[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 13]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 17216-17217]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




 H.R. 1828, SYRIA ACCOUNTABILITY AND LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY RESTORATION 
                              ACT OF 2003

                                 ______
                                 

                     HON. GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR.

                             of washington

                    in the house of representatives

                         Tuesday, July 8, 2003

  Mr. NETHERCUTT. Mr. Speaker, today I joined a growing number of my 
colleagues in cosponsoring H.R. 1828, the Syria Accountability and 
Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act.
  I sponsored this legislation because I believe that Syria presents a 
unique threat to the peace, security and stability in the Middle East. 
Syria is geographically central in the region, but it is also central 
to the peaceful evolution of the region.
  Continued Syrian sponsorship of terrorism threatens to unravel 
renewed efforts at peace in the region. President Bush's Road Map is at 
risk because of this state-sponsored terrorism and we must indicate the 
serious consequences of Syria's destabilizing activity.
  This legislation gives the President the leverage he needs to 
persuade the Syrian regime to reconsider its role in the region. The 
fall of Iraq represented only the first in a series of positive changes 
that will sweep through the Middle East in the coming years, and Syria 
has an opportunity to be on the right side of history. The possibility 
of this legislation becoming law should be understood as a clear 
warning about the position of the House of Representatives.
  At the same time, I do not believe that H.R. 1828 is a perfect bill. 
It needs to be improved before it is sent to the President for his 
signature. I am cosponsoring the bill out of a desire to move this 
legislation forward, but believe a number of changes are necessary.
  First, the legislation must specifically define the meaning of ``food 
and medicine'' in Section 5(a). Specifically, this section should be 
brought into conformity with the definitions of ``agricultural 
commodity,'' ``medicine'' and ``medical device'' included in the Trade 
Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-387). 
Enactment of this legislation three years ago signaled Congressional 
intent to prohibit unilateral sanctions on food and medicine. To ensure 
there is no confusion by implementing agencies that have historically 
demonstrated hostility to excepting categories of exports from 
unilateral sanctions, it is necessary to include very specific 
definitions.
  Second, the legislation must incorporate sunset clauses for both the 
authorization of sanctions and for any sanctions that are imposed 
through Section 5(a)2. Congress should not impose sanctions in 
perpetuity, for while we are often quick to impose sanctions; we are 
not nearly as effective at repealing dated restrictions. Sanctions, 
fundamentally, should be an aberration to how the United States 
approaches other nations. Our bilateral relationship should stress 
engagement over restrictions, but in certain exceptional cases, 
sanctions may be necessary. These sanctions

[[Page 17217]]

should be temporary in nature to encourage future Congressional 
scrutiny of the continued value of the restrictions. Should sanctions 
be perceived necessary in the future then future Congresses are likely 
to extend the prohibitions beyond the sunset period. Sunset periods 
also encourage rogue regimes to recognize that there is an opportunity 
to improve their relations with the United States. Should rogues wish 
to reengage with the United States, they need only to change their 
behavior. Regular Congressional review of sanctions ensures that this 
change in behavior will have a chance to be acknowledged. Conversely, 
permanent sanctions can backfire by signaling to the rogue state intent 
to isolate, irrespective of the nation's willingness to respond with 
reforms. The Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act outlines 
a two-year sunset for unilateral agricultural or medical sanctions. 
H.R. 1828 must incorporate a similar sunset provision.
  Third, the legislation must provide greater flexibility to the 
Executive Branch in the imposition of sanctions. Section 5(b) provides 
a waiver from the imposition of sanctions if the President determines 
that it is in ``the vital national security interest of the United 
States to do so.'' Such a waiver sets the bar too high and is 
potentially restrictive of the exercise of foreign policy by the 
Executive Branch. The Libertad Act (P.L. 104-114), for example, sets 
for a ``national interest'' waiver for Title III sanctions.
  Fourth, the legislation must place a greater priority on cooperation 
with our allies in the imposition of sanctions. Sanctions tend to be 
effective when they are imposed under a multilateral framework. 
Unilateral sanctions isolate the United States as much as they isolate 
the targeted nation. Diplomacy, as in nature, abhors a vacuum and will 
fill it. A loss of American influence will be replaced by other nations 
unless sanctions are imposed through a broad, multilateral coalition. 
The United States must persuade other countries to join us in 
sanctioning Syria if we are to have significant influence.
  I offer these reservations and recommendations out of a desire to 
improve H.R. 1828. I recognize that peace in the Middle East depends on 
change in Syria. But I also believe Congress should adhere to the 
limitations outlined above in the imposition of unilateral sanctions. 
When unilateral sanctions are imposed, they should be limited in scope 
and limited in duration and provide significant flexibility to the 
Executive Branch. H.R. 1828 can be amended to incorporate these 
recommendations, which must be made before the legislation is sent to 
the President for signature.

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