[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 12]
[Senate]
[Pages 16873-16874]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




 EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE THAT THE SENATE STRONGLY SUPPORTS 
           THE NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES

  The Senate proceeded to consider the resolution (S. Res. 90) 
expressing the sense of the Senate that the Senate strongly supports 
the nonproliferation programs of the United States, which had been 
reported from the Committee on Foreign Relations with an amendment to 
the preamble.
  (Strike the part shown in black brackets and insert the part shown in 
italic.)

                               S. Res. 90

       Whereas on March 6, 2003, the Senate gave its advice and 
     consent to the Treaty Between the United States of America 
     and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions, 
     done at Moscow on May 24, 2002 (the Moscow Treaty), which 
     treaty will result in the [draw down] withdrawal from 
     operational deployment of thousands of strategic nuclear 
     weapons by December 31, 2012;
       Whereas the lack of strict and effective control over and 
     security of all weapons of mass destruction by the 
     governments having jurisdiction over such weapons continues 
     to be of grave concern to all nations that are threatened by 
     terrorism, especially after the catastrophic terrorist 
     attacks of September 11, 2001; and
       Whereas despite some recent improvements in cooperation at 
     the highest levels of the Russian Federation, various 
     officials and agencies of the Russian Federation have been 
     counter-productive in barring access and information to the 
     United States with respect to nonproliferation programs and 
     activities, thereby needlessly hindering the progress of such 
     programs and activities: Now, therefore, be it
       Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that--
       (1) the Senate strongly supports the nonproliferation 
     programs of the Department of Defense, the Department of 
     Energy, and the Department of State, which programs are 
     intended to reduce the worldwide threat posed by nuclear, 
     chemical, and biological weapons that remain unsecured in the 
     Russian Federation and elsewhere;
       (2) the Russian Federation should continue to improve the 
     access of the United States to key facilities, and the 
     sharing of information with the United States, so as to bring 
     a successful and timely conclusion to various 
     nonproliferation programs and activities; and
       (3) the United States should redouble its efforts to 
     achieve full implementation of the nonproliferation programs 
     of the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and 
     the Department of State under effective management, and make 
     full use of all funds that Congress appropriates or otherwise 
     makes available for such programs.

  The resolution (S. Res. 90) was agreed to.
  The amendment to the preamble was agreed to.
  The preamble, as amended, was agreed to.
  The resolution, with its preamble, as amended, reads as follows:
  (The resolution will be printed in a future edition of the Record.)
  Mr. BYRD. Madam President, on March 6, 2003, the Senate gave its 
advice and consent to ratification of the Moscow Treaty on strategic 
nuclear arms reductions. The 97 to 0 vote belied significant weaknesses 
in the treaty: it contains no verification procedures, it does not 
require the destruction of any warheads or missiles, and it expires on 
the same day that it goes into effect.
  Those weaknesses should not be ignored. I joined with my colleagues 
in voting to approve a formal treaty on U.S. and Russian arms 
reductions in order to send a message that more work is needed to 
reduce, control, and secure the most dangerous weapons that mankind has 
created. The Moscow Treaty is a modest step away from the Cold War 
threat of nuclear holocaust, but more steps need to be taken.
  The resolution that I offer represents the Senate's next step in 
pushing for more action in the control of nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons. I am grateful to the chairman of the Foreign 
Relations Committee, Senator Lugar, for his support of the resolution 
as its principal cosponsor. The Byrd-Lugar resolution urges the 
administration and the Russian Federation to do more to implement 
nonproliferation programs.
  The United States has a good record in working with the countries of 
the former Soviet Union on nonproliferation programs. The Cooperative 
Threat Reduction program, conceived by former Senator Sam Nunn and of 
Senator Richard Lugar, has an astounding record of success. That 
program has destroyed more than 6,000 Soviet-era nuclear weapons and 
more than 800 ballistic missiles. The program helped to remove all 
nuclear warheads from Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakstan. It has made 
significant progress in securing nuclear materials, chemical weapons, 
and biological weapons.
  The Byrd-Lugar resolution states the sense of the Senate on three 
important issues relating to U.S. non-proliferation programs.
  First, the resolution states clearly the strong support of the Senate 
for non-proliferation programs that ``are intended to reduce the threat 
posed by nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons that remain 
unsecured in the Russian Federation and elsewhere.''
  Second, the resolution urges the Russian Federation to increase 
access to key weapons facilities and to share more information about 
its weapons programs. According to General Accounting Office testimony 
delivered to the House Armed Services Committee on March 5:

       Russia will not allow DOD [Department of Defense] and DOE 
     [Department of Energy] the level of access they require to 
     design security improvements [at weapons storage sites], 
     verify their installation, and ensure their proper operation. 
     As a result, agencies have been unable to help protect 
     substantial portions of Russia's nuclear weapons. . . In 
     addition, many Russian biological sites that store dangerous 
     biological pathogens remain off-limits. (GAO testimony, 3/5/
     03, GAO-03-526T)

  Third, the resolution urges our country to redouble efforts to 
achieve full implementation of nonproliferation programs, under 
effective management, and with full use of the funds that Congress may 
appropriate for nonproliferation activities.
  Critics have been active in pointing out that poor management of some 
nonproliferation projects has resulted in wasted money and lost time. 
Most recently, some have leveled criticism at two projects that were 
intended to eliminate Russian rocket fuel. The United States spent $200 
million to build two facilities to eliminate fuel that was left over 
from destroyed Russian missiles, only to find that the fuel was 
diverted into the Russian civil space program. As a result, these 
facilities are left with no rocket fuel to destroy.
  It is a very serious issue when such a great amount of money is 
devoted to an unsuccessful program. There is no excuse for poor 
planning and management. We should not lose sight of the importance of 
nonproliferation programs, and to ensure their success we must not 
ignore such examples of mismanagement. That is why the Byrd-

[[Page 16874]]

Lugar resolution makes a point about the need for effective management 
in our nonproliferation programs.
  But just as management improvements are needed, the Executive Branch 
has been slow to implement nonproliferation programs. There has been 
delay after delay in spending funds that Congress appropriates for 
these projects.
  According to the administration's fiscal year 2004 budget, $543 
million in DOD nonproliferation funds will remain unexpended this year. 
To put that figure in perspective, the White House has requested $439 
million for these programs in its fiscal year 2004 budget. I support 
that request, but that money--like the half a billion dollars that 
remains in our coffers--will do nothing to improve our security unless 
it is spent by the administration. Whatever funds that Congress 
appropriates to nonproliferation programs should be used in a timely 
manner that recognizes the serious nature of the threat posed by loose 
nuclear weapons in Russia.
  The Byrd-Lugar resolution underscores the important nonproliferation 
tasks ahead of us by spotlighting problems that need to be addressed by 
the United States and Russia. Just as this resolution follows up on the 
Moscow Treaty, there is much more work to do after this resolution. 
These are matters on which the Armed Services Committee, of which I am 
a member, and the Foreign Relations Committee, of which Senator Lugar 
is chairman, should continue to work together.
  One issue that is particularly deserving of increased attention is 
expansion of non-proliferation programs to countries outside of the 
former Soviet Union. The supplemental appropriations bill passed by the 
Senate on April 3, 2003, included temporary authority for the President 
to spend up to $50 million in nonproliferation funds outside of the 
former Soviet Union during this fiscal year. Unfortunately, this 
provision was not included in the final version of that bill that was 
signed into law by the President on April 16, 2003.
  The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency warned the Armed 
Services Committee on February 11 of a new nuclear arms race among 
smaller countries. Let us look beyond the borders of the former Soviet 
Union to address the heart of the growing menace of nuclear 
proliferation, and start thinking about how to leverage the success in 
Russia of the Nunn-Lugar programs into results in other countries.
  The Nunn-Lugar programs have greatly reduced the chance that a poorly 
secured Russian military facility may serve as a one-stop shop for 
terrorists seeking a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon. I count 
myself as a consistent and strong supporter of these programs.
  But there is much more work to do. The Moscow Treaty, which requires 
that thousands of nuclear warheads be removed from deployment, but not 
necessarily destroyed, renews the need for a cooperative program to 
keep these weapons out of the hands of terrorists. The Byrd-Lugar 
resolution sends a message to the White House and to the Kremlin that 
we need to fix the problems that have surfaced in the nonproliferation 
programs between our countries and accelerate our work to secure and 
destroy unneeded and unwanted weapons of mass destruction.

                          ____________________