[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 13]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 17215-17216]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                          AFGHANISTAN'S FUTURE

                                 ______
                                 

                           HON. BARNEY FRANK

                            of massachusetts

                    in the house of representatives

                         Tuesday, July 8, 2003

  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, an unfortunate pattern is 
developing with the Bush Administration--militarily, in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, American forces have been extremely successful. I voted for the 
military action in Afghanistan, and against that in Iraq, but it is 
obvious that in both cases the American military performed extremely 
well and the people of the United States can be confident of the 
ability of our armed forces to do whatever is necessary to protect us 
and to advance our legitimate security interests.
  Unfortunately, this administration's record in the aftermath of these 
military victories has been much less reassuring. The situation in Iraq 
is of course a very distressing one, and is widely known. In part 
because of the attention that is understandably focused on Iraq, with 
the continuing toll on American military personnel and the chaos and 
political troubles in the country, Afghanistan has to some extent been, 
as the headline in The New York Times for July 1 says, ``Lost in the 
Shuffle.''
  I recently met in my office here with representatives of Afghans for 
a Civil Society, and I was troubled by the grave defects they described 
in American policy there. In particular, we are clearly doing much too 
little to support President Karzai--who seems to be a man genuinely 
trying to promote democracy and economic development in a difficult 
situation.
  Mr. Speaker, I supported America's military intervention into 
Afghanistan to deal with the terrorists who had unleashed mass murder 
on the United States. And I believe that overthrowing the brutal, 
bigoted Taliban regime was also a service to human rights. But having 
done that, we have an obligation to help put a coherent government in 
Afghanistan in its place, and I regret to say that I do not think this 
administration is showing sufficient will in this regard.
  Subsequent to my meeting with people from Afghans for a Civil 
Society, I read last week in The New York Times a very thoughtful and 
disturbing article by Sarah Chayes, who had been in that meeting, in 
which she points to one of the central weaknesses of America's policy 
in Afghanistan. Because redeeming our obligation to the people of 
Afghanistan is so important both in moral and geopolitical terms, I ask 
that Sarah Chayes' important article be printed here.

                [From the New York Times, July 1, 2003]

               Afghanistan's Future, Lost in the Shuffle

                           (By Sarah Chayes)

       Kandahar, Afghanistan--Ten miles outside this dust-blown 
     city, the historical capital of Afghanistan, gunmen belonging 
     to the local warlord guard the airport, which American forces 
     use as a base. The hefty fee the guards get from the United 
     States has allowed them to build a marble-faced barracks 
     nearby.
       Kandaharis, baffled, keep asking me, ``Why are the 
     Americans helping President Harold Karzai and helping his 
     enemies, the warlords, too?'' To them the problem with this

[[Page 17216]]

     practice is clear: United States policy is in danger of 
     failing because America won't stop hedging its bets. At stake 
     is not just the future of Afghanistan, but a whole region's 
     hopes of escaping a 30-year nightmare. And ultimately, what 
     happens in Afghanistan will shape relations between the 
     Muslim world and the West.
       The hedging of bets has taken many forms since the fall of 
     the Taliban a year and a half ago: a dizzying succession of 
     officers at the United States Embassy for the first six 
     months; the lack of any reconstruction projects outside Kabul 
     until after the grand council chose Mr. Karzai as 
     transitional president; and later, international donors' 
     obsession with quick-impact projects, known as quips, that 
     didn't cost much and wouldn't be much of a loss if they 
     failed.
       Afghans, meanwhile, have been waiting for major 
     reconstruction that would make a real difference. The Kabul-
     Kandahar road, on which work has only just begun, has become 
     a cause celebre. What was once a six-hour trip to the capital 
     to deliver, say, Kandahar grapes, and the exquisitely 
     fragrant raisins they dry into, is now a three-day trek--and 
     72 hours on the road means grape mash. A good road to Kabul 
     would make all the difference to Kandahar's merchants, and 
     jump start a whole region's economy.
       And what about other projects that would substantially 
     improve Afghan lives? There's the road to Urozgan, an 
     isolated town that is easy prey to Islamic extremists and is 
     at minimum a nine-hour drive from Kandahar along a ribbon of 
     iron-hard dirt. The Helmand Province irrigation system, built 
     by American engineers in the late 1950s, now lies crippled 
     after years of neglect and Soviet sabotage. Donors, however, 
     are loath to commit their money to big projects like these.
       But the most dangerous form of bet-hedging has been 
     American support for local strongmen. Eager for Afghan forces 
     to help fight the Taliban, the United States brought these 
     warlords back from exile after 9/11. What began as a 
     relationship of convenience was cemented in a brotherhood of 
     arms, as United States troops fraternized with the exotic 
     fighters they had bivouacked with. Because they had reaped 
     weapons and cash in the bargain, the warlords were able to 
     impose themselves as provincial governors, despite being 
     reviled by the Afghan people, as every conversation I've had 
     and study I've done demonstrates.
       Their positions have been reinforced by international 
     donors who, for convenience's sake, distribute much of their 
     reconstruction assistance through the warlords. The donors' 
     reasoning sounds plausible: ``So-and-so is the governor,'' 
     numerous United States officials have told me. ``The day 
     President Karzai removes him, we will support that decision. 
     But until then, we have to work with him.'' It's a bit 
     disingenuous, since this explanation ignores the way these 
     men became governors.
       It also begs the truth. In late May, President Karzai 
     summoned to Kabul the 12 governors who control Afghanistan's 
     strategic borders. For the previous fortnight, Afghan and 
     international officials say, he had been preparing to dismiss 
     the most egregious offenders: four or five governors who are 
     running their provinces like personal fiefs, who withhold 
     vast customs revenue from the central government, who truck 
     with meddlesome foreign governments, who oppress their 
     people, who turn a blind eye to extremist activities while 
     trumpeting their anti-Taliban bona fides. United States 
     officials, saying they were taken aback by the scope of the 
     Afghan government's plan, discouraged him. The plan was 
     scrapped, and the Afghan government made do with an agreement 
     in which the recalcitrant governors promised to hand over 
     customs revenue owed the central government.
       Washington, in other words, wouldn't stop hedging its bets. 
     The United States backs Mr. Karzai, but it can't relinquish 
     its alliances with the enemies of all he stands for.
       But President Karzai bears part of the blame. He, too, has 
     been hedging his bets. His endlessly polite interactions with 
     his predator governors are confusing his constituents. 
     Although Washington thought firing half a dozen governors was 
     too much, it would have supported the dismissal of one or 
     two, and Mr. Karzai wasted a golden opportunity by refusing 
     to do that.
       The problem is, no matter what they say, these warlords 
     aren't going to behave. They are not reformable, because it 
     is not in their interest to reform. The warlords' livelihood 
     depends on extremism and lawlessness. That's how they draw 
     their pay; that's what allows them to rule by the gun in an 
     unofficial martial law, looting villages under the pretext of 
     mopping-up operations, extracting taxes and bribes, crushing 
     opponents.
       The American alliance with warlords also discourages 
     ordinary Afghans from helping rebuild their country. And 
     without the people, the process is doomed. Afghans I have met 
     and worked with share a fierce desire to live in a normal 
     country. They have demonstrated that desire. In the face of 
     tremendous adversity, they have managed to open schools, 
     clean irrigation ditches, plant trees and dig sewers. But 
     seeing warlords regain power is making people waver. I have 
     found in my work that more and more Afghans are withdrawing 
     to the sidelines, subtracting their life force from the 
     battle to reconstruct Afghanistan.
       They are also increasingly wary about the elections next 
     year. At a recent meeting here with representatives from the 
     commission that's drafting a new constitution, a nursing 
     student asked, ``How can we freely elect our representatives 
     with warlords controlling the countryside?''
       Despite American officials' misgivings, it would not be so 
     difficult to remove the warlord-governors. Their lack of 
     popular support means no one would fly to their defense were 
     they dismissed. The mere display of American backing for a 
     plan to oust them would be enough to cow their paid liegemen. 
     In the interest of offering Afghanistan a chance at a future, 
     and opening the door to a new kind of relationship with the 
     Muslim world, the United States should back any future 
     decision to remove the warlord-governors.
       For despite the rocky start to reconstructing postwar 
     Afghanistan, an ember of hope for the country's future is 
     still burning. Several high caliber diplomats are now at the 
     American embassy. American military commanders, who by 
     training focus on battle plans, have begun to realize that 
     their activities can have unintended political consequences 
     if they do not have intimate knowledge of the people they are 
     dealing with. These officers have grown more alert to the 
     ways in which local warlords may be using them. In Kandahar, 
     the base commander has begun meeting with tribal elders to 
     forge links with the population. In other words, the United 
     States is finally positioned to do a good job here.
       When President Bush decided to invade Iraq, he promised 
     that Afghanistan would not be forgotten. If that promise is 
     to mean anything, America's accumulated experience in 
     Afghanistan must be acted upon, unequivocally. It's time to 
     stop hedging bets.

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