[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 148 (2002), Part 8]
[Senate]
[Pages 10947-10949]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                             FBI REFORM ACT

  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, yesterday's Washington Post provides yet 
another example of why it is so urgent that we act to pass S. 1974, the 
Leahy-Grassley FBI Reform Act.
  This bill was unanimously reported out of the Judiciary Committee on 
April 25, 2 months ago. Apparently an anonymous Republican Senator has 
operated to block Senate passage of this bill which, as I said, passed 
unanimously from the Judiciary Committee.
  Normally, I would be willing to wait for the time when some of these 
holds finally get dropped off, but I thought it was important for my 
colleagues on both sides of the aisle to know about this. It is 
troubling to me that an anonymous Republican Senator would block 
passage of what is a bipartisan bill, a bipartisan bill to improve the 
FBI, the Nation's leading counterterrorism agency, at the same time the 
President has sought bipartisan efforts to pass his proposed homeland 
security reorganization.
  I hope the White House will ask their fellow party members why they 
would hold up this legislation.
  I urge the Republican Member or Members with the hold on this 
legislation to remove the hold and allow us to discuss whatever issue 
on the merits they may have.
  The press reported yesterday that two new FBI whistleblowers have 
come forward and provided information which might be crucial to the 
FBI's antiterrorism efforts. At least one of those whistleblowers has 
also provided information to the staff of the Judiciary Committee that 
suggests that, in its rush to beef up its translation capabilities 
after September 11, the FBI may have relaxed both quality control and 
its own security standards.
  The Post also reports that some of the allegations made by this 
whistleblower have been verified, but still, even though verified, the 
woman who raised these concerns, who raised these legitimate security 
issues post-September 11, was fired by the FBI for ``disruptiveness,'' 
their words.
  Because the Department of Justice inspector general is looking into 
this matter, Senator Grassley and I sent a letter to his office based 
upon what we learned about the incident. This whistleblower makes 
allegations that amount to far more than just a ``he-said, she-said'' 
internal office dispute. Rather, her allegations raise significant 
security issues that should be addressed as part of the inspector 
general's review.
  The letter Senator Grassley and I sent posed specific questions we 
hope the inspector general will examine as part of his investigation, 
including whether the reaction to this woman's report is likely to 
chill further reporting of security breaches by FBI employees.
  What we are concerned about is, if you have an FBI agent who is aware 
of a security breach, will they be willing to come forward and tell 
about that, or will they fear they may be fired? It is not a good 
management practice for the FBI to fire the person who reports a 
security breach while nothing happens to the person who allegedly 
committed the breach. That could mean if you commit a breach, you might 
get away with it, but if you report it, you are out of here. That is a 
concern we have. That is not the way it should be.
  That is precisely the kind of culture Judge Webster found helped FBI 
Supervisory Agent Robert Hanssen to get away with spying for the 
Russians. He got away with that spying for 20 years.
  Since the attacks of September 11 and the anthrax attacks last fall, 
we have relied on the FBI to detect and prevent acts of catastrophic 
terrorism that endanger the lives of the American people and the 
institutions of our country. FBI reform was already important, but the 
terrorist attacks suffered by this country last year have imposed even 
greater urgency on improving the FBI. The Bureau is our front line of 
domestic defense against terrorists. It needs to be as great as 
possible.
  Even before those attacks, the Judiciary Committee's oversight 
hearings revealed some very serious problems at the FBI that needed 
strong congressional action to fix. We continue this oversight of the 
Department of Justice and the FBI. We heard about a double standard in 
evaluations and discipline. We heard about record and information 
management problems and communications breakdowns between field offices 
and headquarters that led to the belated production of documents in the 
Oklahoma City bombing case. Despite the fact that we have poured 
money--billions of dollars--into the FBI over the last 5 years, we 
heard the FBI's computer systems were in dire need of modernization.
  In fact, most children in grade school in my State have access, many 
times, to better computer systems.
  We heard about how an FBI supervisor, Robert Hanssen, was able to 
sell critical secrets to the Russians, undetected for years, and he 
never even had a polygraph. We heard that there were no fewer than 15 
different areas of security the Justice Department needed to fix at the 
FBI.
  The FBI Reform Act tackles these problems with improved 
accountability, improved security both inside and outside the FBI, and 
required planning to ensure that the FBI is prepared to deal with a 
multitude of challenges we are facing.
  As I said, it was unanimously reported by both Republicans and 
Democrats on the Judiciary Committee. It reflects our determination to 
make sure the FBI is as good and strong as it can be--probably more 
important, as good and as strong as America needs it to be. That reform 
bill is a long stride toward the goal.

[[Page 10948]]

  The case reported in yesterday's Washington Post and the matters 
raised by Minneapolis Field Office Agent Coleen M. Rowley in her May 
21, 2002 letter and subsequent testimony critiquing the handling of the 
Moussaoui case by FBI Headquarters personnel provide case studies for 
many of the precise issues that S. 1974, the FBI Reform Act, addresses 
and why its passage is so critical in the FBI's effort to fight 
terrorism. The Leahy-Grassley bill expands whistle-blower protections 
to ensure that FBI whistle-blowers get the same protections as other 
government employees.
  The FBI is currently exempted from the Whistleblower Protection Act, 
and its employees are only protected by internal Department of Justice 
regulations. For example, while Special Agent Rowley's letter to the 
FBI Director and the Inspector General is protected under these 
regulations, three of the five people to whom she sent her letter were 
Members of Congress and are not covered under the current regulations. 
Moreover, her testimony at the June 6 Judiciary Committee oversight 
hearing, and before any other committee or subcommittee of the 
Congress, is not protected under the current regulations. Even a report 
or complaint to her immediate FBI supervisors would not be protected 
under the current regulations. That is why the FBI Director's personal 
guaranty, and the Attorney General's assurances, that she would be 
protected against retaliations is so important. The Leahy-Grassley FBI 
Reform Act would extend whistleblower protection for FBI employees to 
all these disclosures.
  The FBI Reform Act would also put an end to statutory restrictions 
that contribute to the ``double standard,'' where senior management 
officials are not disciplined as harshly for misconduct as line agents 
are. Agent Rowley complained about this double standard, as have other 
FBI agents who have helped the Judiciary Committee craft solutions to 
the FBI's problems.
  The bill would provide expanded statutory authority for the DOJ 
Inspector General to investigate internal problems at the FBI and help 
design comprehensive, systematic solutions. It would create the Career 
Security Officer Program that Judge Webster and FBI officials have 
endorsed to prevent security breaches.
  These are not partisan provisions. The FBI Reform Act is the result 
of bipartisan oversight hearings which the Judiciary Committee has 
conducted over the last year. It was reported out of Committee 
unanimously. Now, when it reaches the Senate floor, it is being blocked 
anonymously. The future of the FBI is too important for politics. Too 
many Americans depend on it for their safety.
  On June 7, 2002, I delivered a statement that highlighted Republican 
holds on four important bipartisan pieces of legislation, including 
important anti-terrorism legislation aimed at curbing terrorist 
bombings.
  Less than a week later, the United States Embassy in Karachi, 
Pakistan was bombed. The next morning, the Senate passed my bill, S. 
1770, to deal with that issue.
  I now appeal to the Republican Senator or Senators blocking the FBI 
Reform Act to remove your hold so that we may pass this bill. The 
American people deserve action, not politics as usual.
  Senator Grassley and I would never be seen as ideological soulmates, 
but we are joined together in wanting to improve this aspect of the 
FBI, and we have had key Republicans and key Democrats join us.
  Let the bill go forward. The American people deserve this action, not 
politics as usual.
  I ask unanimous consent that yesterday's Washington Post article and 
the letter I sent with Senator Grassley to the Justice Department 
inspector general be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                                   Committee on the Judiciary,

                                    Washington, DC, June 19, 2002.
     Hon. Glen A. Fine,
     Inspector General, Department of Justice,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Fine: The Senate Judiciary Committee has received 
     unclassified information from the FBI regarding allegations 
     made by Ms. Sibel D. Edmonds, a former FBI contract linguist, 
     that your office is currently investigating. We request that, 
     as this investigation progresses, you consider the following 
     questions on this matter:
       (1) Ms. Edmonds has alleged, and the FBI has confirmed, 
     that the FBI assigned a contract language ``monitor'' to 
     Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, contrary to clear FBI policy that only 
     more qualified ``linguists'' be assigned to Guantanamo Bay. 
     What circumstances led to the contract language monitor being 
     considered qualified for this assignment, and what were the 
     consequences, if any, for the effectiveness of the 
     interrogation of those being detained at Guantanamo?
       (2) Ms. Edmonds has alleged, and the FBI has confirmed, 
     that another contract linguist in the FBI unit to which Ms. 
     Edmonds was assigned failed to translate at least two 
     communications reflecting a foreign official's handling of 
     intelligence matters. The FBI has confirmed that the contract 
     linguist had ``unreported contracts'' with that foreign 
     official. To what extent did that contract linguist have any 
     additional unreported or reported contacts with that foreign 
     official? What counterintelligence inquiries or assessments, 
     if any, were made with respect to those contacts? Do you plan 
     to interview field office and headquarters 
     counterintelligence personnel regarding this matter?
       (3) The FBI has said that, to review the other contract 
     linguist's work that Ms. Edmonds questioned, it used three 
     linguists in its language division, a supervisory special 
     agent, and special agents who worked on the case that 
     generated the communications under review. Was this a 
     ``blind'' review by the linguists, or did they know the 
     person whose work was under review? Were the linguists 
     sufficiently independent to make objective judgments about 
     the translations in question? Would it have been appropriate 
     to use linguists from outside the FBI?
       (4) The FBI has said a determination was made by the 
     supervisory special agent that the contract linguist whose 
     work was reviewed made a mistake and that the matter was a 
     training issue. Did this agent's position affect his ability 
     to render an objective judgment? What input did the other 
     special agents provide? Did their involvement in the case 
     that generated the communications affect their ability to 
     make an objective judgement about a person with whom they had 
     worked on the case? Would it have been better to ask other 
     counterintelligence agents to assess the importance of the 
     untranslated information and the reason it was not 
     translated?
       (5) To what extent is the credibility of witnesses 
     regarding Ms. Edmonds' allegations affected by their 
     continuing employment in the same translation unit and under 
     the same supervisor where the contract linguist discussed in 
     question (2) is employed.
       (6) The FBI has said that Ms. Edmonds prepared two 
     classified documents with respect to her allegations on her 
     home computer without authorization and that one witness 
     reported Ms. Edmunds discussed classified information 
     regarding her allegations in the presence of three uncleared 
     members of her family without authorization. Would these 
     actions disqualify her from a security clearance, given the 
     circumstances of her concern about a foreign attempt to 
     penetrate or influence FBI operations at her workplace?
       (7) What guidance is provided to FBI contract linguists as 
     to the steps they should take if they are concerned about a 
     possible foreign attempt to penetrate or influence FBI 
     operations? How well is this guidance understood by contract 
     linguists in the FBI translation centers and other FBI 
     personnel who would handle such matters?
       (8) What improvements, if any, are needed to encourage FBI 
     contract linguists and other FBI contract personnel to come 
     forward with such counterintelligence concerns and to ensure 
     that they are not adversely affected as a result of seeking 
     to assist FBI counterintelligence efforts? Was Ms. Edmunds' 
     case handled in a manner that would encourage such reporting 
     in the future?
       Please let us know the timetable for your investigation and 
     advise us of the results.
           Sincerely,
     Patrick Leahy,
       Chairman.
     Charles E. Grassley,
       United States Senator.
                                  ____


               [From the Washington Post, June 19, 2002]

     2 FBI Whistle Blowers Allege Lax Security, Possible Espionage

                         (By James V. Grimaldi)

       In separate cases, two new FBI whistle-blowers are alleging 
     mismanagement and lax security--and in one case possible 
     espionage--among those who translate and oversee some of the 
     FBI's most sensitive, top-secret wiretaps in 
     counterintelligence and counterterrorist investigations.
       The allegations of one of the whistle-blowers have prompted 
     two key senators--Judiciary Chairman Patrick J. Leahy (D-VT) 
     and Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa)--to pose critical questions 
     about the FBI division working on the front line of gathering 
     and analyzing wiretaps.

[[Page 10949]]

       That whistle-blower, Sibel Edmonds, 32, a former wiretap 
     translator in the Washington field office, raised suspicions 
     about a co-worker's connections to a group under 
     surveillance.
       Under pressure, FBI officials have investigated and 
     verified the veracity of parts of Edmonds' story, according 
     to documents and people familiar with an FBI briefing of 
     congressional staff. Leahy and Grassley summoned the FBI to 
     Capitol Hill on Monday for a private explanation, people 
     familiar with the briefing said.
       The FBI confirmed that Edmonds' co-worker had been part of 
     an organization that was a target of top-secret surveillance 
     and that the same co-worker had ``unreported contacts'' with 
     a foreign government official subject to the surveillance, 
     according to a letter from the two senators to the Justice 
     Department's Office of the Inspector General. In addition, 
     the linguist failed to translate two communications from the 
     targeted foreign government official, the letter said.
       ``This whistleblower raised serious questions about 
     potential security problems and the integrity of important 
     translations made by the FBI,'' Grassley said in a statement. 
     ``She made these allegations in good faith and even though 
     the deck was stacked against her. The FBI even admits to a 
     number of her allegations, and on other allegations, the 
     bureau's explanation leaves me skeptical.''
       The allegations add a new dimension to the growing 
     criticism of the FBI, which has centered in recent weeks on 
     the bureau's failure to heed internal warnings about al-Qaida 
     leading up to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. Last month, FBI 
     agent Coleen Rowley also complained about systemic problems 
     before the attacks. Rowley works in Minneapolis, where agents 
     in August unsuccessfully tried to get a search warrant to 
     look into the laptop computer of a man now described as the 
     ``20th hijacker.''
       Finding capable and trustworthy translators has been a 
     special challenge in the terrorism war. FBI officials told 
     government auditors in January that translator shortages have 
     resulted in ``the accumulation of thousands of hours of audio 
     tapes and pages'' of untranslated material. After the 
     attacks, FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III issued a plea for 
     translators, and hundreds of people applied.
       Margaret Gulotta, chief of language services at the FBI, 
     said the bureau has hired 400 translators in two years, 
     significantly reducing the backlog on high-priority cases 
     while upholding strict background checks. ``We have not 
     compromised our standards in terms of language proficiency 
     and security,'' Gulotta said.
       In the second whistle-blower case, John M. Cole, 41, 
     program manager for FBI foreign intelligence investigations 
     covering India, Pakistan and Afghanistan, said 
     counterintelligence and counterterrorism training has 
     declined drastically in recent years as part of a continuing 
     pattern of poor management.
       Cole also said he had observed what he believed was a 
     security lapse regarding the screening and hiring of 
     translators. ``I thought we had all these new security 
     procedures in place, in light of [FBI spy Robert P.] 
     Hanssen,'' Cole said. ``No one is going by the rules and 
     regulations and whatever policy may be implemented.''
       Edmonds and Cole have written about their concerns to high-
     level FBI officials. Edmonds wrote to Dale Watson, the 
     bureau's counterterrorism chief, and Cole wrote to Mueller. 
     Both cases have been referred to Justice's Office of the 
     Inspector General, which is investigating, government 
     officials confirmed.
       The FBI said it was unable to corrobate an allegation by 
     Edmonds that she was approached to join the targeted group. 
     Edmonds said she told Dennis Saccher, a special agent in the 
     Washington field office who was conducting the surveillance, 
     about the co-worker's actions and Saccher repled. It looks 
     like espionage to me.'' Saccher declined to comment when 
     contacted by a reporter.
       Edmonds was fired in March after she reported her concerns. 
     Government officials said the FBI fired her because her 
     ``disruptiveness'' hurt her on-the-job ``performance.'' 
     Edmonds said she believes she was fired in retaliation for 
     reporting on her co-worker.
       Edmonds began working at the FBI in late September. In an 
     interview, she said she became particularly alarmed when she 
     discovered that a recently hired FBI translater was saying 
     that she belonged to Middle Eastern organization whose taped 
     conversations she had been translating for FBI 
     counterintelligence agents. Officials asked that the name of 
     the target group not be revealed for national security 
     reasons.
       A Washington Post reporter discovered Edmonds' name in her 
     whistle-blowing letters to federal and congressional 
     officials and approached her for an interview.
       Edmonds said that on several occasions, the translator 
     tried to recruit her to join the targeted foreign group. 
     ``This person told us she worked for our target 
     organization,'' Edmonds said in an interview. ``These are the 
     people we are targeting, monitoring.''
       Edmonds would not identify the other translator, but The 
     Post has learned from other sources that she is a 33-year-old 
     U.S. citizen whose native country is home to the target 
     group. Both Edmonds and the other translator are U.S. 
     citizens who trace their ethnicity to the same Middle Eastern 
     country. Reached by telephone last week, the woman, who works 
     under contract for the FBI's Washington field office, 
     declined to comment.
       In December, Edmonds said the woman and her husband, a U.S. 
     military officer, suggested during a hastily arranged visit 
     to Edmonds' Northern Virginia home on a Sunday morning that 
     Edmonds join the group.
       ``He said, `Are you a member of the particular 
     organization?''' Edmonds recalled the woman's husband saying. 
     ``[He said,] `It's a very good place to be a member. There 
     are a lot of advantages of being with this organization and 
     doing things together'--this is our targeted organization--
     `and one of the greatest things about it is you can have an 
     early, an unexpected, early retirement. And you will be 
     totally set if you go to that specific country.'''
       Edmonds also said the woman's husband told her she would be 
     admitted to the group, especially if she said she worked for 
     the FBI.
       Later, Edmonds said, the woman approached her with a list 
     dividing up individuals whose phone lines were being secretly 
     tapped. Under the plan, the woman would translate 
     conversations of her former co-workers in the target 
     organization, and Edmonds would handle other phone calls. 
     Edmonds said she refused and that the woman told her that her 
     lack of cooperation could put her family in danger.
       Edmonds said she also brought her concerns to her 
     supervisor and other FBI officials in the Washington field 
     office. When no action was taken, she said, she reported her 
     concerns to the FBI's Office of Professional Responsibility, 
     then to Justice's inspector general.
       ``Investigations are being compromised,'' Edmonds wrote to 
     the inspector general's office in March. ``Incorrect or 
     misleading translations are being sent to agents in the 
     field. Translations are being blocked and circumvented.''
       Government officials familiar with the matter who asked not 
     to be identified said that both Edmonds and the woman were 
     given polygraph examinations by the FBI and that both passed.
       Edmonds had been found to have breached security, FBI 
     officials told Senate investigators. Edmonds said that two of 
     those alleged breaches were related to specific instruction 
     by a supervisor to prepare a report on the other translator 
     on her home computer.

                          ____________________