[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 12]
[Senate]
[Pages 16078-16079]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                      CIVIL LIBERTIES IN HONG KONG

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, 8 months ago I took the floor in this 
Chamber to call attention to some disturbing trends with regard to 
democracy and civil liberties in Hong Kong. I said that Hong Kong's 
rulers, at the behest of Beijing, were set upon a path that risked 
destroying the spirit and vitality that make Hong Kong unique. I urged 
those who care about Hong Kong, and about freedom, to speak out and 
alert Hong Kong authorities to the error of their ways. Many did so.
  Today, I regret to report, Hong Kong is one step closer to becoming 
just another Chinese city. Hong Kong's Legislative Council is expected 
to vote into law next month antisubversion legislation that would 
significantly erode the barriers that insulate Hong Kong's residents 
from the antidemocratic legal concepts and practices of the People's 
Republic of China.
  As I said here last October, China's leaders pressured their hand-
picked Chief Executive in Hong Kong, Tung Chee-Hwa, to introduce this 
legislation last year. Hong Kong authorities maintained that they had 
no choice but to comply, since Article 23 of the Basic Law that became 
Hong Kong's constitution after the territory reverted from British to 
Chinese control in 1997 required Hong Kong to adopt laws to protect 
national security. Many Hong Kong legal experts disagreed. But be that 
as it may, the same Basic Law says the territory will move toward 
electing its legislature and executive by universal suffrage. At 
present, only one-third of the legislators were chosen by direct 
popular vote, and only 800 of Hong Kong's 7 million residents were 
allowed to cast ballots in Tung Chee-Hwa's reelection as Chief 
Executive last year. The Government has yet to announce any plans to 
expand suffrage.
  The sequence of these steps is important. Pushing through legislation 
curtailing civil liberties to comply with Article 23 before 
establishing a democratic legislature per Article 68 violates the most 
fundamental tenet of popular rule--that governmental authority is 
derived from the consent of the governed. The Hong Kong authorities 
invited public comments on the legislation, both in its initial outline 
form and later detailed drafts. But despite serious objections from 
journalists, lawyers, chambers of commerce, human rights activists, 
religious groups, and other interested parties, the bill on which the 
Legislative Council is expected to vote next month reflects only minor 
revisions from the Government's original draft. Without a legislature 
accountable to the citizenry, the people were free to speak their 
views, but the Government was free to ignore them.
  As a result, most of the concerns I raised about the legislative 
proposal last October remain unaddressed:
  Definitions of offenses such as ``subversion,'' ``sedition'' and 
``secession'' are extremely vague, permitting security officials to 
prosecute people arbitrarily, as they do on the Mainland.
  Merely ``handling'' publications the authorities consider to be 
``seditious'' would be a criminal offense, as would ``intimidating'' 
the Government in Beijing or acting to ``disestablish'' the ``basic 
system'' of China--meaning the political monopoly of the Communist 
Party--or endangering China's ``stability.''
  ``Inciting'' subversion, even if only through speech, would be 
criminalized. In China, workers have been given long prison sentences 
for ``inciting subversion'' for simply demanding to be paid. Others 
have received 10-year terms for criticizing the Government on the 
Internet.
  Hong Kong affiliates of organizations that Beijing decides threaten 
national security may be banned. This provision is likely to be used to 
ban Falun Gong, and conceivably it could be applied to the Roman 
Catholic Church if it does not renounce its ties to Rome. Hong Kong 
groups that monitor human rights and labor conditions in China

[[Page 16079]]

have also been labeled ``hostile foreign elements'' by Mainland 
authorities and thus could be targeted.
  Police will be permitted to enter and search private residences and 
seize property without a warrant.
  Journalists and others could be prosecuted for the unauthorized 
disclosure of official secrets or information related to Hong Kong 
affairs that are the responsibility of the Central Government. Recall 
that for 5 months, Mainland authorities treated information about SARS 
as an official secret, and the world learned about the epidemic only 
after it spread to Hong Kong. Disclosing that information was clearly 
in the public's interest. But this bill does not allow a public 
interest defense, nor is there any counterbalancing right-to-know or 
freedom-of-information legislation. If this bill becomes law, how long 
will it take us to find out about China's next epidemic?
  These proposed revisions to Hong Kong's laws, demanded by Beijing, 
run counter to China's commitment in the 1984 Sino-British Declaration 
to preserve Hong Kong's civil liberties for at least 50 years following 
the handover. They would significantly undermine such internationally 
recognized basic human rights as freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, and freedom of conscience, and potentially threaten 
freedom of religion and the right to due process as well.
  Hong Kong's democratic politicians, activists, attorneys, 
journalists, and other professionals are understandably alarmed about 
this legislation. To hear some of them tell it, passage of this bill 
will mean the end of Hong Kong as we know it. In reality, I suspect 
most Hong Kong residents would wake up on July 10 to find life in their 
city essentially unchanged. The effects of this legislation will appear 
only gradually and incrementally. The first to feel the impact will 
probably be groups on the margins of Hong Kong society, such as Falun 
Gong practitioners. Perhaps most Hong Kongers will say nothing, because 
they are not Falun Gong practitioners. But over time, they will come to 
find themselves living in a poorer place, and the world will be poorer 
as a result.
  If this legislation passes in its present form, it promises to make 
Hong Kong poorer in more ways than one. Last December, the American 
Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong wrote the Government to express its 
concern about the bill's potential impact on the free flow of 
information, which it said was essential for the operation of Hong 
Kong's markets and for maintaining its competitiveness as a business 
location. The letter came a few weeks after a senior analyst at Bank of 
China International resigned after China's Premier criticized one of 
his reports. The British Chamber of Commerce warned Hong Kong could 
become ``a much less favorable location for international business'' if 
investors could not obtain free and unfettered information. Some 
analysts have suggested that investment on the Chinese Mainland could 
suffer as well, since foreign firms operating in China often rely on 
their Hong Kong offices for uncensored information about the Mainland.
  Through the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, Congress made 
support for human rights and democratization in Hong Kong a fundamental 
principle of United States foreign policy. As a concrete expression of 
support for Hong Kong's continued autonomy, the act stipulated that 
Hong Kong would continue to receive the same treatment under most 
United States laws after the handover as it had before. However, it 
allowed the President to suspend that provision on a case by case 
basis, whenever he determined that Hong Kong was no longer sufficiently 
autonomous to justify being treated differently from the rest of China 
under a particular law. This is not a decision the President should 
take lightly. However, if the proposed legislation compromises the 
independence of Hong Kong's judicial system or the integrity of its 
financial markets, as some analysts fear, the President would have no 
choice but to review specific United States statutes to evaluate 
whether separate treatment for Hong Kong can still be justified.
  I hope we never get to that point. I hope that Hong Kong's freedom 
and its creativity can be preserved and that its people will be given 
more say in how they are governed, not less. For that reason, I urge 
those in the Hong Kong Government and Legislative Council who care 
about Hong Kong's future--and I am sure most of them do--to turn back 
from the course they are on before it is too late.

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