[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 149 (2003), Part 1]
[Senate]
[Pages 1366-1367]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                          NORTH KOREA AND IRAQ

  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, we can't afford to put either Iraq or 
North Korea on the back burner. Both need our immediate and sustained 
attention. But the crisis on the Korean peninsula, and it is a crisis--
is our most urgent priority.
  The situation in North Korea has gone from bad to worse. They've 
thrown out the international inspectors. They've turned off cameras 
that tracked thousands of canisters of weapons grade plutonium. They've 
withdrawn from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
  The irony here is that the very rationale some in the administration 
cite for regime change in Iraq is an emerging reality in North Korea: A 
rogue regime and one of the world's worst proliferators is on the verge 
of becoming a plutonium factory. It will sell anything it develops to 
the highest bidder.
  We know it doesn't take much plutonium to make a nuclear threat real. 
You only need something the size of the bottom of a water glass, about 
an eighth of an inch thick, two pieces. With a crude operation to ram 
it together at high speed, you have a 1 kiloton bomb in a homemade 
nuclear device.
  My colleagues from New York will remember this: our national 
laboratories produced what could be a homemade nuclear weapon. They 
made it off the shelf with easily obtainable materials. Everything 
except the plutonium. I asked Senators Clinton and Schumer to bring 
that homemade weapon up to S. 407 and they walked it right in.
  The threat of proliferation exists in North Korea as we speak, right 
now, not tomorrow or next week or next month or next year, but right 
now.
  And by the way, if President Clinton had not completed the Agreed 
Framework, North Korea would already have material for dozens of 
nuclear weapons.
  If North Korea continues down this path, we also risk an arms race in 
Asia. Think about it. North Korea, South Korea, Japan. And if that 
happens, China will build up its nuclear weapons arsenal, India will 
get nervous and do the same, and Pakistan will follow suit. Everything 
we've been working to prevent for decades--a nuclear arms race in Asia 
and beyond--will become a reality. And that could have a terrible 
impact on economic stability, too.
  The regime in Pyongyang is first and foremost to blame for this 
crisis. But frankly, two years of policy incoherence on our part has 
not helped matters. We have see-sawed back and forth between engagement 
and name-calling.
  And the last two weeks of taking options off the table--especially 
talking--has made matters worse. It tied our own hands and added 
tension to our already strained relationship with a key ally, South 
Korea. We need a clear--and clear eyed--strategy for dealing with this 
danger.
  I'm pleased the administration now seems to be on the right track. As 
several of us have argued for weeks, direct talks are the best way out 
of this impasse.
  Some claim that talking is appeasement. Well, we know that not 
talking could result in North Korea having the material to build up to 
a half dozen nuclear weapons in six months--and dozens more in the 
months and years to follow.
  We know that taking out North Korea's plutonium program must be a 
course of very last resort. Pyongyang has more than 10,000 heavily 
protected artillery pieces just miles from Seoul--it could devastate 
the city, its inhabitants and many of our troops before we could 
respond.
  We know that for additional sanctions to bite, we would need the 
participation of South Korea and China, neither of whom so far, wants 
to pursue that path.
  And we know that talking is not appeasement. It is the most effective 
way to tell North Korea what it must do if it wants more normal 
relations with us. In fact, in dealing with an isolated regime and a 
closed-off leader, talking clearly and directly is critical if we want 
to avoid miscommunication and miscalculation.
  We cannot and should not buy the same carpet twice. We won't if we 
insist on getting more from North Korea than we got last time. This 
should include giving up the plutonium and spent fuel it already has 
produced and forsaking the production of plutonium and uranium in the 
future--all of this verified by international inspectors and 
monitoring.
  In turn, we should hold out the prospect of a more normal 
relationship, including energy assistance, food aid and a ``no 
hostility pledge.''


                                  iraq

  As we contend with Korea, we also must deal with Iraq. The 
administration was mistaken to suggest North Korea could be put on the 
back burner. But so are those who suggest Iraq is not a major problem. 
It is, and we must continue to deal with it on its own merits, but on 
our own timetable.
  It's no secret that the State Department, the Defense Department, and 
the Joint Chiefs are at odds on the best course of action in Iraq.
  We have Hans Blix and the IAEA saying that the inspectors need more 
time to accomplish their mission--that they will have to stay in Iraq 
much longer to get the job done.
  Secretary Rumsfeld is saying, if we get ourselves locked in for four 
more months we will lose our weather window and be forced to wait until 
the fall.
  Secretary Powell is saying, look, we must make it a priority to 
maintain the support of the French and the Germans and everyone else, 
not to mention the American people. The President was right to make 
Iraq the world's problem, not just our own. Let's keep it that way.
  In my view, the President has shown restraint on Iraq. He has gone to 
the United Nations. He has allowed inspectors to begin. Now he must 
allow them to take their course. I would say to the President, keep it 
going. In the eyes of the world, you're doing it right.
  Inspectors are not a permanent solution and neither is our massive 
troop presence. But so long as the inspectors are doing their work in 
Iraq, backed up by the threat of our forces, it is highly unlikely Iraq 
could pursue a nuclear program undetected or would run the risk of 
selling chemical or biological weapons to terrorists. And we will 
sustain international support. Meanwhile, the pressure will build on 
Saddam. Unlike in North Korea, times is on our side, not his.

[[Page 1367]]

  Of course, this massive deployment is costly and hard on our men and 
women in uniform. But going to war would be far more costly in terms of 
troops and treasure. It must remain a last resort.
  If we do go to war, we better be absolutely certain that our friends 
and allies are all in the game at the outset.
  Not because we cannot prevail against Saddam Hussein without them. We 
can--though it certainly makes sense to spread the risk and share the 
cost. But because without the support of other nations, we will be left 
with a political, financial, and, potentially, a regionally 
destabilizing burden after we take down Saddam. We will have to deal 
with the ``day after'' Saddam--or more accurately the decade after--on 
our own.
  In the weeks ahead, if we move to war, I hope the President will tell 
the American people what he has not yet told them: How much will the 
war cost? How will he balance his guns and butter rhetoric with the 
bottom-line budget realities we face? How many troops will have to stay 
in Iraq after Saddam and for how long? How much will it cost to rebuild 
Iraq? Who will help us foot the bill? The American people deserve 
answers to these and other key questions.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
Kansas has 5 minutes.

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