[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 10]
[Senate]
[Pages 14072-14073]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                            MORNING BUSINESS

  Mr. McCONNELL. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that there be 
a period of morning business with Senators speaking for up to 10 
minutes each.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, where is Aung San Suu Kyi? Burma's 
political crisis grows, and much of the world is outraged. Burma's 
democratically elected leader, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize and 
world-renowned icon of freedom, remains imprisoned. Burma's ruling 
generals so far have prevented both the U.N. special envoy, who has 
been in Rangoon for 3 days, and the International Committee for the Red 
Cross, to visit her. The generals seem unmoved by the world's 
condemnation, and their peoples' suffering. It is time for all 
respectable members of the international community to put weight behind 
their words and take active measures to secure the freedom of Aung San 
Suu Kyi and the Burmese people.
  Most of the world sees the Burma crisis in staggeringly different 
terms than do its military rulers. Despite the regime's denials, the 
May 30 assault on Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters was a well-
organized, premeditated attack by members of the Union Solidarity 
Development Association, a militia of the ruling, and misnamed, State 
Peace and Development Council. Given Aung San Suu Kyi's stature within 
Burma and around the globe, we know Burma's top generals, led by 
General Than Shwe, would have had to personally approve a physical 
attack on her and her delegation. We know that Than Shwe would never 
let his conscience interfere with any calculation of what is in the 
best interests of the junta's continued ability to repress the 
democratic aspirations of its people.
  Aung San Suu Kyi's associates, including several who witnessed the 
May 30 attacks, say that at least 70 and perhaps 100 members of her 
National for Democracy were slaughtered by the regime's militia in the 
most violent crackdown since the junta crushed the August 1988 popular 
uprising against the regime--and we know the junta's claim that only 
four people died on May 30 in what they call a spontaneous clash with 
the opposition is false. We

[[Page 14073]]

know that Suu Kyi is not in ``protective custody,'' as the junta 
insists, but that she is being held because her national popularity and 
clear democratic mandate ultimately make rule by generals impossible to 
sustain. We know the generals are holding her incommunicado because, if 
she were free to speak, she would speak the truth about their 
brutality, and about the ruin they have brought to their country. 
What's so dangerous about these obvious sentiments is that the generals 
themselves know they are true, and that it is they who are to blame for 
this devastation, exposed as they are before their people and the 
world.
  The irony is that by crushing the democratic opposition, the generals 
have once again demonstrated to their people and the world the 
fragility of their rule, which no amount of repression will legitimize. 
That one woman, unarmed and leading only an army of citizens who 
believe in her, can so rattle a group of uniformed officers who control 
every instrument of national power is testimony to what Vaclav Havel 
called the power of the powerlessness. As Havel and many other brave 
dissidents behind the Iron Curtain knew, no amount of repression can 
provide a regime the democratic legitimacy that is the only basis for 
regime survival. No leader or leaders can systematically repress their 
people and loot their country and get away with it forever. The Burmese 
military has been doing it for 40 years, and their time is running out.
  Another sad truth the current crisis has exposed is how little the 
leaders of Burma's neighbors, including the democracies, seem to care 
for the most basic rights of the Burmese people. The Prime Minister of 
Thailand arrives in Washington today: I hope he is prepared for a 
barrage of questioning--and criticism--of Thailand's warm embrace of 
the dictatorship next door since he assumed office in 2001. Under Prime 
Minister Thaksin, Thailand has moved aggressively to deepen Thai 
business ties with Burma, provide substantial economic assistance to 
the junta, collaborate with the Burmese military against Burmese ethnic 
groups who oppose rule by the generals, arrest and repatriate exiled 
Burmese democrats across the Thai-Burma border, and pursue a policy of 
cooperation and conciliation with a regime that is opposed by the vast 
majority of its people and known to much of the world as an outlaw.
  Bangkok's coddling of Rangoon has gone well beyond passive acceptance 
of the regime next door to something approaching active sponsorship of 
the junta. Thailand has made no effort to reach out to the Burmese 
opposition, which is especially unfortunate since some of its most 
fearless leaders reside in the Thai-Burma border region. Under Prime 
Minister Thaksin, Thailand has supported and sustained its historic 
enemy, at the very time when it could use its influence to help bring 
about the negotiated transition to democracy in Burma.
  India's government also appears to have made a strategic decision to 
``constructively engage'' Rangoon out of fear of growing Chinese 
influence in Burma. India has legitimate concerns about China's 
interest in using Burma as an outlet for Chinese commerce and military 
forces in the Andaman Sea. But given China's pervasive influence in 
Burma, India cannot hope to compete with Beijing for the junta's 
affection. A more effective strategy would be to support the Burmese 
opposition's campaign for a free Burma. I don't know what policies a 
Burma led by Aung San Suu Kyi would pursue towards China, but I'm quite 
confident she wouldn't choose to pursue a strategic partnership with an 
Asian dictatorship. Democratic India would be a natural ally of a free 
Burma, and I believe Delhi would be wise to help move Burma in that 
direction, rather than curry favor with the generals.
  China's unreconstructed policy towards Burma following the attack of 
May 30 was best expressed by China's ambassador to Rangoon, who told 
U.N. envoy Razali Ismail that China considers the crisis to be Burma's 
``internal political affair.'' Interestingly, China has been helpful in 
dealing with the North Korean nuclear crisis, I hope because Beijing 
understands the costs of tying itself too closely to a regime that is 
actively alienating the rest of the world. Perhaps it is wishful 
thinking to hope that China's rulers will reach a similar conclusion 
about their support for the Burmese junta: that in their increasing 
repression and devastation of their country, the generals are fighting 
a battle they can't win, and that undermines the stability and 
prosperity China seeks in Southeast Asia. Perhaps Beijing would take a 
more resolution line with the generals if Southeast Asia were united in 
condemnation of their assault on the Burmese people.
  The Association of Southeast Asian Nations will hold its annual 
ministerial summit and security meetings next week in Phnom Penh. 
Secretary of State Powell is scheduled to attend the meetings of the 
ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences from 
June 18-20. I urge Secretary Powell to reconsider his plans to travel 
to Southeast Asis unless the ASEAN nations, excluding Burma, agree to 
address the crisis in Burma as their central agenda item; agree to 
forcefully condemn the crackdown on democracy in Burma; agree to 
require the release of Burma's detained democracy leaders in order for 
Burma to participate in the ASEAN ministerial meetings; and agree to 
issue a concrete action plan to move Burma towards a negotiated 
settlement with Aung San Suu Kyi that grants her a leading and 
irreversible political role culminating in free and fair national 
elections.
  I understand the importance of Secretary Powell's visit to Southeast 
Asia. I agree that the region is too important for the United States to 
neglect. But as long as Burma's neighbors neglect the political crisis 
in their backyard, it is hard to imagine what coherent role ASEAN can 
play in the region and the world. All Southeast Asian leaders have a 
vested interest in building ASEAN into a strong regional bloc that can 
help expand prosperity and improve security in Southeast Asia. As long 
as Burma, an ASEAN member since 1997, is held captive by the generals, 
destabilizing the region and attracting precisely the kind of 
international sanction Southeast Asian leaders would like to avoid--and 
as long as those leaders do little or nothing about it--Southeast Asia 
will remain little more than the sum of its parts, and ASEAN will have 
little enduring relevance. Secretary Powell should condition his visit 
to Phnom Penh on an ASEAN agenda that addresses the rot at the heart of 
the organization--the decaying dictatorship in Rangoon--and that helps 
move ASEAN towards a more constructive role in Southeast Asia than that 
of ``constructively engaging'', and abetting, tyranny in Burma.
  The United States has moved to restrict visas for officials of 
Burma's Union Solidarity Development Association and freeze Burmese 
leaders' assets. Tomorrow, the Senate will take up a measure banning 
imports from Burma. Europe is moving to tighten existing sanctions 
against the junta. These efforts to bring to bear pressure for 
democratization will have additional force if Burma's neighbors end 
business as usual and take concrete steps to help liberate the Burmese 
people.
  It is hard to believe that Americans and Europeans care more about 
the rights of the Burmese people than do people in Bangkok, Beijing, 
Delhi, Manila, Jakarta, and other Asian capitals. These nations will 
always have Burma as a neighbor. Burma will not always be ruled by the 
generals. When they are gone, free Burma's leaders will speak the truth 
about ASEAN and its support for Asian autocrats, unless that 
organization and its member states make a strategic decision to stand 
with the Burmese people in their struggle for freedom today.

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