[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 14]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 18877-18879]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                             KEY JUDGMENTS

                                 ______
                                 

                           HON. PETER T. KING

                              of new york

                    in the house of representatives

                         Monday, July 21, 2003

  Mr. KING of New York. Mr. Speaker, in light of the incessant barrage 
of attacks of inaccurate and baseless charges being made

[[Page 18878]]

against President Bush by his political opponents and their allies in 
the media, I thought it important to include in the Record the 
declassified portions of the National Intelligence Estimate released by 
the White House this past Friday. This NIE clearly states the consensus 
view of our intelligence agencies that Saddam Hussein was attempting to 
reconstitute his nuclear capacity. The first half of these documents 
are being submitted today and the second half tomorrow. I commend these 
documents to all willing to approach this vital issue with an open 
mind.

                        [From October 2002 NIE]

       Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction

       We judge that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass 
     destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and 
     restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as 
     well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if 
     left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during 
     this decade. (See INR alternative view at the end of these 
     Key Judgments.)
       We judge that we are seeing only a portion of Iraq's WMD 
     efforts, owing to Baghdad's vigorous denial and deception 
     efforts. Revelations after the Gulf war starkly demonstrate 
     the extensive efforts undertaken by Iraq to deny information. 
     We lack specific information on many key aspects of Iraq's 
     WJMD programs.
       Since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its 
     chemical weapons effort, energized its missile program, and 
     invested more heavily in biological weapons; in the view of 
     most agencies, Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear weapons 
     program.
       Iraq's growing ability to sell oil illicitly increases 
     Baghdad's capabilities to finance WMD programs; annual 
     earnings in cash and goods have more than quadrupled, from 
     $580 million in 1998 to about $3 billion this year.
       Iraq has largely rebuilt missile and biological weapons 
     facilities damaged during Operation Desert Fox and has 
     expanded its chemical and biological infrastructure under the 
     cover of civilian production.
       Baghdad has exceeded UN range limits of 150 km with its 
     ballistic missiles and is working with unmanned aerial 
     vehicles (UAVs), which allow for a more lethal means to 
     deliver biological and, less likely, chemical warfare agents.
       Although we assess that Saddam does not yet have nuclear 
     weapons or sufficient material to make any, he remains intent 
     on acquiring them. Most agencies assess that Baghdad started 
     reconstituting its nuclear program about the time that UNSCOM 
     inspectors departed--December 1998.
       How quickly Iraq will obtain its first nuclear weapon 
     depends on when it acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile 
     material.
       If Baghdad acquires sufficient fissile material from abroad 
     it could make a nuclear weapon within several months to a 
     year.
       Without such material from abroad, Iraq probably would not 
     be able to make a weapon until 2007 to 2009, owing to 
     inexperience in building and operating centrifuge facilities 
     to produce highly enriched uranium and challenges in 
     procuring the necessary equipment and expertise.
       Most agencies believe that Saddam's personal interest in 
     and Iraq's aggressive attempts to obtain high-strength 
     aluminum tubes for centrifuge rotors--as well as Iraq's 
     attempts to acquire magnets, high-speed balancing machines, 
     and machine tools--provide compelling evidence that Saddam is 
     reconstituting a uranium enrichment effort for Baghdad's 
     nuclear weapons program. (DOE agrees that reconstitution of 
     the nuclear program is underway but assesses that the tubes 
     probably are not part of the program.)
       Iraq's efforts to re-establish and enhance its cadre of 
     weapons personnel as well as activities at several suspect 
     nuclear sites further indicate that reconstitution is 
     underway.
       All agencies agree that about 25,000 centrifuges based on 
     tubes of the size Iraq is trying to acquire would be capable 
     of producing approximately two weapons' worth of highly 
     enriched uranium per year.
       In a much less likely scenario, Bagbdad could make enough 
     fissile material for a nuclear weapon by 2005 to 2007 if it 
     obtains suitable centrifuge tubes this year and has all the 
     other materials and technological expertise necessary to 
     build production-scale uranium enrichment facilities.
       We assess that Baghdad has begun renewed production of 
     mustard, sarin, GF (cyclosari), and VX; its capability 
     probably is more limited now than it was at the time of the 
     Gulf war, although VX production and agent storage life 
     probably have been improved.
       An array of clandestine reporting reveals that Baghdad has 
     procured covertly the types and quantities of chemicals and 
     equipment sufficient to allow limited CW agent production 
     hidden within Iraq's legitimate chemical industry.
       Although we have little specific information on Iraq's CW 
     stockpile, Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric 
     tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agents--much 
     of it added in the last year.
       The Iraqis have experience in manufacturing CW bombs, 
     artillery rockets, and projectiles. We assess that they 
     possess CW bulk fills for SRBM warheads, including for a 
     limited number of covertly stored Scuds, possibly a few with 
     extended ranges.
       We judge that all key aspects--R&D, production, and 
     weaponization--of Iraq's offensive BW program are active and 
     that most elements are larger and more advanced than they 
     were before the Gulf war.
       We judge Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents 
     and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety 
     of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, 
     missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives.
       Chances are even that smallpox is part of Iraq's offensive 
     BW program.
       Baghdad probably has developed genetically engineered BW 
     agents.
       Bagbdad has established a large-scale, redundant, and 
     concealed BW agent production capability.
       Baghdad has mobile facilities for producing bacterial and 
     toxin BW agents; these facilities can evade detection and are 
     highly survivable. Within three to six months* these units 
     probably could produce an amount of agent equal to the total 
     that Iraq produced in the years prior to the Gulf war.
       Iraq maintains a small missile force and several 
     development programs, including for a UAV probably intended 
     to deliver biological warfare agent.
       Gaps in Iraqi accounting to UNSCOM suggest that Saddam 
     retains a covert force of up to a few dozen Scud-variant 
     SRBMs with ranges of 650 to 900 km.
       lraq is deploying its new al-Samoud and Ababi-100 SRBMs, 
     which are capable of flying beyond the UN-authorized 150-km 
     range limit; Iraq has tested an al-Samoud variant beyond 150 
     km--perhaps as far as 300 km,
       Baghdad's UAVs could threaten Iraq's neighbors, U.S. forces 
     in the Persian Gulf, and if brought close to, or into, the 
     United States, the U.S. Homeland.
       An Iraqi UAV procurement network attempted to procure 
     commercially available route planning software and an 
     associated topographic database that would be able to support 
     targeting of the United States, according to analysis of 
     special intelligence.
       The Director, Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
     Reconnaissance, U.S. Air Force, does not agree that Iraq is 
     developing UAVs primarily intended to be delivery platforms 
     for chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents. The small 
     size of Iraq's new UAV strongly suggests a primary role of 
     reconnaissance, although CBW delivery is an inherent 
     capability.
       Iraq is developing medium-range ballistic missile 
     capabilities, largely through foreign assistance in building 
     specialized facilities, including a test stand for engines 
     more powerful than those in its current missile force.
       We have low confidence in our ability to assess when Saddam 
     would use WMD.
       Saddam could decide to use chemical and biological warfare 
     (CBW) preemptively against U.S. forces, friends, and allies 
     in the region in an attempt to disrupt U.S. war preparations 
     and undermine the political will of the Coalition.
       [Corrected per Errata sheet issued in October 2002]
       Saddam might use CBW after an initial advance into Iraqi 
     territory, but early use of WMD could foreclose diplomatic 
     options for stalling the U.S. advance.
       He probably would use CBW when be perceived he 
     irretrievably had lost control of the military and security 
     situation, but we are unlikely to know when Saddam reaches 
     that point.
       We judge that Saddam would be more likely to use chemical 
     weapons than biological weapons on the battlefield.
       Saddam historically has maintained tight control over the 
     use of WMD; however, he probably has provided contingency 
     instructions to his commanders to use CBW in specific 
     circumstances.
       Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of 
     conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or CBW against 
     the United States, fearing that exposure of Iraqi involvement 
     would provide Washington a stronger cause for making war.
       Iraq probably would attempt clandestine attacks against the 
     U.S. Homeland if Baghdad feared an attack that threatened the 
     survival of the regime were imminent or unavoidable, or 
     possibly for revenge. Such attacks--more likely with 
     biological than chemical agents--probably would be carried 
     out by special forces or intelligence operatives.
       The Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) probably has been 
     directed to conduct clandestine attacks against US and Allied 
     interests in the Middle East in the event the United States 
     takes action against Iraq. The US probably would be the 
     primary means by which Iraq would attempt to conduct any CBW 
     attacks on the US Homeland, although we have no specific 
     intelligence information that Saddam's regime has directed 
     attacks against US territory.
       Saddam, if sufficiently desperate, might decide that only 
     an organization such as al-Qaida--with worldwide reach and 
     extensive terrorist infrastructure, and already engaged in a 
     life-or-death struggle against the United States--could 
     perpetrate the type of terrorist attack that be would hope to 
     conduct.
       In such circumstances, he might decide that the extreme 
     step of assisting the

[[Page 18879]]

     Islamist terrorists in conducting a CBW attack against the 
     United States would be his last chance to exact vengeance by 
     taking a large number of victims with him.

                          ____________________