[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 14]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 19288-19289]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




      DECLASSIFIED PORTIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

                                 ______
                                 

                           HON. PETER T. KING

                              of new york

                    in the house of representatives

                         Tuesday, July 22, 2003

  Mr. KING of New York. Mr. Speaker, as I stated yesterday, President 
Bush's adversaries--both in the political arena and the media--have 
chosen to ignore or distort the facts regarding Iraq's pursuit of a 
nuclear weapons program. To counter the numerous inaccuracies created 
by too many people who should know better, I am including in the Record 
the second half of the declassified portions of the National 
Intelligence Estimate released by the White House this past Friday.

                       State/INR Alternative View

       . . . acquire nuclear weapons. Iraq may be doing so, but 
     INR considers the available evidence inadequate to support 
     such a judgment. Lacking persuasive evidence that Baghdad has 
     launched a coherent effort to reconstitute its nuclear 
     weapons program, INR is unwilling to speculate that such an 
     effort began soon after the departure of UN inspectors or to 
     project a timeline for the completion of activities it does 
     not now see happening. As a result, INR is unable to predict 
     when Iraq could acquire a nuclear device or weapon.
       In INR's view Iraq's efforts to acquire aluminum tubes is 
     central to the argument that Baghdad is reconstituting its 
     nuclear weapons program, but INR is not persuaded that the 
     tubes in question are intended for use as centrifuge rotors. 
     INR accepts the judgment of technical experts at the U.S. 
     Department of Energy (DOE) who have concluded that the tubes 
     lraq seeks to acquire are poorly suited for use in gas 
     centrifuges to be used for uranium enrichment and finds 
     unpersuasive the arguments advanced by others to make the 
     case that they are intended for that purpose. INR considers 
     it far more likely that the tubes are intended for another 
     purpose, most likely the production of artillery rockets. The 
     very large quantities being sought, the way the tubes were 
     tested by the Iraqis, and the atypical lack of attention to 
     operational security in the procurement efforts are among the 
     factors, in addition to the DOE assessment, that lead INR to 
     conclude that the tubes are not intended for use in Iraq's 
     nuclear weapon program.

     Confidence Levels for Selected Key Judgments in This Estimate


                            High Confidence

       Iraq is continuing, and in some areas expanding its 
     chemical, biological, nuclear and missile programs contrary 
     to UN resolutions.
       We are not detecting portions of these weapons programs.
       Iraq possesses proscribed chemical and biological weapons 
     and missiles.
       Iraq could make a nuclear weapon in months to a year once 
     it acquires sufficient weapons grade fissile material.


                          moderate confidence

       Iraq does not yet have a nuclear weapon or sufficient 
     material to make one but is likely to have a weapon by 2007 
     to 2009.


                             Low Confidence

       When Saddam would use weapons of mass-destruction.
       Whether Saddam would engage in clandestine attacks against 
     the U.S. Homeland.
       Whether in desperation Saddam would share chemical or 
     biological weapons with al-Qa'ida.
                                 ______
                                 
       Uranium Acquisition. Iraq retains approximately two-and-a-
     half tons of 2.5 percent enriched uranium oxide, which the 
     IAEA permits. This low-enriched material could be used as 
     feed material to produce enough HEU for about two nuclear 
     weapons. The use of enriched feed material also would reduce 
     the initial number of centrifuges that Baghdad would need by 
     about half, Iraq could divert this material--the IAEA 
     inspects it only once a year--and enrich it to weapons grade 
     before a subsequent inspection discovered it was missing. The 
     IAEA last inspected this material in late January 2002.
       Iraq has about 550 metric tons of yellowcake and low-
     enriched uranium at Tuwaitha, which is inspected annually by 
     the IAEA, Iraq also began vigorously trying to procure 
     uranium ore and yellowcake; acquiring either would shorten 
     the time Baghdad needs to produce nuclear weapons.
       A foreign government service reported that as of early 
     2001, Niger planned to send several tons of ``pure uranium'' 
     (probably yellowcake) to Iraq. As of early 2001, Niger and 
     Iraq reportedly were still working out arrangements for this 
     deal, which could be for up to 500 tons of yellowcake. We do 
     not know the status of this arrangement.
       Reports indicate Iraq also has sought uranium ore from 
     Somalia and possibly the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
       We cannot confirm whether Iraq succeeded in acquiring 
     uranium ore and/or yellowcake from these sources. Reports 
     suggest Iraq is shifting from domestic mining and milling of 
     uranium to foreign acquisition. Iraq possesses significant 
     phosphate deposits, from

[[Page 19289]]

     which uranium had been chemically extracted before Operation 
     Desert Storm. Intelligence information on whether nuclear-
     related phosphate mining and/or processing has been 
     reestablished is inconclusive, however.

           Annex A--Iraq's Attempts To Acquire Aluminum Tubes

       Some of the specialized but dual-use items being sought 
     are, by all indications, bound for Iraq's missile program. 
     Other cases are ambiguous, such as that of a planned magnet-
     production line whose suitability for centrifuge operations 
     remains unknown. Some efforts involve noncontrolled 
     industrial material and equipment--including a variety of 
     machine tools--and are troubling because they would help 
     establish the infrastructure for a renewed nuclear program. 
     But such efforts (which began well before the inspectors 
     departed) are not clearly linked to a nuclear end-use. 
     Finally, the claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in 
     Africa are, in INR's assessment, highly dubious.-

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