[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 148 (2002), Part 8]
[Senate]
[Pages 11013-11014]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                 THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN COLOMBIA

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, I wish to take this opportunity to 
express my support for the Colombian people following the Presidential 
election in Colombia on May 26. I was pleased to cosponsor a resolution 
last week welcoming the successful completion of democratic elections 
in Colombia. It is a tribute to the Colombian people that despite 
significant threats and violence, both international and national 
election observers found the elections to be free and fair.
  I am also pleased that the President-elect of Colombia, Alvaro Uribe 
Velez, has been in Washington this week to discuss U.S. support for 
counternarcotics operations. The United States has already invested 
heavily in a unified effort to reduce the flow of drugs from Colombia, 
while simultaneously promoting human rights and economic development 
throughout the country. It is essential that we build on that 
investment during the new administration of President-elect Uribe. 
Indeed, I am pleased that President-elect Uribe has said that he looks 
forward to the day when Colombia is not

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sending a single kilogram of cocaine to the United States. To make that 
a reality, we must ensure that coca growers in the poor regions of 
Colombia have access to alternative economic opportunities, and that 
they take advantage of those opportunities to get out of the coca 
business for good. We must also promote human rights and the rule of 
law in Colombia; otherwise, the cycle of violence and narco-trafficking 
that is draining the livelihood of the country will ultimately lead to 
total state collapse, and to even more narco-trafficking and perhaps 
support for terrorism in the ruins of such a failed state.
  With the visit to Washington this week of a new President-elect, this 
is an opportune time to reflect on some of the new directions in our 
bilateral relationship with Colombia. In particular, this provides an 
appropriate opportunity to step back and evaluate the effectiveness to 
date of our various policy objectives in Colombia. We must consider, 
for example, whether our initiatives have been effective in reducing 
the levels of violence in the country, in seeking accountability for 
grave human rights violations, and in cutting off the narco-traffickers 
who provide both financing and incentives for insurgent forces. We must 
also ask whether our policy in Colombia provides an effective balance 
of military assistance and well-managed development support. And we 
have an obligation to the people of Colombia to consider the human and 
environmental effects of our ongoing fumigation campaign.
  In reflecting on the situation in Colombia today, one thing remains 
absolutely clear: The status quo in Colombia cannot be justified. The 
prolonged civil war, which is fueled by lucrative narco-trafficking, 
has created a volatile society, with untold suffering and a seemingly 
endless cycle of grave human rights abuses. The narco-traffickers have 
prospered, the guerrillas, and increasingly the paramilitaries, have 
offered the narco-traffickers hired protection, and they, too, are 
prospering from this deadly relationship. It is the people of Colombia, 
the average farmers and the honest citizens, who must pay the price of 
the war. That price can be counted in the number of lives lost or 
displaced in Colombia. But we must also count the lives lost to drugs 
and violence on our own streets in the United States. Such vast costs 
are wholly unacceptable.
  So, where do we go from here? First and foremost, we must continue to 
scrutinize the relationship between the Colombian military and the 
paramilitary forces in the country. The Colombian military has been 
taking steps to sever its ties with the paramilitaries, but I am 
worried that those steps have not translated into meaningful progress 
on the ground. As the United States considers supporting the counter-
insurgency operations of the Colombian military, we must guarantee that 
Colombia takes seriously its obligation to seek out and prosecute the 
paramilitaries. And we must remember that by most accounts, the 
paramilitaries today are more responsible than any other terrorist 
group for the massive war crimes committed in the country.
  We must also ensure that the Colombian government commits its 
resources to a more robust investment in its own institutions. We must 
never substitute our own assets or personnel for an appropriate level 
of investment by Colombia in its own future. This must include domestic 
support to institutions of justice, and for the protection of 
civilians, as well as responsible military support to defend the 
civilian population from rebel and paramilitary attacks.
  Finally, we must do more to ensure that communities that have already 
been so hard-hit by the conflict have access to development 
opportunities to rebuild their lives. Alternative development must be a 
cornerstone of any effective counter-narcotics campaign. Without 
alternative development, displaced communities will have only one 
rational economic option: to turn to the lucrative but illegal 
cultivation of the coca that drug lords are so eager to buy and 
protect. Quite simply, we must give battered rural communities a viable 
economic alternative to coca or poppy cultivation if we are ever to 
bring the wars in Colombia to an end. To date, our investment in such 
development has been insufficient. And perhaps as a result, we have 
also made little progress in stemming the flow of drugs. Without more 
of a social investment in alternative development, I fear that the coca 
fumigation program that is being supported by the United States will 
merely shift drug cultivation into even more remote and ecologically 
sensitive areas of the country.
  So I rise today to congratulate the people of Colombia on their 
successful Presidential election in May. That democratic institutions 
continue to function in the midst of such violence and intimidation is 
an impressive tribute to the Colombian people. But as the United States 
moves to support our new colleagues in the incoming government in 
Colombia, we must continually ask ourselves whether our intervention is 
achieving our policy goals, and whether it is making a difference to 
the lives of average Colombians.
  Carefully crafted U.S. support for Colombia can make a difference. 
Indeed, it must make a difference. But we must monitor the effects of 
that support very closely, because neither the U.S. taxpayer nor the 
vast communities in Colombia that have already been devastated by the 
war can afford to see such a significant U.S. investment in Colombia 
fail. We cannot and must not abandon Colombia. But at the same time, we 
cannot delude ourselves about the efficacy of our policy thus far. 
Critics of U.S. policy in Colombia, and in many cases I have been among 
them, raise valid questions about the commitment of the military to the 
rule of law and to protecting civilians. They raise important questions 
about the consequences of fumigation and the economic prospects for 
farmers who agree not to plant coca. It is our responsibility to weigh 
these points and to answer these questions, and where necessary, to 
adjust our policy so that we get it right. For Americans and for 
Colombians, the stakes are too high to do otherwise.

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