[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 14]
[Senate]
[Pages 18910-18912]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                             FBI CHALLENGES

  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
faces tremendous challenges in the war on terrorism, particularly with 
its internal operations, where a culture of fear, retaliation, and 
coverup demoralize agents and weaken the organizations.
  Director Mueller has taken at least two important steps to address 
this culture. First, he has recognized it, making him one of the first 
Directors in recent memory to acknowledge the problem. His appointment 
of Judge Griffin Bell and Dr. Lee Colwell to study the Office of 
Professional Responsibility, OPR, is an excellent example of his 
recognizing the seriousness of the problem.
  Second, Director Mueller has translated this attitude into action. 
For example, earlier this year, he justly and fairly punished a senior 
manager, which was especially noteworthy because he had been handpicked 
by the Director for the job. Just a few years ago, I could not have 
imagined an FBI Director taking action against a top official the way 
he did with Robert Jordan, the Assistant Director of OPR. By 
implementing the recommended punishment of the Justice Department 
Inspector General (DOJ OIG), Director Mueller fairly applied high 
standards to a senior-level FBI official.
  I commend the Director for these positive developments, and that is 
why I feel the following issues are important.
  Specifically, I am concerned about the FBI recently awarding 
contracts to several former senior officials involved in wrongdoing 
during their careers. The former top officials are Charles Mathews III, 
who recently retired from the position of Special Agent in Charge of 
the Portland, OR, Division; Thomas Coyle, who held the position of 
Assistant Director, Personnel Division; and Special Agent in Charge of 
the Buffalo, NY, Division; and Joseph Wolfinger, who retired in the 
late 1990s from the position of Assistant Director of the Training 
Division in Quantico, VA.
  First, it is my understanding that Mr. Mathews recently was selected 
to accompany several current FBI officials on a trip to Jakarta, 
Indonesia, to conduct training for law enforcement and security 
officials.
  Second, it is my understanding that MPRI, an Alexandria VA, defense 
and security contracting company, was awarded a contract worth between 
$500,000 and $1.5 million to conduct counter-intelligence training for 
FBI agents. Mr. Wolfinger, who holds the title of Senior Vice President 
and General Manager, heads MPRI's ``Alexandria Group,'' which ``will 
provide the highest quality education, training, and organizational 
expertise, to law enforcement and corporations around the world,'' 
according to the company's Web site. Mr. Coyle is listed as ``Senior 
Law Enforcement Affiliate'' for the company.
  One reason I have questions about these former officials and/or their 
companies obtaining contracts is that they were involved in the Ruby 
Ridge scandal (Mathews) and the ``Pottsgate'' scandal (Wolfinger). Mr. 
Coyle was involved with both Ruby Ridge and Pottsgate.
  Ruby Ridge refers not only the deadly 1992 standoff at the Idaho home 
of Randall Weaver, but also the ensuring coverups of misconduct and 
lying by senior FBI officials. The Pottsgate scandal refers to the sham 
conference held in 1997 so friends and co-workers of then-Deputy 
Director Larry Potts could fly to Washington for his retirement party 
on the taxpayers' dime, rather than their own personal money.
  It is not worth repeating the long and sorry history of the 
misconduct of all the senior-level officials involved in the Ruby Ridge 
standoff; Pottsgate; the ensuing investigations, re-investigations, and 
reviews of investigations; and the failure to take appropriate 
disciplinary action in both matters. A full recounting covering more 
than a dozen officials who were involved in wrongdoing would take 
hundreds of pages.
  The most comprehensive, public details of these two scandals are 
outlined in the DOJ OIG's report, entitled ``A Review of Allegations of 
a Double Standard of Discipline at the FBI,'' issued in November 2002.
  The FBI's reputation and integrity suffered enough when these men 
escaped any appropriate discipline for wrongdoing during their careers. 
Not only did they avoid accountability, but recent developments 
indicate that their former colleagues and friends are rewarding them 
with lucrative contracts. I am sure this is not the lesson Director 
Mueller wants agents and the public to learn about the FBI and the way 
it handles misconduct in its top ranks.
  Before I explain my other concerns about Mr. Mathews, Mr. Wolfinger/
MPRI, and Mr. Coyle/MPRI profiting--either directly of indirectly--from 
these contracts, a brief explanation of their involvement in misconduct 
is necessary. The following is based on the DOJ OIG's report on the 
double standard in discipline.
  Mr. Mathews, in June 1994, led an internal inquiry into the findings 
of a previous criminal investigation regarding allegations of FBI 
misconduct during the Ruby Ridge standoff. Danny Coulson, for whom Mr. 
Mathews worked from 1988 to 1990 in Portand, OR, was one subject of the 
criminal probes and Mr. Mathews' inquiry.
  Mr. Mathews' probe led to discipline for several agents and officials 
at the scene of the standoff, but not for any headquarters officials--
including Mr. Coulson and his boss, Mr. Potts. Later,

[[Page 18911]]

the Justice Department, DOJ, conducted criminal and administrative 
investigations into new allegations, including that Mr. Mathews and his 
investigation covered up misconduct. While under investigation for 
those issues, Mr. Mathews was promoted twice, and shortly after that 
DOJ investigation ended in 2001, he was promoted a third time to head 
the Portland, OR, Division. After contradictory conclusions at the 
senior levels of the DOJ under former Attorney General Janet Reno, Mr. 
Mathews, like other senior officials, escaped any discipline.
  However, the November 2002 DOJ OIG report later determined that:

       Mathews should have been disciplined for failure to carry 
     out [his] assigned duties--completing thorough and impartial 
     inquiries--regardless of whether there was evidence of 
     improper motivation. Moreover, like DOJ OPR, we believe that 
     there was sufficient evidence in the record to sustain a 
     finding that [Mathews] acted with an improper purpose. (Page 
     64)

  The DOJ OIG report also stated:

       We also believe that Mathews' failure to rescue himself 
     despite his relationship with Coulson, taken together with 
     his statements and the unsubstantiated findings in his report 
     regarding approval of the rules of engagement, established by 
     a preponderance of the evidence that Mathews conducted an 
     inadequate investigation. (Page 64)

  The Pottsgate scandal refers to the allegation, among others, that 
Mr. Wolfinger, in October of 1997, arranged a conference to justify 
official business travel to Washington, DC, of senior officials so they 
could attend the retirement party of Mr. Potts, who was Deputy Director 
of the FBI at the time. The investigation focused on whether: the 
``conference'' was a sham; it was used to justify the personal travel 
of officials to Washington for the party; those officials 
misrepresented their actions on travel forms and other government 
documents; and the officials were less than honest to investigators 
about their actions.
  Mr. Wolfinger, the Assistant Director of the Training Division in 
Quantico, VA, was the organizer of the Thursday, October 9, 1997, 
retirement party for Mr. Potts. Just 7 days before the party, Mr. 
Wolfinger ordered a subordinate to send out a communication to the 
field announcing a conference for Special agents in charge, SACs, on 
Friday, October 10, 1997, the day after the party.
  This ``conference'' was unusual in several ways, as the DOJ OIG 
November 2002 report points out. The conference--

     announcement did not contain a conference schedule, a 
     starting or concluding time, a training identification 
     number, or travel instructions. The conference was scheduled 
     for a Friday, normally a travel day for FBI employees 
     following the conclusion of conferences. (Page 17)

  The DOJ OIG report identifies other unusual characteristics of the 
``conference.'' Only five people attended: Mr. Wolfinger, the 
subordinate he ordered to organize it, two SACs, and another 
individual. The agent who was ordered to give a presentation was told 
of the conference only 3 days before, on October 7, 1997. The 
conference had no formal agenda, and it lasted between 45 minutes and 
90 minutes, rather than all day.
  Despite the damning evidence, a disciplinary board of Senior 
Executive Service, SES, officials decided the ``conference'' was not a 
sham, though the board did conclude ``the planners exercised poor 
judgment in not properly preparing for it.'' (Page 26)
  The DOJ OIG report notes that it is unclear exactly what action, if 
any, the board during two meetings decided to take against Mr. 
Wolfinger, who retired shortly after the board's meetings. Ultimately, 
however, it appears that Mr. Wolfinger was not punished. Michael Defeo, 
the Assistant Director of FBI OPR at the time, told the DOJ OIG that 
``no recommendation as to Wolfinger was ultimately made . . .'' (Page 
28)
  Mr. Coyle, a coworker of Mr. Wolfinger at MPRI, was one member of the 
disciplinary board in the Pottsgate matter. The DOJ OIG concluded:

       Coyle should not have participated because, at a minimum, 
     an appearance of a conflict of interest existed, if not an 
     actual conflict of interest. (Page 30)

  As the DOJ OIG report notes, at the time of the board's decisions, 
Mr. Coyle and Mr. Potts were subjects of the Ruby Ridge investigation. 
The DOJ OIG wrote:

       It was well known that many people wanted to attend the 
     Potts retirement party to show support for him because of the 
     Ruby Ridge investigation. That attitude was likely to be 
     especially strong for someone like Coyle who also was a Ruby 
     Ridge subject. We believe that Coyle should have recused 
     himself or been removed from these Board proceedings. (Page 
     30)

  The actions of these officials during their careers at the FBI are 
troubling. That is why I sent Director Mueller a letter today asking 
questions about the contracts these men were awarded. I asked for a 
response by Wednesday, August 27, 2003.
  Mr. Chairman, I also ask that the letter, dated today, July 22, be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                    July 22, 2003.
     Hon. Robert Mueller,
     Federal Bureau of Investigation,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Director Mueller: The purpose of this letter is to 
     inquire about the FBI recently awarding contracts to several 
     former senior officials. The former top officials are Charles 
     Mathews III, who recently retired from the position of 
     Special Agent in Charge of the Portland, Oregon Division; 
     Thomas Coyle, who held the position of Assistant Director, 
     Personnel Division, and Special Agent in Charge of the 
     Buffalo, New York Division; and Joseph Wolfinger, who retired 
     in the later 1990s from the position of Assistant Director of 
     the Training Division in Quanticao, Virginia.
       First, it is my understanding that Mr. Methews recently was 
     selected to accompany several current FBI officials on a trip 
     to Jakarta, Indonesia, to conduct training for law 
     enforcement and security officials.
       Second, it is my understanding that MPRI, an Alexandria, 
     Virginia defense and security contracting company, was 
     awarded a contract worth between $500,000 and $1.5 million to 
     conduct counter-intelligence training for FBI agents. Mr. 
     Wolfinger, who holds the title of Senior Vice President and 
     General Manager, heads MPRI's ``Alexandria Group,'' which 
     ``will provide the highest quality education, training and 
     organizational expertise, to law enforcement and corporations 
     around the world,'' according to the company's Web site. Mr. 
     Coyle is listed as ``Senior Law Enforcement Affiliate'' for 
     the company.
       (1) Mr. Wolfinger and Mr. Coyle.
       (A) Please provide a list of Mr. Wolfinger's involvement in 
     counterintelligence cases during his career in the FBI, 
     including the John Walker spy case. This list should include 
     the name of the counterintelligence investigation, a brief 
     description of the case, his role in the case, his title and 
     place of work at the time. Also, please provide detailed 
     information on any counterintelligence training Mr. Wolfinger 
     participated in or led during his career at the FBI.
       (B) What role did Mr. Wolfinger, David Szady, Assistant 
     Director of the Counterintelligence Division, and Beverly 
     Andrews, a Deputy Assistant Director in the 
     Counterintelligence Division, play in the John Walker spy 
     case? This reply should include their titles and place of 
     work at the time, their duties and responsibilities, and the 
     time period each person worked on the case.
       (C) Did their relationship play any role in the awarding of 
     the contract to Mr. Wolfinger and MPRI?
       (D) Did any FBI official, in the course of awarding the 
     contract, consider the potential appearance of favoritism if 
     the contract was awarded to Mr. Wolfinger and MPRI?
       (E) Please describe in detail the role that Mr. Wolfinger 
     and Mr. Coyle play in supervising MPRI contract personnel 
     conducting the counterintelligence training, and their role 
     in fulfilling the contract in general.
       (F) What objective performance measurements does the DBI 
     employ to check whether MPRI personnel on this contract are 
     tardy or absent from some training sessions, or lack the 
     appropriate security clearances?
       (G) Please provide all documents and materials relating to 
     performance evaluations of MPRI contract personnel, including 
     for Mr. Wolfinger and Mr. Coyle.
       (H) Who was/were the deciding official(s) at the FBI who 
     selected Mr. Wolfinger/MPRI for this contract? In addition, 
     please identify all the persons involved in the contract 
     process, including those persons dealing with the Request For 
     Proposal, evaluating bids and making the decision to award 
     the contract.
       (I) Please provide all records generated in the course of 
     selecting a company for this contract, including information 
     submitted by MPRI, Mr. Wolfinger, and other bidders on the 
     contract, as well as FBI records. This reply should include 
     the FBI's Request For Proposal, detailed criteria used to 
     evaluate the bidders and select MPRI.
       (J) Please provide any records of contacts between the 
     deciding official(s) for this contract and Mr. Szady or Ms. 
     Andrews. This

[[Page 18912]]

     list of contacts should include copies of, among other 
     things, all (1) e-mail; (2) facsimiles; (3) facsimile logs; 
     (4) correspondence; (5) memoranda; (6) telephone bills and 
     logs; (7) notes; (8) working papers; (9) reports; (10) 
     minutes of meetings, transcripts or electronic recording that 
     the FBI or its employees, contractors or counsel have in 
     their control or possession regarding the contract.
       (K) Please provide a copy of the contract. In addition, 
     provide in summary form the compensation and general 
     conditions and terms, as well as any modifications, deletions 
     and changes.
       (2) Mr. Mathews
       (A) By what criteria and on what basis was Mr. Mathews 
     selected for the trip of FBI officials to Jakarta, Indonesia 
     for a training seminar? This reply should include details of 
     Mr. Mathews qualifications for the specific purpose of the 
     trip. This reply should also include, if relevant, the FBI's 
     Request for Proposal, Mr. Mathews bid, and other bids. If 
     this was not a competitively bid contract, please explain the 
     selection process in detail.
       (B) Who was/were the deciding official(s) at the FBI who 
     selected Mr. Mathews for this trip? Please identify all 
     persons--including title and place of work--involved in 
     selecting Mr. Mathews for the trip.
       (C) Was Mr. Mathews compensation approximately $7,000 for 
     this 10-day trip, plus expenses? If not, please explain what 
     his compensation was, including expenses billed to the FBI.
       (D) Please provide the names, affiliation and titles of all 
     other persons who went on the trip, whether they are or were 
     employed by the U.S. government or not.
       (E) Please provide detailed information on the nature and 
     purpose of the trip, including the names and a brief synopsis 
     of lectures or seminars provided by Mr. Mathews and others on 
     the trip.
       (F) What official government-issued identification or 
     identity documents did Mr. Mathews use for his travel?
       (G) Please provide a copy of Mr. Mathews' contract for this 
     trip. In addition, please provide copies of, among other 
     things, all (1) e-mail; (2) facsimiles; (3) facsimile logs; 
     (4) correspondence; (5) memoranda; (6) telephone bills and 
     logs; (7) notes; (8) working papers; (9) reports; (10) 
     minutes of meetings, transcripts or electronic recordings 
     that the FBI or its employees, contractors or counsel have in 
     their control or possession regarding the contract.
       (I) Will Mr. Mathews be considered for future contracts 
     with the FBI?
       I ask that these questions be answered, and requested 
     documents provided, by Wednesday, August 27, 2003. Once the 
     answers and documents are provided, I ask that the 
     appropriate FBI officials brief interested committee staff on 
     this matter.
           Sincerely,
     Charles E. Grassley.

                          ____________________