[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 148 (2002), Part 8]
[Senate]
[Pages 11120-11124]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                            MISSILE DEFENSE

  Mr. KYL. Madam President, by way of introduction, my remarks will 
primarily be in support of an amendment that will be offered by the 
distinguished ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, the 
Senator from Virginia, tomorrow to restore missile defense funding that 
was cut in the Armed Services Committee.
  I wanted to note that this afternoon the President advised both 
Senator McCain and I that he would be traveling to our home State of 
Arizona tomorrow--specifically to the town of Show Low which is under 
threat of this raging wildfire we have all seen and read about--and he 
graciously offered to allow us to accompany him on that trip. But, 
obviously, the importance of this Defense authorization bill--
specifically, the votes we will have tomorrow, including an effort to 
restore funding for the missile defense portion of the bill--requires 
that we remain.
  I am going to speak to the issue that will involve his visit to 
Arizona tomorrow, why these raging wildfires don't need to continue to 
devastate our country, what we can do about it, and what we need to do 
about it as a country at the conclusion of my remarks on the Defense 
bill. I will address my comments first to this bill which is before the 
Senate, and which we will be considering this week.
  It seems to me that there is a strange disconnect between recent 
developments in the world and some of the contents of the bill that we 
are considering.
  For example, in early May, Iran--newly dubbed by the State Department 
as the No. 1 terrorist nation in the world--conducted a successful test 
of its 800-plus-mile-range Shahab III missile. There are some reports 
that Iran is now set to begin domestic production of the Shahab III 
which will be able to reach Israel, as well as U.S. troops deployed in 
the Middle East and South Asia.
  On May 7, the Associated Press, citing an administration official, 
reported that Iran is continuing the development of a longer range 
missile, the Shahab IV, with an estimated range of 1,200 to 1,800 
miles. The Shahab IV will be able to reach deep into Europe.
  That means that the fanatical mullahs in Tehran will be able to put a 
multitude of U.S. allies and our troops within striking distance of 
their missiles and weapons of mass destruction.
  We have also just witnessed one of the scariest standoffs in recent 
decades with India and Pakistan angrily pointing their nuclear-tipped 
missiles at each other.
  These developments represent a dramatic increase in the worldwide 
missile threat.
  You might think that the United States would therefore want to 
accelerate its effort to build a defense against such weapons. But the 
bill before us today would seriously hamper our ability to do exactly 
that. This is not something that the American people will stand for.

[[Page 11121]]

  This is why I believe that tomorrow it is incumbent upon the Members 
of this body to listen to their constituents, to listen to the 
President of the United States, to look at the events around the world, 
and to reconnect our policy here in the Senate to the realities of the 
world around us.
  This bill makes very deep and damaging cuts to the President's 
proposed budget for missile defense. Unless remedied, those cuts will 
seriously limit our ability to end our current--and let me say our 
unacceptable--vulnerabilities to ballistic missile attack.
  As I noted, the threat from ballistic missiles continues to grow.
  In addition to the two examples I mentioned, consider this: Today, 
there are nearly three dozen countries that either have or are 
developing ballistic missiles of increasing range and sophistication. 
That includes Iran's fellow ``axis of evil'' partners--or members, I 
should say--Iraq and North Korea, as well as the terrorist regimes of 
Syria and Libya.
  Let us take a look at some of these developments, which, unless 
indicated otherwise, are taken straight from the December 2001 National 
Intelligence Estimate on Foreign Ballistic Missiles. That is the 
estimate of our intelligence community about this threat.
  North Korea, despite the moratorium on flight testing that it is 
supposedly adhering to, continues its development of long-range 
missiles. According to press accounts and administration officials, 
North Korea has recently conducted rocket motor tests of these 
missiles.
  In fact, North Korea's Taepo Dong 2 missile, which is capable of 
reaching the United States with a nuclear-weapon-sized payload, may now 
be ready for flight testing.
  As to Iraq, despite U.N. sanctions, Baghdad has been able to maintain 
the infrastructure and expertise necessary to develop longer range 
missiles.
  Its Al-Samoud missile, with a 60 to 90-mile range, probably will be 
deployed soon.
  And Iraq retains a covert force of scud-variant missiles, launchers, 
and conventional, chemical, and biological warheads.
  Not to forget about China, the intelligence community assesses that 
it could begin deploying its 5,000-mile-range DF-31 missile during the 
first half of this decade. That means essentially any time now. China's 
even longer range mobile missile, the DF-41, could be deployed in the 
latter half of the decade.
  China also maintains a robust force of medium-range CSS-5 missiles 
which can reach our troops in Japan and Korea.
  Of course, China continues to add to its arsenal of short-range 
missiles which already number in the several hundreds and are deployed 
opposite Taiwan.
  According to the intelligence community--and I am quoting now--

       China's leaders calculate that conventionally armed 
     ballistic missiles add a potent new dimension to Chinese 
     military capabilities, and they are committed to continue 
     fielding them at a rapid pace. Beijing's growing short-range 
     ballistic missile force provides China with a military 
     capability that avoids the political and practical 
     constraints associated with the use of nuclear-armed 
     missiles. The latest Chinese short-range ballistic missiles 
     provide a survivable and effective conventional strike force 
     and expand conventional ballistic missile coverage.

  Even the terrorists are getting into the act. According to a variety 
of news sources, some of which have quoted U.S. and Israeli officials, 
Iran and Syria have supplied Lebanon's Hezbollah terrorist organization 
with Fajr-5 missiles, which, at 40 to 50 miles, can reach deeper into 
Israel than any rockets Hezbollah has fired so far. One press account 
stated further that Hezbollah is assembling chemical warheads for these 
missiles.
  These developments, among others, led to the following conclusions in 
the December 2001 National Intelligence Estimate:
  One, short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, particularly if 
armed with weapons of mass destruction, already pose a significant 
threat overseas to U.S. interests, military forces, and allies.
  Two, proliferation of ballistic-missile-related technologies, 
materials, and expertise--especially by Russian, Chinese, and North 
Korean entities--has enabled emerging missile states to accelerate 
development timelines for their missile programs.
  In other words, this is making the point that instead of having to 
always indigenously develop a missile capability, a country can now buy 
these literally readymade missiles from countries such as China, North 
Korea, and Russia.
  Three, most intelligence community agencies project that, before 
2015, the United States most likely will face ICBM threats from North 
Korea and Iran, and possibly from Iraq, as well as from the existing 
ICBM forces of China and, of course, Russia.
  Four, the probability that a missile with a weapon of mass 
destruction will be used against U.S. forces or interests is higher 
today than during most of the cold war, and will continue to grow as 
the capabilities of potential adversaries mature.
  After September 11, we dare not willfully remain vulnerable to these 
threats. But that is essentially the impact of the partisan cuts that 
were made to this bill when it was before the Armed Services Committee.
  Of course, there are those who suggest that the September 11 attacks 
demonstrated that the major threat to this country comes from 
relatively low-tech attacks: suitcase bombs and the like. But what 
September 11 really demonstrated is that our enemies have the will and 
the ruthlessness to exploit our weaknesses in any way they can. In 
other words, if we are weak in a given area, that will be an area 
attempted to be exploited. Therefore, if we have no missile defense, is 
there any question that a potential adversary would see the ability to 
strike us with ballistic missiles as a potential area for their policy?
  The new types of threats we face from terrorists and the rogue 
regimes that support them cannot be dealt with solely through 
traditional deterrence. President Bush was right when he recently 
remarked at West Point:

       Deterrence--the promise of massive retaliation against 
     nations--means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks 
     with no nation or citizens to defend.

  In addition, I make this point. I do not think the majority of the 
Iranian or Iraqi people or Syrian people detest the United States or 
wish to attack us with nuclear weapons.
  If tyrants like Saddam Hussein, who dictatorially rule some of those 
countries, were to use a weapon of mass destruction against our ally 
Israel, or even against U.S. troops abroad, I am not sure the President 
of the United States, in those circumstances, would want to retaliate 
with a nuclear weapon in the middle of Baghdad, let's say, or some 
other Iraqi city.
  Clearly, we would rain massive retaliation upon Saddam Hussein, but 
we would have to think very carefully about a nuclear deterrent in a 
situation such as that.
  So traditional deterrence may or may not be an appropriate response 
to a terrorist attack. The bottom line is, we are not always dealing 
with rational actors. To depend on nuclear deterrence alone with a 
dictator like Saddam Hussein, who, remember, used chemical weapons 
against his own people, or a terrorist like Osama bin Laden would be to 
place American lives in the hands of madmen. That, itself, is mad when 
we have the ability to defend against such an attack.
  That alternative, of course, is to develop and deploy missile 
defenses. They will add to our options in terms of a crisis. Defenses 
against missiles will help the United States avoid being frozen into 
inaction by the threat of a missile attack.
  This is the threat of blackmail: A country that acquires a nuclear 
weapon and the ballistic missile capability to deliver it will be in a 
much stronger position to dictate what it wants around the world--or to 
prevent the United States from acting--than one that does not. It 
reduces our options significantly.

[[Page 11122]]

  Just imagine the impact on our decision to go to war against Saddam 
Hussein in 1991 had he been able to threaten the United States or our 
allies with nuclear missiles. Missile defense will also reduce the 
incentives for proliferation by devaluing offensive missiles. If a 
rogue actor views missiles as likely to be effective because of our 
lack of defenses, they will be developed. If, on the other hand, we 
have defenses, then they will obviously be less inclined to spend as 
much time or money trying to acquire it.
  Finally, and perhaps most important of all, in the worst case 
scenario, we will save American lives with missile defense.
  So we should not be fooled by the fact that the bill still authorizes 
several billion dollars for something called missile defense. Make no 
mistake that the cuts in this bill are very carefully designed to gut 
the administration's plans to protect the American people from 
missiles.
  If one had wanted to leave intact a program that looked very much 
like missile defense, but very surgically gutted the key components of 
it, one could not have done better than the language and the money that 
comes out of the Armed Services Committee bill.
  Allow me to describe some of the features of the President's new 
approach. We are very much aware that the President has decided that we 
need to transform our military. And the President has proposed an 
aggressive overhaul of not only the missile defense program but other 
programs from the previous administration.
  Let me describe some of the features of this transformational 
approach: First, a single, integrated architecture to command and 
control all of the various components of a missile defense system. What 
this does is to move us from the old concept of several unlinked 
systems to one overarching system composed of several integrated 
components or elements, as they are now called. This system removes the 
need for each element to do everything and, instead, distributes the 
basic tasks--such as launch detection, tracking, and battle 
management--across the entire system.
  So instead of having three or four specific components that do 
everything, you have several ways of attacking the problem, all linked 
together; therefore, they are much more effective in their overall 
ability to detect, track, and destroy an enemy missile.
  Secondly, multilayered defenses capable of intercepting missiles in 
all phases of flight, including the boost, midcourse, and terminal 
phases is an element of the President's transformation plan. The 
obvious benefits of this feature is that it will give us several shots, 
if necessary, to knock down a missile after it has been launched.
  The point is, we do not have very much time, when a missile has been 
launched against us, to make a decision to launch a counterattack. By 
the time we do that, the missile could well be coming down on top of 
us. We need the ability to have multilayered defenses which can be 
effective in the boost phase, as the offending missile is going up, 
which can try to attack it in midcourse, and, as a last resort, as it 
is barreling down on us at something like 17,000 miles an hour.
  But if you only rely on that last system, you are not going to get 
multiple shots. You are going to get one shot. And it may not always do 
the trick. In that case, you have lost.
  Third, the ability to deploy defenses rapidly in the event of an 
emergency is one of the critical components of the President's plan. To 
accommodate these goals and others, the administration reformed the 
Missile Defense Agency and gave it wide latitude to pursue innovative 
approaches rather than the former approach which was to have a long-
term project of design and research and then development and then 
deployment.
  The problem is that the bill on the floor today takes dead aim at 
each of these worthy efforts. The system's integration and command and 
control accounts, the brains of the whole system, if you will, are 
reduced in funding by two-thirds. That is gutting the program. To cut 
the funding by two-thirds, literally, imagine the human body. It looks 
just like it did after the operation except for one thing: You have 
taken out the brain. It is not going to work very well. That is the 
first damage that was done to the President's program as a result of 
Armed Services Committee action.
  Programs to intercept missiles in the boost phase, particularly those 
employing new basing modes and technologies, are virtually wiped out. 
Funding for 10 THAAD test missiles, which would be deployed in an 
emergency, is eliminated, and the Missile Defense Agency staff is cut 
by two-thirds. Essentially what the bill leaves us is the old piecemeal 
approach, with many of the most promising technologies starved of 
funding and a variety of impediments created to early deployment of the 
President's proposed system.
  It is quite interesting that just as these cuts were being made, cuts 
that will wreck the Bush administration's approach to protecting the 
American people from missiles, the ABM Treaty lapsed into history on 
June 13. The bill is an attempt to revive the spirit of that treaty by 
those who have never accepted President Bush's decision to opt out of 
it. If this is the case, they are in dwindling company.
  A year ago, the anti-missile defense, pro-ABM Treaty crowd created 
much hubbub over how any decision to renounce the ABM Treaty would 
supposedly alienate our allies, cause a major rift with Russia, and 
spark an arms race. It was going to be a disaster. Well, as it turns 
out, none of those dire predictions came true. Let's have a look.
  Have we alienated our allies? As of last count, 12 of our 19 NATO 
allies have contributed troops to our campaign in Afghanistan, 7 
countries have sent their troops into combat alongside our own, and 
dozens of countries are contributing to our war on terrorism.
  Did it cause a rift with Russia? No. Russia has just entered into a 
new partnership with NATO, and President Bush just signed a communique 
with President Putin of Russia in May, committing both sides to 
cooperation on a host of issues, including, of all things, missile 
defense.
  How about a new arms race? No, again. President Bush also signed a 
treaty with Russia under which both sides intend to reduce strategic 
nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200. So the doomsayers were 
wrong. It is true that Russia and many European countries might have 
preferred that President Bush not renounce the ABM Treaty, but it seems 
these countries were not quite as wedded to this outmoded document as 
some of its Americans supporters.
  The ABM Treaty, as the cold war that gave birth to it, is gone. 
Russia and the United States, despite a number of disagreements and 
interests that don't always intersect, have moved beyond enmity toward 
a new, more cooperative relationship, and at the same time we have 
entered into a new area in international relations in which the threats 
to this Nation are increasingly complex and difficult to predict.
  So the President expended a great deal of energy and capital in 
working with our allies and Russia to terminate the cold war and its 
documentation in the form of the ABM Treaty, to enter into new 
agreements with Russia, to demonstrate we are friends, not enemies. In 
order to be able to pivot and address the new threats that face us, the 
threats from these Third World rogue powers, he proposes a national 
missile defense.
  Having gone to all of that trouble--and I shouldn't characterize it 
as trouble so much as devoting a great deal of America's prestige and 
commitment to this effort--we now have opponents in the Senate who 
would go right back to a missile defense of the kind that would be 
authorized by the ABM Treaty, which is to say virtually none at all. 
That is wrong, very wrong.
  The traditional cold-war-style deterrence is not going to deal with 
the threats we face today. It is time for ABM Treaty supporters who 
have stood in the way of missile defense for nearly 30 years to 
recognize this new reality. This reality was brought home with horrible 
abruptness on September 11.

[[Page 11123]]

Just imagine if that day were to repeat itself but this time with a 
ballistic missile armed with a nuclear or chemical or biological 
warhead. The only responsible course of action to deal with that 
possibility is to proceed with the most robust program of missile 
defense development we can muster. That is what the President proposed.
  The Pentagon's approach to missile defense is exactly that. It is an 
aggressive, forward-looking plan to provide the American people with 
protection against ballistic missiles at the earliest possible date. 
Indeed, this body overwhelmingly voted to make such a plan U.S. policy 
in the 1999 Missile Defense Act.
  We have to fund the plan, and we can't allow those who oppose missile 
defense to go in and surgically remove the key components of the 
President's program in order to effectively defeat missile defense 
while at the same time arguing that they have left the program intact. 
It does no good to spend $5 or $6 billion on a program without a brain, 
on a program that can't communicate among its independent parts, and on 
a program that does not begin the transformational policy the President 
has outlined.
  I am hopeful that when we vote on the amendment of the Senator from 
Virginia tomorrow, which restores the funding that was proposed by the 
President, the Senate will overwhelmingly stand with the President and 
with the American people, with common sense, to be able to defend the 
American people against ballistic missile attack. The issue is 
literally that stark.
  If we support the committee action, while people can claim that they 
still support missile defense, the reality will be that that program 
cannot go forward because it has effectively been denuded by the cuts 
that have been made. We have to support the amendment of the Senator 
from Virginia.
  I wanted to talk about that tonight because I am not sure that 
tomorrow I will be able to engage in the debate prior to the vote. As I 
said, it is a vote which we must be here to cast, notwithstanding a 
devastating tragedy occurring in my home State.
  Since I believe it is the desire of the majority to terminate my 
remarks on the Defense authorization bill and the Warner amendment so 
that we can go into morning business for a little bit and I can discuss 
that subject separately, I ask unanimous consent that a Wall Street 
Journal editorial of June 17, 2002, be printed in the Record on the 
Defense authorization bill.
  There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

             [From the Wall Street Journal, June 17, 2002]

                            Don't Go Wobbly

                         (By Margaret Thatcher)

       The crisis in the Indian subcontinent is currently engaging 
     the diplomatic activity of all the great powers. Rightly so. 
     The calamity a nuclear exchange could bring is truly dreadful 
     to contemplate.
       We can expect that this somber fact alone will exercise an 
     effective restraint on both sides. But we cannot assume that 
     the nuclear deterrent effect is the same in the Cold War and 
     post-Cold War worlds. This reflection has implications far 
     beyond the subcontinent. It goes to the heart of our 
     priorities since the events of Sept. 11.


                             untold damage

       During most of my political lifetime the two superpowers, 
     the U.S. and the Soviet Union, had massive nuclear arsenals, 
     even a small proportion of which would have inflicted untold 
     damage. But this knowledge imposed discipline on the 
     aggressive expansionism of the Soviets and made for a kind of 
     stability. There were, in fact, well-understood limits on the 
     extent to which either side would directly challenge the 
     other's interests. The exceptions--like the Cuban Missile 
     Crisis of 1962--only proved the rule.
       The nuclear deterrent did not prevent all war; the 
     conflicts in South East Asia show that. But the West's 
     possession of a credible nuclear deterrent prevented nuclear 
     war. It also prevented conventional war in the Alliance's 
     most vulnerable sector--Europe. The calculation behind the 
     deterrent was not completely fail-safe. But the rules were 
     clear, the psychology understood and each side's sticking 
     points known.
       One cannot say the same with India and Pakistan. The 
     conflicting claims on Kashmir are compounded by lack of 
     experience in coping with the temptations offered by their 
     own nuclear capabilities. President Clinton's attempt four 
     years ago to persuade the hostile neighbors to relinquish 
     their nuclear status was doomed to failure. The task of 
     President Bush and his envoys now is both more complex and 
     more realistic: to remind New Delhi and Islamabad that war, 
     even a victorious conventional war, would in the long run 
     damage their nations' interests more than a messy and 
     unsatisfactory peace. The dangers of a nuclear escalation 
     only make that more true.
       But this crisis also holds wider lessons for us. The 
     proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has 
     fundamentally changed the world in which we and our children 
     will live. India's and Pakistan's nuclear arsenals have given 
     them the power to inflict huge destruction. But neither is a 
     rogue state. India is a democracy. Pakistan is not, but it 
     has a ruler who has demonstrated his willingness to side with 
     democracies against terror. Both are basically friendly to 
     the West.
       Proliferation of WMD offers far more menacing risks when 
     those weapons are in the hands of the West's sworn enemies. 
     We have to assume that if those who hate us are confident 
     that they can threaten us or our allies by this means they 
     will do so. The threat alone could transform the West's 
     ability to intervene in order to protect its interests or to 
     undertake humanitarian missions. In some cases we must expect 
     the rogue states to try to go beyond mere threat.
       It is still true that any such action would be irrational. 
     There can be no doubt that response to the use of WMD against 
     us would be massive--probably nuclear. Yet even this awesome 
     prospect might not deter a fanatic who cared nothing for his 
     own country or safety. We already see such a mentality at 
     work in the suicide bombers. At the rate at which nuclear, 
     chemical and biological weaponry and missile technology have 
     been proliferating we must expect that at some point these 
     weapons will be used.
       The is quite simply the greatest challenge of our times. We 
     must rise to it.
       The right strategy has been clearly enunciated by President 
     Bush. America must speedily build a ballistic missile defense 
     system which will afford protection against missiles launched 
     from anywhere in the globe. The president has made progress 
     in winning the argument for this policy. He deserves the 
     fullest cooperation from all who stand to gain from it, 
     including Britain.
       We also have to isolate rogue states that are seeking to 
     develop (or have developed) WMD, and eliminate the threat 
     they pose. Sometimes this will be possible by a mixture of 
     diplomatic sticks and carrots. Iran for example, was quite 
     rightly classed by the president as part of the ``axis of 
     evil.'' It has a missile program which poses a threat to 
     Israel's security--a threat that Iran's support for terrorism 
     against Israel only magnifies. But this is part of a more 
     complex picture. Iran is a theocracy which is edging toward 
     democracy. At a certain point, the continuing growth of civil 
     society in Iran may require its rehabilitation.
       North Korea, on the other hand, is beyond reform. Diplomacy 
     has little value. Indeed, North Korea has already been 
     appeased too much. It is in the grip of a psychotic Stalinist 
     regime whose rule is sustained by terror and bankrolled by 
     those who buy its missiles. It is one of the few states that 
     could launch an unprovoked nuclear strike. The regime must 
     go, and I fear that it may not go peacefully.
       Between Iran on the one hand and North Korea on the other, 
     the list of rogue states will be the subject of continuing 
     revision and debate. And in each case there will be a mix of 
     policies appropriate to achieve our goal of removing the 
     threat which these states pose.
       That is also true of Iraq. I have detected a certain amount 
     of wobbling about the need to remove Saddam Hussein--though 
     not from President Bush. It is not surprising, given the 
     hostility of many allies to this venture, that some in 
     Washington may be having second thoughts. It is, of course, 
     right that those who have the duty to weigh up the risks of 
     particular courses of action should give their advice--though 
     they would be better to direct their counsel to the president 
     not the press. But in any case, as somebody once said, this 
     is no time to go wobbly.
       Saddam must go. His continued survival after 
     comprehensively losing the Gulf War had done untold damage to 
     the West's standing in a region where the only forgivable sin 
     is weakness. His flouting of the terms on which hostilities 
     ceased has made a laughingstock of the international 
     community. His appalling mistreatment of his own countrymen 
     continues unabated. It is clear to anyone willing to face 
     reality that the only reason Saddam took the risk of refusing 
     to submit his activities to U.N. inspectors was that he is 
     exerting every muscle to build WMD. We do not know exactly 
     what stage that has reached. But to allow this process to 
     continue because the risks of action to arrest it seem too 
     great would be foolish in the extreme.


                           coercive measures

       I do not claim to know the precise balance of coercive 
     measures required now to remove Saddam: only those with 
     access to the best intelligence can assess that. A major 
     deployment of ground forces as well as sustained air strikes 
     will probably be required. And it will be essential that 
     internal groups opposed to Saddam be mobilized and assisted. 
     No one pretends that an equivalent of the Afghan Northern 
     Alliance is available. But I

[[Page 11124]]

     suspect that once the aura of terror surrounding the Iraqi 
     regime is dispelled we may be astonished by the number of 
     opponents who come forward to help finish the job.
       Finally, a warning: We should not try now to predetermine 
     the final outcome for a post-Saddam Iraq. One of the errors 
     in 1991 was an exaggerated fear of the possible breakup of 
     Iraq if the measures required to topple Saddam were taken. 
     The Kirds and Shiites have since endured years of murderous 
     repression as a result. In great strategic questions it is 
     possible to be too clever. We need to concentrate on what we 
     can achieve with the instruments at hand, and then press 
     ahead boldly with the task before us. That will be quite 
     taxing enough.

  Mr. KYL. Madam President, that terminates my remarks on the bill. May 
I inquire of the Chair, is it correct that at the conclusion of my 
remarks the Chair was prepared to put the Senate into a period of 
morning business?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  The Senate is in morning business.

                          ____________________