[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 16]
[Senate]
[Pages 22039-22048]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




         ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2004

  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Enzi). Under the previous order, the 
Senate will resume consideration of H.R. 2754, which the clerk will 
report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (H.R. 2754) making appropriations for energy and 
     water development for the fiscal year ending September 30, 
     2004, and for other purposes.

  Pending:

       Feinstein amendment No. 1655, to prohibit the use of funds 
     for Department of Energy activities relating to the Robust 
     Nuclear Earth Penetrator, Advanced Weapons Concepts, 
     modification of the readiness posture of the Nevada Test 
     Site, and the Modern Pit Facility, and to make the amount of 
     funds made available by the prohibition for debt reduction.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I am very pleased today that we have set 
a time and we are going to vote on the so-called Feinstein amendment. I 
am also pleased we will hear from a very distinguished Senator whose 
thoughts and reputation in the Senate, from this Senator's standpoint, 
are becoming more valid, more looked upon, and listened to.
  The issue before us is a straightforward issue that is trying to be 
made complex. It is not the issue of building new nuclear weapons. 
Senator Chambliss and I can start off by saying there is nothing in 
this bill that permits us to build a single, solitary, new nuclear 
weapon. That requires an act of Congress that is not before us.
  Secondly, the Senator knows it provides for the testing ground in 
Nevada, which we had said since we put it in mothballs, it should be 
ready for testing at any time. Any time today means 3 years. Under this 
legislation, at the request of the administration, it will be 
modernized so it will only take 1\1/2\ years to get ready for a test, 
if a test is necessary.

[[Page 22040]]

  So far, those things I have said, it would seem to me, should pass 
this Senate 100 to 0. There are two other issues I am sure my friend 
from Georgia will explain, but none of them do anything to build a new 
line of nuclear weapons for this great Nation. That is not the issue, 
and I hope the Senator from Georgia will join me in convincing a few 
more Senators this is an issue to be defeated. Small funding, big 
ideas; little, tiny funding with great repercussions if we fail to do 
what we ought to do.
  I yield the floor and welcome the Senator's comments.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. I thank the Senator from New Mexico for his kind 
comments, but most importantly I thank him for his strong leadership on 
the issue of energy and any number of other issues. In my years in the 
House I had the privilege of working with the Senator when he was 
chairman of the Budget Committee. What great leadership he provided, 
and he is carrying that forward as chairman of the Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Energy now. It is indeed a privilege and a pleasure to 
work very closely with him to make sure a strong energy policy is 
developed in the United States of America, something that is sorely 
lacking. Under the Senator's leadership we are going to make sure that 
happens.
  Before I make my comments relative to this amendment, though, I 
cannot help but take a minute to say to the Presiding Officer that as a 
grandfather twice over, I am very happy for the Chair and Diana. I will 
say if he thinks he is having fun today, every day gets more and more 
fun.
  Being the obnoxious grandparent I am, I would like to compare 
pictures with the Presiding Officer as he moves down the road. My 
pictures of little John and little Parker are something special that I 
hold very near and dear. I see the Chair already has his. So we will 
compare them early on.
  I rise today to speak in opposition to the amendment offered by my 
distinguished colleague, Senator Feinstein. I do not support this 
amendment for several reasons and I would like to take a few minutes to 
outline my concerns. The amendment offered contains four provisions, 
all of which will negatively affect our Nation's security and our 
ability to maintain a modern and safe nuclear weapons capability.
  This amendment prohibits our Nation's scientists from researching one 
of the foremost military challenges our Nation faces, which is an enemy 
using a hardened, deeply buried facility to protect weapons of mass 
destruction or carry out command and control operations. Our Nation has 
just begun exploring whether modified existing warheads might be 
effective in countering such targets. The underlying bill provides 
funds to conduct the second year of a 3-year feasibility study to see 
if existing weapons can be modified to address this critical threat. 
The bill allows the United States to simply explore--and I emphasize 
the word--the full range of weapons concepts that could offer a 
credible deterrent and response to new and emerging threats. It is 
imperative that our Nation continue to perform this research. It 
absolutely has to be done.
  The funding for advanced concepts that this amendment strikes will 
also prohibit our scientists from exploring and incorporating changes 
to our existing nuclear-related programs, including upgrades to safety 
and security measures that make our nuclear arsenal more reliable and 
safer. Advanced concepts are the ``idea machines'' for scientists and 
engineers at our national laboratories that allow them to take 
advantage of advancement in technology. Essentially, this amendment 
would restrict our scientists from doing their job, which is to improve 
the reliability and sustainability of our programs.
  The amendment also restricts funding for the improvement of our 
country's timeline to prepare for an underground nuclear test. Our goal 
is to reduce the timeline from the current threshold of 36 months to 18 
months. The President could decide that a test is necessary to confirm 
a problem or test a fix to a problem involving the safety, security or 
reliability of a nuclear weapon in the stockpile. This administration 
has determined that, should such a test become necessary, the United 
States should not have to wait 3 years to address the problem in the 
stockpile. As our nuclear systems age, the necessity to conduct a test 
becomes more likely, should the President determine that it is in the 
national interest to do so. This amendment would make our Nation and 
our nuclear arsenal less, not more, secure.
  The last provision in this amendment would have the most drastic 
effect, I believe, to our Nation's security. For the first time in more 
than a decade, the United States will now be able to design and 
implement a program to manufacture a plutonium pit, an essential 
nuclear warhead component. The lack of this proficiency has seriously 
constrained our ability to maintain our nuclear stockpile. In fact, the 
Department of Energy, in 2002, indicated that the U.S. is the only 
nuclear power that lacks the ability to manufacture ``pits.'' All pits 
currently in the U.S. nuclear stockpile were made at the Rocky Flats 
Plant near Denver, CO, which opened in 1952. The Department of Energy 
halted pit manufacturing operations there in 1989. The administration 
has proposed a multi-year planning and design process that would result 
in a final decision on constructing a modern pit facility in 2011. If 
construction is approved, the proposed facility would begin full 
operation in 2020. The modern pit facility allows us to incorporate 
this capability into our nuclear weapons program and modernize our 
systems accordingly.
  Should this amendment pass, the United States' capabilities for 
ensuring a safe, reliable nuclear arsenal will continue to regress for 
several years. This amendment will prohibit the U.S. from taking 
advantage of the latest technology.
  Let me reiterate, the U.S. is not planning to resume testing; nor are 
we improving test readiness in order to develop new nuclear weapons. In 
fact, the U.S. is not planning to develop any new nuclear weapons at 
all. Our goal is to maintain a safe, secure, reliable, and effective 
nuclear weapons program, and for this reason I oppose the pending 
amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I rise to oppose the amendment. I thought 
I would comment in three areas.
  First of all, I have had an opportunity to visit our laboratories in 
the United States. I will talk a little bit about that. Then I would 
like to review where we are in the overall aspect as far as our nuclear 
weapons are concerned. Finally, I will talk a little bit about what is 
in the authorization bill we passed in the Senate earlier on in the 
year, and talk a little bit about the fact that we have considered most 
of these amendments already. I don't understand why we are bringing 
them up for reconsideration, because the Senate has spoken.
  I had an opportunity earlier this year to go around and visit the 
laboratories. I began to understand how important it is--that we need 
to study our nuclear weapons and we need to understand where we are in 
regard to the strategic nuclear stockpile.
  Not long ago, several years back, the hope for the strategic nuclear 
stockpile was that it would work, but there was skepticism in the 
scientific community. But going around the laboratories earlier this 
year, those scientists, very capable scientists, very dedicated 
employees we have in our laboratories--and they want to see world peace 
and they don't necessarily want to see the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons--understand the need for us to know what is happening as far as 
our own strategic stockpile is concerned; that we need to continue to 
evaluate the threats from our enemies or potential enemies and where we 
stand in relation to that threat.
  I was convinced that we need to do studies; we need to do some design 
thought; we need to bring it up for discussion. Nobody is out here 
saying we need to go into a nuclear arms race. I

[[Page 22041]]

think that is overstated. But I think there is a lot of science that 
needs to be known, still, as far as nuclear weapons. We are going 
through a period of time where our stockpile is aging. Because it is 
aging, there are some phenomena that we perhaps do not understand. We 
want to make sure we understand. We want to make sure we have a safe 
environment and, from a safety aspect, that we understand what happens 
with aging.
  The administration's budget request for fiscal year 2004 included 
several initiatives to advance their agenda as spelled out in the 2001 
Nuclear Posture Review. The Nuclear Posture Review laid out a plan to 
reduce the nuclear threshold by making advances in conventional 
munitions and missile defense capabilities, and in revitalizing our 
nuclear weapons infrastructure, while at the same time reducing the 
number of nuclear weapons--reducing the number of nuclear weapons in 
our stockpile from around 6,000 to between around 1,700 and 2,200 
operationally deployed nuclear warheads.
  One focus of the Nuclear Posture Review is to make advances in our 
nuclear weapons capabilities to deter future threats instead of 
maintaining a nuclear weapons stockpile which was designed to deter 
past threats.
  This bill includes funding to support the administration's 
initiatives. Specifically, the Senate bill provides $6 million for 
advanced concepts, $15 million to continue a 3-year feasibility study 
on the robust nuclear earth penetrator, which is commonly referred to 
as RNEP, and $25 million to enhance our test readiness capabilities at 
the Nevada Test Site. That was mentioned in previous comments on the 
Senate floor, how important it is in order to meet our 18-month 
response requirement that this needs to be met. There needs to be money 
to meet that requirement. And there is $23 million to continue 
conceptual design efforts for a modern pit facility. Each of these 
individual facilities will enhance our Nation's readiness and 
capabilities in support of the Nuclear Posture Review.
  I think the Members of the Senate need to know the Nuclear Posture 
Review was analyzed by those people in the know, those people who 
understand what is happening in other countries, people who understand 
the science and understand where we are in this country.
  The advanced concepts initiative will support preconceptual and 
concept definition studies and feasibility and cost studies approved by 
the Nuclear Weapons Council. With advanced concepts, we are beginning 
to challenge our scientists, designers, and engineers to consider what 
is within the art of the possible. They will be challenged to think, 
discover, create, and innovate. By supporting the administration's 
request for the advanced concepts initiative, we will ensure there is 
an active advanced development program to assess the capabilities of 
our adversaries, conceptualizing innovative methods for countering 
those threats, developing weapon system requirements in response to our 
adversaries, and prototyping and evaluating the concepts.
  The advanced concepts initiative will also help our experts to design 
enhanced safety and security aspects for our nuclear weapons, 
particularly the aging nuclear weapons that we possess.
  The Feinstein amendment would strike this funding for advanced 
concepts.
  The RNEP study is not a new issue for the Congress to consider. Last 
year, Congress authorized and appropriated $15 million for the first of 
the 3-year feasibility studies on the robust nuclear earth penetrator. 
This bill provides funding for the continuation of the feasibility 
study. It does not authorize the production or deployment of such a 
capability. The RNEP feasibility study will determine if one of two 
existing nuclear weapons can be modified to penetrate into hard rock in 
order to destroy a deeply buried target that could be hiding weapons of 
mass destruction or command and control assets.
  The Department of Energy has modified nuclear weapons in the past to 
modernize their safety, security, and reliability aspects. We also 
modify existing nuclear weapons to meet new military requirements. The 
B61-11, one of the weapons being considered for the RNEP feasibility 
study, was already modified once before to serve as an earth penetrator 
to hold specific targets at risk. At that time, the modification was to 
assure the B61 could penetrate frozen soils. The RNEP feasibility study 
is an attempt to determine whether the same B61 or another weapon, the 
B83, could be modified to penetrate hard rock or reinforced underground 
facilities.
  Funding research on options, both nuclear and conventional, for 
attacking such targets is a responsible step for our country to take.
  Admiral James Ellis, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, confirmed 
in testimony before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee on April 8, 2003, 
that not all hardened and deeply buried targets can be destroyed by 
conventional weapons. Many nations are increasingly developing hardened 
and deeply buried targets to protect command and communications and 
weapons of mass destruction production and storage assets. It is 
prudent to support the study of potential capabilities to address this 
growing category of threat.
  What the Senate bill provides funding for is simply the second year 
of the 3-year feasibility study, nothing more. Should the National 
Nuclear Security Administration determine through this study that the 
robust nuclear earth penetrator can meet the requirements to hold a 
hardened and deeply buried target at risk, NNSA still could not proceed 
to full-scale weapon production development or deployment without an 
authorization and appropriation from Congress.
  We should allow our weapons experts to determine if the robust 
nuclear earth penetrator could destroy hardened and deeply buried 
targets and to assess what would be the collateral damage associated 
with such capability. Then Congress would have the information it needs 
to decide whether development of such weapons is appropriate and 
necessary to maintain our Nation's security.
  The Feinstein amendment would strike funding to continue the ANEP 
feasibility study.
  The enhanced test readiness initiative has also been closely 
considered by the Congress and the administration. The House and the 
Senate Armed Services Committees required the Department of Energy, in 
consultation with the Department of Defense, to do a study to determine 
the optimum readiness posture for the Nevada Test Site. After a 
thorough review, the optimal test readiness posture chosen by the 
Department of Energy was 18 months.
  Against the thoughtful consideration of both the Congress and the 
administration, the Feinstein amendment would strike the funding to 
allow our Nation's readiness to be enhanced at the Nevada Test Site.
  Another important initiative is the continuing efforts to design and 
construct a modern pit facility to ensure the United States can, once 
again, manufacture plutonium pits for our existing nuclear weapons 
stockpile and for future weapons design, if necessary. The United 
States is the only nuclear power which does not have the current 
ability to mass produce plutonium pits.
  Let me restate that. The United States is the only nuclear power that 
does not have the current ability to mass produce plutonium pits.
  Although we have limited capabilities to produce a few pits at the 
Los Alamos National Laboratory since the shutdown of Rocky Flats in my 
home State of Colorado, the United States has not produced plutonium 
pits. That is a problem for our aging nuclear weapons stockpile since 
the pits and those weapons are aging beyond their design life, and as a 
radioactive material, plutonium continues to deteriorate until the pits 
can no longer be usable. The Feinstein amendment would strike funding 
for the modern pit facility.
  All of the administration's nuclear weapons initiatives are designed 
to make sure the United States has the best and the brightest 
scientists and engineers prepared to innovate, create, test, and even 
manufacture, if necessary, to make sure any adversary is

[[Page 22042]]

deterred from conducting harmful actions against the United States or 
its allies.
  There are protections in the National Defense Authorization Act which 
provide that, at a minimum, no engineering design work can occur on the 
robust nuclear penetrator without specific authorization from Congress. 
We maintain our ability to control any mass production of those nuclear 
weapons.
  We already had that debate. We should allow these initiatives to 
continue. Therefore, I am urging my colleagues to join me in voting 
against the Feinstein amendment.
  There are a couple more issues I would like to cover. First, I ask 
unanimous consent that an op-ed by the Secretary of Energy, Spencer 
Abraham, from the Washington Post on Monday, July 21, 2003, be printed 
in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Washington Post, July 21, 2003]

                      Facing a New Nuclear Reality

                          (By Spencer Abraham)

       The United States took another step toward eliminating the 
     last vestiges of Cold War nuclear weapons production in May 
     when the Department of Energy awarded contracts for 
     construction of fossil fuel power plants to replace three 
     Russian nuclear reactors. These reactors produce not only 
     heat and electricity but also weapons-grade plutonium, enough 
     to build 1\1/2\ nuclear weapons a day. When the new U.S.-
     financed power plants are constructed and the nuclear 
     reactors shut down, weapons-grade plutonium will no longer be 
     produced in Russia.
       President Bush is deeply committed to reducing the number 
     of our nation's strategic nuclear warheads by two-thirds, and 
     to preventing nuclear and radiological materials from falling 
     into the hand of terrorists. This $466 million project is the 
     latest advancement in an aggressive nonproliferation effort 
     that has expanded from $800 million to $1.3 billion per year 
     since the president took office. That's why I was perplexed, 
     during congressional debate on the defense budget by the 
     hysterics over the $21 million that would allow our 
     scientists to contemplate advanced weapons concepts that 
     could be used to protect against 21st-century threats. (In 
     all, some $6.4 billion in the budget is for Department of 
     Energy nuclear weapons programs.)
       This funding should not have surprised anyone. It is the 
     logical result of early Bush administration initiatives, 
     endorsed by Congress, to conduct a thorough review of the 
     nation's nuclear weapons policy. That review determined that 
     the 21st-century national security environment differs 
     greatly from that of the past half-century.
       Deterrence during the Cold War led to a predictable--if 
     chilling--balance of terror that has now largely vanished. 
     Henceforth threats will likely evolve more quickly and less 
     predictably. It is a situation that demands the restoration 
     of our capacity to meet new challenges.
       Recently the United States has begun making great strides 
     to rebuild those capabilities. Now, for the first time in 
     more than a decade, we are able to manufacture a plutonium 
     pit--also known as a trigger--an essential nuclear warhead 
     component. The lack of this proficiency has seriously 
     constrained our ability to maintain our nuclear stockpile. We 
     have also launched a much-needed facility modernization 
     program. But maintaining our capability to address 21st-
     century challenges requires more.
       Should our scientists decide we cannot certify the 
     reliability of our nuclear stockpile, we must be capable of 
     conducting a nuclear test in a much shorter time frame than 
     the current three years. The capacity to test within 18 
     months is a critical capability every president must have. We 
     must also give our weapons scientists the resources and 
     authority to explore advanced weapons concepts, including 
     research related to low-yield weapons. Funding constraints 
     and confusing legal prohibitions have stifled most new 
     thinking on these issues. This has, in turn, made us less 
     capable of devising the best responses to emerging threats.
       The challenges posed by rogue nations or terrorists 
     possessing weapons of mass destruction are strikingly 
     different from that posed by the Soviet Union. Yet our best 
     thinkers aren't being allowed to fully shift their focus from 
     winning the Cold War to meeting new challenges.
       Finally, we must move ahead to address one of the foremost 
     military challenges identified in our recent review--an enemy 
     using hardened, deeply buried facilities, to protect its 
     weapons and other assets. We have just begun to explore 
     whether modified existing warheads might be effective in 
     attacking such targets. Similar analyses of the applicability 
     of conventional weapons to addressing this threat are also 
     being done.
       We are not planning to resume testing; nor are we improving 
     test readiness in order to develop new nuclear weapons. In 
     fact, we are not planning to develop any new nuclear weapons 
     at all. Our goal is designed to explore the full range of 
     weapons concepts that could offer a credible deterrence and 
     response to new and emerging threats as well as allow us to 
     continue to assess the reliability of our stockpile without 
     testing.
       This is a sensible course that meets our national security 
     requirements by restoring our capabilities and ensuring that 
     we have the flexibility to respond quickly to any potential 
     problems in the current stockpile, or to new threats that 
     require immediate attention. Our policies are designed to 
     strengthen the deterrent value of our nuclear weapons so that 
     they don't ever have to be used.

  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I would like to briefly point out some of 
the things we had in the Defense authorization bill as it applied to a 
number of areas affecting nuclear weapons. The section that dealt with 
the developing low-yield nuclear weapon--section 3131 of the Defense 
authorization bill--repeals the ban on research and development of low-
yield nuclear weapons. But that same section also includes a provision 
which states that nothing in this repeal should be ``construed as 
authorizing the testing, acquisition, or deployment of a low-yield 
nuclear weapon.''
  Also included in that same provision is a section that limits DOE 
from beginning phase 3. Phase 3 is the full-scale engineering 
development or any subsequent phase of a low-yield nuclear weapon 
``unless specifically authorized by the Congress.''
  Finally, also in that same section 3131, a report is to be submitted 
to determine if the repeal of the ban on research and development of 
low-yield nuclear weapons will affect the ability of the United States 
to achieve its nonproliferation objectives.
  On that section of the Defense Authorization Act, we had a number of 
amendments that we considered on the floor which we have already voted 
on. Again, one was the Feinstein amendment. Senator Feinstein offered 
an amendment to strike the repeal of the ban on low-yield nuclear 
weapons research. The motion to table was agreed to by a vote of 51 to 
43. That was the Senate's position supporting the language of the 
Senate authorization bill on Armed Services.
  The Reed-Levin amendment was also brought up in that section. They 
offered an amendment which retains the ban on low-yield nuclear weapon 
research. This amendment would retain the ban on phase 3 and subsequent 
phases but allow research on phases 1, 2, and 2A. This amendment was 
very similar to a House-Senate Armed Services Committee provision.
  Chairman Warner offered an amendment in the form of a substitute 
which struck the Reed-Levin amendment and added a limitation which 
required a specific authorization from the Congress before the 
Secretary of Energy can proceed with phase 3--which again is 
engineering development--or any subsequent phases of low-yield nuclear 
weapons. The Warner substitute passed by a vote of 59 to 38. The Reed-
Levin amendment, as amended by the Warner substitute, passed by a vote 
of 96 to 0.
  In another section in the Senate Armed Services Committee 
authorization bill dealing with the robust nuclear earth-penetrator--
commonly referred to as RNEP--there was an authorization for $15 
million for RNEP, which was the amount of the request we had in the 
budget proposal. That was section 1050.
  Section 3135 also requires DOE to receive a specific authorization 
from Congress before commencing with phase 3 or any subsequent phase of 
the RNEP.
  Time and time again, the Senate has spoken--that there will not be 
any further procedure on nuclear weapons development and advanced 
engineering unless there is specific authorization from the Senate.
  Under the RNEP, there were a couple of Senate floor amendments that 
we considered. For example, Senator Dorgan offered an amendment to 
prohibit the use of funds for the nuclear earth-penetrator weapon, and 
the motion to table was agreed to by a vote of 56 to 41.
  There was a Nelson amendment on RNEP. That amendment limited the DOE 
from beginning phase 3--full-scale development--or any subsequent phase 
of the robust nuclear earth-penetrator without a specific authorization 
from Congress.

[[Page 22043]]

  Chairman Warner prepared a very similar amendment, and the Nelson 
amendment was agreed to by a voice vote.
  We have debated this issue thoroughly. The Senate has spoken on these 
amendments and on these provisions. The appropriators have language 
supporting what we have already voted on and what has been passed by 
this body. I think it is time to move forward.
  I think it is important that we move forward with the appropriations 
bill in light of our energy needs in this country. We shouldn't delay.
  I rise in support of the bill, and I rise in opposition to the 
Feinstein amendment and ask my colleagues to join me.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sessions). The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from 
Colorado for his comments and overall summary of this situation. It has 
been extremely helpful. I am very grateful that he found time to do it 
today.
  I understand that Senator Bayh desires to speak as if in morning 
business shortly with reference to the death of the Governor of his 
State. He is on his way. When he arrives, I will yield to him. He said 
he wanted 7 minutes.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to explain my reasons for 
supporting the Feinstein amendment. This amendment first and foremost 
seeks to reduce the funding for the robust nuclear earth penetrator, or 
RNEP. While on the Armed Services Committee, I took the lead on 
numerous occasions in opposing this program. I believe that it sends 
the wrong signal to other nations when we are proposing to expand our 
nuclear arsenal at the very same time we are trying to control the 
spread of weapons of mass destruction worldwide.
  Further, this country clearly has superiority in advanced 
conventional weapons, as evidenced by the recent conflict in Iraq. Very 
few, if any, nations can compete with the U.S. in conventional weapons. 
We should be relying on this advantage in conventional weapons rather 
than forcing other nations to compete with us on nuclear weapons as we 
did before the end of the cold war.
  There is also a pragmatic reason why I believe the RNEP is not 
needed. In my opinion, our existing arsenal, particularly the B-83 
tactical nuclear bomb, is more than adequate to serve as a deterrent 
against the hardest underground targets that confront us today. The 
administration envisions the RNEP as a weapon that will destroy deep 
underground targets. Yet proponents of this argument seem not to have 
considered the loss of function to an underground target that a B-83, 
whose yield is in excess of 1 megaton, will cause. I am sure that after 
such a devastating explosion, very little, if any, of the deepest 
underground targets will pose much of a threat to the U.S.
  Further, the amendment seeks to strike funding for the advanced 
concepts initiative. The administration claims that such funds are 
needed to keep our weapons scientists on the cutting edge of warhead 
design but they have not explained to us what avenues of research they 
wish to pursue. In my opinion, we barely know enough about modeling how 
our existing warheads function under the stockpile stewardship program. 
Our modern strategic warheads, such as the W-76 and W-88, are very 
complicated; modeling them challenges even the most advanced 
calculations on our laboratory supercomputers. There is no need at this 
time to embark on the new avenue of research in the advanced concepts 
initiative when we don't understand the science underlying the 
stockpile stewardship of our deployed arsenal. The advanced concepts 
initiative will be a dangerous distraction from the stockpile 
stewardship program.
  The third provision of this amendment is somewhat more complicated. 
Let me begin by stating that I strongly support the construction of a 
modern pit facility as an integral component of the stockpile 
stewardship program. An earlier version of this amendment struck the 
funding for conceptual design work on this facility, which, in my 
opinion, was a mistake. I expressed my concerns to Senator Feinstein, 
and I am pleased that this version of the amendment retains these 
conceptual designs funds.
  There is a fundamental reason why I think the modern pit facility is 
important. Our pits are approaching ages in some cases of up to 35 
years old. Our best scientists do not fully understand the way aging 
affects on these plutonium pits. At Los Alamos National Laboratory, we 
are just now at the stage where we can produce our first prototype test 
pit, 15 years after the Rocky Flats plant stopped production of these 
pits. But the Los Alamos facility cannot expand to handle the 
production that our stockpile may require 15 years from now.
  With regard to siting the facility, I do not believe that we will 
have all the information we will need to do so by 2004. I have not seen 
any statements by the administration on what size the stockpile will be 
in 2012, when the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty reduces the 
stockpile down to 1200 to 1700 strategic weapons. I note that this 
treaty does not account for the deployed warheads found in gravity 
bombs. As a result of this lack of precision in future stockpile size, 
the DOE's Environmental Impact Statement gives production rates that 
range by a factor of four from 100 to 450 pits per year. Given that the 
stockpile size has not been decided at this time, and that the modern 
pit facility will not start operations until 2018, I cannot see how the 
Department of Energy can configure, much less site, their pit 
production facility in fiscal year 2004. I concur with Senator 
Feinstein that the DOE can hold off siting the facility for a year, 
while continuing its design to match the stockpile requirements from 
the Department of Defense.
  I would like to note that I have advocated that if and when DOE 
justifies the facility's size, then Carlsbad, NM is the best location 
for it. Carlsbad's close proximity to Los Alamos National Laboratory 
means that the scientists who are researching the best ways to re-
manufacture pits will be able to easily travel and impart that 
knowledge to the production plant. Carlsbad has a top-notch workforce 
at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant well-trained for handling 
radioactive materials that will be essential to the pit facility. The 
Carlsbad community has shown strong support for the facility as well.
  I support this amendment, but I also want to make clear that I also 
support the goal of constructing a modern pit facility, provided that 
they have a clear mandate from the Department of Defense on the 
facility's size based upon the stockpile, and we expect in 2018, when 
it begins operation.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I stand today in support of my 
colleague Senator Feinstein, and her amendment to strip the funding 
from the robust nuclear earth-penetrator and the advanced weapons 
concepts program, and to stop the enhancement of the time-to-test 
readiness at the Nevada Nuclear Test Site and the site selection of the 
modern pit facility. I fully support Senator Feinstein's efforts to 
attempt to put an end to nuclear proposals that have not yet been 
justified by hard arguments but would likely result in adverse 
consequences.
  Almost a decade ago, the United States, our allies, and the freedom-
loving nations around the world rejoiced as the cold war ended 
peacefully and the threat of total nuclear annihilation was lifted. We 
dreamed then and we hope now that we will never again enter into a 
global struggle with thermonuclear consequences.
  Yet there are those in this world who would still do us harm, and 
they are armed with weapons of mass destruction. To pretend otherwise 
would be to pander to a most dangerous delusion. There is a real danger 
that they seek to secure those weapons in hardened or deeply buried 
bunkers. We must put our best scientists to work to learn how to 
neutralize this threat.
  At the same time, we must be careful that in seeking to neutralize 
this threat, we do not aggravate it by pursuing dangerously 
destabilizing policies and weapons programs.

[[Page 22044]]

  As a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I have been 
briefed on our military's conventional and nuclear capabilities. Like 
most Americans, I have also watched with pride as our armed forces 
prove in Iraq and around the world that they are second to none. Based 
on these observations, I am convinced that we can and will meet the 
threat posed by our enemies without having to resort to developing 
nuclear weapons to destroy deeply buried or hardened targets at this 
time. To do so would be premature at best and dangerous and misguided 
at worst.
  I am further convinced by the testimony and writings of experts, both 
those who have worn our Nation's uniform and those who did not, that 
not only is the utility of these nuclear weapons questionable, but so 
is the very fact of whether or not they will work as hoped.
  Developing low-yield nuclear weapons at this time would also severely 
undermine our global nonproliferation efforts. I believe that at a time 
when the United States is seeking to convince the North Korean 
leadership that they do not need to engage in a brazen drive for a 
robust nuclear capability; at a time when our diplomats are trying to 
deescalate nuclear tensions along the Indian and Pakistani border; at a 
time when the International Atomic Energy Agency is presently engaged 
in negotiations with Iran over denu-
clearization and inspections, that we would be naive to think that we 
can coax these nations to drop their nuclear plans while we invest in 
pursuing our own new nuclear capabilities.
  In addition to undermining our international nonproliferation 
efforts, a new generation of nuclear weapons, especially the low-yield 
variety envisioned by the administration, will blur the bright lines 
between conventional and nuclear capabilities, and raise the likelihood 
of resorting to the latter. I am not alone in this concern. Former 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili stated 
this concern clearly and persuasively: ``[a]ny activities that erode 
the firebreak between nuclear and conventional weapons or that 
encourage the use of nuclear weapons for purposes that are not 
strategic and deterrent in nature would undermine the advantage that we 
derive from overwhelming conventional superiority.''
  The world we live in is indeed a dangerous place. In response to 
these dangers, however, we must guard against rash actions that 
undermine our ultimate security. The new nuclear weapons the 
administration advocates will not substantially increase our sense of 
security and may in fact detract from it.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I rise today to support Senator 
Feinstein's amendment to remove funding for the development of new 
nuclear weapons. The administration is seeking $15 million to fund more 
research on the robust nuclear earth penetrator a nuclear bunker buster 
and $6 million for research on new nuclear weapons.
  I must register my shock that the administration has requested this 
funding, reversing almost 60 years of U.S. nuclear policy. Funding such 
a request is the first step on a ``slippery slope'' that could 
irreversibly lead us to testing and maybe even deploying these new 
nuclear weapons.
  It is imperative that we nip this mischief in the bud by supporting 
Senator Feinstein's amendment.
  Let me remind my colleagues that the administration has consistently 
identified one distinct threat to U.S. security and reiterated this 
threat innumerable times in the past year: The proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction and their transfer to terrorists.
  In the President's speech to the United Nations on Sept. 12, 2002, in 
his address to Congress in October, 2002, in his State of the Union 
speech this past January, he repeatedly expressed his concern about the 
proliferation of biological, chemical, and especially nuclear weapons.
  Many Members of Congress voted to send our young men and women to 
Iraq to eliminate the threat of Saddam Hussein's supposed nuclear 
arsenal. We were told that while Saddam had not yet developed nuclear 
weapons, he was actively intent on doing so and the consequences would 
be horrific.
  Meanwhile, during this same year, the administration is looking to 
create new nuclear weapons.
  Our diplomats have just returned from six-way talks in Beijing aimed 
at resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis instigated last fall when 
Kim Jong IL announced his defiance of the 1994 Agreed Framework. How 
can our negotiators in good faith reassure the North Koreans and the 
other participants at these talks of peaceful United States intentions 
in the region, while at home, in our labs, nuclear scientists are 
experimenting with new nuclear weapons that will eventually have a 
yield 70 times that of the bomb dropped at Hiroshima?
  It is abundantly clear that there is a copycat effect of U.S. 
military planning. According to former Undersecretary of Energy, Rose 
Gottemoeller:

       Other countries watch us like a hawk. They are very, very 
     attentive to what we do in the nuclear arena. I think people 
     abroad will interpret this as an enthusiastic effort by the 
     Bush administration to re-nuclearize. And I think definitely 
     this nuclear funding is going to be an impetus to the 
     development of nuclear weapons around the world.

  I clearly remember the devastation that the atom bombs wrought not 
only on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but on all society. As Adlai Stevenson 
put it, ``Man wrested from nature the power to make the world a 
desert.''
  Since those two unforgettable days in 1945, administration after 
administration, Republicans and Democrats, have made it clear that 
nuclear weapons have held a special status within the U.S. arsenal. 
U.S. policymakers have committed to the international nuclear arms 
control regime.
  The research funding in this bill for the nuclear earth penetrator 
departs from 60 years of nuclear policy. If these weapons are 
researched, they will be inevitably be tested, which will undermine a 
10-year U.S. commitment to a nuclear testing moratorium.
  I am deeply concerned about the standing of the United States in the 
international community.
  As a result of the unilateral approach the Bush administration has 
taken in Iraq, we have lost friends, trust, respect and admiration in 
the global community. This new nuclear policy departure will only 
further erode U.S. leadership and esteem in the world.
  I urge my colleagues to support this vital amendment.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise to support Senator Feinstein's 
amendment to strike funding allocations for certain nuclear weapons 
research and development activities contained in H.R. 2754 the energy 
and water appropriations bill. Before I discuss the particulars of this 
amendment, let me explain why it matters so very much in the context of 
the international environment in coming decades.
  Today, the United States is the pre-eminent conventional superpower 
in the world. We spend more on our Nation's military than the rest of 
the world combined. As the dazzling display of firepower exhibited by 
our troops in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrates, our Nation boasts the 
mightiest military machine in world history.
  But none of that means our Nation is secure or can afford to rest on 
its laurels. As September 11 graphically exhibited, the world is a very 
dangerous place, if only because our adversaries and rivals are turning 
to asymmetric warfare to nullify our military advantages and exploit 
our weaknesses. One key asymmetry lies in the use of weapons of mass 
destruction. The spread of technology around the world allows a greater 
number of states and non-state actors to access the knowledge, 
technology, and infrastructure required to develop and produce nuclear, 
chemical, and biological weapons.
  Nuclear weapons, in particular, can nullify the overwhelming 
conventional military strength of the United States. Today no weapons 
system can defend against the detonation of a nuclear weapon in an 
American city. National missile defense holds out the prospect one day 
of preventing the delivery of nuclear weapons via intercontinental 
ballistic missiles, but the technology is so premature that any 
effective system

[[Page 22045]]

is years, if not decades, away. Indeed, a terrorist is unlikely to use 
an ICBM with a return address. And there is absolutely no system that 
can prevent a barge from sailing into New York City's harbor and 
detonating a nuclear explosive on board.
  So nuclear proliferation represents the gravest threat today to our 
national security, a threat from which our overwhelming conventional 
military strength provides little protection. How do we best respond to 
this threat? One school calls for the development of new nuclear 
weapons for possible use in an otherwise nonnuclear conflict. In order 
to ensure that a North Korea or an Iran cannot secure its chemical and 
biological weapons or hide its leaders in underground bunkers, some 
people call for new nuclear weapons capable of penetrating layers of 
earth and destroying deeply buried targets.
  Advocates of new nuclear weapons go off the deep end, however, when 
they suggest that low-yield weapons could ever destroy deeply buried 
targets, or that a ``bunker-busting'' weapons would not cause horrific 
civilian casualties. The laws of physics dictate that a warhead cannot 
penetrate more than 50 feet of dry rock before gravitational forces 
cause the warhead to break up. That means that a nuclear weapon big 
enough to destroy a deeply buried target--even a target 100 feet below 
ground--cannot be ``low-yield''. Any low-yield weapon would simply lack 
the explosive power necessary to destroy a target buried at that depth 
or lower. So the nuclear weapons designers tell us explicitly: A Robust 
Nuclear Earth Penetrator will never be a low-yield weapon.
  But what would happen if a low-yield weapon were used against a 
buried target? According to the physicist Sidney Drell, a one-kiloton 
nuclear weapon, well below the 5-kiloton threshold below which nuclear 
weapons are called ``low-yield'', detonating at a depth of 40 feet 
below the surface would still create a crater larger than the entire 
World Trade Center impact zone and churn up about 1 million cubic feet 
of radioactive material into the air. This very small one-kiloton 
nuclear weapon would wreak tremendous damage, contaminating the 
surrounding area for miles on end with dangerous gamma rays and other 
radiation. This reality is vastly different from the image of a 
surgical weapon promoted so often by its advocates.
  Advocates of low-yield nuclear weapons are trying to have it both 
ways. They want a weapon powerful enough to take out bunkers, 
neutralizing any stored chemical and biological agents, that are buried 
deeply below the Earth's surface. At the same time, these weapons must 
be small enough to minimize civilian casualties and destruction on the 
surface. Unfortunately, scientists and weapons designers say it just 
can't be done.
  Weapons designers will tell you that the real purpose for low-yield 
nuclear weapons is not to strike underground targets when all other 
options have failed. Rather, these weapons could strike regular surface 
targets like leadership compounds--while reducing the damage that a 
more regular-sized nuclear weapons would cause. But that resurrects the 
misguided strategic concept that nuclear weapons are just handy tools, 
like any other weapon--a bizarre notion that should have expired along 
with Dr. Strangelove decades ago. Besides, low-yield weapons are 
nothing new. Every time we developed them, however, the military 
concluded that they weren't worth the effort.
  Any deterrence benefits that new low-yield nuclear weapons would 
provide are far outweighed by both the risk that they will actually be 
used and the dangerous signal that they send to other countries--
intentionally or not--that we intend to fight nuclear wars. Low-yield 
weapons, in particular, blur the traditional firewall between nuclear 
and conventional war. The sidestep the fact that a nuclear weapon is a 
weapon of a wholly different order and magnitude from any other weapon 
in existence today--something that any sane and rational society would 
only use as a truly last resort. As Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated 
in 1945, even crude nuclear weapons are city-killers.
  Let me point out one final challenge to the possible use of low-yield 
nuclear weapons to strike deeply buried targets. Any decision to order 
such a strike must rely upon unimpeachable intelligence, because no 
rational President will order even a low-yield nuclear weapons like 
without great confidence in the success of the mission. It is precisely 
that type of intelligence which is so difficult to obtain when it comes 
to acquiring information on the location of WMD stockpiles and 
leadership compounds in rogue states. Just look at what happened during 
the war on Iraq this spring. Twice, we thought we had Saddam in our 
sights. Our intelligence folks told the President they had good 
information that Saddam was in a particular location at a given time--
but in both cases they were wrong. Saddam either was never there or had 
left before the bombs arrived. And as for taking out Saddam's chemical 
or biological weapons, ``all the king's horses and all the king's men'' 
will get back to us later.
  I'm not casting blame on our intelligence community--it is an 
incredible challenge to gain real-time tactical information in the heat 
of battle. But imagine the international outcry had the United States 
used a low-yield nuclear weapons to go after Saddam. Not only would we 
have failed to kill him because he was not in the bunker, we would have 
caused incalculable civilian casualties, razed a large part of Baghdad, 
and breached the nuclear threshold.
  Is this a price any future Commander in Chief would or should be 
willing to pay? Our enemies are not stupid--they will increasingly 
locate valuable targets near or next to civilian sites, such as mosques 
and hospitals. They may will bury deeply hidden bunkers under these 
sites. Again, should any President give the OK to use a low-yield 
nuclear weapon under such circumstances? If not, why incur the fiscal 
expense, diplomatic costs, and strategic risks of developing these new 
weapons in the first place? Why give other countries the sense that 
nuclear weapons are a vital element in our war-fighting plans, when 
there would still be no rational reason for us to use them except in 
retaliation?
  So what's the right response to the world we live in today, where 
nuclear proliferation poses the greatest security threat we face? I 
wish I could offer you one simple solution that will effectively answer 
this challenge. Unfortunately, no such magic bullet exists. Instead, we 
need to rely on a shrewd combination of accurate intelligence, 
diplomacy, multilateral cooperation, arms control, export controls, 
interdiction, sanctions, and when appropriate, the threat or use of 
military force, to deter and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
  In those situations where we must target deeply buried targets, 
conventional weapons offer a promising alternative to introducing 
nuclear weapons into the conflict. After all, chemical or biological 
weapons stored in an underground site can do no harm as long as they 
remain within that bunker. And an earth-penetrating nuclear weapon 
could spread far more chemical or biological agents than it burned up, 
unless it landed very precisely on the target. So our military could 
employ large conventional bombs to seal or destroy the entrance and 
exit tunnels to underground sites, so that any weapons stockpiles 
stored in such sites will not be going anywhere for a while.
  Other scientists have discussed the feasibility of targeting a series 
of conventional missiles, one following the other, in order to burrow a 
``pilot hole'' toward a deeply buried target. So let's be clear--
nuclear weapons are not the only possible solution for attacking an 
underground target.
  The neoconservative school argues that diplomacy, arms control, and 
international ``norms' have failed to deter rogue states like Iran and 
North Korea from developing nuclear weapons programs. There may be some 
truth to that, but diplomacy has been instrumental in slowing down the 
progress of these programs and restraining their scope. In addition, 
nonproliferation regimes and international

[[Page 22046]]

norms have provided tremendous value in convincing more established 
states in the international system to remain non-nuclear. For example, 
it was their desire for international legitimacy which, in part, 
persuaded Argentina and Brazil to give up their nascent nuclear weapons 
programs in the 1980's. The same can be said for Japan, Taiwan, the 
Ukraine, and South Africa, which have all foregone, halted, or 
voluntarily given up their own nuclear weapons programs.
  How does the Feinstein amendment fit into this broader discussion 
over U.S. nuclear weapons strategy and the battle to combat nuclear 
proliferation? The energy and water appropriations bill includes the 
administration's original requests for funding of a series of 
controversial nuclear weapons activities, including research into 
advanced nuclear concepts, such as low-yield weapons, and reduction of 
the time period between when a President makes the decision to resume 
nuclear testing and when our nuclear weapons complex would be able to 
carry out a test.
  This new funding to enhance our readiness to resume nuclear weapons 
testing and conduct research on new weapons concepts and designs will 
lead us to a world where the further proliferation of nuclear weapons 
is more widely tolerated. While the senior officials in the current 
administration have disavowed any intent to resume nuclear testing or 
produce new nuclear weapons, their actions tell a different story.
  The Nuclear Posture Review of December 2001 identified not only 
Russia and China as potential targets in a future nuclear war, but also 
North Korea, Iran, Syria, and Libya. The latter countries were cited as 
seeking weapons of mass destruction, but not necessarily nuclear 
weapons.
  More recently, civilian Pentagon leaders ordered a task force to 
consider possible requirements for new low-yield nuclear weapons, even 
while assuring the Senate that no formal requirement has yet been 
established.
  A presidential strategy document reportedly stated that the United 
States might use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state possessing 
chemical or biological weapons.
  Senior officials publicly discuss the possible need to resume 
underground nuclear testing, either to ensure that existing weapons are 
safe and reliable or to test new weapons, all the while scorning the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
  The Feinstein amendment would strike out the $15 million allocation 
for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, eliminate the $6 million 
allocation for Advanced Weapons Concepts Initiative and prohibit the 
use of any appropriated funds to shorten the time period required to 
prepare for an underground nuclear test from the current 24 to 36 
months to less than 24 months.
  It would also prohibit the use of funds for site selection or 
conceptual design of a Modern Pit Facility, which would produce 
replacement plutonium triggers for the existing nuclear stockpile. The 
amendment reallocates the eliminated funding to the paramount goal of 
deficit reduction.
  Let me remind my colleagues that this amendment only proposes to do 
what the Republican-controlled House largely already did in July, when 
it adopted its version of the Energy and Water appropriations bill. 
According to press reports, Representative David Hobson, the Republican 
chairman of the relevant House Appropriations subcommittee, defended 
his panel's decision to strike this funding by asserting the U.S. 
Government should first address the rising costs of managing its 
existing nuclear stockpile and disposing of its nuclear waste before 
moving ahead with new nuclear programs. Neither the full House 
Appropriations Committee nor the House as a whole challenged the 
subcommittee's mark.
  We should all remember the House's actions when our opponents charge 
that this amendment will jeopardize U.S. national security or 
represents some extremist, antinuclear weapons agenda. In fact, the 
opposite is true.
  So what's the bottom line here? Today, the United States deploys 
6,000 strategic nuclear warheads and possesses in total more than 
10,000 deployed or reserve nuclear weapons. As we are the overwhelming 
conventional military power in the world, it is decidedly against our 
interest to see others obtain and/or use nuclear weapons. Why on earth, 
then, are we considering the acquisition of additional and more 
advanced nuclear weapons?
  If we continue on these steps to develop these new weapons, our 
friends and enemies alike can easily dismiss our future admonitions on 
why nuclear weapons fail to provide true security. Indeed, our 
adversaries will take to heart one overriding lesson: Develop your own 
nuclear weapons to deter a preemptive U.S. strike.
  Let me close with a statement by Secretary of State Colin Powell, a 
man who spent the majority of his career in the uniformed military. In 
May 2002, Secretary Powell discussed the potential for an India-
Pakistan conflict to evolve into a nuclear clash. But his larger point 
holds true for our debate today:

       Nuclear weapons in this day and age may serve some 
     deterrent effect, and so be it, but to think of using them as 
     just another weapon in what might start out as a conventional 
     conflict in this day and age seems to be something that no 
     side should be contemplating.

  The Feinstein amendment enhances U.S. national security by preventing 
our Nation from sleepwalking into an era when nuclear weapons are 
considered just another weapon. The United States is the leader of the 
world. Other nations watch us and they follow our lead. Let's not lead 
them astray.
  Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise today to comment on the debate over 
funding for the administration's request for studying new nuclear 
weapons in the Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill.
  The administration proposes that Congress fund the study of two new 
nuclear weapons: a robust nuclear earth penetrator, RNEP, and a low 
yield nuclear weapon.
  Why does the United States need these new nuclear weapons?
  The administration's case for these new nuclear weapons presumes that 
deterrence may not be working well in the post-cold war security 
environment. Leaders of rogue states may conclude that the United 
States cannot attack their deep bunkers or weapons of mass destruction, 
WMD, and so act or use their WMD with impunity. These new nuclear 
weapons supposedly will bolster the U.S. deterrent.
  But does our nuclear arsenal no longer deter?
  Deterrence involves credibly threatening an enemy to deter them from 
taking unwanted actions. It involves having the forces to fulfill the 
threat and the resolve to carry out the threat. We have enough nuclear 
weapons to accomplish this goal. Over a decade after the end of the 
cold war we possess an arsenal that could still end life on earth as we 
know it. This massive destructive power should give pause to any nation 
or dictator that wants to attack the United States with nuclear 
weapons.
  While the Congress was on recess, the annual remembrance of the 
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the end of World War II passed. 
On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped the first atomic bomb on 
Hiroshima. Three days later another was dropped on Nagasaki. Shortly 
thereafter Japan surrendered, ending World War II.
  The Hiroshima bomb had an explosive power of 15 kilotons of TNT and 
killed almost 70,000 people immediately and injured as many more. The 
Nagasaki bomb was 22 kilotons and killed 40,000 people and injured 
another 25,000. There had been devastating conventional bombing attacks 
during World War II. The fire bombings of Dresden and Tokyo also caused 
widespread damage and loss of life. But the realization that one plane 
with one bomb could destroy a city was a new and fearsome development.
  After the end of World War II and the onset of the cold war, the U.S. 
arsenal expanded rapidly. By 1960, more than ten thousand nuclear 
weapons were in the U.S. arsenal. Weapons had expanded from kiloton to 
megaton size. The U.S. arsenal grew to have 20,500 megatons of TNT 
explosive power.
  A megaton is an enormous amount of destructive power. A kiloton is a 
thousand tons. A megaton is a million tons.

[[Page 22047]]

In 1960, the U.S. arsenal had almost seven tons of TNT of explosive 
power for every one of the three billion men, women and children on the 
planet.
  The massive overkill of the U.S. arsenal, like its Soviet 
counterpart, has declined since the 1960s. The United States still 
keeps thousands of nuclear weapons. But the average explosive power of 
a U.S. nuclear weapons has decreased. As a result the U.S. arsenal 
today contains only some 1,200 megatons of explosive power. Still 
enough, however, for 400 lbs. for every person on Earth.
  Some advocates of small nuclear weapons claim massive firepower is a 
poor deterrent. They argue that the United States would not use a large 
nuclear weapon for a limited strike. They further argue that smaller, 
more usable nuclear weapons will be a more credible deterrent because 
rogue state leaders will believe the United States could use them. The 
administration proposes to investigate the possibilities of a new 
nuclear weapon with a yield of less than five kilotons to meet this 
goal.
  Five kilotons is one third the size of the Hiroshima bomb. It is not 
a low-yield weapon. It is equivalent to 5,000 tons or ten million 
pounds of TNT. Yet, the use of such new lower yield nuclear weapons is 
incredible because it is impractical and there are conventional weapons 
that can or will be able to do the job. We are told there are dozens if 
not hundreds of buried hardened targets. Without excellent intelligence 
on where WMD or rogue leaders may be hidden, the United States would 
need to drop dozens or hundreds of nuclear weapons. The radioactive 
fallout from such a strike would be large. The international political 
fallout would be massive and so would be the international 
environmental effects.
  The U.S. nuclear arsenal is currently diverse and flexible. the 
United States in fact already possesses such low-yield nuclear weapons. 
I asked Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham for the record when he was 
before the Senate Armed Services Committee this spring if the United 
States had operational nuclear weapons that could have yields of less 
than five kilotons. Secretary Abraham's unclassified written response 
was that, ``The U.S. has two existing nuclear weapons that have 
certified yields of less than five kilotons.''
  As for the robust nuclear earth penetrator, we already have one of 
these as well. As has been well publicized, in the mid-1990's, the 
United States deployed the B61-11 bomb for an earth penetrating 
mission.
  The administration claims the B61-11 is no longer adequate for the 
job. Energy Department officials informed congressional staff in an 
unclassified briefing that the B61-11 was designed not to penetrate 
rock but to attack only certain targets in hard or frozen soil in 
Russia. It is not able to counter targets deeply buried under granite 
rock. Moreover, it has a high yield, in the hundreds of kilotons. If 
used in North Korea, the radioactive fall out could drift over nearby 
countries such as Japan.
  Is the solution to a seeming limitation to the B61-11 exploring yet 
more and more nuclear weapon designs? This search for a perfect nuclear 
deterrent reminds me of the mad logic of the cold war where the United 
States and Soviet Union pursued more and more nuclear weapons of more 
and more sophisticated designs to try to cover more and more 
contingencies. These endless improvements are unnecessary, expensive 
and dangerous.
  For example, some argue using new small penetrator nuclear weapons is 
preferable to using conventional weapons for attacking buried chemical 
or biological weapons. They hope that a nuclear weapon would incinerate 
hidden weapons. However, calculations by Princeton physicist Robert 
Nelson indicate that, unless the strike is extraordinarily precise, the 
blast from a nuclear weapon has as good a chance of dispersing buried 
agents as destroying them. Our conventional forces can also attack or 
disable deeply buried targets. They will continue to improve in 
effectiveness and lethality. We should focus on improving their 
capability, not chasing some nuclear will o' the wisp.
  The $21 million for the RNEP and advanced weapons concepts, including 
the low-yield nuclear weapons, in the fiscal year 2003 budget could be 
better spent elsewhere to guard us against real nuclear threats. There 
is widespread agreement that al Qaeda or other terrorist groups would 
make use of a dirty bomb if they could get hold of radioactive 
materials. I have released three General Accounting Office reports this 
year that show the United States and international controls over 
radioactive sealed sources that could be used in a dirty bomb are 
severely lacking. The Energy Department could better spend the funds 
being proposed for new nuclear weapons on improving the tracking and 
security of dangerous radioactive sources here and abroad.
  Pursuing new nuclear weapons will undermine our non-proliferation 
goals. The example we set for the rest of the world does matter. 
Getting the world's approval for the indefinite extension of the 
Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty in 1995 was dependent on the United 
States and the other nuclear powers signaling they would rapidly 
negotiate a comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, CTBT.
  The United States and Russian decision to stop nuclear testing in the 
lead up to the CTBT talks put pressure on France and China to end their 
nuclear test programs in the 1990's. Had the United States and the 
other nuclear powers not stopped nuclear testing it would have been 
even more difficult to pressure Pakistan and India to put a quick end 
to their nuclear tests. It would be even harder to put pressure on 
North Korea today.
  Getting the world to continue to help us to pressure North Korea and 
Iran will be more complicated if the United States weakens its 
commitments to non-proliferation. In early September, Russia complained 
that several states' failure to ratify the CTBT is delaying its entry 
into force at an international conference convened to look at this 
question. This controversy over the U.S. non-proliferation policy is 
not welcome news when the administration is now seeking support to 
condemn Iran's nuclear program at an upcoming IAEA meeting. News 
reports indicate that the United States will have a hard time doing 
this as Iran has more allies on the IAEA's board than does the United 
States.
  The non-proliferation regime, laboriously constructed by the United 
States and the international community over 30 years, has been a 
success. Rather than having dozens of countries with nuclear weapons, 
we confront a few, final, hard cases that have been a problem for many 
years but whose time is running out. New nuclear weapons are not the 
way to address the challenges these nations pose.
  Rather, a diplomacy of engagement, building the support of the 
international community, and maintaining our strong alliance 
commitments and conventional forces is the way forward.
  The administration is learning that force and confrontation are not a 
solution to the non-proliferation problem. Saddam Hussein's weapon of 
mass destruction program was not an imminent threat. Continued 
inspections and indefinite monitoring which were envisioned under the 
U.N. resolutions would have contained his program. Confrontation with 
North Korea has led to an acceleration of the North Korean nuclear 
program not its demise. Now the administration must negotiate seriously 
with North Korea to bring and end to the crisis and create a new 
security regime in the Northeast Pacific.
  The administration should understand more and more types of nuclear 
weapons will not guarantee deterrence, prevent the proliferation of 
WMD, prevent war or conflict. In fact, during the cold war we found our 
ever increasing nuclear arsenal could not achieve these goals. 
Paranoid, pygmy or pariah states, as Professor Richard Betts once 
characterized them, sought nuclear weapons for their defense due to 
their imagined or justified fears, their perceived conventional 
weaknesses, or because of their outcast status. Nuclear weapons did not 
prevent the Korean war, the Vietnam war, the Arab-Israeli wars, or the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

[[Page 22048]]

  Deterrence has many components: nuclear forces, conventional forces, 
strong alliances, a strong economy, and a strong resolve among them. At 
this moment in history we need an intelligent diplomacy, strengthened 
alliances and capable conventional forces more than we need more and 
new types of nuclear weapons.
  We have enough nuclear weapons to maintain nuclear deterrence. If 
anything, we should be seeking ways to further reduce ours and other 
countries' nuclear arsenals, not add to them. Talk to the contrary by 
promoters of new nuclear weapons misrepresents the strength of our 
existing forces and our resolve. We are sending the wrong message about 
our military strength.
  I urge my colleagues to reject funding for these new nuclear weapon 
designs.
  I urge my colleagues to vote for Senator Feinstein's amendment.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, if I might have the attention of Senator 
Reid, it has come to my attention, for a reason involving an individual 
Senator, that it would be more accommodating if we started our vote at 
2:45. Does the Senator have any objection to that?
  Mr. REID. I modify the request that the time between 2:15 and 2:45 be 
equally divided between both sides, Senator Domenici controlling 15 
minutes and Senator Feinstein controlling 15 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I indicate to the Senate that we will have a few 
minutes before the vote. I will summarize again and we will have 
handouts if anyone needs to know what this Senator thinks the issues we 
will vote on are.
  In summary, No. 1, there is no authorization to build any new nuclear 
weapons. We are building none now. We have not built any for a long 
period of time.
  No. 2, a portion of this bill says the Nevada Test Site will be made 
ready so it can be used in 18 months rather than 3 years. Almost 
everyone knowledgeable in the field thinks it is high time that 
happened.
  No. 3, there is a small amount of money to begin planning, designing 
and feasibility, for a pit manufacturing facility. We are the only 
nation with nuclear weapons which has no spare pits, plutonium pits, 
the essential ingredient. We have tried to make them in Los Alamos. It 
is makeshift and it has been very expensive.
  It is clearly indicated for the next 40 or 50 years we need to build 
a facility. This bill provides a start on that long-term effort.
  Not yet have I said anything about new weapons or America engaging in 
a new course of conduct with respect to nuclear energy. That is not 
happening.
  Next, the bill says, do not tie the hands of our great scientists 
with reference to the future. Let them study, let them think, let them 
design, but do not let anyone build any new weapons. Let them think 
about the future and what might be needed in light of the changed 
circumstances in the world. It is very prudent to do that.
  In all three regards, there are clear cases the Feinstein amendment 
should fail. I hope it does so we can proceed ahead with these things 
that are necessary.
  I yield whatever time the distinguished Senator from Indiana needs. I 
share my grave concern and condolences over the death of his esteemed 
Governor.
  I yield the floor.

                          ____________________