[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 148 (2002), Part 8]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page 11194]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                       LOS ANGELES TIMES ARTICLE

                                 ______
                                 

                             HON. RON PAUL

                                of texas

                    in the house of representatives

                         Monday, June 24, 2002

  Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, I call my colleagues' attention to a recent 
article by Scott Ritter, former chief UN weapons inspector in Iraq, 
published in the Los Angeles Times. In this article, Mr. Ritter makes a 
salient point that deserves careful and serious consideration in this 
body: how will it be possible to achieve the stated Administration goal 
of getting weapons inspectors back into Iraq when the Administration 
has made it known that it intends to assassinate the Iraqi leader?
  If nothing else, Saddam Hussein has proven himself a survivor. Does 
anyone believe that he will allow inspectors back into his country 
knowing that any one of them might kill him? Is it the intention of the 
Administration to get inspectors back into Iraq and thus answers to 
lingering and critical questions regarding Iraq's military 
capabilities, or is the intent to invade that country regardless of the 
near total absence of information? Or actually make it impossible for 
Suddam Hussein to accept the inspectors.
  Mr. Ritter, who as former chief UN inspector in Iraq probably knows 
that country better than any of us here, made some excellent points in 
a recent meeting with Republican members of Congress. According to Mr. 
Ritter, no American-installed regime could survive in Iraq. 
Interestingly, Mr. Ritter noted that though his rule is no doubt 
despotic, Saddam Hussein has been harsher toward Islamic fundamentalism 
than any other Arab regime. He added that any U.S. invasion to remove 
Saddam from power would likely open the door to an anti-American 
fundamentalist Islamic regime in Iraq. That can hardly be viewed in a 
positive light here in the United States. Is a policy that replaces a 
bad regime with a worse regime the wisest course to follow?
  Much is made of Iraqi National Congress leader Ahmed Chalabi, as a 
potential post-invasion leader of Iraq. Mr. Ritter told me that in his 
many dealings with Chalabi, he found him to be completely unreliable 
and untrustworthy. He added that neither he nor the approximately 100 
Iraqi generals that the U.S. is courting have any credibility inside 
Iraq, and any attempt to place them in power would be rejected in the 
strongest manner by the Iraqi people. Hundreds, if not thousands, of 
American military personnel would be required to occupy Iraq 
indefinitely if any American-installed regime is to remain in power. 
Again, it appears we are creating a larger problem than we are 
attempting to solve.
  Similarly, proponents of a U.S. invasion of Iraq often cite the Kurds 
in the northern part of that country as a Northern Alliance-like ally, 
who will do much of our fighting on the ground and unseat Saddam. But 
just last week the Washington Times reported that neither of the two 
rival Kurdish groups in northern Iraq want anything to do with an 
invasion of Iraq.
  In the meeting last month, Scott Ritter reminded members of Congress 
that a nation cannot go to war based on assumptions and guesses, that a 
lack of knowledge is no basis on which to initiate military action. Mr. 
Ritter warned those present that remaining acquiescent in the face of 
the Administration's seeming determination to exceed the authority 
granted to go after those who attacked us, will actually hurt the 
president and will hurt Congress. He concluded by stating that going in 
to Iraq without Congressionally-granted authority would be a ``failure 
of American democracy.'' Those pounding the war drums loudest for an 
invasion of Iraq should pause for a moment and ponder what Scott Ritter 
is saying. Thousands of lives are at stake.

              [From the Los Angeles Times, June 19, 2002]

              Behind ``Plot'' on Hussein, a Secret Agenda

                           (By Scott Ritter)

       President Bush has reportedly authorized the CIA to use all 
     of the means at its disposal--including U.S. military special 
     operations forces and CIA paramilitary teams--to eliminate 
     Iraq's Saddam Hussein. According to reports, the CIA is to 
     view any such plan as ``preparatory'' for a larger military 
     strike.
       Congressional leaders from both parties have greeted these 
     reports with enthusiasm. In their rush to be seen as 
     embracing the president's hard-line stance on Iraq, however, 
     almost no one in Congress has questioned why a supposedly 
     covert operation would be made public, thus undermining the 
     very mission it was intended to accomplish.
       It is high time that Congress start questioning the hype 
     and rhetoric emanating from the White House regarding 
     Baghdad, because the leaked CIA plan is well timed to 
     undermine the efforts underway in the United Nations to get 
     weapons inspectors back to work in Iraq. In early July, the 
     U.N. secretary-general will meet with Iraq's foreign minister 
     for a third round of talks on the return of the weapons 
     monitors. A major sticking point is Iraqi concern over the 
     use--or abuse--of such inspections by the U.S. for 
     intelligence collection.
       I recall during my time as a chief inspector in Iraq the 
     dozens of extremely fit ``missile experts'' and ``logistics 
     specialists'' who frequented my inspection teams and others. 
     Drawn from U.S. units such as Delta Force or from CIA 
     paramilitary teams such as the Special Activities Staff (both 
     of which have an ongoing role in the conflict in 
     Afghanistan), these specialists had a legitimate part to play 
     in the difficult cat-and-mouse effort to disarm Iraq. So did 
     the teams of British radio intercept operators I ran in Iraq 
     from 1996 to 1998--which listened in on the conversations of 
     Hussein's inner circle--and the various other intelligence 
     specialists who were part of the inspection effort.
       The presence of such personnel on inspection teams was, and 
     is, viewed by the Iraqi government as an unacceptable risk to 
     its nation's security.
       As early as 1992, the Iraqis viewed the teams I led inside 
     Iraq as a threat to the safety of their president. They were 
     concerned that my inspections were nothing more than a front 
     for a larger effort to eliminate their leader.
       Those concerns were largely baseless while I was in Iraq. 
     Now that Bush has specifically authorized American covert-
     operations forces to remove Hussein, however, the Iraqis will 
     never trust an inspection regime that has already shown 
     itself susceptible to infiltration and manipulation by 
     intelligence services hostile to Iraq, regardless of any 
     assurances the U.N. secretary-general might give.
       The leaked CIA covert operations plan effectively kills any 
     chance of inspectors returning to Iraq, and it closes the 
     door on the last opportunity for shedding light on the true 
     state of affairs regarding any threat in the form of Iraq 
     weapons of mass destruction.
       Absent any return of weapons inspectors, no one seems 
     willing to challenge the Bush administration's assertions of 
     an Iraqi threat. If Bush has a factual case against Iraq 
     concerning weapons of mass destruction, he hasn't made it 
     yet.
       Can the Bush administration substantiate any of its claims 
     that Iraq continues to pursue efforts to reacquire its 
     capability to produce chemical and biological weapons, which 
     was dismantled and destroyed by U.N. weapons inspectors from 
     1991 to 1998? The same question applies to nuclear weapons. 
     What facts show that Iraq continues to pursue nuclear weapons 
     aspirations?
       Bush spoke ominously of an Iraqi ballistic missile threat 
     to Europe. What missile threat is the president talking 
     about? These questions are valid, and if the case for war is 
     to be made, they must be answered with more than speculative 
     rhetoric.
       Congress has seemed unwilling to challenge the Bush 
     administration's pursuit of war against Iraq. The one 
     roadblock to an all-out U.S. assault would be weapons 
     inspectors reporting on the facts inside Iraq. Yet without 
     any meaningful discussion and debate by Congress concerning 
     the nature of the threat posed by Baghdad, war seems all but 
     inevitable.
       The true target of the supposed CIA plan may not be Hussein 
     but rather the weapons inspection program itself. The real 
     casualty is the last chance to avoid bloody conflict.

     

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