal job 
opportunities. The Employment Non-Discrimination Act is strongly 
supported by labor unions and a broad religious coalition. They know 
that America will not reach its full potential or realize its promise 
of equal justice and equal opportunity for all until we end all forms 
of discrimination.
  Over 60 percent of Fortune 500 companies have implemented non-
discrimination policies that include sexual orientation. Our 
legislation has been endorsed by leading corporations such as AT&T, BP, 
Cisco Systems, Eastman Kodak, FleetBoston, General Mills, Hewlett-
Packard, IBM, JP Morgan Chase & Co., Microsoft, Nike, Oracle, Shell 
Oil, and Verizon.
  Small businesses support our legislation as well. At a hearing in 
2001, Lucy Billingsly, a Republican small business owner in Dallas, 
said, ``A uniform Federal law banning sexual orientation discrimination 
will give businesses the right focus. By paying attention to the 
quality of work being done and not to factors that have nothing to do 
with job performance, all of America's businesses will perform 
better.''
  Despite broad-based support in the business community and Congress's 
history of enacting anti-discrimination legislation, some argue that 
the solution to the problem of job discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation should be left to the States. I disagree.

[[Page 24090]]

Only 14 States and the District of Columbia have laws similar to the 
Employment Non-Discrimination Act. Too many American workers are left 
without redress. A Federal law is clearly needed to ensure that all 
Americans receive equal treatment in the workplace.
  Hard-working citizens in every State deserve the opportunity to feel 
secure in their jobs when they perform well, and they deserve the 
opportunity to compete in the workplace when they are qualified for a 
job. Job discrimination based on sexual orientation is unacceptable, 
and I urge my colleagues to support this bill.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I am delighted to join with Senators 
Kennedy, Chafee, Jeffords and many other colleagues as an original 
cosponsor of this important legislation, the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act of 2003. By guaranteeing that American workers 
cannot lose their jobs simply because of their sexual orientation, this 
bill would extend the bedrock American values of fairness and equality 
to a group of our fellow citizens who too often have been denied the 
benefit of those most basic values.
  More than 225 years ago, Thomas Jefferson laid out a vision of 
America as dedicated to the simple idea that all of us are created 
equal, endowed by our creator with the unalienable rights to life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness. As Jefferson knew, our society 
did not in his time live up to that ideal, but since his time, we have 
been trying to. In succeeding generations, we have worked ever harder 
to ensure that our society removes unjustified barriers to individual 
achievement and that we judge each other solely on our merits and not 
on characteristics that are irrelevant to the task at hand. We are 
still far from perfect, but we have made much progress, especially over 
the past few decades, guaranteeing equality and fairness to an 
increasing number of groups that traditionally have not had the 
benefits of those values and of those protections. To African-
Americans, to women, to disabled Americans, to religious minorities and 
to others we have extended a legally enforceable guarantee that, with 
respect to their ability to earn a living at least, they will be 
treated on their merits and not on characteristics unrelated to their 
ability to do their jobs.
  It is time to extend that guarantee to gay men and lesbians, who too 
often have been denied the most basic of rights: the right to obtain 
and maintain a job. A collection of 1 national survey and 20 city and 
State surveys found that as many as 44 percent of gay, lesbian and 
bisexual workers faced job discrimination in the workplace at some time 
in their careers. Other studies have reported even greater 
discrimination--as much as 68 percent of gay men and lesbians reporting 
employment discrimination. The fear in which these workers live was 
clear from a survey of gay men and lesbians in Philadelphia. Over 
three-quarters told those conducting the survey that they sometimes or 
always hide their orientation at work out of fear of discrimination.
  The toll this discrimination takes extends far beyond its effect on 
the individuals who live without full employment opportunities. It also 
takes an unacceptable toll on America's definition of itself as a land 
of equality and opportunity, as a place where we judge each other on 
our merits, and as a country that teaches its children that anyone can 
succeed here as long as they are willing to do their job and work hard.
  This bill provides for equality and fairness--that and no more. It 
says only what we already have said for women, for people of color and 
for others; that you are entitled to have your ability to earn a living 
depend only on your ability to do the job and nothing else.
  This bill would bring our nation one large step closer to realizing 
the vision that Thomas Jefferson so eloquently expressed 227 years ago 
when he wrote that all of us have a right to life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness. I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting 
this important legislation.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Ms. STABENOW:
  S. 1707. A bill to amend title 39, United States Code, to provide for 
free mailing privileges for personal correspondence and certain parcels 
sent from within the United States to members of the Armed Forces 
serving on active duty abroad who are engaged in military operations 
involving armed conflict against a hostile foreign force, and for other 
purposes; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.
  Ms. STABENOW. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Providing 
Our Support to Troops or POST Act of 2003. This bill would provide free 
mailing privileges for letters and packages sent from within the United 
States to members of the Armed Forces serving on active duty abroad who 
are engaged in military operations involving armed conflict against a 
hostile foreign force. This bill is a companion bill to Representative 
Lucas's H.R. 2705, a bill with 31 bipartisan cosponsors in the House of 
Representatives.
  Our troops overseas can send mail and packages to their loved ones at 
no cost, but their families must pay postage to do the same. As the 
holidays approach, the families back here in the States are not only 
not able to give their Christmas or Hanukah presents to their loved 
ones in person, but they have to pay postage to do so.
  Two constituents of mine, both mothers of servicemen in Iraq, brought 
this inequity to my attention. Renee Walton from Lincoln Park, MI, 
mother of twins Jeremy and Joshua who are serving in the Marine Corps, 
writes, ``I believe this is something all the troops' families will 
benefit from and most especially the soldier who is waiting patiently 
for a package from home.''
  Suzann Sareini, a Dearborn resident, says, ``As a mother of one of 
the brave individuals in our armed forces fighting for this country, I 
believe this act exhibits a tremendous amount of patriotic gratitude 
for the sacrifices being made by members of the military and their 
families. This small gesture would be invaluable in its contribution to 
the morale of our soldiers waiting patiently for packages from back 
home.''
  I wholeheartedly agree with these two Michigan moms.
  Currently 2,500 Michigan Guard and Reserves are on active duty, many 
of whom are serving in Iraq or Afghanistan or fighting the war against 
terrorism around the globe. That means that there are thousands of 
families who will have an empty seat at the Thanksgiving table and will 
be missing a loved one during the holidays. But, by providing free 
postage for these families, we are making it easier for them to stay in 
touch with their loved ones and provide them with moral support. This 
is only fair since our service men and women have so unselfishly made 
great sacrifices to protect us and our country. This is a small 
gesture, but one that will speak loudly in the hearts of our troops and 
their families.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1707

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Providing Our Support to 
     Troops Act of 2003''.

     SEC. 2. FREE MAILING PRIVILEGES.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 34 of title 39, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

     ``Sec. 3407. Free postage for personal correspondence and 
       certain parcels mailed to members of Armed Forces of the 
       United States

       ``(a) In General.--The matter described in subsection (b) 
     (other than matter described in subsection (c)) may be mailed 
     free of postage, if--
       ``(1) such matter is sent from within an area served by a 
     United States post office;
       ``(2) such matter is addressed to an individual who is a 
     member of the Armed Forces of the United States on active 
     duty, as defined in section 101 of title 10, or a civilian, 
     authorized to use postal services at Armed Forces 
     installations, who holds a position or performs one or more 
     functions in support of military operations, as designated by 
     the military theater commander; and
       ``(3)(A) such matter is addressed to the individual 
     referred to in paragraph (2) at an

[[Page 24091]]

     Armed Forces post office established in an overseas area with 
     respect to which a designation under section 3401(a)(1)(A) is 
     in effect; or
       ``(B) in the case of an individual who is hospitalized at a 
     facility under the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces of the 
     United States as a result of a disease or injury described in 
     section 3401(a)(1)(B), such matter is addressed to such 
     individual at an Armed Forces post office determined under 
     subsection (f).
       ``(b) Mail Matter Described.--The free mailing privilege 
     provided by subsection (a) is extended to--
       ``(1) letter mail or sound- or video-recorded 
     communications having the character of personal 
     correspondence; and
       ``(2) parcels not exceeding 10 pounds in weight and 60 
     inches in length and girth combined.
       ``(c) Limitation.--The free mailing privilege provided by 
     subsection (a) does not extend to mail matter that contains 
     any advertising.
       ``(d) Rate of Postage.--Any matter which is mailed under 
     this section shall be mailed at the equivalent rate of 
     postage which assures that the mail will be sent by the most 
     economical means practicable.
       ``(e) Marking.--All matter mailed under this section shall 
     bear, in the upper right-hand corner of the address area, the 
     words `Free Matter for Members of the Armed Forces of the 
     United States', or words to that effect specified by the 
     Postal Service.
       ``(f) Regulations.--This section shall be administered 
     under such conditions, and under such regulations, as the 
     Postal Service and the Secretary of Defense jointly may 
     prescribe.''.
       (b) Funding.--
       (1) Free postage.--Sections 2401(c) and 3627 of title 39, 
     United States Code, are amended by striking ``3406'' and 
     inserting ``3407''.
       (2) Air transportation.--
       (A) In general.--Section 2401 of title 39, United States 
     Code, is amended by redesignating subsections (d) through (g) 
     as subsections (e) through (h), respectively, and by 
     inserting after subsection (c) the following:
       ``(d) There are authorized to be appropriated to the Postal 
     Service each year a sum determined by the Postal Service to 
     be equal to the expenses incurred by the Postal Service in 
     providing air transportation for mail sent to members of the 
     Armed Forces of the United States free of postage under 
     section 3407, not including the expense of air transportation 
     that is provided by the Postal Service at the same postage 
     rate or charge for mail which is not addressed to an Armed 
     Forces post office.''.
       (B) Amendment to prevent duplicative funding.--Section 
     3401(e) of title 39, United States Code, is amended by 
     striking ``office.'' and inserting ``office or (3) for which 
     amounts are authorized to be appropriated to the Postal 
     Service under section 2401(d).''.
       (C) Technical and conforming amendments.--
       (i) Annual budget.--Section 2009 of title 39, United States 
     Code, is amended in the next to last sentence by striking 
     ``(b) and (c)'' and inserting ``(b), (c), and (d)''.
       (ii) Comprehensive plan references.--Sections 2803(a) and 
     2804(a) of such title 39 are amended by striking ``2401(g)'' 
     and inserting ``2401(f)''.
       (c) Chapter Analysis.--The analysis for chapter 34 of title 
     39, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:

``3407. Free postage for personal correspondence and certain parcels 
              mailed to Members of the Armed Forces of the United 
              States.''.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. CRAIG (for himself, Mr. Durbin, Mr. Crapo, Mr. Feingold, 
        Mr. Sununu, Mr. Wyden, and Mr. Bingaman):
  S. 1709. A bill to amend the USA PATRIOT ACT to place reasonable 
limitations on the use of surveillance and the issuance of search 
warrants, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.
  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I rise today on behalf of myself and 
Senators Durbin, Crapo, Feingold, Sununu, and Bingaman, to introduce 
the Security and Freedom Ensured Act of 2003, which we call the SAFE 
Act.
  This bill is aimed at addressing some specific concerns that have 
been raised about the USA PATRIOT Act. We believe this is a measured, 
reasonable, and appropriate response that would ensure the liberties of 
law-abiding individuals are protected in our Nation's fight against 
terrorism, without in any way impeding that fight.
  Let me say at the outset that I voted in favor of the USA PATRIOT 
Act. I believed then, and still do, that it was the right thing to do 
in the wake of the terrible and unprecedented attacks on our Nation on 
September 11, 2001. I would also like to express my gratitude to those 
brave men and women who put their lives on the line every day to 
protect the American people from further attacks by would-be terrorists 
and criminals. The Department of Justice and Department of Homeland 
Security should be commended for the dramatic progress they are making 
in detecting, pursuing, and stopping those who pose a threat to our 
Nation and our people.
  Even so, the USA PATRIOT Act is not a perfect law, and it is no 
criticism of those who are so ably waging the war against terrorism to 
suggest that it may be in order to amend some aspects of that law.
  The SAFE Act is intended to do just that: make some commonsense 
changes that help to safeguard our freedoms, without sacrificing our 
security. It focuses on areas of activity that have been particularly 
controversial: delayed notice warrants, which are also referred to as 
``sneak and peek'' warrants; wiretaps that do not require specificity 
as to either person or place; the impact of the new law on libraries; 
and nationwide search warrants. Our bill would amend, not eliminate 
these tools or repeal the USA PATRIOT Act in these areas.
  I spend a lot of time on the ground in my home State of Idaho, and 
regardless of the pride Idahoans have in the success of the war on 
terrorism, many of them continue to raise concerns about the tools 
being used in that war. Admittedly, a lot of misinformation has been 
spread about the USA PATRIOT Act, and I applaud the Administration for 
working to correct that misinformation. However, not all of the 
concerns about the law are unfounded or misguided, and I strongly 
believe they deserve a proper airing in Congress. Furthermore, one has 
only to look at the cosponsors of the SAFE Act to see that these 
concerns are not unique to Idahoans--they are shared by a wide regional 
and political spectrum.
  This morning, the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee announced a series of hearings on how our anti-terrorism laws 
are working. As a member of that committee, I look forward to the 
opportunity of exploring these issues in detail and finding solutions 
for any problems we discover, possibly including the SAFE Act. The 
changes this bill makes are not numerous or sweeping, but they are 
significant. I hope my colleagues will agree and will support the 
legislation we are introducing today.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1709

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Security and Freedom Ensured 
     Act of 2003'' or the ``SAFE Act''.

     SEC. 2. LIMITATION ON ROVING WIRETAPS UNDER FOREIGN 
                   INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978.

       Section 105(c) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805(c)) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by striking subparagraphs (A) and (B) 
     and inserting the following:
       ``(A)(i) the identity of the target of electronic 
     surveillance, if known; or
       ``(ii) if the identity of the target is not known, a 
     description of the target and the nature and location of the 
     facilities and places at which the electronic surveillance 
     will be directed;
       ``(B)(i) the nature and location of each of the facilities 
     or places at which the electronic surveillance will be 
     directed, if known; and
       ``(ii) if any of the facilities or places are unknown, the 
     identity of the target;''; and
       (2) in paragraph (2)--
       (A) by redesignating subparagraphs (B) through (D) as 
     subparagraphs (C) through (E), respectively; and
       (B) by inserting after subparagraph (A), the following:
       ``(B) in cases where the facility or place at which the 
     surveillance will be directed is not known at the time the 
     order is issued, that the surveillance be conducted only when 
     the presence of the target at a particular facility or place 
     is ascertained by the person conducting the surveillance;''.

     SEC. 3. LIMITATION ON AUTHORITY TO DELAY NOTICE OF SEARCH 
                   WARRANTS.

       (a) In General.--Section 3103a of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended--
       (1) in subsection (b)--

[[Page 24092]]

       (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``may have an adverse 
     result (as defined in section 2705)'' and inserting ``will--
       ``(A) endanger the life or physical safety of an 
     individual;
       ``(B) result in flight from prosecution; or
       ``(C) result in the destruction of, or tampering with, the 
     evidence sought under the warrant''; and
       (B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``within a reasonable 
     period'' and all that follows and inserting ``not later than 
     7 days after the execution of the warrant, which period may 
     be extended by the court for an additional period of not more 
     than 7 days each time the court finds reasonable cause to 
     believe, pursuant to a request by the Attorney General, the 
     Deputy Attorney General, or an Associate Attorney General, 
     that notice of the execution of the warrant will--
       ``(A) endanger the life or physical safety of an 
     individual;
       ``(B) result in flight from prosecution; or
       ``(C) result in the destruction of, or tampering with, the 
     evidence sought under the warrant.''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(c) Reports.--
       ``(1) In general.--Every 6 months, the Attorney General 
     shall submit a report to Congress summarizing, with respect 
     to warrants under subsection (b), the requests made by the 
     Department of Justice for delays of notice and extensions of 
     delays of notice during the previous 6-month period.
       ``(2) Contents.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) 
     shall include, for the preceding 6-month period--
       ``(A) the number of requests for delays of notice with 
     respect to warrants under subsection (b), categorized as 
     granted, denied, or pending; and
       ``(B) for each request for delayed notice that was granted, 
     the number of requests for extensions of the delay of notice, 
     categorized as granted, denied, or pending.
       ``(3) Public Availability.--The Attorney General shall make 
     the report submitted under paragraph (1) available to the 
     public.''.
       (b) Sunset Provision.--
       (1) In general.--Subsections (b) and (c) of section 3103a 
     of title 18, United States Code, shall cease to have effect 
     on December 31, 2005.
       (2) Exception.--With respect to any particular foreign 
     intelligence investigation that began before the date on 
     which the provisions referred to in paragraph (1) cease to 
     have effect, or with respect to any particular offense or 
     potential offense that began or occurred before the date on 
     which the provisions referred to in paragraph (1) cease to 
     have effect, such provisions shall continue in effect.

     SEC. 4. PRIVACY PROTECTIONS FOR LIBRARY, BOOKSELLER, AND 
                   OTHER PERSONAL RECORDS UNDER FOREIGN 
                   INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978.

       (a) Applications for Orders.--Section 501(b)(2) of the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
     1861(b)(2)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``shall specify that the records'' and 
     inserting ``shall specify that--
       ``(A) the records''; and
       (2) by striking the period at the end and inserting the 
     following: ``; and
       ``(B) there are specific and articulable facts giving 
     reason to believe that the person to whom the records pertain 
     is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.''.
       (b) Orders.--Section 501(c)(1) of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861(c)(1)) is amended by 
     striking ``finds that'' and all that follows and inserting 
     ``finds that--
       ``(A) there are specific and articulable facts giving 
     reason to believe that the person to whom the records pertain 
     is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; and
       ``(B) the application meets the other requirements of this 
     section.''.
       (c) Oversight of Requests for Production of Records.--
     Section 502(a) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1862) is amended to read as follows:
       ``(a) On a semiannual basis, the Attorney General shall, 
     with respect to all requests for the production of tangible 
     things under section 501, fully inform--
       ``(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
       ``(2) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;
       ``(3) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives; and
       ``(4) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
     Representatives.''.

     SEC. 5. PRIVACY PROTECTIONS FOR COMPUTER USERS AT LIBRARIES 
                   UNDER NATIONAL SECURITY AUTHORITY.

       Section 2709 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)--
       (A) by striking ``A wire'' and inserting the following:
       ``(1) In general.--A wire''; and
       (B) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(2) Exception.--A library shall not be treated as a wire 
     or electronic communication service provider for purposes of 
     this section.''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(f) Defined Term.--In this section, the term `library' 
     means a library (as that term is defined in section 213(2) of 
     the Library Services and Technology Act (20 U.S.C. 9122(2)) 
     whose services include access to the Internet, books, 
     journals, magazines, newspapers, or other similar forms of 
     communication in print or digitally to patrons for their use, 
     review, examination, or circulation.''.

     SEC. 6. EXTENSION OF PATRIOT SUNSET PROVISION.

       Section 224(a) of the USA PATRIOT ACT (18 U.S.C. 2510 note) 
     is amended--
       (1) by striking ``213, 216, 219,''; and
       (2) by inserting ``and section 505'' after ``by those 
     sections)''.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, the USA PATRIOT Act, the counterterrorism 
bill that the Bush administration pushed through Congress after the 
September 11 terrorist attacks, has been the focus of much controversy 
in recent months. I voted for the PATRIOT Act, as did the vast majority 
of my colleagues in the Congress. I believed then, and I still believe, 
that the PATRIOT Act made many reasonable and necessary changes in the 
law.
  For example, the PATRIOT Act tripled the number of Federal agents at 
the Northern border, an area that had been greatly understaffed. It 
allocated $100 million to upgrade technology for monitoring the 
Northern border. It expedited the hiring of FBI translators, who were 
desperately needed to translate intelligence after 9/11.
  Most importantly, the PATRIOT Act updated information technology and 
enhanced information sharing between Federal agencies, especially the 
FBI and the CIA. As we learned after 9/11, the failure of these 
agencies to communicate with each other may have prevented law 
enforcement from uncovering the 9/11 plot before that terrible day.
  However, the PATRIOT Act contains several controversial provisions 
that I and many of my colleagues believe went too far. The Bush 
administration placed Congress in a very difficult situation by 
insisting on including these provisions in the bill. We were able to 
amend or sunset some of the most troubling components of the bill. 
However, many remained in the final version. As a result, the PATRIOT 
Act makes it much easier for the FBI to monitor the innocent activities 
of American citizens with minimal or no judicial oversight. For 
example:
  The FBI can now seize records on the books you check out of the 
library or the videos you rent, simply by certifying that the records 
are sought for a terrorism or intelligence investigation, a very low 
standard. A court no longer has authority to question the FBI's 
certification. The FBI no longer must show that the documents relate to 
a suspected terrorist or spy.

  The FBI can conduct a ``sneak and peek'' search of your home, not 
notifying you of the search until after a ``reasonable period,'' a term 
which is not defined in the PATRIOT Act. A court is now authorized to 
issue a ``sneak and peek'' warrant where a court finds ``reasonable 
cause'' that providing immediate notice of the warrant would have an 
``adverse result,'' a very broad standard. The use of ``sneak and 
peek'' warrants is not limited to terrorism cases.
  The FBI can obtain a ``John Doe'' roving wiretap, which does not 
specify the target of the wiretap or the place to be wiretapped. This 
increases the likelihood that the conversations of innocent people 
wholly unrelated to an investigation will be intercepted.
  Many in Congress did not want to deny law enforcement some of the 
reasonable reforms contained in the PATRIOT Act that they needed to 
combat terrorism. So, we reluctantly decided to support the 
administration's version of the bill, but not until we secured a 
commitment that they would be responsive to Congressional oversight and 
consult extensively with us before seeking any further changes in the 
law.
  Unfortunately, the Justice Department has reneged on their commitment 
to Congress, frustrating oversight on the PATRIOT Act at every turn. 
Attorney General Ashcroft only rarely appears on Capitol Hill. In fact, 
he has only testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee, of which I 
am a member, once this year. He appeared, along with two other 
administration officials, for just half a day. The Justice Department 
regularly fails to answer

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congressional inquiries, either arguing that requested information is 
classified, or simply not responding at all.
  At the same time, the administration's allies in Congress have argued 
that the PATRIOT Act's sunset clauses should be repealed before we have 
had an opportunity to review their effectiveness. Earlier this year, we 
learned that the administration had secretly drafted another sweeping 
counter-
terrorism bill, ``PATRIOT Act II,'' without consulting with Congress. 
This bill would grant the Justice Department even broader authority, 
such as the right to strip Americans of their citizenship.
  That proposal generated widespread opposition, but, unchastened, the 
administration went on the offensive again recently. On the anniversary 
of the 9/11 attacks, President Bush proposed new legislation that would 
give the Justice Department the authority to issue so-called 
administrative subpoenas, without judicial review, create 15 new 
federal death penalty crimes, and mandate pretrial detention for 
defendants accused of a laundry list of crimes, many of them unrelated 
to terrorism. These proposals continue the Administration's pattern of 
seeking to limit judicial oversight and grant broad, unchecked 
authority to law enforcement.
  While they are pushing radical changes in the law, the Bush 
administration has failed to take commonsense steps to prevent 
terrorism, like developing fully interoperable information systems and 
creating a consolidated terrorist watch list. Most of the information 
systems now within the Department of Homeland Security's jurisdiction 
were acquired and developed independently within the former agencies in 
a parochial ``stovepipe'' fashion, and may be incompatible with other 
DHS systems. The Bush administration indicated that an initial 
inventory of these systems would be completed by this spring. I 
understand that inventory is still not completed.
  This April, the GAO concluded that nine different agencies still 
develop and maintain a dozen terrorist watch lists, including 
overlapping and different data, and inconsistent procedures and 
policies on information sharing. The law creating the Department of 
Homeland Security requires the Department to consolidate watch lists. 
The Bush Administration promised that these lists would be consolidated 
by the first day of Homeland Security's operations. Seven months later, 
the lists are still not consolidated.
  The Bush administration has devoted too many resources to coun-
terterrorism measures that threaten our civil liberties and do little 
to improve our security. For example, John Ashcroft's Justice 
Department has launched a number of high-profile initiatives that 
explicitly target immigrants, especially Arabs and Muslims, for 
heightened scrutiny. These efforts squander precious law enforcement 
resources and alienate communities whose cooperation we desperately 
need. They run counter to basic principles of community policing, which 
reject the use of racial and ethnic profiles and focus on building 
trust and respect by working cooperatively with community members.
  The Justice Department's own Inspector General has found that the 
Justice Department has not adequately distinguished between terrorism 
suspects and other immigration detainees. The IG found that the Justice 
Department detained 762 aliens as a result of the September 11 
investigation, exactly zero of whom were charged with terrorist-related 
offenses. No one is suggesting that the Department should never use 
immigration charges to detain a suspected terrorist, but the broad 
brush of terrorism should not be applied to large numbers of every out-
of-status immigrants who happen to be Arab or Muslim.
  Many of us in Congress have raised concerns with the Justice 
Department about implementation of the PATRIOT Act and other civil 
liberties issues, and, rather than respond to legitimate concerns, they 
have gone on the offensive. In testimony before the Judiciary 
Committee, Attorney General John Ashcroft warned his critics:

       To those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of 
     lost liberty; my message is this: Your tactics only aid 
     terrorists--for they erode our national unity and diminish 
     our resolve. They give ammunition to America's enemies, and 
     pause to America's friends. They encourage people of good 
     will to remain silent in the face of evil.

  It is unacceptable to dismiss those who raise legitimate concerns 
about civil liberties as terrorist sympathizers.
  For the American people, the PATRIOT Act has become a potent symbol 
of the Justice Department's poor record on civil liberties. In fact, 
three states, Alaska, Hawaii, and Vermont, and over 180 cities and 
counties across the country, including Chicago in my home State of 
Illinois, have passed resolutions opposing provisions of the PATRIOT 
Act.
  Almost 2 years after its passage, I believe that it is time to 
revisit the debate about the PATRIOT Act. Let me be clear: I do not 
believe that we should repeal the PATRIOT Act. However, I do believe 
that we should amend several of its most troubling provisions. Law 
enforcement must have all the necessary tools to combat terrorism, but 
we must also be careful to protect the civil liberties of Americans. I 
believe we can be both safe and free.
  Today, I, Senator Craig, and several of our Republican and Democratic 
colleagues in the Senate introduced the Security and Freedom Ensured 
Act of 2003. The SAFE Act is a narrowly-tailored bipartisan bill that 
would amend the most problematic provisions of the PATRIOT Act, those 
that grant broad powers to the FBI to monitor Americans with inadequate 
judicial oversight. The bill would impose reasonable limits on law 
enforcement's authority without impeding their ability to investigate 
and prevent terrorism. It would not amend pre-PATRIOT Act law in 
anyway. The SAFE Act is supported by a broad coalition from across the 
political spectrum, including the American Civil Liberties Union and 
the American Conservative Union.
  The SAFE Act would:
  Reinstate the pre-PATRIOT Act standard for seizing business records. 
In order to obtain a subpoena, the FBI would have to demonstrate that 
it has reason to believe that the person to whom the records relate is 
a suspected terrorist or spy. The SAFE Act retains the expansion of the 
business record provision to include all business records, including 
library records, rather than just the four types of records--hotel, car 
rental, storage facility and common carrier--covered before the PATRIOT 
Act.
  Authorize a court to issue a delayed notification warrant where 
notice of the warrant would endanger the life or physical safety of an 
individual, result in flight from prosecution, or result in the 
destruction of or tampering with the evidence sought under the warrant. 
It would require notification of a covert search within seven days, 
rather than an undefined ``reasonable period.'' It would authorize 
unlimited additional 7-day delays if the court found that notice of the 
warrant would continue to endanger the life or physical safety of an 
individual, result in flight from prosecution, or result in the 
destruction of or tampering with the evidence sought under the warrant.
  Limit ``John Doe'' roving wiretaps by requiring the warrant to 
identify either the target of the wiretap or the place to be 
wiretapped. To protect innocent people from Government surveillance, it 
would also require that surveillance be conducted only when the suspect 
is present at the place to be wiretapped.
  Sunset several of the PATRIOT Act's most controversial surveillance 
provisions on December 31, 2005. Many of PATRIOT's surveillance 
provisions already sunset on December 31, 2005. The SAFE Act would 
simply give Congress an opportunity to assess the effectiveness of 
several additional controversial provisions before deciding whether to 
reauthorize them.
  Under the SAFE Act, the FBI would still have broad authority to 
combat terrorism. For example, consider the following hypotheticals:
  The FBI would like to search the travel records of a suspected 
terrorist to help determine if he attended a

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meeting with other extremists. The FBI has reason to believe the 
records are related to a suspected terrorist, so the SAFE Act would 
authorize the issuance of a subpoena.
  The FBI suspects that an individual affiliated with an extremist 
organization is planning a terrorist attack. The FBI would like to 
search the suspect's computer drive to learn more about the plot 
without tipping off the suspect and his co-conspirators. The SAFE Act 
would permit the issuance of a ``sneak and peek'' warrant, and permit 
the FBI to delay notice of the warrant for as long as it would continue 
to endanger the life or physical safety of an individual, result in 
flight from prosecution, or result in the destruction of or tampering 
with the evidence sought under the warrant.
  At the same time, the SAFE Act would protect innocent Americans from 
unchecked Government surveillance. For example:
  The FBI is investigating suspected members of a terrorist cell and 
would like to subpoena the records of a library and a bookstore that 
they frequent. Currently, the FBI could subpoena all of the records of 
the library and bookstore, including the records of countless innocent 
Americans, by certifying they are sought for a terrorism investigation, 
the exceedingly low standard created by the PATRIOT Act. The SAFE Act 
would permit the FBI to obtain the records related to the suspected 
terrorists, but not records related to innocent Americans who are not 
suspected terrorists.
  The FBI is tracking a suspected terrorist who is using public phones 
at local restaurants to do business. The PATRIOT Act would permit the 
issuance of a roving wiretap that would apply to any phone the suspect 
uses. Under the PATRIOT Act, the FBI could monitor the conversations 
not just of the suspect, but of innocent patrons of these restaurants. 
The SAFE Act would also permit the issuance of a roving wiretap that 
would apply to any phone the suspect uses, but would only permit the 
FBI to gather intelligence when they ascertain that the suspect is 
using a phone.
  The Justice Department has argued that amending the PATRIOT Act would 
handcuff law enforcement and make it very difficult to combat 
terrorism. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is possible to 
combat terrorism and protect our liberties. The SAFE Act demonstrates 
that. I urge my colleagues to support it.

                          ____________________