[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 1]
[Senate]
[Pages 402-407]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                              NORTH KOREA

  Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, we have heard some weighty 
subjects discussed here today. The Senator from New Hampshire was 
discussing the issue of education. Prior to that, Senators from Utah 
and New Jersey were talking about tax policy, trying to get our sickly 
economy revved up and moving again. If those were not enough of weighty 
subjects to talk about, I want to bring up one of grave concern to the 
foreign policy of this United States, indeed to the very defense of 
these United States: That is the subject of North Korea.
  I rise today to speak on this subject as a member of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee. This question of development of nuclear 
weapons by North Korea is something we should address. That is the 
occasion to which I rise today.
  Over half a century we have seen North Korea struggle along in its 
totalitarian, repressive regime. If there is any question about that, 
look at the fruits of that repressive labor--the starvation there among 
the people while the leaders, indeed, lead very comfortable and cushy 
lives. Nobody questions the starvation among the people in North Korea. 
The free world has been trying to do something about it.
  To those in this Chamber who have had the privilege, as I have, of 
going to the DMZ, to the line, to see the stark differences on either 
side of the line, it is very apparent. One, is a side that is lush in 
vegetation, highly developed. Then, just looking across the line, you 
see quite a contrast with the sparse vegetation on the north side of 
the line.
  But I saw North Korea also from a different perspective, from the 
window of a spacecraft on the night side of the Earth. There is quite a 
contrast for the lights reflecting from Earth back up into space--there 
is a distinct difference between North and South Korea from space at 
night. The South Korean peninsula is lit up, vibrant in its economic 
activity, whereas north of the line there are very few lights 
discernible from the view of the window of the spacecraft.
  In North Korea, we have had a regime that has isolated its own 
country. Now this situation is urgent, vis-a-vis the foreign policy of 
the United States. It requires sustained attention from our 
administration even as we deal with a separate and growing crisis in 
Iraq. Unfortunately, the Bush administration is approaching the events 
on the Korean peninsula in an inconsistent and incoherent way, in the 
opinion of this Senator, even as it continues to build up our forces in 
the Persian Gulf region.
  This is dangerous. We cannot, in my opinion, and we must not, allow 
the North Koreans to develop an effective nuclear weapons arsenal. Yet 
it is a very difficult situation. Go back to 1994. The Clinton 
administration faced a similar crisis in 1994, which it averted by 
striking an agreement with North Korea. This Agreed Framework provided 
the United States would provide North Korea with economic assistance 
and more open diplomatic communication in exchange for a cessation of 
operations and infrastructure development of reactors and facilities 
used to build its nuclear weapons program. This agreement, while 
flawed, allowed the United Nations to come in and monitor the disposal 
of the plutonium rods to ensure they would not be used to develop 
weapons. Indeed, it helped prevent North Korea from having dozens of 
nuclear weapons by now.
  One year ago, President Bush, in his State of the Union speech, 
referred to North Korea as a member of the axis of evil for its 
repressive and brutal actions against their own population. In that 
respect the President was correct.
  But we see now what the consequences of that speech are. Instead of 
speaking softly and carrying a big stick, President Bush decided to 
speak harshly without a coherent policy to back it up. Though this 
pronouncement did not cause the North Koreans to begin their bad 
behavior and cheat on their agreements--it certainly didn't cause them 
to start that bad behavior or cheat on their agreements with the United 
States and the international community which, by the way, the North 
Koreans have now admitted--it did embolden them to harden their 
position, to renounce the 1994 agreement and to begin in earnest to 
openly pursue more nuclear weapons.
  This is now the situation in which the Bush administration, by its 
own words, has painted our Nation into a very difficult corner.
  U.S. policy regarding North Korea has been inconsistent. The 
President has demanded North Korea give up its nuclear weapons 
programs, which is a good starting point. He said he wants to solve 
this peacefully, through diplomatic means, but until this week--indeed, 
until day before yesterday--the President refused even to speak 
directly to the North Koreans. The administration has said it wanted to 
isolate North Korea, possibly with sanctions.
  Look around the world. That option is opposed vehemently by the 
governments, friendly to us, of South Korea and Japan. Even China has 
stated its position, that it supports a non-nuclear Korean peninsula. 
Yet the administration has scarcely engaged the Chinese in a meaningful 
way. We ought to be encouraging them to join us to stop the development 
of North Korean nuclear weapons.
  Russia also needs to be included in these discussions. The lack of a 
clear strategy increases the risk of a volatile and destabilized 
atmosphere in the face of a North Korean nuclear threat. This danger is 
underscored by today's news that North Korea has announced its 
immediate withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. U.S.

[[Page 403]]

leadership is needed for the world's declared nuclear powers to work 
together, perhaps through the United Nations, in a common response to 
this immediate danger.
  If we fail to do so, the nightmare scenario of North Korea selling 
its nuclear weapons to terrorist groups and other rogue states and 
other provocations could become a reality.
  I welcome the President's belated decision to engage the North 
Koreans directly. I hope it has not come too late. I also hope that 
these talks will be conducted at the highest possible levels. We must 
make North Korea understand that the building of an arsenal of nuclear 
weapons will not be tolerated, and that all options to combat this 
threat are on the table.
  At the same time, we must work to form a viable, regional solution 
with South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia. No policy that we pursue 
can possibly work unless it is carried out in consultation with these 
key countries. We must devise workable policy options that the United 
States and North Korea may consider to de-escalate the situation 
immediately. These talks must be substantive and be conducted in good 
faith, which has been a consistent problem over the years with North 
Korea--but now the world is watching--immediately, now.
  Finally, I hope that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will hold 
hearings on North Korea as soon as possible. Hearings should explore 
the administration's detailed plans and policy prescriptions for this 
crisis and its implications. I know Senators Lugar and Biden care a 
great deal about this. I thank them for their leadership.
  I call upon President Bush to stop sending mixed signals on this 
urgent matter. Consistency in policy and leadership is demanded in 
these very hazardous and uncertain times. Then one day, maybe from the 
window of a future spacecraft--with a North Korea that has become a 
part of the world community of nations, a North Korea that reaches out 
in friendship to her neighbors--then maybe one day from the window of a 
future spacecraft on the night side of the Earth, we can look down and 
see a North Korea joining a South Korea lit up like a glittering jewel 
showing economic and political progress and freedom in that part of the 
world.
  Thank you for the opportunity to address this most important matter.
  I yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The senior assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as long as I 
may speak beyond 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Arizona is recognized.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I want to talk today about a subject that is 
very much on our minds--the subject of North Korea and the threat North 
Korea poses to the entire world because of its development of weapons 
of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, and the fact it is the 
world's largest proliferator of those kinds of weapons.
  Next week, Senator McCain and I will be introducing a bill called the 
North Korea Democracy Act of 2003. The purpose of this legislation is 
to establish American policy, from a congressional standpoint, that 
will help us to move North Korea toward a more democratic regime and 
forego the development of these weapons of mass destruction and the 
proliferation of them as well as missiles throughout the world. As we 
are all very much aware, today, right now, North Korea is ruled by a 
leader and leaders who have cheated on agreements in the past not to 
produce these weapons, and has really brought the world to the brink of 
military conflict, and has removed itself from numerous agreements it 
had earlier entered into, which have constrained its activities to 
date.
  As a result, the United States is presented with a challenge of what 
to do in North Korea that has a very short timeline on it, a challenge 
in which, as one pundit put it, ``the clock is ticking.'' Just as an 
aside, we know we have to deal with countries such as Iraq as well. 
Iraq is one of the fronts of the war on terror, and we are all aware of 
the fact the President has been preparing for the potential for 
military action should Saddam Hussein not comply with the U.N. 
resolutions that require him to come clean on his weapons of mass 
destruction program and to dismantle those weapons.
  The President has made it clear that while he is proceeding for those 
preparations with regard to Iraq, that he also understands the 
importance of dealing with the problem of North Korea, because North 
Korea has nuclear weapons already, we believe, and because of its 
recent actions, it could create more nuclear weapons quite quickly and, 
from our past understanding of North Korea's policies, could begin to 
sell those weapons to other countries.
  To not put too fine a point on it, think about the prospects of 
dealing with a Libya or an Algeria or a Syria or a Sudan or a country 
such as these that bought a nuclear weapon from North Korea. It is a 
very troubling prospect, indeed. Yet in a matter of months--not years, 
not some time way down the line, but literally in a matter of a few 
months under the current program in which it is engaged--North Korea 
could develop nuclear weapons and sell them to countries such as those 
I have mentioned. Of course, it could also sell a weapon to a terrorist 
organization, other than a state that sponsors terror.
  This is, indeed, a troubling prospect, and that is why I say the 
clock is ticking. That is why it is important for the United States to 
have a very firm policy, a very clear policy for dealing with this and 
for the Congress to be engaged in the development of that policy; 
hence, the reason for the introduction of this legislation.
  I will set the stage with what this threat is, what the U.S. policy 
has been, what our current strategy is with respect to dealing with 
North Korea, and then I will describe in a little more detail the bill 
about which I am talking.
  The President has said that the centerpiece of our policy with 
respect to North Korea is that it must promptly and verifiably 
dismantle its nuclear enrichment program. Of what exactly is the 
President speaking?
  In the past, North Korea created a plutonium enrichment facility that 
produced only 5 megawatts of electricity, so it was clearly not 
something to produce power for the country of North Korea--in fact, it 
requires coal to operate--but was for producing fissionable material to 
put into nuclear weapons.
  In 1994, North Korea agreed that it would no longer produce 
fissionable material from that facility and that it would not produce 
any other fissionable material. That plant was put into a standby mode, 
in effect, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, was 
permitted to install devices that would monitor the compliance of that 
commitment, as well as people who were onsite to verify compliance.
  In the interim, North Korea began to develop a uranium enrichment 
project in deep underground facilities in North Korea. North Korea 
began this program and only recently 'fessed up to the fact that it had 
been engaging in this program for a long time.
  It, too, is in violation of agreements that North Korea had entered 
into, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or the NPT. North 
Korea today, I believe, announced it was, in fact, withdrawing from the 
NPT. It had been threatening to do so for some time. At the time it 
developed this fissionable material, North Korea was a signatory to the 
NPT.
  Throughout the last several years--and we do not know precisely how 
long--North Korea had been developing a clandestine nuclear fissionable 
program with which to build nuclear weapons. We believe that as a 
result of the previous program, as well as perhaps what might have been 
developed

[[Page 404]]

in the uranium program, North Korea does, in fact, possess nuclear 
capability at this time. The exact number of weapons we believe they 
have is a classified number.
  That is what the President was talking about when he said that North 
Korea must promptly and verifiably dismantle its nuclear enrichment 
program--both the plutonium enrichment program, which it has now 
restarted, as well as the uranium fissile material program that it has 
recently admitted to possessing.
  I mentioned the NPT, but North Korea has also agreed in other fora to 
not produce these kinds of weapons. Another agreement that it entered 
into was the North-South Declaration on the Denuclearization of the 
Korean Peninsula.
  It also in 1994, as part of what is referred to as the agreed 
framework with the United States, forsworn the development of any of 
these nuclear weapons. There are actually four specific different 
agreements that North Korea is currently in violation of as a result of 
these two nuclear programs with which it is engaged.
  When we confronted the Koreans last September with the fact that we 
were aware of the development of its uranium enrichment program, at 
that point North Korean leaders threatened to pull out of the NPT and, 
as a result of that, the United States and the other nations that had 
been involved in the agreed framework on the Korean peninsula agreement 
decided the violation of these accords could not be rewarded with 
continued sale or providing of heavy fuel oil or other products to 
North Korea, as a result of which the last shipment, I believe, went to 
North Korea in September or October.
  That was part of the quid pro quo for North Korea forswearing these 
nuclear programs. We said: We will build nuclear facilities for you; we 
will provide you with fuel for your current facilities, including this 
heavy fuel oil; if you will continue to forswear those nuclear weapons, 
we will continue to supply that material and that fuel to you.
  Once they threatened to pull out of the NPT and agreed they were in 
violation, we stopped those fuel oil shipments. That is what brought 
the current controversy to a literal boiling point when the Korean 
leaders said they would pull out of the NPT ostensibly because we cut 
off the fuel shipments, and, of course, it was the other way around.
  The question is what to do at this point with the North Korean 
leaders having not only threatened now to pull out of the NPT, but 
actually giving notice that they pulled out, and their admission they 
have been in violation of these other agreements.
  There have basically been three schools of thought. One school of 
thought is we should actually engage in a military attack on the 
plutonium facility which has been restarted by North Korea. Some people 
who worked in the Clinton administration, and perhaps President 
Clinton--I am not sure--actually said that was part of President 
Clinton's threat against North Korea: That if they ever started that 
facility again, we would bomb the facility. I do not know if that was 
conveyed to the North Koreans. I do not know whether we ever would have 
done so.
  The problem with military activity is that North Korea is a country 
that today possesses a very large number of rockets and artillery 
pieces, as well as missiles, all of which could very quickly, within a 
matter of minutes, literally kill millions of people in the area of 
Seoul, Korea, only 30-some miles away from the DMZ.
  It is a good example, by the way, of why, if we are going to have to 
deal with Saddam Hussein, it is better to do it today when he does not 
pose that kind of threat to us than tomorrow when he might, just as 
North Korea does today.
  So, the military option, while probably not one that should be taken 
off the table, is one that is fraught with peril and difficulties. 
North Korea could very probably cause great destruction not only on 
South Korea, killing South Koreans and American servicemen, about 
37,000 of which are stationed in South Korea, but also, if they desire 
to do so, could strike Japan and possibly even Hawaii. Its missiles are 
that well developed.
  Because of that, the potential for military action, while it probably 
should never be taken off the table because we do not know just how 
serious North Korea will be with its aggression, is not one most 
experts believe should be threatened as a means of making North Korea 
comply.
  At the other end of the spectrum are those who say we should talk 
with North Korea. There are two problems. One, it has been tried and 
found to have failed. North Korea is willing to talk, but it is not 
willing to make concessions or, if it does make concessions, it is not 
willing to keep them. So talk alone is clearly, at least in my view, 
not a solution to this problem. Originally, North Koreans said if you 
will talk to us, then we can get a dialog going that will actually 
result in our compliance with these agreements. But as soon as the 
Secretary of State hinted maybe the United States would talk, all of a 
sudden there are new conditions. As a matter of fact, it is reported in 
the news media that the North Korean leaders said they were going to 
pull out of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty today--unless we would 
resume fuel oil shipments to them.
  This is the point. That is the way the North Koreans talk. They are 
always bargaining. They will talk to you today if you will give them 
something today; otherwise, no dice. And the problem is you give it to 
them and then even if they have made a commitment, we find they will 
break it. So the North Koreans are not exactly the kind of partners you 
can rely upon and negotiate. For the same reason, we are not 
negotiating with Saddam Hussein or the al-Qaida. We do not believe it 
is in our best interest to negotiate with the North Koreans. So talk 
alone will not solve the problem.
  Somewhere in between military action and talk there has to be a 
solution to this problem. As I pointed out, the clock is ticking. We do 
not have a long time to wait. So even though the legislation I will be 
describing in a moment contains components that would gradually 
pressure North Korea to become more democratic, to become more 
peaceful, to eschew its weapons of mass destruction and stop its 
nuclear program, the question is whether even this kind of approach can 
take hold quickly enough to force North Korea to stop before it 
develops the nuclear weapons and gets them in somebody else's hands. 
That is the real question.
  So, even this middle ground, this third wave, as I call it, has the 
potential of not working if North Korea believes it can gain enough 
time to build these nuclear weapons and sell them to somebody else or 
build them and threaten to do that as a way of extracting concessions 
from us. That is the problem. I don't want to get too specific about 
the timing. I will say that in a matter of months, much less than a 
year, North Korea could develop a number of nuclear weapons. That is 
the kind of timeframe we are talking about.
  Mr. DORGAN. Will the Senator yield for a unanimous consent request.
  Mr. KYL. I am happy to yield.
  Mr. DORGAN. I apologize for interrupting. I ask unanimous consent 
that I be recognized following the presentation by the Senator from 
Arizona.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KYL. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a very 
well thought-through op-ed piece called ``Don't Rule Out Force,'' 
penned by Dennis Ross, which appeared in today's Washington Post 
newspaper.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Washington Post, Jan. 10, 2003]

                          Don't Rule Out Force

                            (By Dennis Ross)

       Why is the Bush administration suggesting there is no 
     crisis in Korea? Is it because it doesn't want to be diverted 
     from taking on Saddam Hussein and, in effect prefers dealing 
     with each threat sequentially? Perhaps. But I suspect it has 
     less to do with Hussein than with what is clearly a weak set 
     of options.

[[Page 405]]

       True, it would not be easy to fight both North Korea and 
     Iraq at the same time. But even more to the point, North 
     Korea has formidable conventional military capabilities. If 
     the United States decided to bomb the nuclear processing 
     center in the Yongbyon complex, one could not rule out the 
     possibility that the North Koreans would react with a massive 
     attack against the South. They certainly want us to think 
     they would, and it would be irresponsible not to take this 
     threat seriously.
       Does that argue for the administration's approach of 
     isolation and containment of North Korea? It might, if the 
     North Koreans were two or three years away from being able to 
     produce a half-dozen nuclear devices. But it's more likely 
     that they are only six months away, and that is not 
     sufficient time for the effects of isolation and containment 
     to work on Kim Jong Il. The price to North Korea in six 
     months will not be appreciably different from what it is 
     today. In six months North Korea will be in a position to 
     sell a nuclear device, and its record to date demonstrates 
     unmistakably that it will sell anything to anybody any time.
       To put it simply, the clock is ticking. And paradoxically, 
     by publicly taking the military option off the table, the 
     United States is sending Kim Jong Il the message that he has 
     time. From his standpoint, that will permit him to become a 
     nuclear power, making him, in his eyes, a factor 
     internationally and requiring us to deal with him on his 
     terms.
       He may, of course, be miscalculating. But even the Bush 
     administration's preferred strategy of isolation and 
     containment has no real support from those who would be 
     essential to making it work over time. Neither the South 
     Koreans nor the Chinese nor even the Russians seem to accept 
     it. Each country favors a policy of engagement. While South 
     Korea's desire to mediate the crisis is understandable, North 
     Korea will continue to use the South's fears to erode its 
     positions and to try to drive a wedge between Washington and 
     Seoul.
       If we want diplomacy to stand a chance, we cannot divorce 
     it completely from possible military responses, and we must 
     look to those who actually do possess leverage given current 
     realities. Our readiness to use military force--alone if 
     necessary--has been essential to the administration's ability 
     to isolate Iraq and build a consensus on disarming it. By 
     taking the military option off the table in Korea, we not 
     only signal the North Koreans that they have time, but also 
     reduce the sense of urgency that might alter Chinese and 
     Russian behavior. And it is the Chinese and Russians who have 
     the greatest leverage on Kim Jong Il.
       The Chinese provide half of North Korea's food and fuel 
     assistance. Russia's leverage stems less from what it 
     provides now, though its economic ties are important to North 
     Korea, than from the relationship President Vladimir Putin 
     has with Kim Jong Il. He has feted him in Moscow and seems to 
     take him seriously. The North Korean leader clearly values 
     his connection to Putin.
       While neither the Chinese nor the Russians are pleased with 
     North Korean behavior, their public reactions have been 
     tepid. (Moscow ``regrets'' the North Korean threat to 
     withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.)
       Both the Russians and the Chinese would undoubtedly oppose 
     a U.S. military response. But if we want to mobilize more 
     vigorous action from them, those two countries have to become 
     seized with the seriousness of the moment. They have to 
     believe that the resumption of reprocessing is not acceptable 
     to us and could trigger a military reaction.
       The purpose is not to make the military option inevitable 
     but to build the pressure to produce a diplomatic 
     alternative.
       At the minimum, the administration must introduce greater 
     ambiguity into its posture. For example, it could make clear 
     that no option is being excluded, including military ones. 
     Similarly, without calling attention to it, we could also 
     build our naval presence in the area, something that would 
     please neither the Chinese nor the Russians. Should we feel 
     the need for more dramatic and extreme measures, the 
     administration could say that a continuing North Korean 
     capability to produce nuclear weapons is so threatening that 
     we would reserve the right to act militarily and would even 
     contemplate extending our nuclear umbrella to South Korea.
       The goal would be to promote a greater sense of urgency, 
     without making an empty bluff or triggering worse North 
     Korean behavior. Making clear we have been left with no 
     choice but to consider the military option need not be done 
     in public, but it does need to be done if we are to persuade 
     the Russians and the Chinese to help us alter North Korean 
     behavior.
       Neither the Russians nor the Chinese want a war on the 
     Korean peninsula; nor do they want the U.S. presence to be 
     expanded or the U.S. nuclear umbrella to be extended, making 
     us even more of the arbiter of Asian affairs. We have to play 
     on these fears, while making it clear that it is in the hands 
     of Russia and China to head off the very possibilities that 
     are so troubling to them.
       The Russians, in particular, could organize a diplomatic 
     initiative that could finesse the administration's 
     unwillingness to ``negotiate'' with North Korea, while 
     creating the indirect engagement that will be necessary. In 
     this connection, Moscow could host a meeting of all the 
     interested parties: the United States, China, South Korea, 
     Japan and perhaps the European Union and the United Nations.
       Ground rules for settling this crisis could be established, 
     with the clear understanding that North Korea's wishes will 
     not be addressed until Pyongyang is ready to stop its nuclear 
     program, subject all parts of its nuclear efforts to 
     intensive and continuing inspection and turn over all 
     existing spent fuel.
       No doubt if the Russians were to present such demands to 
     North Korea, the North Koreans would seek to negotiate on 
     these conditions and what they might receive in return. 
     Provided the Russians knew clearly what our red lines were--
     and convinced of our readiness to act military if necessary--
     diplomacy might yet succeed.

  Mr. KYL. The reason I do this at this point, Mr. President, Dennis 
Ross makes the point, and I think eloquently, that the administration 
should not rule out force; that it ought to make it clear not only to 
North Korea but to North Korea's neighbors, Russia and China, that, of 
course, force is always an option; that there have to be some 
consequences to an absolute refusal of North Korea to agree to abide by 
the norms all the rest of us abide by, and to abide by the agreements 
it has entered into.
  I hasten to point out neither Dennis Ross nor I are advocating the 
use of force. He points out, and I reiterate the point, one would hope 
it would never come to that because the use of force against North 
Korea is fraught with the perils I discussed before.
  But Ross makes the point, and I think it is a valid one, that without 
consequences to failing to agree to be reasonable, it is unlikely North 
Korea will be reasonable. And more importantly, without that kind of a 
potential development, it may well be our allies in the region--the 
Russians and Chinese--who may also not be willing to put the kind of 
pressure they can and should against North Korea to cause North Korea 
to back down.
  So that is the reason why this kind of action by the United States 
should not necessarily be ruled out, even with all of its potential 
dangers.
  The reason I make this point is as follows: Talks can only succeed if 
we change the circumstances on the ground today. As of right now, talks 
result in promises by North Korea in exchange for fuel oil or food or 
whatever to North Korea, and then they violate the agreements and we 
are left in a position of reacting to their violation. We have to 
change that dynamic in some way so that North Korea feels some pressure 
to come to terms with its violations, some pressure to comply with the 
commitments it has made, some pressure to begin to dismantle its 
nuclear programs. Without that kind of pressure, without something to 
lose by refusing to go along in our negotiations or violating the 
agreements they make, talk alone is not likely to change anything. We 
have to change the circumstances.
  How do we do that? That is where our legislation comes in. This 
legislation would put into place several circumstances which we believe 
would cause North Korea to more seriously consider negotiations as a 
means toward real, peaceful resolution of the dispute and real 
disarmament of its nuclear facilities. But without these kinds of 
pressures or conditions or circumstances, they are not likely to do so.
  Let me briefly summarize the legislation. The first thing is to 
recognize what the North Koreans themselves have said, but to make it 
official: That the agreed framework entered into 9 years ago has failed 
and is no longer extant and it related to a circumstance North Korea 
has no longer permitted to exist and, as a result, the subsidization of 
North Korea called for under the agreement will cease; that they are 
not going to continue to be supported by the United States under the 
agreed framework.
  The second thing we do is prohibit the United States assistance to 
North Korea or the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization 
under the agreed framework. This is designed, among other things, to 
help deny North Korea the funds, the hard currency it needs, to 
continuing the development of its nuclear program.

[[Page 406]]

  That is the third thing the act would do. It would reinstitute the 
sanctions that were previously in place and permit the President to 
invoke new sanctions. In effect, what I have called for is a resolution 
similar to resolution 611 against Iraq. Same terms, prohibiting exports 
and imports, as a way of denying hard currency to a country to engage 
in illicit activity. In the case of North Korea, this is especially 
important. The biggest source of hard currency for North Korea is the 
illicit drug trade and the weaponry it sends to other countries.
  Where do countries such as Iraq get Scud missiles? North Korea. Where 
did Pakistan get some of its equipment? North Korea. Where do other 
countries get weapons of mass destruction? North Korea.
  If we impose sanctions that both prohibit the importation and the 
exportation of these items from North Korea, we can help to impose upon 
their regime an economic circumstance which might persuade them it is 
more beneficial to talk and to make promises they intend to keep than 
to continue on their present course of action.
  Another provision of the act would prohibit any nuclear cooperation 
agreement or type of nuclear interaction with North Korea unless and 
until the President made several determinations and sent them to the 
Congress and Congress approved of such an interaction or agreement by 
congressional action.
  We would also encourage the President to obtain multilateral 
sanctions including the blocking of remittances from ethnic Koreans to 
North Korea. That's the other source of hard currency, the remittances 
from North Koreans elsewhere in the world to their relatives in North 
Korea itself.
  But with regard to multilateral activity here, it is interesting to 
me that probably the most significant pressure that could be put on 
North Korea to begin complying with its commitments would come from 
China. China supplies approximately 80 percent of the fuel oil to North 
Korea. It provides over half of the food and fuel generally to North 
Korea. It has a long border with North Korea. It clearly would be 
called upon to help enforce sanctions if they were imposed. And it 
clearly would suffer, probably more than any other country, from any 
kind of nuclear explosion on the North Korean peninsula or any other 
explosion in which poison gases or nerve agents or biological agents of 
some kind were released from the atmosphere since the wind is 
prevailing south to north.
  China has a great deal to lose from North Korea acquiring a nuclear 
capability as well. In the first place, I don't think China wants other 
countries in the region to have nuclear weapons. China has those 
weapons, but I don't think it wants Japan to acquire those weapons. I 
don't think it would want South Korea or Taiwan to acquire nuclear 
weapons. I am not sure it would want the United States to extend its 
nuclear umbrella to South Korea, for example.
  All of those things could happen if North Korea is permitted to 
develop nuclear weapons. It seems to me, therefore, it is very much in 
China's interest to quietly, if that is the way they have to do it, but 
firmly dissuade the North Koreans from progressing with its nuclear 
development program.
  It is especially troublesome that very recently China has continued 
to supply North Korea with materiel and other assistance for the 
further development of North Korea's nuclear program. Again, without 
going into details, we are well aware of what China has been doing. The 
United States needs to come down very firmly against this kind of 
export from China to North Korea. Not only do I think we should argue 
to China what we believe is in China's best interests, but in other 
ways to exert what other kind of influence we can on China to stop this 
kind of activity and assist us working with the North Koreans to stop 
their program.
  To some extent, arguments similar to that relate to Russia, although 
Russia is not as close to North Korea as are the Chinese. But in both 
cases, both Russia and China could assist us. One of the things our 
bill urges is the development of those multilateral kinds of agreements 
and actions that would stop North Korea from furthering its program.
  We would also in this act do a variety of things which we think would 
help to put pressure on North Korea, in terms of democratization and in 
terms of liberalizing its country in general. For example, granting 
North Koreans refugee status in the United States, encouraging the 
executive branch to work with other countries to care for and resettle 
refugees from North Korea and provide money for that purpose. We would 
require Radio Free Asia to increase its broadcasting to North Korea to 
24 hours a day and authorize whatever money is necessary to do that.
  We also believe it is important for Congress to actually take 
measures, including military reinforcements, if that is called for, and 
enhanced defense exercises and other steps as determined appropriate to 
assure the highest level of deterrence against North Korea.
  This is important for two reasons. First, there are those who called 
on us to bring our troops home from South Korea and, frankly, the 
temptation is great, when South Korean leaders basically talk about not 
wanting the United States in South Korea anymore, to do precisely that. 
Why should we have our own troops there when they allegedly do not want 
us there? Unfortunately, that's a shortsighted way of looking at the 
problem. If we are to put the pressure on North Korea to make dialog 
meaningful, the third way I was talking about, to back it up with some 
potential action, then you do have to have a military presence and 
demonstrate you mean it when you talk about the North Koreans needing 
to comply with their agreements. Therefore, it would be the wrong time 
to either remove our troops or suggest they are not prepared. Thus, the 
reason our bill calls for enhanced measures to ensure our deterrence in 
that area.
  What these provisions of the bill demonstrate is that there are a lot 
of alternatives in between just talk which, as I said, is cheap, and 
military action, which is to be avoided at all costs here because of 
the consequences of it. There are a lot of things we could be doing in 
between that. I have described in not very much detail what our bill 
provides in that regard, to just demonstrate there are a lot of things 
we could be doing to cut off its supply of hard currency, to isolate 
it, and to put pressure on North Korea to begin to comply with the 
agreements it has made in the past.
  Some might say this is provocative. Frankly, I don't think it is very 
provocative. It is certainly not as provocative as having to resort to 
military force. It seems to me it is also not provocative to let the 
North Koreans know there are consequences to violating agreements they 
have made with the rest of the world.
  If we are not able to back up these agreements, then why ever have 
agreements in the first place? Why couldn't any country simply get out 
of the NPT and say, We didn't really mean it when we signed up? The 
United Nations charter itself--I have forgotten the exact chapters; I 
think it is chapters 6 and 7--provides for the imposition of 
international norms of behavior in cases where the peace of the world 
is threatened by a particular country. That applies directly to North 
Korea in this case.
  So we have the ability to act as an international group of nations, 
in addition to unilaterally in the case of the United States. But I 
would also say to those who say this is dangerous and provocative, 
that's the same thing people criticized Ronald Reagan for when he 
talked about the Evil Empire, Russia. It was the pressure the United 
States put on Russia in the latter stages of the Soviet Union, during 
which time the President not only built up our military to create a 
strong deterrence to any military action by the Soviet Union but also 
began to expand our push for democratization and freedom in Eastern 
Europe and in the outlying areas of the Soviet empire.
  Many think it was the combination of those factors that caused the 
Soviet Union to break up, the combination of a strong deterrence on our 
part, the peace-through-strength concept of

[[Page 407]]

Ronald Reagan, but also the declaration that it was an evil empire, the 
assistance to Lech Walesa, the characterization of the country and all 
of the eastern satellite countries of the Soviet Union as evil and 
nondemocratic and abusive of human rights, the Jackson-Vanik amendment. 
Those actions, over time, I believe, had a very salutary effect on the 
people in the Soviet Union and caused them to eventually conclude they 
could not confront the democratic nations of the world. As a result, 
Russia has been the product, fortunately for the people of Russia, of 
that kind of push.
  I do not think you create a more dangerous or provocative situation 
here. I think in the case of North Korea you begin to lay the 
groundwork for the North Koreans to become a democratic society that 
can actually take care of its people and not starve them to death and 
engage in the human rights abuses it has in the past.
  Let me just quote something Ronald Reagan wrote to himself. This is 
in a book called ``Reagan's War.'' It is talking about the philosophy 
Reagan had in dealing with the Soviet Union, but I think it is relevant 
to North Korea as well. In his diary the President wrote the following 
with respect to a meeting that had been convened, an emergency meeting 
of the NSC. He jotted these notes to himself about his goal with 
respect to Poland. He said:

       I took a stand that this may be the last chance in our 
     lifetime to see a change in the Soviet empire's colonial 
     policy re Eastern Europe. We should take a stand and tell 
     them unless and until martial law is lifted in Poland, the 
     prisoners were released and negotiations resumed between 
     Walesa and the Polish government, we would quarantine the 
     Soviets and Poland with no trade or communications across 
     their borders. Also tell our NATO allies and others to join 
     us in such sanctions or risk an estrangement from us.

  Bearing in mind that all know what the result of President Reagan's 
policies were, I think that is the same philosophy that should animate 
our policy today toward North Korea. We should not be seen as 
vacillating. Some have characterized the administration as vacillating.
  We should be sure the positions we are taking are clear-cut, firm, 
and no one can mistake what our intentions are, as the first step. 
Second, we should adhere to the President's policy of forcing North 
Korea to promptly and verifiably dismantle its nuclear enrichment 
program. And third, Congress can play a role in this by enacting 
legislation of the kind I have described that would not only create the 
conditions for more democratization in the country by granting refugee 
status to political refugees, broadcasting into North Korea the message 
of freedom to its people, but also squeezing economically the military 
leaders of the country to deny them the hard currency they are 
currently using to build up this nuclear capability, to prevent them 
from exporting these weapons of mass destruction to other countries.
  Just as a final point, such an export limitation or quarantine as 
part of the sanctions that could be imposed here would not only deny 
the economic reward to the North Koreans from the production of this 
material, but it could result in an interdiction of such material if in 
fact they are going to try to send it some place else. Remember that 
shipment from North Korea that was recently intercepted going into 
Yemen. This kind of sale of weapons of mass destruction by North Korea, 
therefore, if interdicted, would not only deny the country the hard 
currency that it uses for its nuclear program but perhaps ultimately 
more importantly would prevent this kind of equipment from getting into 
the hands of terrorists or terrorist nations that mean us harm.
  This is the approach we believe is appropriate for the United States 
to take. Neither military action nor just plain talk, but a dialog 
backed up by firm, positive, constructive actions on the part of the 
United States would put a lot of pressure on North Korea and would 
hopefully bring countries such as China and Russia along with us to 
help us put pressure on North Korea to cause it to come to meaningful 
agreement with the United States that is verifiable and that would 
result in peace in the region and the dismantlement of dangerous 
nuclear weapons they have been building.
  We will be introducing this legislation next week. I appreciate the 
support Senator McCain has provided in putting this legislation 
together, and I look forward to visiting with my colleagues and getting 
sponsorship of the legislation with an early commitment to get it 
passed by this body and sent on to the President.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.

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