[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 17]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page 23912]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




            SPACE SHUTTLE INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT ACT OF 2003

                                 ______
                                 

                           HON. RALPH M. HALL

                                of texas

                    in the house of representatives

                       Wednesday, October 1, 2003

  Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing the ``Space Shuttle 
Independent Oversight Act of 2003'', legislation that will help the 
Space Shuttle fly more safely once it resumes its operations.
  As the Congress reviews the implications of the Columbia Shuttle 
accident for NASA's Space Shuttle program, we acknowledge the excellent 
report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), chaired by 
Admiral Hal Gehman. Released six weeks ago, the CAIB report clearly 
laid out what NASA needs to do before the Space Shuttle can be safety 
returned to flight, probably within the next year. Equally importantly, 
the report contains many recommendations and observations on what NASA 
should do to keep the Shuttle flying safely over the remainder of its 
operational lifetime, which may extend another decade or more.
  NASA has already put in place an external task force, co-chaired by 
Tom Stafford and Dick Covey, to oversee its implementation of the 
CAIB's ``return-to-flight'' recommendations--those recommendations that 
must be met before the next Shuttle launch. Over the coming months, the 
Congress will be monitoring the task force's assessment of NASA's plans 
closely to assure ourselves and the American public that the next 
flight is as safe as is humanly possible.
  However, a long-term oversight problem remains. The Stafford-Covey 
task force will conclude its activities when the Shuttle resumes 
flying, or even earlier. Admiral Gehman has repeatedly registered his 
concern that once the Shuttle is flying again, there may be no 
effective oversight mechanism to ensure that NASA follows through on 
the long-term CAIB recommendations--those designed to keep the Shuttle 
flying safely over the next decade. I share his concern.
  My bill will establish an external, independent, and technically 
competent committee to monitor NASA's implementation of the CAIB's 
recommendations. The committee will be selected and run by the National 
Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering and will 
provide its timely assessments to both the Congress and NASA. Following 
the 1986 loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger, the National Academies 
provided a similar function in overseeing the re-design of the 
Shuttle's solid rocket motors (SRM), as well as reviewing other post-
Challenger Shuttle modifications. History shows that the National 
Academies served a vital role in providing high-quality, independent 
advice and assessments to NASA during that difficult time. They were 
tough--rejecting several redesigns and test plans before approving the 
final design--but they were fair, and there have been no problems with 
the SRMs since Challenger.
  Why can't the Congressionally established Aerospace Safety Advisory 
Panel (ASAP) monitor the long-term CAIB recommendations? Because a week 
ago--on September 22--all nine ASAP members tendered their resignation, 
a distress signal that we in Congress should be taking very seriously. 
In interviews with the press, ASAP members have noted both their lack 
of independence from NASA and the discouraging fact that NASA has 
regularly dismissed the ASAP's safety recommendations. The oversight 
Committees, including the Science Committee, on which I serve as 
Ranking Member, need to get to the bottom of the ASAP situation. 
Perhaps the ASAP will need to be re-constituted legislatively to 
provide it with greater independence and resources.
  At the same time, however, we need to establish a dedicated group 
that can effectively oversee NASA's implementation of the CAIB's 
longterm recommendations. I recognize that there may be many ways to 
reach this goal, and I call on the leaders of the relevant oversight 
Committees to convene hearings promptly to examine the various options. 
The strengths of my legislation are that it gives the Shuttle oversight 
group complete independence and it follows a model that has been proven 
to work effectively in the past. It also ties the oversight body to 
standing institutions--the National Academies--that can provide it with 
the support and stability it needs for the long run.
  I offer this legislation with the goal of helping the NASA 
Administrator to promote safety in the human space flight program. I 
urge my colleagues to support the legislation and to speed its 
enactment into law.

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