[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 148 (2002), Part 8]
[Senate]
[Pages 10902-10925]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now 
resume consideration of S. 2514, which the clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 2514) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
     year 2003 for military activities of the Department of 
     Defense, for military construction, and for defense 
     activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe 
     personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed 
     Forces, and for other purposes.

  Pending:

       Feingold Amendment No. 3915, to extend for 2 years 
     procedures to maintain fiscal accountability and 
     responsibility.
       Reid (for Conrad) Amendment No. 3916 (to Amendment No. 
     3915), of a perfecting nature.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island is recognized.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for the 
fiscal year 2003 Defense authorization bill. I believe this bill 
provides the needed resources to compensate and to reward the men and 
women in uniform who are doing an extraordinary job protecting this 
country across the globe and here at home. I also think the bill will 
provide the funding and the direction to continue the transformation of 
our military forces so that we are able to meet the new emerging 
threats of this new century.
  This year, I again served as chairman of the Strategic Subcommittee. 
This subcommittee focuses on strategic systems, space systems, missile 
defense, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance programs, and 
the national security functions of the Department of Energy. The 
subcommittee and the full committee held seven hearings dealing with 
matters in the subcommittee's jurisdiction.
  The issues addressed by the subcommittee cover a wide range of 
subjects. These issues include the Nuclear Posture Review, which the 
Defense Department issued in December, which covers our strategic 
nuclear plan; the creation of a new Missile Defense Agency, which 
replaced the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization; increased concerns 
about the security of nuclear weapons and materials; the need to 
substantially restructure several space programs; and proposed 
reductions to the number of deployed nuclear weapons in the context of 
the new and very commendable agreement with Russia.
  Let me turn, first, to the issues of strategic systems.
  The strategic systems that fall within the jurisdiction of the 
Strategic Subcommittee include long-range bombers, the land-based and 
sea-based ballistic missile forces, and the broad range of matters 
pertaining to nuclear weapons in the Department of Defense.
  In the area of strategic systems, the bill, as reported, adds $23 
million to keep the Minuteman III ICBM upgrade programs and the effort 
to retire the Peacekeeper on track, as has been requested by the Air 
Force in their list of unfunded requirements.
  The Peacekeeper and the Minuteman III missiles are both land-based 
missile systems. When the Peacekeeper is retired, Minuteman III will be 
the only land-based system, so it is very important to ensure, for our 
nuclear deterrence, that the process of retirement of Peacekeeper and 
modernization of Minuteman III continues at the appropriate pace.
  Under the terms of the Nuclear Posture Review, the Department of 
Defense plans to eliminate all 50 of the Peacekeeper missiles and 
download the 500 Minuteman III missiles from their current multi-
warhead configuration to a single warhead. This is a significant step 
in reducing the threat posed by nuclear weapons and one of the major 
reasons that the United States and Russia were able to come to an 
agreement.
  Reducing the number of warheads on the Minuteman III to one warhead 
per missile, and removing all of the warheads from retiring Peacekeeper 
missiles, is a key to achieving the goals of a reduced number of 
deployed missiles that are at the heart of the agreement with the 
United States and Russia.
  The commitment is to reduce the number of deployed nuclear warheads 
to the range of 1,700 to 2,200 from the present approximately 6,000 
deployed warheads.
  Also, this will provide more stability, as missiles with single 
warheads, in the context of deterrence policy, are a more stable 
element than multi-warhead missiles.
  These are all encouraging developments, but it is necessary to keep 
this process on track by the additional funds which we have added to 
this legislation.
  The subcommittee is also concerned about ensuring that the long-range 
bomber fleet is modernized and maintained. These bombers, particularly 
the B-2 and the B-52, have repeatedly showed their usefulness in 
conflicts from Desert Storm to present operations. There are no plans 
to replace these bombers in the near future. In fact, in 2000, when the 
Air Force last reviewed the projected lifetime of these bombers, they 
determined they could rely on these bombers for an additional 30 years. 
The reality is, the pilots who will retire the B-52 and B-2 bombers 
have not yet been born.
  We have to maintain these systems, upgrade their electronics and 
avionics, to make sure they are still a valuable and decisive part of 
our forces.
  This bill would include an additional $28 million to address 
shortfalls in the B-2 and B-52 bomber programs, and also approves the 
request by the Department of Defense to reduce and consolidate the B-1 
fleet.
  Adding these additional funds is absolutely necessary if the Air 
Force projections are correct, and we will have these systems--the B-2 
and the B-52--in our inventory for an additional 30 years.
  Turning to the area of space, another jurisdiction of the Strategic 
Subcommittee, we considered a variety of very important Defense 
Department space programs. These programs include satellite programs 
that provide communications, weather, global positioning systems, early 
warning, and other satellites for defense and national security 
purposes.
  Space programs are critical to the effective use of our Nation's 
military forces, and each day they grow in importance. This is a very 
important aspect of our deliberations.
  We also included in our consideration the ability of the United 
States to continue to effectively launch space vehicles by looking at 
the east coast ranges in Florida and the west coast ranges in 
California.
  The bill includes funding at the requested levels for most of the 
Department of Defense space programs. There are some exceptions, 
however. The committee has added $29 million to continue to improve the 
readiness and operations safety at the east coast and west coast space 
launch and range facilities. If we cannot launch vehicles into space, 
we cannot ensure that we have the appropriate constellation of 
satellites to communicate, to provide intelligence resources, to 
provide global positioning signals--all the things that are critical to 
the success of our military forces in the field. These ranges are 
important, and these additional funds will upgrade their ability to 
continue to play a vital role in our national security.

[[Page 10903]]

  The bill also includes reductions in certain space programs. One of 
these programs is the Space-Based Infrared Radar-High or SBIRS-High 
satellite program. This is a satellite program which is critical to 
replacing an older and aging system of satellites that provides early 
warning of missile launches and other activities of concern to the 
United States.
  The worldwide reach of this satellite system is key to its ability to 
warn of any launches and to provide other critical intelligence. But 
this program has been plagued with serious problems. It is overbudget 
and years behind schedule. It is in the process of being restructured 
by the Department of Defense.
  Reflecting this restructuring, the bill reduces the over $800 million 
budget request for SBIRS-High by $100 million so that this 
restructuring can literally catch up with the funding stream. I think 
this is an appropriate way to continue to maintain the defense 
capabilities of the United States while recognizing a program that is 
in the midst of serious restructuring by the Department of Defense.
  The bill also reduces the requested funding for another satellite 
that has had a troubled history; and that is the Advanced Extremely 
High Frequency, or Advanced EHF satellite. This satellite program is 
designed to ensure that the Department of Defense and the military 
services will retain the ability to have a reliable and survivable 
communication. Advanced EHF, like SBIRS-High, is a replacement for a 
current system. But, here again, the program is in serious trouble, 
overbudget and behind schedule. It, too, is being structured. This 
restructuring made $95 million available that the Air Force requested 
be shifted to other high-priority programs. And we have followed their 
advice and their suggestion.
  Space programs are critical to the operations of the U.S. military. 
As I indicated, with each day, they become more and more critical. But 
several of these programs, not only the SBIRS-High program and the 
Advanced EHF communications satellite program, are experiencing 
significant problems with cost growth and schedule slippage.
  Some of the problems with the space programs appear to be connected 
with the oversight and management of the programs. To address this, the 
bill includes a legislative provision to ensure the adequate oversight 
of space programs. This provision would direct the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense to maintain oversight of space programs and would 
require the Secretary to submit to Congress a plan on how oversight by 
OSD and the joint staff will be accomplished. This provision is 
included largely as a result of testimony before the Strategic 
Subcommittee in March of 2002 and will ensure that OSD remains and 
retains an oversight role for space programs.
  Under Secretary of the Air Force Peter Teets, when testifying before 
the subcommittee, stated that the Air Force is facing significant 
challenges in several of our most important space programs. This bill 
attempts to address these concerns by ensuring that adequate oversight 
by the Department of Defense is maintained.
  Let me again stress the importance of these programs. We have all 
been amazed by the extraordinary success of our military forces in 
Afghanistan. If you listened to the reports of the special forces 
troops conducting these operations on the ground, one of the key 
weapons they had was not a cannon or an M-16, it was a global-
positioning, range-finding, targeting device which will operate 
magnificently as long as we have GPS satellites and comparable 
satellites in the air. So communications and satellites are critical to 
the special forces soldier on the ground, the aviator in the air, every 
member of our military forces. We are endeavoring to maintain, to 
enhance, and to secure the future of our space operations within this 
legislation.
  Let me turn now to another aspect of our responsibilities. That is 
the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance functions. This area 
includes programs such as the Global Hawk and the Predator unmanned 
aerial vehicles, or UAVs. We have long supported these very innovative 
and sophisticated weapons. They have shown their worth, particularly 
Predator in Afghanistan, and therefore the committee recommends fully 
funding the administration's request to accelerate the development and 
procurement of UAVs.
  Another area we have supported--and in fact we provide additional 
support in the legislation--is the acquisition of commercial satellite 
imagery by the Department of Defense. The bill includes an additional 
$30 million to authorize the Department to buy commercially available 
imagery to supplement and complement the imagery which we collect 
through our own assets. This will enhance our ability to conduct 
operations. This is an initiative strongly supported by Senator Allard, 
ranking member of the committee. We join in his support of this very 
worthy enterprise and endeavor.
  Let me turn to some of the aspects in the subcommittee that touch 
upon the responsibilities of the Department of Energy when it comes to 
nuclear weapons. We include several provisions addressing DOE programs. 
The first would ensure that Congress continues to exercise its 
oversight responsibility with respect to funding for future nuclear 
weapons activities.
  This is absolutely important. In December the administration released 
a Nuclear Posture Review. This Nuclear Posture Review has been 
criticized, challenged, identified as perhaps blurring the line between 
nuclear and conventional responses. This is an area where there is much 
concern. Again, it reinforces the need for Congress to be informed and 
responsive to evolving policy with respect to development and 
deployment and use, potentially--we hope never--of nuclear weapons.
  If you look at the Nuclear Posture Review, you will see throughout a 
new triad which includes offensive strike systems which are described 
as including both nuclear and nonnuclear.
  You will see that in the context and literal words of the Nuclear 
Posture Review, they have talked about ``in setting requirements for 
nuclear strike capabilities, distinctions can be made among the 
contingencies for which the United States must be prepared. 
Contingencies can generally be categorized as immediate, potential, or 
unexpected.''
  In the realm of immediate, potential, or unexpected contingencies, 
they list countries such as North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya. 
These are countries which may be endeavoring to develop nuclear weapons 
but at this time are not declared nuclear powers, raising the issue of 
whether we would abandon a long-term policy that we would not use 
nuclear weapons as a first strike on a nonnuclear power unless they 
attack us in conjunction with a nuclear power. This uncertainty, 
ambiguity, exists. Perhaps it has always existed, but it underscores 
the need for Congress to be informed, to be part of this evolving 
discussion and debate about nuclear policy.
  Therefore, we would ask that the Department of Energy specifically 
request funds for any new or modified nuclear weapons. There is no 
money in this budget for such weapons, but I think at this juncture we 
have to go on record to ask for that type of specific information and 
not rely upon finding it buried in some larger account. It is an 
important issue. It is a critical issue. After the tensions between 
Pakistan and India, that have not yet subsided totally, no one needs to 
be reminded about the horrendous impact of the potential use of a 
nuclear weapon. Therefore, it is vitally important that this Congress 
be informed of any potential developments of new weapons by the United 
States.
  The budget request did include $15.5 million for a feasibility study 
of a robust nuclear earth penetrator weapon. The bill denies funding 
for this purpose and directs the Secretaries of Energy and Defense to 
submit a report to Congress setting forth the military requirements, 
the characteristics and types of targets the nuclear earth penetrator 
would hold at risk, the employment policies of such a nuclear earth 
penetrator, and an assessment of the capabilities of conventional 
weapons against these potential targets.

[[Page 10904]]

  Once again, in the context of a statement by administration officials 
about the, perhaps, rejection of long-term policy, the nonfirst use 
against nonnuclear powers, and the ambiguity that has been created, it 
is essential to stop and look at justification for creating this weapon 
system.
  We already have a nuclear earth penetrator. It is the B61-11; it has 
been publicly reported. We have the system in place. It is incumbent 
upon the Departments of Energy and Defense to say why we need to modify 
another system to do a similar job.
  I will also point out there has been some suggestion that what the 
Department of Energy might be working on is a small mini-nuke that 
would be less troublesome in terms of radiation, in terms of the 
impact. Quite seriously, once we cross the nuclear threshold, the size 
of the weapon may be less important than the fact that we have crossed 
the threshold.
  From the candidates that might be chosen to modify for this robust 
nuclear earth penetrator, these are very large weapons, hundreds of 
kilotons, at least six or seven times the destructive force that was 
used upon Hiroshima. We have to be very careful. The bill goes ahead 
and denies the funds and asks the Department of Energy to justify with 
the report several parameters which are necessary before they go 
forward, if they do go forward.
  The last DOE provision I would like to speak about is a provision 
that would focus additional resources, $100 million, in cleanup efforts 
to clean up DOE sites throughout the country that have been polluted by 
the nuclear activities going back more than 50 years. It is essential 
to make our commitment to communities throughout this country that have 
hosted DOE facilities and now see the ground around them literally 
contaminated, in many cases by nuclear operations. This is very 
important.
  Let me turn to one of the most contentious and challenging issues 
before the subcommittee. That is the issue of ballistic missile 
defense. I want to take some time and go into some detail because there 
are misconceptions and misinformation about what the subcommittee did 
and what the committee finally approved.
  Let me start with the very broad picture. The administration 
requested $7.6 billion for missile defense. The committee recommends 
$6.8 billion, a reduction of $812 million, or 11 percent. I should 
point out that the budget for missile defense has grown dramatically in 
the last several years. We are still funding this program at a very 
robust $6.8 billion. The $812 million reduction in ballistic missile 
defense was transferred to more immediate and pressing needs in the 
view of the committee.
  The most significant, in terms of dollars, was $690 million for 
additional shipbuilding, which will provide advanced procurement for a 
new submarine, a new destroyer, and a new troop transport ship, all 
immediate and vital needs for our military forces.
  Some of the additional money would be used to increase the security 
of the Department of Energy facilities. Again, after the last several 
weeks, where we thought an al-Qaida operative was making his way to the 
United States to steal radioactive material to construct a ``dirty'' 
bomb, the need for enhanced security at DOE sites, as well as many 
other sites that have radiological material, cannot be underestimated.
  Let me talk in general terms about the ballistic missile threat and 
the programs that are evolving to meet that threat. First, historically 
and generally, we have categorized this in two ways: short-range 
threats and the longer range threat of the intercontinental ballistic 
missile. The reality is that many countries have short-range missiles, 
some of which are capable of mounting chemical and biological warheads. 
They are an immediate present threat to U.S. forces deployed throughout 
the world and to U.S. allies throughout the world.
  Intercontinental ballistic missiles are those, obviously, that travel 
long distances and are designed to strike the homeland of the United 
States. Those two distinctions have formed most of our programmatic 
response for many decades.
  The administration has come in and, in some respects, blurred the 
lines between these two distinctions. Rather than the traditional 
distinction between theater missile and national missile defense, 
between the short- and medium-range missiles and the longer range 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, they have talked about creating a 
missile defense consisting of the boost phase defense systems--those 
systems designed to strike a missile when it leaves the launch pad, in 
the 2 or 3 minutes before it gets into the upper atmosphere; in fact, 
outside of the atmosphere in some cases--a midcourse phase, as the term 
indicates, which would destroy the missile in the middle of its flight; 
and the terminal phase, which is the final point where the missile is 
heading toward its target, coming down rapidly towards its target.
  Now, there is a certain logic to this. I have to be fair about that. 
If one looks at defense in other contexts, such as the more terrestrial 
contexts of a land battle, defense in depth is a watchword--long-range 
fires, intermediate fires, and close fires. So there is a logic to 
this, and it might be unwitting, but there is a blurring and distortion 
that I think can be misinterpreted--and I think it has been in many 
cases--with respect to the actual programs we are trying to develop and 
the progress on those programs.
  One case in point is a recent article in the Wall Street Journal, on 
June 18, where it talks about discussions by General Kadish, about the 
Navy theater-wide missile system, on which the Journal opined in this 
article:

       The move would represent the first deployment of a 
     defensive missile shield since a system was first proposed by 
     President Reagan in the 1980s.

  What General Kadish was talking about was a theater missile, not a 
national missile system. In point of fact, the PAC-3 system, a land 
based theater system, is being operationally tested now and likely will 
be deployed. Certainly it is further along in development than this 
proposed sea based system.
  This type of blurring of the lines in recalibration and renaming of 
systems I think has created a lot of misunderstanding. Hopefully, we 
can add some clarity today.
  As I mentioned before, theater ballistic missiles have long 
threatened forward deployed U.S. forces. For years we have confronted 
the potential of a real-time missile attack in North Korea and in other 
places. Long-range missiles were the source of our long and, 
fortunately, stalemated cold war with the Soviet Union. They had the 
capacity to fire missiles intercontinentally. We were able to wait them 
out or, through deterrence, through our strategic policy, we were able 
to bring the cold war to a conclusion, and also to have a situation in 
which now we are making real progress with Russia in terms of strategic 
arms control. So this distinction between theater missiles and ICBMs is 
significant.
  I think it is appropriate at this point to try to go through the list 
of the systems which have been developed, which we have been 
developing, and systems that are the underpinning of this new 
constellation of missile defenses the administration talks about.
  I ask unanimous consent to have printed an article by Philip Coyle, 
former director of operational test and evaluation in the Department of 
Defense, in the Arms Control Today of May 2002. It summarizes in 
excellent detail the systems we are talking about today.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                  [From Arms Control Today, May 2002]

            Rhetoric or Reality? Missile Defense Under Bush

                           (By Philip Coyle)

       Since it assumed office, the administration of President 
     George W. Bush has made missile defense one of its top 
     priorities, giving it prominence in policy, funding, and 
     organization.
       First, the administration outlined an ambitious set of 
     goals that extend well beyond the Clinton administration's 
     missile defense aims. In early January 2002, Secretary of 
     Defense Donald Rumsfeld described the administration's top 
     missile defense objectives his way: ``First, to defend the 
     U.S., deployed forces, allies, and friends. Second, to employ

[[Page 10905]]

     a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) that layers 
     defenses to intercept missiles in all phases of their flight 
     (i.e., boost, midcourse, and terminal) against all ranges of 
     threats. Third, to enable the Services to field elements of 
     the overall BMDS as soon as practicable.''
       Then, in its nuclear posture review, the administration 
     outlined the specific elements of a national missile defense 
     that it wants to have ready between 2003 and 2008: an air-
     based laser to shoot down missiles of all ranges during boost 
     phase; a rudimentary ground-based midcourse system, a sea-
     based system with rudimentary midcourse capability against 
     short- and medium-range threats; terminal defenses against 
     long-range ICBMs capable of reaching the United States; and a 
     system of satellites to track enemy missiles and distinguish 
     re-entry vehicles from decoys.
       Finally, to speed implementation, the administration has 
     taken a number of tangible steps. It announced on December 
     13, 2001, that the United States would withdraw from the 1972 
     Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, ostensibly because the 
     treaty was restricting testing of mobile missile defenses 
     against y026ICBMs. In its first defense budget, the 
     administration requested a 57 percent increase in funding for 
     missile defense--from $5.3 billion to $8.3 billion, of which 
     it received $7.8 billion. Then, Rumsfeld reorganized the 
     Ballistic Missile Defense Organization into the new Missile 
     Defense Agency, cancelled the internal Pentagon documents 
     that had established the program's developmental goals, and 
     changed the program's goal from being able to field a 
     complete system against specific targets to simply being able 
     to field various missile defense capabilities as they become 
     available.
       All in all, a lot has happened in missile defense in the 
     first year or so of the Bush administration. But have these 
     actions brought the United States any closer to realizing its 
     missile defense goals, especially deployment of a national 
     missile defense? And what elements, if any, of a national 
     missile defense capability might it be possible for the 
     United States to deploy by 2008, as called for in the nuclear 
     posture review?
       Despite the Bush administration's push for missile defense, 
     the only system likely to be ready by 2008 is a ground-based 
     theater missile defense intended to counter short-range 
     targets--i.e., a system to defend troops in the field. Before 
     Bush leaves office, the only system that could conceivably be 
     ready to defend the United States itself is the ground-based 
     midcourse system pursued by the Clinton administration. None 
     of the other elements mentioned in the nuclear posture review 
     as possible defenses against strategic ballistic missiles is 
     likely to be available by 2008.
       To understand why, let us examine each of the missile 
     defense programs--starting with the short-range, theater 
     missile defense systems and moving to the longer-range, 
     strategic systems--to see what has happened since the Bush 
     administration took office 16 months ago. The results suggest 
     that the Bush administration should not base its foreign 
     policy on the assumption that during its tenure it will be 
     able to deploy defenses to protect the United States from 
     strategic missiles.


                        Theater Missile Defenses

       Each of the U.S. military services has been pursuing 
     tactical missile defense programs designed to defend U.S. 
     troops overseas. None of these programs was designed to 
     defend the United States against ICBM attacks, and none has 
     any current capability to do so. However, the administration 
     hopes to be able to apply some of the technology from these 
     service programs to a layered national defense capable of 
     defending the U.S. homeland. (For an explanation of the 
     various stages of development discussed below, see the box 
     below.)
     PAC-3
       The Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) is a tactical 
     system designed to defend overseas U.S. and allied troops in 
     a relatively small area against short-range missile threats 
     (such as Scuds), enemy aircraft, and cruise missiles. 
     Developmentally, it is the most advanced U.S. missile defense 
     system, and a small number have been made available for 
     deployment although testing has not yet been completed.
       PAC-3 flight testing began in 1997. From 1997 to 2002, 11 
     developmental flight tests were conducted, including four 
     flight intercept tests with two or three targets being 
     attempted at once. Most of these tests were successful, but 
     in two of the tests one of the targets was not intercepted. 
     In February, PAC-3 began initial operational testing, in 
     which soldiers, not contractors, operate the system. Three 
     operational tests have been conducted, all with multiple 
     targets. In each, one of the targets has been missed or one 
     of the interceptors has failed.
       A year ago, PAC-3 was planned to begin full-rate production 
     at the end of 2001. However, problems with system reliability 
     and difficulties in flight intercept tests have delayed that 
     schedule. This means that full-rate production likely will be 
     delayed until more stressing ``follow-on'' operational tests 
     can be conducted against targets flying in a wide range of 
     altitudes and trajectories. In March, Lieutenant General 
     Ronald Kadish, who heads U.S. missile defense programs, 
     testified to Congress that the full-rate production decision 
     would be made toward the end of 2002 (before operational 
     testing has been completed), representing a delay of about a 
     year since last year. The full system will be deployed once 
     all operational testing has been completed, perhaps around 
     2005.
       A future version of PAC-3 is being considered for terminal 
     defense of the United States. However, PAC-3 was not designed 
     to counter long-range threats, and no flight intercept tests 
     have been conducted to demonstrate how it might be 
     incorporated in a terminal defense layer. Further, the ground 
     area that can be defended by PAC-3 is so small that it would 
     take scores of systems to defend just the major U.S. cities. 
     A version of PAC-3 that could be effective in a national 
     missile defense is probably a decade away.
     THAAD
       The Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system is 
     designed to shoot down short- and medium-range missiles in 
     their terminal phase. THAAD would be used to protect forward-
     deployed troops overseas as well as nearby civilian 
     populations and infrastructure. THAAD is to defend a larger 
     area against longer-range threats than PAC-3, but it is not 
     designed to protect the United States from ICBMs.
       From 1995 to 1999, 11 developmental flight tests were 
     performed, including eight in which an intercept was 
     attempted. After the first six of those flight intercept 
     tests failed, the program was threatened with cancellation. 
     Finally, in 1999, THAAD had two successful flight intercept 
     tests. The THAAD program has not attempted an intercept test 
     since then, instead focusing on the difficult task or 
     developing a new, more reliable, higher-performance missile 
     than the one used in early flight tests.
       A year ago, full-rate production was scheduled to begin in 
     2007 or 2008, but because there were no intercept tests in 
     2000 or 2001, that schedule has likely slipped two years or 
     more. In fact, no flight intercept test is scheduled until 
     2004, and it is therefore unlikely that the first THAAD 
     system will be deployed before 2010.
       The Bush administration is considering THAAD for use in a 
     layered national missile defense system. Conceptually, THAAD 
     might be used in conjunction with PAC-3 as part of a terminal 
     defense, or it could be deployed overseas to intercept enemy 
     missiles in the boost phase. However, in its current 
     configuration THAAD is incapable of performing these 
     missions--even once it has met its Army requirements for 
     theater missile defense--and therefore a role for THAAD in 
     national missile defense is probably more than a decade away.
     Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
       The Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense was the 
     sea-based equivalent of PAC-3. The Navy Area system was being 
     designed to defend forward-deployed Navy ships against 
     relatively short-range threats. But in December 2001 the 
     program was cancelled because its cost and schedule overruns 
     exceeded the limits defined by law. (Ironically, the 
     cancellation came just one day after President Bush announced 
     that the United States would pull out of the ABM Treaty 
     because its missile defense testing was advanced enough to be 
     bumping up against the constraints of the treaty.)
       The Navy still wants to be able to defend its ships against 
     missile attack, and the program will most likely to be 
     restructured and reinstated once the Navy decides on a new 
     approach. In the meantime, the Navy Area program is slipping 
     with each day that passes. As with PAC-3, the Bush 
     administration has considered extending the Navy Area system 
     to play a role in the terminal segment of a layered national 
     missile defense. However, at this point the program is too 
     poorly defined to allow speculation about when it could 
     accomplish such a demanding mission.
     Navy Theater Wide
       The Navy Theater Wide program was originally intended to 
     defend an area larger than that to be covered by the Navy 
     Area system--that is, aircraft carrier battle groups and 
     nearby territory and civilian populations--against medium 
     range missiles during their midcourse phase. In this sense, 
     Navy Theater Wide is the sea-based equivalent of THAAD.
       In January, the Navy Theater Wide program conducted its 
     first successful flight intercept test, but a dozen or more 
     developmental flight tests will be required before it is 
     ready for realistic operational testing. About a year ago, 
     full-rate production was scheduled for spring 2007, meaning 
     that the system could be deployed before the end of the 
     decade.
       But since then, the Pentagon has given new priority to a 
     sea-based role in defending the U.S. homeland. Navy Theater 
     Wide was not designed to shoot down ICBMs, but the Bush 
     administration has restructured the program so that it aims 
     to produce a sea-based midcourse segment and/or a sea-based 
     boost-phase segment of national missile defense.
       Either mission will require a new missile that is twice as 
     fast as any existing version of the Standard Missile, which 
     the system

[[Page 10906]]

     now uses; a new, more powerful Aegis radar system to track 
     targets; a new launch structure to accommodate the new, 
     larger missiles; and probably new ships. As a result, the 
     Navy Theater Wide program requires a great deal of new 
     development. It is unlikely that Navy Theater Wide will be 
     ready for realistic operational testing until late in this 
     decade, and it will not be ready for realistic operational 
     demonstration in a layered national missile defense for 
     several years after that.
     Airborne Laser
       The Airborne Laser (ABL) is a program to develop a high-
     power chemical laser that will fit inside a Boeing 747 
     aircraft. It is the most technically challenging of any of 
     the theater missile defense programs, involving toxic 
     materials, advanced optics, and the coordination of three 
     additional lasers on-board for tracking, targeting, and beam 
     correction. The first objective of the program is to be able 
     to shoot down short-range enemy missiles. Later, it is hoped 
     the ABL program will play a role in national missile defense 
     by destroying strategic missiles in their boost phase.
       The ABL has yet to be flight-tested. About a year ago, 
     full-rate production of the ABL was scheduled for 2008. The 
     plan was to build seven aircraft, each estimated to cost 
     roughly $500 million. At that time, the first shoot-down of a 
     tactical missile was scheduled for 2003. Recently, the ABL 
     program office announced that the first shoot-down of a 
     tactical missile had been delayed to later 2004 because of 
     many problems with the basic technology of high-power 
     chemical lasers--about a one-year slip since last year and 
     about a three-year slip since 1998. Accordingly, full-rate 
     production probably cannot be started before 2010, and the 
     cost will likely exceed $1 billion per aircraft.
       Assuming all this can be done, it is important to note that 
     the ABL presents significant operational challenges. The ABL 
     will need to fly relatively close to enemy territory in order 
     to have enough power to shoot down enemy missiles, and during 
     a time of crisis it will need to be near the target area 
     continuously. A 747 loaded with high-power laser equipment 
     will make a large and inviting target to the enemy and will 
     require protection in the air and on the ground. Finally, 
     relatively simple countermeasures such as reflective surfaces 
     on enemy missiles could negate the ABL's capabilities.
       Deployment of an ABL that can shoot down short- and medium-
     range tactical targets is not likely before the end of the 
     decade, and the Airborne Laser will not be able to play a 
     role in national missile defense for many years after that.


                        National Missile Defense

       The Bush administration hopes to build a layered national 
     missile defense that consists of a ground-based midcourse 
     system, expanded versions of the theater systems discussed 
     above, and, potentially, space-based systems. The Bush 
     administration does not use the phrase ``national missile 
     defense'' because it was the name of the ground-based 
     midcourse system pursued by the Clinton administration and 
     because the Pentagon's plans to defend the country are now 
     more robust. But national missile defense is a useful 
     shorthand for any system that is intended to defend the 
     continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii against 
     strategic ballistic missiles, and it is in that sense that it 
     is used here.
       For all practical purposes, the only part of the Bush 
     national missile defense that is ``real'' is the ground-based 
     midcourse system. It is real in the sense that six flight 
     intercept tests have been conducted so far, whereas versions 
     of the THAAD or Navy Theater Wide systems that might be used 
     to defend the United States have not been tested at all. 
     Space-based systems are an even more distant prospect. For 
     example, the Space-Based Laser, which would use a laser on a 
     satellite to destroy missiles in their boost phase, was to be 
     tested in 2012, but funding cuts have pushed the testing date 
     back indefinitely. Deployment is so far in the future that it 
     is beyond the horizon of the Pentagon's long-range planning 
     document, Joint Vision 2020.
       As a result, despite the Bush administration's attempts to 
     distinguish its plans from its predecessor's, Bush's layered 
     national missile defense is, in effect, nothing more than the 
     Clinton system.
       Since 1997, the ground-based midcourse program has 
     conducted eight major flight tests, known as IFTs. The first 
     two, named IFT-1A and IFT-2, were fly-by tests designed 
     simply to collect target information. The next six tests, 
     IFT-3 through IFT-8, were all flight intercept tests. IFT-4 
     and IFT-5, conducted in January 2000 and July 2000 
     respectively, both failed to achieve an intercept, which 
     became a principal reason why, on September 1, 2000, 
     President Bill Clinton decided not to begin deployment of 
     ground-based midcourse components, such as a new X-band radar 
     on Shemya Island in Alaska.
       Another year passed before the next flight intercept test, 
     IFT-6, was conducted. The intercept was successful except 
     that the real-time hit assessment performed by the ground-
     based X-band prototype radar on the Kwajalein Atoll in the 
     Marshall Islands incorrectly reported the hit as a miss. IFT-
     7, conducted in early December 2001, was also successful. 
     Until then, all of the flight intercept tests had had 
     essentially the same target cluster: a re-entry vehicle, a 
     single large balloon, and debris associated with stage 
     separation and decoy deployment. Then, in IFT-8, conducted on 
     March 15, 2002, two small balloons were added to the target 
     cluster. This flight intercept test also was successful and 
     marked an important milestone for the ground-based midcourse 
     program.
       However, despite these recent successes, there have been 
     significant delays in the testing program. Several of the 
     flight tests were simply repeats of earlier tests, and as a 
     result IFT-8 did not accomplish the tasks set for it in the 
     original schedule. In short, the testing program has slipped 
     roughly two years--i.e., what was originally scheduled to 
     take two years has taken four. That is not to say that the 
     program has made no progress but rather that key program 
     milestones have receded into the future.
       The pace of successful testing will be one of the primary 
     determinants of how quickly the United States can field a 
     national missile defense. If the ground-based midcourse 
     system has three or four successful flight intercept tests 
     per year, as it has during the past year, it could be ready 
     for operational testing in four or five years. If those 
     operational tests also were successful, then whatever 
     capability had been demonstrated in all those tests--which 
     would probably not include the capability to deal with many 
     types of decoys and countermeasures or the capability to 
     cover much of the space through which an enemy missile could 
     travel--could be deployed by the end of the decade or even by 
     2008.
       However, the ground-based midcourse system has difficulties 
     beyond the testing pace of its interceptor. The system 
     requires a new, more powerful booster rocket than the 
     surrogate currently being used in tests--a task that was 
     thought to be relatively easy. That new booster was to be 
     incorporated into the continuing series of flight intercept 
     tests to make those tests more realistic and to be sure that 
     the new booster's higher acceleration did not adversely 
     affect other components or systems on board.
       But development of the new booster is about two years 
     behind schedule. Indeed, on December 13, just hours after 
     President Bush announced U.S. plans to withdraw from the ABM 
     Treaty, a test of the new booster had to be aborted and the 
     missile destroyed in flight for safety reasons because it 
     flew off course. Flight intercept tests that were to have 
     used the new booster have come and gone without it. Indeed, 
     development of the booster is so far behind that the Pentagon 
     recently issued another contract for a competing design.
       Equally problematic is uncertainty over how the system will 
     track enemy missiles in flight and distinguish targets from 
     decoys. One approach is to use high-power radars operating in 
     the X-band (that is, at a frequency of about 10 billion 
     cycles per second). A prototype X-band radar on the Kwajalein 
     Atoll has been part all of the ground-based midcourse flight 
     intercept tests so far, and technically, X-band radar 
     progress has been one of the most successful developments in 
     missile defense technology.
       A year and a half ago, Lieutenant General Kadish testified 
     to Congress that establishing an X-band radar in Alaska was 
     the ``long pole in the tent'' for missile defense. This meant 
     that the X-band radar was critical to a ground-based 
     midcourse system and that if that radar was not built soon, 
     the program would start slipping day for day. Then, as now, 
     there were many other developments that would take as long or 
     longer than building an X-band radar at Shemya, but the 
     Pentagon's official position was that construction needed to 
     start in the spring of 2001 at the latest. Nevertheless, 
     Clinton deferred taking action on the radar.
       Surprisingly, the Bush administration has not requested 
     funding for an X-band radar at Shemya in either of its first 
     two budgets. This may be because the administration views 
     such an installation as inconsistent with the ABM Treaty, 
     which the administration has said it will not violate while 
     the treaty is still in effect. Or the administration may not 
     have requested funding because the Missile Defense Agency has 
     been exploring ``portable'' X-band radars--that is, X-band 
     radars deployed on ships or barges.
       Some defense analysts believe that the Space-Based Infrared 
     Satellite (SBIRS) program could be used in place of the X-
     band radar to assist a national missile defense. SBIRS--which 
     would consist of two sets of orbiting sensor satellites, 
     SBIRS-high and SBIRS-low--is designed to detect the launch of 
     enemy ballistic missiles and could be used to track and 
     discriminate among them in flight. However, the program has 
     significant technical problems.
       SBIRS-high, which will consist of four satellites in 
     geosynchronous orbit and two satellites in highly elliptical 
     orbits, is to replace the existing Defense Support Program 
     satellites, which provide early warning of missile launches. 
     A year ago, the SBIRS-high satellites were scheduled for 
     launch in 2004 and 2006, but recently those dates have 
     slipped roughly two years because of problems with software, 
     engineering, and system integration. A year ago, realistic 
     operational

[[Page 10907]]

     testing was scheduled for 2007; now, it may not occur this 
     decade, which means that full deployment may not occur this 
     decade. SBIRS-high is also well over cost and is in danger of 
     breaching the legal restrictions covering cost growth.
       SBIRS-low is to consist of approximately 30 cross-linked 
     satellites in low-Earth orbit. A year ago, the launch of the 
     first of these satellites was scheduled for 2006, but SBIRS-
     low has slipped two years because of a variety of difficult 
     technical problems. The developmental testing program for 
     SBIRS-low is very challenging, and realistic operational 
     testing will probably not begin this decade. This could delay 
     deployment of the full constellation of SBIRS-low satellites 
     until the middle of the next decade. SBIRS-low is also 
     dramatically over budget and was threatened with cancellation 
     in the latest round of congressional appropriations.
       For now, the administration has been saying that it will 
     upgrade an existing radar on Shemya called Cobra Dane. Under 
     this plan, the Cobra Dane radar would become an advanced 
     early-warning radar with some ability to distinguish among 
     targets. But the Cobra Dane radar operates in the L-band with 
     about eight-times poorer resolution than a new X-band radar 
     would have, raising questions about the effectiveness of any 
     national missile defense using it.
       In sum, the only element of a ``layered'' national missile 
     defense that exists on anything but paper is the ground-based 
     midcourse system pursued by the Clinton administration. 
     Accordingly, it is nearly impossible to predict when, if 
     ever, an integrated, layered national missile defense with 
     boost, midcourse, and terminal phases might be developed. As 
     noted above, given the most recent pace of testing, some part 
     of the ground-based midcourse system could be deployed by the 
     end of the decade or possibly by 2008.
       However, the capability such a system would have would be 
     marginal and probably would not be able to deal with many 
     types of decoys and countermeasures or to cover much of the 
     space through which an attacking ICBM might fly. The Bush 
     administration has said it will deploy test elements as an 
     emergency capability as early as possible, but such a 
     deployment would be rudimentary and its capabilities would be 
     limited to those already demonstrated in testing. It would 
     likely not be effective against unauthorized or accidental 
     launches from Russia or China, which might include missiles 
     with countermeasures. It also would not be effective against 
     launches from Iraq, Iran, or Libya since those countries are 
     to the east, out of view of a radar on Shemya.


                               Conclusion

       During the first year of the Bush administration, all U.S. 
     missile defense programs--both theater and national--have 
     slipped. In general, the shorter-range tactical missile 
     defense systems are further along than the medium-range 
     systems, and those medium-range systems are further along 
     than the longer-range systems intended to defend the United 
     States against ICBMs.
       PAC-3 is the most developmentally advanced of any U.S. 
     missile defense system, but full deployment will not likely 
     take place before 2005, and realistic operational testing 
     will continue for many years after the first Army units are 
     equipped in the field. The THAAD program has slipped two 
     years or more and will not be deployable until 2010. The Navy 
     Area Wide program has been cancelled, and the Navy Theater 
     Wide program has slipped two years or more and will not be 
     deployable in a tactical role until the end of the decade. If 
     the Pentagon restructures the program so that its priority is 
     boost-phase or midcourse defense against strategic missiles, 
     it will likely take longer. The Airborne Laser has slipped 
     one year and will probably not be deployed as a theater 
     missile defense before the end of the decade.
       SBIRS-low has slipped two years and doubled in cost and 
     probably will not be deployed before 2008. For all practical 
     purposes, national missile defense is technically not much 
     closer than it was in the Clinton administration. There have 
     been no flight intercept tests of the boost-phase or 
     terminal-phase elements suggested by the Bush administration, 
     and developmental testing could take a decade or more, 
     depending on the pace of testing and the level of success in 
     each test. The only element that can be flight-intercept 
     tested against strategic ballistic missiles today is the 
     ground-based midcourse system. Part of that system could be 
     deployed by 2008, but elements fielded before then will have 
     only a limited capability.
       Thus, while making foreign policy, the Bush administration 
     would do well to consider that probably only a limited-
     capability version of PAC-3 will be fielded during its tenure 
     and that an effective, layered national missile defense will 
     not be realized while it is in office. It would make little 
     sense to predicate strategic decisions on a defense that does 
     not exist.
       It is important for Congress and the American public not to 
     be frightened into believing that the United States is--as 
     some missile defense proponents like to assert--defenseless 
     against even a limited missile attack by a ``rouge state'' 
     such as North Korea. Powerful and effective options exist, 
     both military and diplomatic.
       In Afghanistan, U.S. attack operations with precision-
     guided weapons have been highly effective. Those same 
     precision weapons would be effective against an enemy ICBM 
     installation. In fact, given current capabilities and the 
     ever-improving technologies for precision strike, it would be 
     fantasy to believe any national missile defense system 
     deployed by 2003 to 2008 would work better and provide 
     greater reliability at a lower cost than the precision-guided 
     munitions used in Afghanistan.
       On the diplomatic front, in 1999 former Secretary of 
     Defense William Perry made a series of trips to convince 
     North Korea to stop developing and testing long-range 
     missiles. He was remarkably successful. Although Secretary 
     Perry would not say that North Korea was no longer a threat, 
     it was obvious that the North Korean threat had been 
     moderated. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was able to 
     build on his trip the next year to secure a pledge from 
     Pyongyang to half flight testing of missiles. Dollar for 
     dollar, Secretary Perry has been the most cost-effective 
     missile defense system the United States has yet to develop. 
     The most straightforward route to missile defense against 
     North Korea may be through diplomacy, not technology.
       Many decision-makers in Washington--and, from what one 
     reads, the president himself--seem to be misinformed about 
     the prospects for near-term success with national missile 
     defense and the budgets being requested for it. It takes 20 
     years to develop a modern, high performance jet fighter, and 
     it probably will take even longer to develop an effective 
     missile defense network. Taking into account the challenges 
     of asymmetric warfare, the time it can take to develop modern 
     military equipment, the reliability required in real 
     operational situations, and the interoperability required for 
     hundreds of systems and subsystems to work together, it would 
     be highly unrealistic to think that the United States can 
     deploy an effective, layered national missile defense by 2004 
     or even by 2008.
       In the meantime, policymakers should be careful that U.S. 
     foreign and security goals and policies are not dependent on 
     something that cannot work now and probably will not work 
     effectively for the foreseeable future. A case in point is 
     President Bush's decision to abandon the ABM Treaty with 
     Russia. That decision was certainly premature given the state 
     of missile defense technology and likely could have been 
     avoided or postponed for many years if not indefinitely.
       This is not to say that missile defense technology ought 
     not to be pursued--only that it should be pursued with 
     realistic expectations. Policymakers must be able to weigh 
     the potential merits and costs of missile defense based on a 
     sound understanding of both the technology and the possible 
     alternatives. No one weapon system can substitute for the 
     sound conduct of foreign policy, and even a single diplomat 
     can be effective on a time scale that is short when compared 
     with the time that will be required to develop the technology 
     for national missile defense.


                         stages of development

       Missile defense, especially national missile defense, is 
     the most difficult program ever attempted by the Department 
     of Defense--much more difficult than the development of a 
     modern jet fighter like the F-22 Raptor, the Navy's Land 
     Attack Destroyer (DD-21), or the Army's Abrams M1A2 tank 
     complete with battlefield digitization, endeavors that all 
     have taken 20 years or more. Each new major weapons system 
     must proceed through several stages of development, which are 
     listed below. Most U.S. missile defense systems are currently 
     in developmental testing and are therefore not close to 
     deployment.
       Research and Development (R&D): The period during which the 
     concepts and basic technologies behind a proposed military 
     system are explored. Depending on the difficulty of the 
     technology and the complexity of the proposed system, R&D can 
     take anywhere from a year or two to more than 10 years.
       Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD): The period 
     during which a system design is engineered and the industrial 
     processes to manufacture and assemble a proposed military 
     system are developed. For a major defense acquisition such as 
     a high-performance jet fighter, EMD can take five years or 
     more. If substantial difficulties are encouraged, EMD can 
     take even longer.
       Developmental Testing: Testing that is performed to learn 
     about the strengths and weaknesses of proposed military 
     technologies and the application of those technologies to a 
     new military system in a military environment. Generally, 
     developmental testing is oriented toward achieving certain 
     specifications, such as speed, maneuverability, or rate of 
     fire. Developmental testing is conducted throughout the R&D 
     and EMD phases of development and becomes more stressing as 
     prototype systems evolve and mature.
       Operational Testing: Testing that aims to demonstrate 
     effective military performance against operational 
     requirements and mission needs established for a system. 
     Testing is performed with production-representative

[[Page 10908]]

     equipment in realistic operational environments--at night, in 
     bad weather, against realistic threats and countermeasures. 
     Military service personnel, not contractors, operate the 
     system, which is stressed as it would be in battle. 
     Operational testing of a major defense acquisition system 
     typically takes the better part of a year and is usually 
     broken into several periods of a month or two to accommodate 
     different environments or scenarios. If substantial 
     difficulties are encountered, several years of operational 
     testing may be required.
       Production: The phase of acquisition when a military system 
     is manufactured and produced. Early on, during ``low-rate 
     production,'' the quantities produced are typically small. 
     Later, after successfully completing operational testing, a 
     system may go into ``full-rate production,'' where the rate 
     of production is designed to complete the government's 
     planned purchase of the system in a relatively short period 
     of time, about five years.
       Deployment: The fielding of a military system in either 
     limited or large quantities in military units. The first 
     military unit equipped may help develop tactics, techniques, 
     and procedures for use of the new system if that has not 
     already been done adequately in development.
       All ballistic missiles have three stages of flight.
       The boost phase begins at launch and lasts until the rocket 
     engines stop firing and pushing the missile away from Earth. 
     Depending on the missile, this stage lasts three to five 
     minutes. During much of this time, the missile is traveling 
     relatively slowly although toward the end of this stage an 
     ICBM can reach speeds of more than 24,000 kilometers per 
     hour. The missile stays in one piece during this stage.
       The midcourse phase begins after the propulsion system 
     finishes firing and the missile is on a ballistic course 
     toward its target. This is the longest stage of a missile's 
     flight, lasting up to 20 minutes for ICBMs. During the early 
     part of the midcourse stage, the missile is still ascending 
     toward its apogee, while during the latter part it is 
     descending toward Earth. It is during this stage that the 
     missile's warhead, as well as any decoys, separate from the 
     delivery vehicle.
       The terminal phase begins when the missile's warhead re-
     enters the Earth's atmosphere, and it continues until impact 
     or detonation. This stage takes less than a minute for a 
     strategic warhead, which can be traveling at speeds greater 
     than 3,200 kilometers per hour.

  Mr. REED. The system that is most developed is one I mentioned 
previously, the PAC-3 system. It is a theater missile system. It is not 
designed to counter long-range threats. It has been tested rigorously. 
It is in operational testing now. Phil Coyle states that the 
administration is considering an advanced version of PAC-3 for a 
national missile defense. But if you were trying to use it in a 
terminal phase it would take many systems to defend a rather small area 
of the United States. We probably would never have the number of 
systems needed to adequately defend the United States.
  Another system we have been developing for years is the THAAD system. 
Phil Coyle states that the Administration is also considering use of 
THAAD along with PAC-3 for national missile defense. But in its current 
configuration THAAD is not ready for this role. In fact, it is far away 
from it--perhaps a decade before it could be reasonably used in that 
way.
  The other system being developed as we speak is a Navy theater-wide 
system. It is a midcourse system as it is currently designed. They are 
now talking about this system as a potential element of their midcourse 
national missile defense. Again, there are still significant issues 
with respect to the use of this system for national missile defense.
  As Mr. Coyle points out, if the system were to be used for a 
midcourse mission, or a boost-phase mission, for national missile 
defense, it would require a new missile that is twice as fast as any 
existing version of the standard missile which the system now uses. He 
writes it would require:

       A new, more powerful Aegis radar system to track targets; a 
     new launch structure to accommodate the new, larger missiles; 
     and probably new ships. As a result, the Navy theater-wide 
     program requires a great deal of new development. It is 
     unlikely that Navy theater-wide will be ready for realistic 
     operational testing until late in this decade, and it will 
     not be ready for realistic operational demonstration in a 
     layered national missile defense for several years after 
     that.

  It is interesting to note that this system is being considered today 
by the Missile Defense Agency for possible deployment in 2004. It is 
also interesting, and a bit surprising, because in last year's 
authorization bill we asked the Missile Defense Agency to tell us what 
they propose to do with the Navy theater-wide system. We asked for a 
report on April 30. The response to our request was actually a letter 
that came to us on May 30, and repeated the questions we asked. It 
responded to some of the questions in a very cursory way. It didn't 
give any life cycle cost for us, so it is hard for us to estimate how 
much this new evolving system will cost. It simply said they redefined 
the system. That was May 30.
  Yet, about 2\1/2\ weeks later, they were telling the press that we 
are deploying this system in 2004. In fact, one of the points they made 
in the letter is:

       The details of the sea-based program block 2006 and out 
     capability are being developed through work that is scheduled 
     to be completed by December 2003. We will be able to provide 
     specifics on the system definition, along with a preliminary 
     assessment of force structure and life cycle cost at that 
     time.

  So this work is going to be completed in planning by 2003. Yet this 
system is being talked about for deployment in 2004.
  It just does not seem to make much sense, and it illustrates, I 
think, the problem we have had in the subcommittee, first of getting 
reliable information, and second of getting a sense of the direction of 
all these programs.
  We are not trying to micromanage the Missile Defense Agency, but when 
we asked a year ago in our report for information specifically about a 
type of missile system, when we get a cursory response saying, we have 
renamed it and we will not be able to tell you anything until we 
conclude in December of 2003 our deliberations, and then 2 weeks later 
they are talking about the system being deployed in a theater role in 
2004, it illustrates, I think, the problems and the issues we have 
confronted with simply getting the information we need to do our job, 
to inform our colleagues, to make decisions that are not only important 
to our national security, but extremely expensive decisions so that we 
can perform our mission, our role-in the Senate.
  That is the Navy theater wide system. There are other systems we have 
developed, and I think it is appropriate to note that the next system 
is the airborne laser system. This is a program to develop a high-power 
chemical laser that will fit inside a Boeing 747 aircraft. This is a 
system that would be designed to shoot down short-range enemy missiles 
in the boost phase. It has some potential, but it is a major 
technological effort which is going forward, but not going forward with 
great speed at the moment.
  The final major component is the national missile defense midcourse, 
or the land-based system, in Alaska, and that system we have supported. 
We have supported it, but having supported it, we also have serious 
questions with it. The system was inaugurated, if you will; at least 
ground was broken last week for a test bed for missiles. There are 
concerns that the missiles cannot be effectively used in a flight test 
capacity because of safety concerns and other factors with respect to 
the local area in Alaska. That is one issue.
  The other issue, though, is for several years now in the development 
of this national missile defense midcourse land-based system in Alaska, 
the administration and the Missile Defense Agency have talked about 
using an x-band radar, claiming it as absolutely necessary because of 
its ability to discriminate the warhead. This is important because the 
major issue that faces the midcourse intercept is the possibility of 
countermeasures and decoys. So we need a very fine discriminating radar 
to determine what is the warhead and what are the decoys. However, that 
x-band radar has not been funded by the administration. They have 
declared instead they will use an existing radar, COBRA DANE.
  One of the problems with COBRA DANE is it faces the wrong way to 
provide any coverage of Iran or Iraq and provides only limited coverage 
of North Korea, if you are concerned with the ``evil empire.''
  Despite that, and in an effort to support sincerely and consistently 
the

[[Page 10909]]

mission of developing adequate national missile defense, we have 
provided robust funding for the Alaska test bed, and that is included 
in this bill. However, I do think it is important and appropriate to 
state our reservations now because they are points we should consider 
as we go forward.
  Let me continue to discuss some of the important issues, particularly 
some of the actions the committee has specifically taken.
  One thing we should point out is we have looked at the theater 
missile systems. We have particularly found that the Arrow Missile 
Defense Program is making great progress. We have increased funding for 
the Arrow missile system. That is a joint United States-Israeli effort 
for a theater missile system.
  We have also fully funded the PAC-3 system, which is the one closest 
to deployment. It is one that is, again, a theater missile system.
  In all of our deliberations, we have striven to ensure deployment of 
these systems in a timely way, but also ensure these systems are 
operationally tested and rigorously tested before they are put in the 
field. That is incumbent upon us.
  We also tried to ensure the independent oversight of the Defense 
Department's Director of Operational Tests and Evaluation is part of 
the process. One of the concerns I have, frankly, is that in an attempt 
by the administration for secrecy and flexibility, we will find a 
situation in which there is no outside objective voice within the 
Department of Defense. One that is looking at these programs, advising 
these programs, and making some judgments that are not influenced by 
the need for a successful program at any cost, or even a program--
forget successful--at any cost, but are motivated by the need to deploy 
effective systems that will defend this country.
  The other factor we considered, and consider constantly, is the 
discussion of contingency deployments, contingency capabilities. One of 
the reasons we pause slightly is these contingency capabilities and 
deployments often result in a rush to failure, often result in a 
situation where the system is pushed beyond its absolute capabilities. 
A few years ago, that is exactly what happened with the THAAD Program. 
It failed its first six intercept tests in a rush to deploy the system 
before it was ready.
  The THAAD Program was subsequently totally redone and revamped. It 
cost hundreds of millions of dollars that were unnecessary 
expenditures. It is on track now but, frankly, the situation is such 
that we do not want to repeat that experience in other missile defense 
programs. We do not want a situation where the pressure for contingency 
deployments undercuts the need for thorough, deliberate consideration 
of the operational characters of these systems and the ability of these 
systems to do the job they are designed to do.
  We have looked very closely at what we think are attempts to rush the 
systems. In one area, we have reduced funding of THAAD because they 
have requested what we consider a premature acquisition of missiles 
before they have actually had missile's first flight test. We have made 
that judgment.
  Let's turn to another aspect of missile defense, and that is the ICBM 
threat to the United States. It is not as immediate today as the 
theater missile threat, but it is still a threat.
  Fortunately, with our new relationship with Russia, the ICBM threat 
has decreased significantly. China has a small arsenal of ICBMs, but 
they typically do not have their missiles on ready status, fueled, and 
with a warhead on the missile. North Korea seems to be developing an 
ICBM capability of reaching the United States, although it has 
voluntarily suspended its long-range missile flight test program. There 
are other potential adversaries.
  This is an issue about which we are concerned, but one of the things 
we have to recognize with an ICBM is that its launch leaves an 
indelible signal of the point of departure and our deterrence doctrine 
is very clear. We have the capacity to strike back, and strike back 
with overwhelming force. That has been the hinge, really, of our 
deterrence policy for 50 or more years, and it remains an important 
part of our policy.
  As I have mentioned, the issue of intercontinental ballistic missiles 
has been with us for many years. We have relied upon deterrence as a 
mainstay of our defense posture. Today we are developing one system in 
Alaska that is clearly designed to be a national missile defense 
system, and this authorization bill supports that effort in Alaska.
  As I mentioned, we have taken away resources from some programs that 
are unjustified or duplicative and simply not advancing what we believe 
is the common concern of developing adequate missile defense systems, 
both theater and national. We have taken away approximately $800 
million and applied $690 million to shipbuilding. But in addition, we 
have applied resources for security at our nuclear facilities.
  One of the things I found startling in press reports was the fact 
that the Department of Energy asked for considerably more money to 
protect nuclear facilities, and they were turned down by OMB.
  This is a letter to Bruce M. Carnes, who is the Director of the 
Office of Management Budget and Evaluation, from the chief financial 
office of the Department of Energy:

       We are disconcerted that OMB refused our security 
     supplemental request. I would have much preferred to have 
     heard this from you personally, and been given an opportunity 
     to discuss, not to mention, appeal your decision. We were 
     told by Energy Branch staff that the Department's security 
     supplemental proposals were not supported because the revised 
     Design Basis Threat, the document that outlines the basis for 
     physical security measures, has not been completed. This 
     isn't a tenable position for you to take, in my view. We are 
     not operating, and cannot operate, under the pre-September 11 
     Design Basis Threat. Until that is revised, we must operate 
     under Interim Implementing Guidance, and you have not 
     provided resources to enable us to do so.

  That is from the Department of Energy to the OMB. We would move 
resources into the Department of Energy to provide for security of DOE 
facilities.
  But I think this underscores something else, too. It illustrates what 
I would say are the misaligned priorities between missile defense and 
other pressing, immediate concerns. Yes, missile defense is important. 
Yes, we should develop it quickly, thoroughly, and deliberately, but 
certainly defending and protecting our facilities that have nuclear 
radiological material is of an immediate and significant concern.
  Last week, we were not threatened by an intercontinental missile. We 
were threatened by a terrorist, an American who became infatuated with 
the al-Qaida and their rhetoric and came here, if you believe the press 
reports, to obtain nuclear materials to construct a ``dirty'' bomb. 
That is the immediate real threat today.
  Yet when the question before the administration was, do we fund 
security at DOE facilities or do we continue to put resources into 
missile defense, they made their choice to put resources in missile 
defense, way above, I believe, the appropriate amount. As a result, we 
have made adjustments, and I think those adjustments are entirely 
appropriate.
  The other aspect of this, too, when it comes to the issue of 
resources, is, first, a point that all of these deliberations on the 
missile defense budget seems to be outside the purview of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. I thought it was shocking when the Chiefs came up and 
testified that they were not consulted during the preparation of the 
ballistic missile defense budget. These are the uniformed leaders of 
our military forces. These individuals are charged with and have taken 
an oath to the Constitution to protect the country, and yet they were 
not consulted at all about this budget.
  Another point that is critical, and let me quote from Secretary 
Rumsfeld's testimony before the Appropriations Committee on May 21. He 
said:

       In February of this year, we began developing the Defense 
     Planning Guidance for fiscal year 2004. In the fiscal years 
     2004 to 2009 program, the senior civilian and military

[[Page 10910]]

     leadership had to focus on the looming problem of a sizeable 
     procurement bow wave beyond fiscal year 2007.

  This is shorthand for describing the course of procurement of systems 
that will be ready for fielding later in this decade.

       If all were funded, they would crowd out all other areas of 
     investment and thereby cause a repetition of the same 
     heartaches and headaches that we still suffer from today as a 
     result of the procurement holiday of the 1990s.

  This in the context of his plea to cut the Crusader system.
  But what is most alarming about this quote is that this bow wave does 
not include any deployment costs of missile defense at a time when the 
administration is developing multiple systems which they proposed to 
deploy at the end of this decade, costing hundreds of billions of 
dollars perhaps.
  As a result, we cannot simply ignore the cost implications of these 
systems. As I mentioned before, simply to obtain life cycle cost 
information on any of these systems has proven to be virtually 
impossible. We asked for that with respect to Navy theater wide and we 
got a letter back saying, we will not know until December of 2003 and 
then we will tell you.
  We cannot operate without an idea, understanding that it will be 
amended many times before the end of this decade, but an idea about the 
cost of all of these systems over several years, procurement and 
operational deployment. If this bow wave is a crisis today, it becomes 
a tidal wave when you include missile defense costs. As a result, we 
have asked again for more specific information about the projected 
costs associated with the missile defense program.
  One of the areas, and an area on which we have focused our 
reductions, has been systems engineering funding. The Department of 
Defense Missile Defense Agency has asked for significant amounts of 
money for systems engineering, BMD systems engineering, in addition to 
specific moneys they are asking in every one of these component parts, 
boost phase, midcourse, and terminal, where there is sufficient systems 
engineering money. So we have directed reductions in this BMD systems 
engineering.
  It seems to us, again, to be an ill-defined area. We have asked for 
what products they are buying. Mostly, I suspect it is engineering 
services, or consulting services. It is not hardware. We have asked for 
this and we have gotten very little in terms of a response. As a 
result, we have shifted these funds significantly into the 
aforementioned shipbuilding programs and further security for our 
Department of Energy laboratories.
  These efforts represent an attempt to provide good government, good 
management to a program. We hope it will accelerate the deployment of 
an effective missile system that has been operationally tested.
  I hasten to add that this does not represent a revisitation of the 
ABM Treaty debate. The President used his prerogative as President to 
withdraw. This is not about arms control as much as it is about 
maintaining good management, informing the Congress, so we can make 
difficult decisions, so that 5 years from now we are not surprised when 
that bow wave hits us and suddenly the bow wave becomes a tidal wave 
because of the inclusion of significant costs of missile defense and 
for theater missile defense.
  There is a consensus to support missile defense, clearly theater and, 
in fact, I think also at this juncture clearly national missile 
defense. I do not think we support that without asking tough questions 
and making tough choices about how we spend our money, particularly 
when it comes to the other uses that are so necessary today, the 
immediate protection of our homeland, the immediate protection of 
forces around the globe that are confronting our enemies today. So we 
have to make these judgments and we made these judgments.
  In addition to that, we have asked that a whole system of, we think, 
very sensible reports and information be given to us. I have a 
disconcerting feeling that there is a deliberate attempt to limit 
information that we get and it is justified under the guise that we 
need flexibility, that we have not thought through the problem yet. 
There may be something to that, but it is particularly distressing when 
the Director of Test and Evaluation does not have unfettered access to 
the program. It is particularly distressing when the Joint Requirements 
Oversight Council, the JROC, chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, does not have a role in these deliberations. It is 
particularly distressing when the Joint Chiefs of Staff are not 
consulted in the preparation of this significant budget. The American 
people, I think, assume that these officials of the Department of 
Defense are intimately involved in all of these details and have a seat 
at the table to make judgments and to give advice. Our legislation 
would do that.
  As we go forward, we will continue to ask the tough questions. The 
specifics of our requests with respect to these issues of oversight 
include a reiteration of some of the things that we incorporated in 
last year's request.
  Last year, the National Defense Authorization Act required the Agency 
to submit lifecycle cost estimates for all missile defense programs 
that it entered into the engineering and manufacturing and development, 
or EMD, phase. These are the same types of reports that every major 
weapons system provides to the Congress.
  The THAAD missile defense program, I have mentioned before, entered 
EMD phase 2 years ago. We fully expected those lifecycle costs would be 
reported to us in a routine way. However, instead of providing the 
required information for THAAD, the Department chose to reclassify 
THAAD as no longer being in EMD thereby avoiding, in their view, the 
congressional requirement to submit the cost estimate.
  It seems to be gamesmanship, to avoid responding to an obvious 
question, an obvious concern: Tell us how much this system will cost 
over its lifetime. That, again, is the type of nonresponsiveness, 
either inadvertent or deliberate, that we have encountered. Therefore, 
it reinforces the need for additional language in this legislation to 
require appropriate reports, the same types of reports that you get 
from mature systems in other areas of defense procurement.
  We are not asking for the speculative. We are looking at systems that 
have had many years of development, which are entering the phases of 
engineering work. So the issue is defined. We can't do that because it 
is not defined--sometimes we hear that--that is not at the heart of our 
request. We have applied the request to major missile defense systems 
such as the ground and sea-based midcourse program, Airborne laser, and 
the THAAD program.
  It is particularly important to get information because, on the one 
hand, the administration says these are all speculative, ill-defined, 
and they are thinking about it. And then they say: We will deploy the 
system in a very short time, in 2004, for example.
  You cannot have it both ways. If we are ready for contingency 
deployment, certainly the information should be available to the 
Congress. And this legislation would ask for that information.
  We also recommend a provision that requires the Pentagon's director 
of testing and evaluation to assess the potential operational 
effectiveness of the major missile defense systems on an annual basis. 
This would help the administration and Congress determine whether a 
contingency deployment of a missile defense system is appropriate. 
There has to be a certain operational threshold before deploying the 
system. Who better than the director of testing and evaluation to make 
that assessment.
  It also requires the Joint Requirement Oversight Council to annually 
assess the costs and performance in relation to military requirements. 
This is the statutory role of the JROC for all military programs. 
Missile defense is too important to bypass such a review.
  As I mentioned earlier, the Chiefs were not even asked to provide 
their views with respect to these missile defense priorities. That 
should be corrected also. That should be something

[[Page 10911]]

the Secretary of Defense would want to have and would insist be 
included.
  Now, we are endeavoring to bring this legislation to the floor 
representing a commitment to missile defense but also a commitment to 
the overall defense and security of the United States, to be able to 
assure our constituents that we have looked carefully and deliberately 
at all these programs and are aware of these programs, that we support 
these programs, but we don't do it blindly. We do it on an informed 
basis and are able to tell them: We are doing what we can, indeed, all 
we can, in a thoughtful, deliberate, careful, professional way, to 
enhance the security of the United States in terms of missile defense 
and in terms of overall defense. We are, in fact, doing our job.
  I believe the legislation we have brought from the subcommittee to 
the committee and to the floor does this. It is a product of careful 
deliberation. It is a product of many hours of work by staff and 
Members. It is a product that is designed to enhance the security of 
the United States. I believe it does. I hope my colleagues agree and 
concur.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. REID. I hope all Members listened closely to the Senator from 
Rhode Island. He certainly is qualified by virtue of his service in the 
Congress, but mostly by virtue of his service in the U.S. Army. The 
Senator from Rhode Island is the only Senator to graduate from the U.S. 
Military Academy at West Point, to my knowledge. I always listen 
closely to what he says. The country is very fortunate to have his 
expertise.
  Mr. WARNER. Would the Senator allow me to associate myself as an 
extension about observations regarding my colleague. We have some 
philosophical differences, but he does bring to our committee the 
wealth of experience he gained in the U.S. military. That is so 
important.
  I also want to discuss scheduling on the floor.
  Mr. REID. I am happy to yield without losing the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. I say to our leader, subject to the pending amendment, we 
are hopeful to move on to other amendments in due course.
  Mr. REID. I respond to my friend from Virginia, the comanager of this 
bill, Majority Leader Daschle announced in his dugout this morning that 
he wanted Members to offer amendments and that he was going to look 
very closely early next week, if things are not moving well, at filing 
cloture on this bill.
  We cannot have this bill not completed by the time we leave for the 
July recess. The committee has worked too hard. The President needs 
this legislation. The United States military needs it. We have to 
complete this bill.
  I agree with the Senator from Virginia. We have a very important 
amendment now pending, and we have to figure out some way to get this 
off the floor. There are many people working on that as we speak.
  The Senator from Virginia is absolutely right. Members need to offer 
amendments. The majority leader spoke earlier today; he very much 
desires to move this legislation along quickly. If it does not move 
quickly after a week or so of debate, he will try to invoke cloture.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank our distinguished assistant majority leader.
  I am assured that the Republican leader worked hand-in-glove with the 
majority to bring up this bill, providing our committee with this very 
important period of time prior to the Fourth of July, but we must 
finish it.
  Mr. REID. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the 
quorum call be dispensed with for purposes of an introductory statement 
of approximately 5 minutes. At the conclusion, it is my intention to 
place the Senate back into quorum call.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Florida is recognized.
  Mr. GRAHAM. I thank the Chair.
  (The remarks of Mr. Graham pertaining to the introduction of S. 2652 
are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills 
and Joint Resolutions.'')
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the 
quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Clinton). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.


                           Order Of Business

  Mr. REID. Madam President, for the information of Members, we have 
had a message from the House. We are going to go back into a quorum 
call. We are trying to move on that as quickly as possible. As I 
mentioned to the distinguished Senator from Texas, we are going to 
modify the second-degree amendment. Then Senator Gramm has some things 
he wants to say and a motion he wants to make, of which we are aware. 
But this should not take long. In a few minutes we should be able to 
get to the legislation.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                    Amendment No. 3916, As Modified

  Mr. REID. Madam President, I send a modification to the desk to the 
Reid-Conrad amendment. This is on behalf of Senator Conrad.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right. The amendment is 
so modified.
  The amendment, as modified, is as follows:

       Strike all after the first word in the amendment, and 
     insert the following:

       BUDGET ENFORCEMENT.

       (a) Entension of Budget Enforcement Points of Order.--
     Section 904 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 
     621 note) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (c)(2)--
       (A) by inserting ``and'' before ``312(b)'' and by striking 
     ``, and 312(c)''; and
       (B) by striking ``258C(a)(5)''; and
       (2) in subsection (d)(3)--
       (A) by inserting ``and'' before ``312(b)'' and by striking 
     ``, and 312(c)''; and
       (B) by striking ``258C(a)(5)''; and
       (3) in subsection (e), by striking ``2002'' and inserting 
     ``2007''.
       (b) Extension of Budget Enforcement Act Provisions.--
       (1) In general.--Section 275(b) of the Balanced Budget and 
     Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (2 U.S.C. 900 note) is 
     amended to read as follows:
       ``(b) Expiration.--Sections 251 and 258B of this Act and 
     sections 1105(f) and 1106(c) of title 31, United States Code, 
     shall expire September 30, 2007. The remaining sections of 
     part C of this title shall expire on September 30, 2011.''.
       (2) Striking expired provisions.--
       (A) BBA.--The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control 
     Act of 1985 (2 U.S.C. 900 et seq.) is amended by striking 
     section 253.
       (B) Congressional budget act.--The Congressional Budget Act 
     of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 621 et seq.) is amended--
       (i) in section 312, by striking subsection (c); and
       (ii) in section 314--
       (I) in subsection (b), by striking paragraphs (2) through 
     (5) and redesignating paragraph (6) as paragraph (2); and
       (II) by striking subsection (e).
       (c) Extension of Discretionary Caps.--
       (1) In general.--Section 251(b)(2) of the Balanced Budget 
     and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (2 U.S.C. 
     901(b)(2)) is amended--
       (A) in the matter before subparagraph (A), by striking 
     ``2002'' and inserting ``2007'';
       (B) by striking subparagraphs (C), (D), (E), and (F); and
       (C) by redesignating subparagraph (G) as subparagraph (C).
       (2) Caps.--Section 251(c) of the Balanced Budget and 
     Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (2 U.S.C. 901(c)) is 
     amended by striking paragraph (7) and (8) and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(7) with respect to fiscal year 2003--
       ``(A) for the discretionary category: $766,167,000,000 in 
     new budget authority and $756,259,000,000 in outlays;

[[Page 10912]]

       ``(B) for the highway category: $28,931,000,000 in outlays;
       ``(C) for the mass transit category: $6,030,000,000 in 
     outlays; and
       ``(D) for the conservation spending category: 
     $1,922,000,000 in new budget authority and $1,872,000,000 in 
     outlays;
       ``(8)(A) with respect top fiscal year 2004 for the 
     discretionary category: $784,425,000,000 in new budget 
     authority and $814,447,000,000 in outlays; and
       ``(B) with respect to fiscal year 2004 for the conservation 
     spending category; $2,080,000,000, in new budget authority 
     and $2,032,000,000 in outlays;''.
       (3) Reports.--Subsections (c)(2) and (f)(2) of section 254 
     of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 
     1985 (2 U.S.C. 904) are amended by striking ``2002'' and 
     inserting ``2007''.
       (d) Extension of Pay-As-You-Go.--
       (1) Enforcement.--Section 252 of the Balanced Budget and 
     Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (2 U.S.C. 902) is 
     amended--
       (A) in subsection (a), by striking ``2002'' and inserting 
     ``2007''; and
       (B) in subsection (b), by striking ``2002'' and inserting 
     ``2007''.
       (2) Pay-as-you-go rule in the senate.--
       (A) In general.--Section 207 of H. Con. Res. 68 (106th 
     Congress, 1st Session) is amended--
       (i) in subsection (b)(6), by inserting after ``paragraph 
     (5)(A)'' the following: ``except that direct spending or 
     revenue effects resulting in net deficit reduction enacted 
     pursuant to reconciliation instructions since the beginning 
     of that same calendar year shall not be available.''; and
       (ii) in subsection (g), by striking ``2002'' and inserting 
     ``2007''.
       (B) Senate pay-as-you-go adjustment.--For purposes of 
     Senate enforcement of section 207 of House Concurrent 
     Resolution 68 (106th Congress), upon the enactment of this 
     Act, the Chairman of the Committee on the Budget of the 
     Senate shall adjust balances of direct spending and receipts 
     for all fiscal years to zero.
       (3) Pay-as-you-go enforcement during on-budget surplus.--
     If, prior to September 30, 2007, the Final Monthly Treasury 
     Statement for any of fiscal years 2002 through 2006 reports 
     an on-budget surplus, section 252 of the Balanced Budget and 
     Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (2 U.S.C. 902) shall 
     expire at the end of the subsequent fiscal year, and the 
     President, in the next budget, shall submit to Congress a 
     recommendation for pay-as-you-go enforcement procedures that 
     the president believes are appropriate when there is an on-
     budget surplus.
       (e) Senate Appropriations Committee Allocations.--Upon the 
     enactment of this Act, the Chairman of the Committee on the 
     Budget of the Senate shall file allocations to the committee 
     on Appropriations of the Senate consistent with this Act 
     pursuant to section 302(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 
     1974.
       (f) Advance Appropriations.--
       (1) In general.--Section 204 of H.Con.Res.290 (106th 
     Congress) is amended by striking subsections (a) through (f), 
     (h), and (i).
       (2) Limitation.--Section 202 of H.Con.Res.83 (107th 
     Congress) is amended--
       (A) in subsection (b)(1)--
       (i) by striking ``2003'' and inserting ``2004''; and
       (ii) by striking ``$23,159,000,000'' and inserting 
     ``$25,403,000,000''; and
       (B) in subsection (d), by striking ``2002'' in both places 
     it appears and inserting ``2003''.
       (g) Special Rule.--Section 250(c)(4)(D)(i) of the Balanced 
     Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (2 U.S.C. 
     900(c)(4)(D)(i)) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following: ``Any budget authority for the mass transit 
     category shall be considered nondefense category budget 
     authority or discretionary category budget authority.''.
       (h) Treatment of Crime Victims' Fund.--For purposes of 
     congressional points of order, the Congressional Budget Act 
     of 1974, and the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
     Control Act of 1985, any reduction in spending in the Crime 
     Victims' Fund (15-5041-0-2-754) included in the President's 
     budget or enacted in appropriations legislation for fiscal 
     year 2004 or any subsequent fiscal year shall not be scored 
     as discretionary savings.
       (i) Exercise of Rulemaking Powers.--Congress adopts the 
     provisions of subsections (d)(2), (e), (f), (g) and (h) of 
     this section--
       (1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate 
     and the House of Representatives, respectively, and as such 
     they shall be considered as part of the rules of each house, 
     or of that house to which they specifically apply, and such 
     rules shall supersede other rules only to the extent that 
     they are inconsistent therewith; and
       (2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of 
     either house to change those rules (so far as they relate to 
     that house) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same 
     extent as in the case of any other rule of that house.
       (j) Senate Firewall for Defense and Nondefense Spending.--
       (1) In general.--It shall not be in order in the Senate to 
     consider any bill, joint resolution, amendment, motion, or 
     conference report that exceeds $392,757,000,000 in new budget 
     authority or $380,228,000,000 in outlays for the defense 
     discretionary category or $373,410,000,000 in new budget 
     authority or $376,031,000,000 in outlays for the nondefense 
     discretionary category for fiscal year 2003, as adjusted 
     pursuant to section 314 of the Congressional Budget Act of 
     1974.
       (2) Exceptions.--This subsection shall not apply if a 
     declaration of war by Congress is in effect or if a joint 
     resolution pursuant to section 258 of the Balanced Budget and 
     Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 has been enacted.
       (3) Waiver and appeal.--This subsection may be waived or 
     suspended in the Senate only by an affirmative vote of three-
     fifths of the Members, duly chosen and sworn. An affirmative 
     vote of three-fifths of the Members of the Senate, duly 
     chosen and sworn, shall be required in the Senate to sustain 
     an appeal of the ruling of the Chair on a point of order 
     raised under this subsection.

  Mr. REID. Madam President, Senator Conrad, chairman of the Budget 
Committee, wants to speak about this modification. The chairman of the 
Judiciary Committee, Senator Leahy, has been here for a while. Senator 
Conrad has graciously allowed him to speak first. Senator Leahy needs 
up to 15 minutes as in morning business. Following that, the Senator 
from North Dakota would be recognized.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Vermont.
  (The remarks of Mr. Leahy are located in today's Record under 
``Morning Business.'')
  Mr. CONRAD. Madam President, this is perhaps one of the most 
challenging years we have faced dealing with the budget of the United 
States. That is why moments ago I sent a modified amendment to the 
desk. Let me just outline what is included in that amendment and why I 
think it is so critically important that we adopt it today.
  The Conrad-Feingold amendment sets discretionary spending limits for 
2003 and 2004.
  It also extends the 60-vote points of order protecting Social 
Security, enforcing discretionary spending caps, and requiring fiscal 
responsibility, and it extends for 5 years the pay-go and other budget 
enforcement provisions that otherwise expire on September 30.
  Let me discuss the level of spending that is covered by this 
amendment. For 2003, it would provide a discretionary spending limit of 
$768.1 billion. That is precisely the same as the President's budget 
for 2003. The President sent us a discretionary spending level of $768 
billion.
  I have talked with Mr. Daniels this morning, the head of the Office 
of Management and Budget. He believes this number is too high by some 
$9 billion. Even though that is the President's number, even though 
that is the number the President sent us, we have not adopted the 
President's policy because the President has proposed switching certain 
accounts from mandatory spending to discretionary spending. Those are 
the retirement requirements of people in the Federal Government. In 
other words, he has proposed switching the retirement accounts that 
come out of the budget of the various agencies from mandatory spending 
to discretionary spending.
  Obviously, that would make discretionary spending more by $9 billion. 
That is included in the President's proposal. We have not adopted that 
part of his proposal. Their argument is that would shift back to the 
mandatory side of the equation and reduce the $768 billion by $9 
billion. That is true. They are correct about that.
  It is also true that their budget needs to be adjusted in a number of 
ways, I believe, in order to secure passage in the Congress. The 
President has cut transportation funding, highway construction, and 
bridge construction by 27 percent, by $9 billion. We proposed adding 
back about two-thirds of that, about $6 billion. That money has to come 
from somewhere.
  The President has proposed cutting law enforcement by over $1 
billion. I do not think that is realistic at a time when we face 
terrorist threats to the United States. The President has proposed a 
smaller amount for education that is even provided for in his own No 
Child Left Behind legislation. That is going to have to be acknowledged 
and dealt with before we finish our work. We are not going to cut that 
program

[[Page 10913]]

of No Child Left Behind that the President talked about all across the 
country.
  There are other provisions as well that are going to have to be 
addressed. We are going to need that $9 billion to meet the needs of 
the country. Again, it still leaves us with an overall amount that is 
precisely what the President sent us in his own budget.
  In addition to that, there is a second year of budget caps, of 
restrictions on what can be spent, and that amount is $786 billion. 
That is about a 2-percent increase over this year. That is a very sharp 
restriction on spending, especially given the fact we are under attack, 
especially given the fact the President, no doubt, will be asking more 
for defense, more for homeland security. But we have agreed to a cap 
this year that is exactly the number the President sent us in his 
budget, and we have agreed on a cap for spending for next year at $786 
billion, about a 2-percent increase over where we are now.
  In addition, the amendment I have sent to the desk limits advance 
appropriations. This was raised as an issue by Members on the other 
side of the aisle. They wanted a restriction on advance appropriations, 
so we included that in this bill. And we have included another request 
from the other side of the aisle to establish a 1-year defense 
firewall. What that means is, the money that is allocated for defense 
would go for defense and could not be used for other purposes.
  This amendment establishes a supermajority point of order in the 
Senate to enforce a defense/nondefense firewall in 2003. Again, this 
was in response to requests from Members on the other side of the 
aisle.
  This is the circumstance we face that I think we need to keep in mind 
as we consider this amendment. Last year, the Congressional Budget 
Office told us we could expect some $5.6 trillion of budget surpluses 
over the next decade. That is what we were told just a year ago--nearly 
$6 trillion of surpluses. Some of us questioned that. Some of us said: 
Do not rely on a 10-year forecast. There is too much risk associated 
with that. But others said: No, there will even be more money. That is 
what we were told repeatedly.
  Now we get to June of this year and look at the difference a year 
makes. Not only do we not see any surpluses for the next decade, we see 
deficits of some $600 billion over the next 10 years.
  Where did the money go? This chart shows our analysis of what 
happened to those surpluses, and the biggest chunk went for the tax 
cuts that were enacted last year and the additional tax cuts passed 
this year.
  Forty-three percent of the disappearance of the surplus went to tax 
cuts; 21 percent went to increased spending as a result of the attack 
on this country--increased defense spending, increased homeland 
security spending. That is where all of the increase has gone. Twenty-
one percent is from economic changes, that is, the economic slowdown 
that occurred. That is where 21 percent of the disappearance of the 
surplus occurred. And the last 14 percent is technical changes. 
Largely, those are underestimations of the cost of Medicare and 
Medicaid. That is where the money went, primarily to tax cuts; the next 
biggest is increased spending as a result of the attack on the country; 
the next biggest reason was the economic slowdown, and actually those 
two are equal; and the final and smallest reason is underestimations of 
the cost of Medicare and Medicaid.
  That is where we are. What it tells us, as we look over an extended 
period of time, a 10-year period going back to 1992 when we were in 
deep deficit, and when the husband of the occupant of the chair came in 
as President of the United States and fashioned a 5-year plan in 1993 
that was very controversial to raise revenue and cut spending, we can 
see that plan worked.
  Each and every year, we were pulling ourselves out of deficit under 
that plan. In 1997, we had a bipartisan plan that finished the job. As 
a result, we emerged from deficit. We stopped using Social Security 
funds for other purposes, and we were running surpluses, non-trust-fund 
surpluses for 3 years.
  Then last year we had the triple whammy: the tax cut that was too 
large, the attack on this country, and the economic slowdown. We can 
see now that we are headed for deficits for the entire next decade. 
That is Social Security money being taken to pay for the tax cuts, 
being taken to pay for other items.
  In fact, we now estimate some $2 trillion will be taken from Social 
Security over the next decade to pay for the President's tax cuts and 
other spending initiatives. All of that matters, and it matters a lot 
because of where we are headed.
  The leading edge of the baby boom generation starts to retire in 6 
years. It is hard to believe, but that is the reality. What that tells 
us is those surpluses in the trust funds that have helped us offset 
these deep deficits are going to evaporate; in 2016 the Medicare trust 
fund is going to turn cash negative; and in 2017 the Social Security 
trust fund is going to turn cash negative. Then it is going to be like 
falling off a cliff.
  This is a demographic time bomb that we are facing as a society. It 
is unlike anything we have ever faced before because always in our 
history the succeeding generation has been much larger than the 
generation retiring.
  In very rapid fire order, the number of people who are eligible for 
Social Security and Medicare are going to double. We are headed for a 
circumstance in which there will only be two people working for every 
retiree. If that does not sober us, if that does not inform our 
actions, I do not know what it will take.
  The first thing we need to do is get these budget spending caps in 
place for next year and the year thereafter, and couple that with the 
budget disciplines that give us the chance to fend off ideas for 
greater spending and for more tax cuts that are not paid for. Yes, we 
can have spending initiatives. They have to be paid for. We can have 
additional tax cuts, but they have to be paid for; otherwise, we are 
going to dig this hole deeper and deeper.
  There are real consequences to digging that hole deeper. Mr. Crippen, 
the head of the Congressional Budget Office, told us that when he 
appeared before the Senate Budget Committee. He said, in response to a 
question from me:

       Put more starkly, Mr. Chairman, the extremes of what will 
     be required to address our retirement are these: We'll have 
     to increase borrowing by very large, likely unsustainable 
     amounts; raise taxes to 30 percent of GDP, obviously 
     unprecedented in our history; or eliminate most of the rest 
     of the Government as we know it. That is the dilemma that 
     faces us in the long run, Mr. Chairman, and these next 10 
     years will only be the beginning.

  I do not know how to say this with more force or more persuasiveness, 
but we are coming to another moment of truth on this journey in our 
economic future. Some will rise and say this spending amount is too 
much; that $768 billion is $9 billion more than the President proposed, 
even though the $768 billion number is precisely the number the 
President sent us. Some will say we ought to wait. Some will say there 
is some other reason to be opposed.
  Another moment of truth is coming very soon, and the question is, Are 
we going to have the budget disciplines that otherwise are phased out 
at the end of September? Are we going to have those to discipline the 
process as we proceed this year? Are we going to have a budget number 
that can inform the appropriations process as we proceed, a budget 
number, I again say, that is identical to the budget number the 
President sent us?
  I am swift to acknowledge we have adopted his number but not his 
policy. It is absolutely correct he wanted to switch $9 billion from 
mandatory spending to discretionary spending, and when we do not do 
that, it allows us to use that $9 billion in a way different from the 
way he proposed.
  I say to my colleagues, do they really want to adopt a 27-percent cut 
in highway and bridge construction that puts 350,000 people out of work 
in this country? I do not think that is the will of the Congress or the 
will of the American people. We have proposed a reduction from what was 
spent last year but

[[Page 10914]]

not as big a reduction as the President has proposed.
  Are we really going to cut the COPS Program by over a billion dollars 
when we have a terrorist threat to this country?
  Are we really going to take police off the street? I do not think so. 
Are we really going to cut the President's signature education program, 
No Child Left Behind? I do not think so. Those are the fundamental 
issues that are before us now.
  I emphasize to my colleagues that not only is this a spending cap for 
this year at the level the President proposed in his budget, but in 
addition to that, it is a spending cap for next year of $786 billion. 
That is an increase of over 2 percent. That is very tight fiscal 
constraint. I am ready to take the medicine to get us back on a course 
to fiscal responsibility, and I believe most of my colleagues are as 
well.
  This amendment is the product of weeks of negotiation between 
Republicans and Democrats and is a good-faith effort to capture in an 
amendment the positions of Democrats and Republicans on what should be 
contained in the budget for this year and next; what the limits should 
be on spending for this year and next; what should be the budget 
disciplines that are continued so we have a way of enforcing fiscal 
restraint, and it contains a 1-year defense firewall in the Senate, 
something requested by Members on the other side.
  For those of us who believe it is critically important to have a 
budget process in the Senate, for those of us who believe it is 
critically important to have budget disciplines in place, this is our 
opportunity. This is our chance. It may not come again.
  I urge my colleagues to very carefully consider their votes on this 
measure. This should not be a Republican vote or a Democratic vote. 
This should be a vote for the country. This should be a vote for the 
Senate. This should be a vote that sends a signal we are serious about 
reestablishing fiscal discipline. This is a vote that should send a 
signal that fiscal discipline matters to the economy of this country. 
This should be a signal to the markets that this Congress is serious 
about fiscal responsibility, and this should be a signal that while the 
President has asked for the second biggest increase in our debt in our 
Nation's history, all of us are committed to getting back on track 
towards a course of reducing the debt of the United States, especially 
in light of the coming retirement of the baby boom generation.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, the pending amendment and the second 
degree to it, as modified, are an effort to control spending and 
protect the Social Security trust fund. That is what it is--pure and 
simple--to control spending and, by doing so, also protect the Social 
Security trust fund. That is obviously not a new idea.
  What we are doing here is trying to extend a process that has worked, 
and worked pretty well, for most of the years since 1990. We are trying 
to give 2 more years of life to the process that helped us do something 
that a lot of people didn't think could happen--balance the budget 
without using Social Security in both 1999 and 2000.
  What we are trying to do is make sure there is some constraint on the 
size of the Government.
  I remind my colleagues, if we do not pass this amendment, if we do 
not extend the budget process, then the vast majority of budget process 
constraints will simply expire on September 30. Our failure to act will 
mean an almost complete absence of responsible budget limitations.
  Again, what our amendment does is not something new. It just tries to 
keep in place these limitations that made the good fiscal management of 
this Government possible during the 1990s.
  As we saw this deadline coming, this problem that will occur on 
September 30 with the loss of the rules and constraints, what I have 
tried to do, with others, is work very hard to come to where we are 
today. Our amendment is not my idea alone, by any means. It is the 
result of a collaborative effort extending over several months. 
Starting in March, my staff has been working with the staff of Senators 
from about a dozen Senate offices, half Republican and half Democratic. 
I followed up in a number of meetings with Senators from other sides of 
the aisle, trying to build consensus. What we tried to do is get the 
strongest budget process we could.
  My colleagues will recall that we tried to extend the caps for 5 
years in an amendment to the supplemental appropriations bill that 
Senator Gregg and I offered on behalf of Senators Chafee, Kerry, 
Voinovich, McCain, and Cantwell. Half the Senate, a bipartisan group of 
Senators, actually voted for that amendment, but we were not able to 
generate the support necessary to get the 60 votes and have the 
amendment actually adopted.
  The amendment before us today is an effort to get the most done that 
we can. For the first 2 years, it provides almost exactly the same cap 
levels that were in the amendment of myself and Senator Gregg to the 
supplemental appropriations bill. It is my judgment, and the judgment 
of the bipartisan group of Senators with whom I worked to draft this 
amendment, that this is as strong a budget process that the Senate will 
actually be able to pass this year. So that is what I am asking of my 
colleagues--to do at least this much. Let's at least get this done. 
Let's at least preserve this much constraint and this kind of 
responsibility, even though many of us would prefer more.
  One of the reasons is because in the next decade the baby boom 
generation will begin to retire in large numbers. Starting in 2016, 
Social Security will start redeeming the bonds it holds and the non-
Social Security Government will have to start paying for those bonds 
from non-Social Security surpluses. Starting in 2016, the Government 
will have to show restraint in the non-Social Security budget so we can 
pay the Social Security benefits that Americans have already earned or 
will have already earned by that time. If we keep adding to the Federal 
debt, we will simply add to the burden to be borne by the taxpayers of 
the coming decade and decades thereafter. That is all we are really 
doing. It has been said in many political speeches, but it is true--we 
are just leaving them the bill. We are not doing our job. We are not 
showing responsibility, if that is how we leave things.
  Of course, September 11 changed our priorities in many ways, 
including how our Government spends money. But September 11 does not 
change the oncoming requirements of Social Security. As an economist 
has said: ``Demographics is destiny.'' We can either prepare for that 
destiny or we can fail to prepare for it.
  To get the Government out of the business of using Social Security 
surpluses to fund other Government spending, we have to strengthen our 
budget process. That is what this amendment does. That is why we urge 
our colleagues to support it.
  We have sought to advance a goal that has a long and bipartisan 
history, and I would like to just recite a little of that history. In 
his January 1998 State of the Union Address, President Clinton called 
on the Government to ``save Social Security first.'' That is also what 
President George W. Bush said in a March 2001 radio address. In his 
words, we need to ``keep the promise of Social Security and keep the 
Government from raiding the Social Security surplus.'' That is what 
President Bush said. It is what the Republican leader, Senator Lott, 
said on the Senate floor in June 1999 when he said:

       Social Security taxes should be used for Social Security 
     and only for Social Security--not for any other brilliant 
     idea we may have.

  It is what Senator Domenici said in April of 2000 when he said:


[[Page 10915]]

       I suggest that the most significant fiscal policy change 
     made to this point--to the benefit of Americans of the future 
     . . . is that all of the Social Security surplus stays in the 
     Social Security fund. . . .

  Yes, we should stop using Social Security surpluses to fund the rest 
of Government because it is the moral thing to do; for every dollar we 
add to the Federal debt is another dollar our children must pay back in 
higher taxes or fewer Government benefits.
  I do not think our children's generation will forgive us if we fail 
in our fiscal responsibility today. History will not forgive us if we 
fail to act. We must balance the budget, we must stop accumulating 
debts for future generations to pay, and we have to stop robbing our 
children of their own choices.
  We have got to make our own choices. We are doing that today. Let's 
not take away from these kids their right to make their own choices in 
their time because we have locked up all the money and we cannot pay 
the Social Security benefits.
  The amendment before us today, I am pretty sure, is the best, last 
hope to do this this year. I urge my colleagues to support it.
  Madam President, the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities has 
issued a paper that concludes as follows:

       These proposals, No. 1, are likely to be workable because 
     they extend enforcement tools that have worked in the past; 
     No. 2, are evenhanded because they treat spending increases 
     and tax cuts in the same fashion, without favoring one or the 
     other; and, No. 3, set targets that appear realistic and thus 
     are more likely not to be blown away by subsequent 
     congressional action.

  This analysis by the Center on Budget and Policy is their view of 
this amendment. It is a positive analysis.
  I ask unanimous consent the full text of this analysis be printed in 
the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

    [From the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, June 20, 2002]

 The Feingold Amendment to the Defense Authorization Bill: A Workable 
           and Responsible Strengthening of Fiscal Discipline

       Senator Feingold's amendment to the Defense authorization 
     bill would establish tight but realistic caps on 
     appropriations for 2003 and 2004, extend for five years the 
     requirement that tax and entitlement legislation be paid for, 
     and extend supermajority enforcement of congressional budget 
     plans for five years. These proposals: (1) are likely to be 
     workable because they extend enforcement tools that have 
     worked in the past; (2) are evenhanded because they treat 
     spending increases and tax cuts in the same fashion, without 
     favoring one or the other; and (3) set targets that appear 
     realistic and are thus more likely not to be blown away by 
     subsequent congressional action.
       Key Budget Enforcement Tools are Due to Expire This 
     September 30. Four key tools to enforce budget discipline are 
     scheduled to expire September 30, 2002. If these provisions 
     expire, Congress will find it much easier to increase 
     appropriations and entitlements by unlimited amounts and cut 
     taxes by unlimited amounts. The clear risk is that the large 
     deficits we are currently experiencing would grow even larger 
     rather than decline, leaving the budget in a weak position at 
     just the wrong time--right before the baby boom generation 
     retires and places still greater pressure on the budget. 
     Allowing all these budget enforcement tools to expire could 
     set the stage for highly undisciplined budgeting in the 
     coming months and years.
       Congressional Budget Targets. The budget targets in 
     Congressional budget plans are currently enforced by points 
     of order that can only be waived by 60 votes. This means that 
     appropriations and entitlement bills cannot spend more than 
     is provided for in the Congressional budget resolution and 
     tax cuts cannot exceed the level of tax cuts the 
     Congressional budget resolution allows, unless 60 Senators 
     agree. Starting October 1, however, excessive appropriation 
     bills, excessive entitlement increases, and excessive tax 
     cuts can all be agreed to by simple majority vote. The 
     Feingold Amendment keeps these vital 60-vote enforcement 
     mechanisms in place for another five years.
       Discretionary Caps. Currently, a statute requires the 
     President to cut appropriations bills across-the-board if, at 
     the end of a session, those bills have breached dollar 
     ``caps,'' or upper limits, set in statute. This law worked 
     well for eight years--from 1991 through 1998--but then was 
     evaded through gimmicks or set aside by statute for the last 
     four years because the caps established in 1997 proved 
     unrealistically tight. The entire mechanism of caps and 
     across-the-board cuts (called ``sequestration'') expires on 
     September 30 and so does not apply to FY 2003 appropriations 
     bills. The Feingold amendment renews the mechanism for 
     another five years and sets caps for 2003 and 2004 (no such 
     caps currently exist). The 2003-2004 caps in this amendment 
     are at the levels in the recent Gregg-Feingold amendment and 
     are tight but probably realistic.
       The Senate Pay-As-You-Go Rule. Currently, a point of order 
     waivable by 60 votes lies against legislation that would 
     increase the cost of entitlements or reduce revenues unless 
     these costs are offset over 1, 5, and 10 years, except to the 
     extent that a budget surplus is projected outside Social 
     Security. This rule expires September 30; the Feingold 
     Amendment would renew it for another five years.
       The Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Rule. Under current law, a 
     statute requires the President to cut a selected list of 
     entitlement programs across the board if, at the end of a 
     session, OMB determines that tax and entitlement legislation 
     has not been fully offset for the coming fiscal year, i.e., 
     if entitlement increases and tax cuts have not been ``paid 
     for.'' This mechanism worked well from 1991 through 1998 but 
     broke down when surpluses appeared; Congress wrote ad hoc 
     provisions setting it aside. Starting October 1, the 
     mechanism effectively expires even though deficits have 
     returned--new entitlement increases and tax cuts will not 
     have to be paid for. The Feingold Amendment renews for five 
     years the requirement that such legislation must be paid for, 
     while turning off this requirement if the Treasury reports 
     that a year has been completed in which the budget outside 
     Social Security was in surplus.
       The Feingold Amendment Sets Appropriations Targets For This 
     Year That Can Be Enforced By The Senate. In addition to the 
     extension of the four enforcement mechanisms discussed above, 
     the Feingold Amendment responds to the particular situation 
     faced by the Senate this year because a new congressional 
     budget plan has not been agreed to. While last year's 
     congressional budget plan continues to govern entitlement and 
     tax legislation, it does not govern appropriations. This 
     means that, as soon as the Appropriations Committee is ready, 
     the Senate can begin consideration of appropriations bills at 
     any funding level and pass them by majority vote. The 
     Feingold Amendment would address this problem by requiring 60 
     votes for any 2003 appropriations bill that exceeds its 
     allocation. The allocations for all the appropriations bills 
     combined must not exceed the statutory cap the Feingold 
     Amendment sets.


            How Tight Are the Feingold Appropriations Caps?

       If caps are too loose, they do not constitute fiscal 
     discipline. Experience also demonstrates that caps fail to 
     impose fiscal discipline if they are set unrealistically 
     tight. In that event, the caps are inevitably breached, which 
     can lead to a free-for-all on appropriations.
       The Feingold caps are tight but realistic. They equal the 
     levels for 2003 and 2004 in the Gregg-Feingold amendment 
     offered three weeks ago. If Congress provides the defense and 
     homeland security increases the President has requested, as 
     appears very likely, these caps would require a reduction in 
     FY 2003 funding for all other discretionary programs of $5 
     billion below the CBO baseline level--i.e., below the FY 2002 
     level adjusted for inflation. (It may be said that the 
     proposed FY 2003 cap would be $36 billion above the 2000 
     level adjusted for inflation. This is true, but the 
     President's defense and homeland security levels are $41 
     billion above the 2002 levels adjusted for inflation. 
     Assuming the defense and homeland security requests are 
     funded, everything else would have to be cut $5 billion below 
     the CBO baseline.)
       These figures constitute restraint. If figures much tighter 
     are agreed to, either the President will not receive his full 
     defense and homeland security increases, or, more likely, the 
     caps will be maneuvered around when appropriations battles 
     heat up because the cuts required in other programs will be 
     too large to be politically achieveable. If that occurs, the 
     attempt at restraint will fail and, as has been the case over 
     the last few years, no effective cap will be in operation.

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, I yield the floor and suggest the 
absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Carnahan). The clerk will call the roll.
  The senior assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Conrad 
second-degree amendment be agreed to; that the time until 3 p.m. today 
be for debate with respect to the Feingold amendment, as amended, with 
the time equally divided and controlled by the two leaders or their 
designees; that during this time, whenever Senator Gramm of Texas 
raises a Budget Act point of order against the amendment, and a motion 
to waive the point of

[[Page 10916]]

order is made, the Senate vote on the motion to waive at 3 p.m., 
without further intervening action or debate; provided that no other 
amendments or motions be in order prior to a vote on the motion to 
waive the point of order.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Under the previous order, the second-degree amendment is agreed to.
  The amendment (No. 3916), as modified, was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.


                           Amendment No. 3915

  Mr. GRAMM. Madam President, I wish to explain why I am opposed to 
this amendment, why I intend to raise a point of order against it, and 
why I believe that point of order should be sustained.
  Let me begin by saying we have not adopted a budget this year. A 
budget has never been brought to the floor of the Senate during this 
session of Congress. We have not been in a similar position since 1974. 
We are now being asked on a Defense authorization bill to have the 
Senate commit to a budget figure outside the budget process. In fact, 
the point of order arises because we are basically going outside the 
budget process and dealing with an amendment that was not reported by 
the Budget Committee.
  In doing so, we would be committing the Senate to a level of spending 
that next year is $9 billion more than the President requested and $52 
billion more than we spent last year. We would be going on record as 
agreeing to setting a constraint under which we could spend $25 billion 
this year that would not be counted until the following year.
  In other words, we could actually spend $25 billion more than the $9 
billion more that we are committing above the level the President 
requested by what is called advanced appropriations. I do not believe 
the Senate should lock itself into a budget that has not been approved 
by the Budget Committee. We had a vote on that budget that was brought 
up on another bill. Nobody voted for it--not one Democrat or one 
Republican. We are now being asked to commit to a figure of $9 billion 
above the President's, $52 million above last year, with the ability to 
get around that constraint by spending $25 billion in advanced 
appropriations. Last year was the largest level of advanced 
appropriations in American history, and that was $23 billion. This 
would set a new global record. And I do not believe this represents 
good policy.
  This is adamantly opposed by the President. OMB has notified Members 
today that they are opposed to it. There is no possibility the House 
will agree to this. I say to any of my colleagues who are tempted by 
this and by the thought that any kind of budget numbering process is 
better than none, the bottom line is the House will never agree to 
this. What they would be doing in the process would be committing to a 
level of spending $9 billion above the level the President requested, 
with a $25 billion advanced appropriation escape hatch.
  I do not believe this is a good deal. I wish we had more than an 
opportunity to offer an amendment, but a consensus among Members that 
when we didn't adopt a budget, we needed a permanent budget enforcement 
process. This would give us the process but at numbers that are grossly 
beyond the level the President requested and far beyond the numbers I 
could ever support.
  So I hope my colleagues will sustain this budget point of order. I 
don't think it is good for the Senate to be trying to write a partial 
budget on a Defense authorization bill instead of bringing a budget up 
and debating it and amending it. The amendment will be subject to 
amendment if we do not sustain the point of order. There will be 
amendments offered. I will offer amendments if we do not sustain the 
budget point of order.
  Let me reiterate briefly that this is $9 billion more than the 
President requested, $52 million more than we spent last year. This 
would have advanced appropriations of $25 billion, which would be the 
largest in American history, that would be sanctioned under this 
agreement. The White House is adamantly opposed to this amendment. The 
House will never accept this amendment. Therefore, it cannot and will 
not become binding.
  I urge colleagues to sustain the budget point of order. This is a 
budget point of order with a purpose. Sometimes these budget points of 
order represent sort of a ``gotcha'' kind of circumstance, where they 
apply, but the logic of them is kind of convoluted. They are almost 
accidental. The budget point of order I raise is not accidental. It 
says that an amendment that alters the budget process has to come 
through the orderly process of being reported by the Budget Committee 
or else it is subject to a point of order.
  I remind my colleagues that we are under a unanimous consent request. 
So by making the point of order now, I am not cutting off anybody's 
debate. That will continue until 3 o'clock. I say that so everybody 
understands exactly where we are.
  The pending amendment contains matter within the jurisdiction of the 
Committee on the Budget, and it has been offered to a measure that was 
not reported from the Budget Committee. I therefore raise a point of 
order against amendment No. 3915 pursuant to section 306 of the 
Congressional Budget Act.
  Let me ask the Parliamentarian a question. Is 3915 the right number, 
given they have merged the amendments?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. It is 3915, as amended.
  Mr. GRAMM. Madam President, I make that point of order against the 
pending amendment under section 306.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, pursuant to section 904 of the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, I move to waive the applicable 
sections of that act for purposes of the pending amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The motion is pending. Who yields time?
  The Senator from New Mexico is recognized.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Madam President, parliamentary inquiry. Is there a time 
limit on the situation with which we are confronted?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes. The time is evenly divided up until 3 
o'clock.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Then we must proceed to a vote?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I thank the Chair.
  Who is in charge of the time in favor of the amendment?
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, how much time do we have on our side?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Forty-one minutes remain for the sponsors.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. How much time does the Senator want?
  Mr. DOMENICI. May I have 20?
  Mr. FEINGOLD. I yield to the Senator from New Mexico 20 minutes.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Madam President, it is not often I would come to the 
floor on a Thursday afternoon when a Defense authorization bill is 
before us and join in an amendment offered by the chairman of the 
Budget Committee on the other side, who has failed to produce a budget 
resolution heretofore. I believe his side of the aisle had a 
responsibility to do that. They did not do it. That is not the end of 
the world.
  We are today confronted with that situation. The truth of the matter 
is that there will be an awful lot of Senators pondering the 
appropriations process and wondering whether Senator Phil Gramm from 
Texas, who knows an awful lot about this, is right when he speaks of 
the dangers to America of authorizing a budget produced by the 
Congress, not the President, which would exceed the President's annual 
appropriation by $9 billion.
  My friend from Texas makes that appear to be a very big issue. Let me 
suggest that I would not join in producing an alternative to a 
congressional budget that would permit us to spend between $9 billion 
and $10 billion more than the President in appropriations if I did not 
see down the road something a lot more onerous than a congressional 
attempt not only to limit spending for each of the next 2 years, but 
also to insert the points of order that are going to keep this Congress 
from

[[Page 10917]]

going absolutely wild on entitlement spending during the ensuing 
months.
  I think I could say this is going to be a year without any 
restraints, if it were the $9 billion we were arguing about. But I tell 
you, that is not it. For all the Senators who have been praying for the 
day when there is no longer a Budget Act, they thought they would be 
confronting appropriations bills run wild. But the truth of the matter 
is, it is the entitlement programs that are coming to us during the 
next 4 months, until October 1, that will have no constraints on them 
and no 60-vote points of order, which have saved the American people 
and this Congress from hundreds and hundreds of billions of dollars of 
outyear, next year expenditures.
  For formal purposes, the Senator ought to put my name on the 
amendment as a cosponsor. This amendment sets caps that is expenditure 
limitations--for 2003 and 2004 with a Defense firewall in the Senate 
but only for 2003, and that is good enough. That means in the Senate we 
will not spend Defense money for domestic programs, but neither will we 
spend the opposite. We will not spend domestic money for Defense 
programs. That is what a wall means.
  White House, before you get on the telephone and do what Senator Phil 
Gramm said you have done, Mr. President--our President, down on 
Pennsylvania Avenue--before you say to all the Republicans, ``Vote 
against this,'' let me make a couple points for you.
  One, this is not your budget, Mr. President--I am speaking of our 
President down at the White House. It is not your budget. You have a 
budget. The law of America says you produce a budget. I do not know 
what would happen if you did not, Mr. President, but you did.
  Then it says in another place in the law that Congress passes a 
budget, and that congressional budget is for the use by the Congress in 
their attempting to get their priorities adopted by the Congress. And, 
Mr. President, if I were you, I would say: Congress, pass the best one 
you can, but remember, that does not mean I am going to sign every bill 
you produce.
  The President still has the veto threat on every appropriations bill, 
if that is what he wants.
  I submit to you, Mr. President, my friend down on Pennsylvania 
Avenue, just because the Senator from Texas has talked about the 
ravages of his $9 billion that we might spend in excess of your 
appropriations, just remember, you can vitiate every one of those with 
negotiations in the appropriations bills and a veto just like you have 
today. We cannot change your veto authority.
  We have proceeded in a realistic manner with one of two alternatives, 
and listen up, there are not 20, there are 1 or 2. Do we do this, which 
is a half-baked budget resolution? It is half-baked because you did not 
do your job, half-baked because you did not do your job because you 
were supposed to produce a budget resolution, and you should not make 
up your mind that it is too tough this year so we will not do it. I 
heard somebody on that side say that. That is not the law.
  For 27 years, when I was either chairman or ranking member, we 
produced a budget every single year, no matter how tough it was, no 
matter who had to vote on issues on which they did not want to vote. 
Senator Baker sat right there on that table with the appearance of a 
Buddha, and every Republican who came up, the Buddha would say--and 37 
times the Buddha won.
  We did precisely what the Republicans wanted to do to move our 
country ahead. You did not have that. That is not my fault. That is 
your fault. But it isn't America that ought to suffer from it, nor 
should Congress be put in a position where they cannot do any work.
  I have come to the conclusion it is a lot better to get caps, and 
they are at pretty meaningful levels. Next year's are pretty low. The 
one for the budget we are writing today is $9 billion to $10 billion 
over the President's, and I submit when all this day is gone and the 
rhetoric has simmered down, it is going to be very difficult, even with 
our President with his pen in hand waiting to veto, it is going to be 
very difficult to come out of this spending less than the amount that 
we put in these caps. I hope we can. I will be there attempting to 
enforce them, for what it is worth. The truth is, those caps are better 
than none, and the President retains his veto authority.
  For the defense of America, for which you asked us for so much money, 
Mr. President, we put all that money in and we got a firewall, meaning 
you cannot spend defense money for anything else. That is a very 
important budget consideration.
  We set limits on advance appropriations consistent with what we 
wanted on this side when we met.
  We extend the 60-vote budget points of order, including the pay-as-
you-go.
  We eliminated a gimmick regarding the crime victims fund, and I think 
you all have seen that and concurred with it. We showed it to you 10 
days ago.
  I do not know if 3 o'clock is enough time, or quarter of 3, but I 
think it is. If somebody wants more time and we need to explain it 
better, or I need to explain it to my side better, just come down and 
ask for some time. I think we will get it.
  I repeat, I want to talk to two situations for the next 2 minutes. I 
say to my fellow Senators, through no fault of this side of the aisle, 
we are in a real predicament today. If we let a whole batch of bills 
get through and do not put some points of order and some budget-like 
points of order and some caps on how much you can spend after which the 
expenditure bills get hit--we have to do that. We cannot sit here and 
watch this all go down the river, with the economy already in 
sputtering shape.
  Second, the President of the United States does not lose anything in 
terms of his power, his strength. If anything, he gains a potential for 
orderliness in the Senate and House as we finish our business that we 
might not have but for the adoption of this amendment.
  My last remarks: I do not know that this is the best bill on which to 
put this, but I do not know which bill is next. It is sort of the 
chicken and egg. The appropriators are waiting for the number. We are 
saying: You know the number. Let's bring an appropriations bill up and 
we will put this on it.
  Others are saying that is too late if you do that. So here is a big 
authorizing bill. If we approve this--and I urge that we do; Senator 
Stevens, if he had time, would be here concurring in this, pledging to 
stick to the numbers--if we approve this, we can put it on another bill 
later if, as a matter of fact, this defense bill does not pass or gets 
tied up in a conference that takes too long.
  If anybody wants any further explanation, I will do it here on the 
floor and seek time, or I will meet them wherever they like and show 
them what we have done. I believe we might turn somebody. Thanks to 
Senator Feingold for his courage, and Senator Gregg who is with the 
Senator on this amendment. If he is not, we must ask him to be a 
cosponsor because he had a lot to do with it.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
Senator from New Mexico, Mr. Domenici, be added as a cosponsor of the 
pending amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. How much time remains on our side?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 29 and \1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. I yield 15 minutes to the Senator from North Dakota.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
  Mr. CONRAD. Madam President, I thank my colleague. We have heard some 
arguments advanced by the Senator from Texas as to why Members should 
not vote for this amendment. The Senator has said this has not gone 
through the budget process. I reject that argument by the Senator from 
Texas. The fact is the numbers that are before us are exactly the 
numbers that passed the Senate Budget Committee on the budget 
resolution that I took through the committee. That is a fact.
  The fact is, I reported out of the Budget Committee, pursuant to the

[[Page 10918]]

budget I proposed, $768.1 billion in discretionary spending for this 
year. That is precisely the same as what was in the President's budget. 
It is true we did not adopt his policy. We did adopt his number.
  The Senator says this is outside what the Budget Committee has 
recommended. It is not outside what the Budget Committee has 
recommended. It is precisely what the Budget Committee recommended in 
the resolution I offered--$768 billion this year, $786 billion next 
year. Where is the money going? I say to my colleagues who think that 
is too much money, here is where the money is going: Last year we spent 
$710 billion. The President has asked for, and we have agreed to, a $45 
billion increase for national defense, every penny of it requested by 
the President of the United States.
  The President asked for an additional $5.4 billion for homeland 
security. We have endorsed that, every penny of it requested by the 
President of the United States. Now there is another $7 billion, $7 
billion on a base last year of $710 billion. That is a 1-percent 
increase available for all the other functions of Government, after the 
increase asked for by the President for defense, after the increase 
asked for by the President for homeland security.
  If we look at the amount of money that is in this budget for this 
year, the $768 billion, we have provided for the year thereafter an 
increase of $18.4 billion. That is an increase of 2 percent, and that 
is precisely what was in the budget resolution that passed the 
committee. It is true, we have not yet considered a budget resolution 
on the floor of the Senate. That is not unprecedented for June. There 
have been many times we have not concluded work on a budget. In fact, 4 
years ago, we never did complete work on a budget through the whole 
process.
  So we know the reality. We know what has occurred in the past. The 
fact is, we have passed a budget resolution through the committee. The 
budget numbers that are in that document are the numbers that are 
before us today. They represent serious constraint on spending for both 
this coming year and the year thereafter.
  When the Senator from Texas says there is a $50 billion increase over 
last year, it is actually a $58 billion increase. But where is it? 
Again, I remind my colleagues, it is in defense; $45 billion of the 
increase is in national defense, every penny of it requested by the 
President of the United States.
  Is the Senator from Texas saying he is against that increase in 
defense? And $5.4 billion is an increase in homeland security, every 
penny requested by the President of the United States. Is the Senator 
from Texas against that increase in homeland security requested by the 
President of the United States? The only other money is $7 billion for 
everything else, a 1-percent increase.
  Let's get serious about budgets and let's get serious about what is 
being discussed. The Senator from Texas raises advanced appropriations. 
Advanced appropriations have been done for many years. Why? Because the 
school year does not fit the fiscal year of the Federal Government. The 
Federal fiscal year ends at the end of September. Everybody knows the 
school year does not end until May or June. So advanced appropriations 
were adopted to fit the reality of the school year in America. There is 
nothing wrong about that. There is nothing wrong with that at all.
  The Senator from Texas says the House will never agree. That is not 
our job, to write a budget that agrees with the House. Our 
responsibility is to write a budget for this Chamber. We will then 
negotiate with the House on an overall agreement. The first thing we 
have to do is reach a conclusion in this Chamber.
  What we are proposing, once again, for discretionary spending for 
fiscal year 2003, is exactly the same number the President sent up in 
his budget, $768 billion. That is what was in my mark that passed 
through the Budget Committee and that is what we are proposing. It is 
true it is not the same policy as the President proposed. He proposed a 
different way of spending the money, but he proposed exactly that same 
number.
  I am proud of the way the Budget Committee has performed. The Budget 
Committee had dozens of hearings and produced a responsible document, 
one that restrains spending, one that did not contain a tax increase or 
any delay in the scheduled tax cuts, but one that also called on the 
Congress to put in place a circuitbreaker mechanism so that next year 
it will be a responsibility of the Budget Committee to come before our 
colleagues with a plan to stop the raid on Social Security.
  The Budget Committee had more debt reduction than the President 
proposed, less deficits than the President proposed and said that 
additional tax cuts can be had, but they ought to be paid for, and to 
put in place serious restraint on spending, not only for this year but 
in the years following.
  I am proud of that budget resolution. I am proud of the parts of it 
that are before us now, that give our colleagues a real opportunity to 
choose. Are we going to have a budget for this coming year and budget 
caps for the next year? Are we going to have a continuation of the 
budget disciplines that are critically important to keep this process 
from spinning out of control or are we not? That is the choice that is 
before the body.
  I want to again thank my colleague from Wisconsin who has been a 
valued member of the Budget Committee and who came to the floor with 
something he negotiated on both sides of the aisle. I then became 
involved with him in an effort and we have negotiated with many more 
Members on both sides of the aisle. I think we have a responsible 
package, and our colleagues are going to have a chance to vote in a few 
moments. I hope they will carefully consider the implications of a 
failure to pass this amendment.
  I yield the floor, and I reserve the remainder of our time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
  Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, in this modern age, we are used to 
revisionist history, but I have to say the debate we just heard is one 
of the most extraordinary examples of revisionist history I have ever 
heard. I am tempted to get into this debate about this wonderful budget 
that when it was voted on not one Democrat voted for it and not one 
Republican voted for it. That is a vote of confidence, or lack thereof, 
which I have never witnessed before.
  The budget that was rejected without a single vote in favor was a 
budget that set taxes above the level requested by the President the 
first year, the first 5 years, the first 10 years, and consistently 
spent more money. In fact, it raided Social Security in the first year 
more than the President's budget, even though it had taxes higher than 
the level requested by the President because it increased spending by 
over $13 billion. But that is an old debate. Why debate a budget that 
was rejected unanimously?
  Now we are on another debate, and it is a wonderful debate because we 
have our colleagues who are saying we want to control spending, we are 
worried about spending, and we need this budget to control spending. 
There is only one problem. The budget increases spending. The budget 
proposes spending $9 billion above what the President requested.
  This amendment before us proposes spending $52 billion above last 
year, and it does not stop with spending $9 billion more than the 
President wants. That kind of budget constraint we have had a lot of. 
It not only spends $9 billion more than the President wants, but it 
allows $25.4 billion to be appropriated this year that won't count 
until next year, what is called advanced appropriations. Last year, we 
set a record in American history with $23 billion. This year, in this 
amendment, we would condone in advance $25.4 billion, but that is not 
the worst of it. We have had a budget provision that banned delayed 
obligations.
  Senator Domenici was a big proponent of this provision, as I 
remember. This was to try to deal with this phony little game we play 
by starting a program on the last day of the fiscal year and claiming 
in the budget that it costs one-three hundred and sixty-fifth as much 
as it really does, and then have it permanently in effect.

[[Page 10919]]

  Interestingly enough, not only does this amendment spend $9 billion 
more than the President requested, not only does it say you can spend 
$25 billion more than that, it gets us back in the game of deferred 
obligations by striking subsections (a) through (f), (h), and (i) of 
House Concurrent Resolution 290. That is the section that deals with 
deferred obligations.
  This doesn't have to be belabored. This is not about controlling 
spending. This is about spending. This is about force-feeding the 
President and making the President take $9 billion more than he 
requested, setting up a procedure where we will spend $25 billion more 
than that, which will not count because it will be spent next year, and 
then allowing us to get into the game of spending it, but deferring the 
spending until a point where it doesn't count. This is an issue about 
spending, and this point of order is about controlling spending.
  The President has not been silent on this. Last night he spoke. I 
will read what he said:

       I know there's going to be some tough choices on these 
     appropriations bills, but I want to make sure that everybody 
     understands with clarity that the budget the House passed is 
     the limit of spending for the United States Congress.

  If we adopt this amendment, we will be saying the President wants $9 
billion less, but we are going to go on record saying we are going to 
spend $9 billion more. I will be with the President on this issue. 
Other Members will have to decide where they are.
  We have a letter dated today from the OMB Director, and I will read 
part of it:

       It is my understanding that the Senate will continue 
     consideration today of two pending amendments regarding 
     budget enforcement--a Feingold amendment and a Reid/Conrad 
     amendment. I ask that you strongly oppose these amendments 
     and encourage your colleagues to oppose them as well.
       Both amendments would lock in a spending cap that is much 
     too high--over $19 billion more than the President's budget 
     request.
       Budget enforcement in Congress is vital and necessary but 
     enforcement at the wrong number could be even more 
     detrimental to our budget outlook.

  Now, if we had not waived the budget last week, maybe I would take 
this seriously. If 60 Members of this body had not last week voted to 
waive the Budget Act to spend more money, maybe I would take this thing 
seriously. But I don't take it seriously. We rejected making the death 
tax permanent. This amendment would spend nine times as much money next 
year as making the death tax penalty permanent would have cost.
  Our colleagues do not have a nickel, they do not have a penny, to let 
working people keep more of what they earn, but they have billions to 
spend. They never, ever, have enough to let working people keep what 
they earn, but they have always got plenty to spend.
  This is an effort to bust the President's budget. This is an effort 
to mandate that we set a budget $9 billion above the President's level. 
This is a proposal that would let us back into the gimmick business on 
deferred obligations. This is a budget that would let us advance 
appropriate--which is spending money but not counting it until another 
year--at a level unprecedented in American history. The President does 
not want this. OMB has asked that we oppose it. I hope my colleagues 
will oppose it. But I hope they will understand, whether they oppose it 
or whether they support it, that this amendment is not about budget 
control. This amendment is about spending, pure and simple. If you want 
to spend more, you want this amendment.
  Now, I am not saying it is going to be easy in the budget process not 
having a budget. But we don't have a budget. We have not passed a 
budget, and I don't believe we are going to see one brought to the 
floor. People are proud of the budget resolution considered in the 
Budget Committee, but not proud enough to bring it to the floor to 
debate it, amend it, and vote on it.
  The President has said he will veto appropriations that violate his 
budget and the budget adopted by the House. What this amendment would 
do would be to legitimize $9 billion in additional spending. That is 
what it does.
  Last week, we voted to waive the same points of order to spend money. 
We have done it over and over again. What we are doing here is 
legitimizing more spending. If you don't want to do it, you want to 
vote and sustain this point of order. Those who want to waive the point 
of order will have to have 60 votes. Maybe they have it. I pointed out 
earlier, this is not going to become law. I don't think it ought to be 
passed by the Senate. I don't think we ought to be slapping the 
President of the United States in the face today.
  When the President last night said he was going to hold the line on 
his budget, to then turn around and do this is to say: You say you are 
going to hold the line, but we are not going to let you do it.
  Count me with the man. Count me with the President. That is what this 
issue is about.
  I hope when people cast this vote, they won't be confused. I hope 
they will understand. This is not about budget points of order that we 
just waived last week. This is not about process. This is about 
spending $9 billion more spending next year, $25 billion more spending 
above that in advanced appropriations, and an unlimited amount of 
spending through a gimmick. I don't understand why people who support 
the budget process, after all our effort to get rid of these delayed 
obligations, can support this amendment. I am sure our colleagues 
remember the games that were played where we started a program on 
September 30 of a year so that it becomes law but you only count 1 day 
of the spending. Why anybody could say this is about controlling 
spending and could have an amendment that strikes the point of order on 
deferred obligation, I don't understand. This is about spending, pure 
and simple.
  Don't be confused. If you are for spending, if you are against the 
President, then vote to waive the budget point of order. But if you are 
with the President, if you are against all this spending, if you think 
it has to end somewhere, end it right here today. Let's stop this 
process today. Do not add $9 billion more than the President asked 
today. Do not spend $25 billion beyond that in advanced appropriations 
today. And do not let Congress back in the gimmick business today. Vote 
to sustain the point of order.
  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Carper). The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as required.
  The Senator from Texas knows very well that my goal in working on 
this amendment has nothing to do with trying to upset the President's 
budget. We have talked together, worked together on the Budget 
Committee, and he knows exactly what I and other Members are trying to 
do. We think there ought to be some rules, there ought to be some caps, 
there ought to be some budget discipline. I don't think he could point 
to one shred of information or comment I have made throughout the 
months to suggest it has anything to do at all with trying to disrupt 
the President.
  I remember welcoming the comments of the OMB Director when he 
suggested some aspects of what we were trying to do made sense. I will 
work with anybody on this in order to get it done, because in the 10 
years I have been in the Senate, we have had rules, we have had budgets 
disciplines, and they have had good results. Sometimes when the 
Democrats were in the majority, and sometimes when the Republicans were 
in the majority, at least on this issue, I have seen this body 
function, and function well, but only because there were caps, only 
because there were rules and because there were enforcement mechanisms.
  The Senator from Texas complains we are doing this outside of the 
budget process. I agree with him. This is not the ideal way to do this. 
But he knows why. He saw the efforts we made in the Budget Committee 
and the difficulties we had. We could not get it done there. It is not 
my idea to have to do it on the Defense bill.
  The Senator says, even if the Senate were considering the budget 
resolution, that the resolution could not have accomplished the 
extension of the budget

[[Page 10920]]

process that our amendment would do. But the Senator from Texas knows 
that a budget resolution, unlike this one, cannot constitutionally bind 
the President or his OMB. We have to pass a law, not just a resolution 
to extend the Budget Act.
  I would say nobody in the history of the Senate knows this better 
than the Senator from Texas, who is very famous across this country for 
passing statutes to control Government spending. A statute has much 
more enforcement power than simply doing it on a budget resolution.
  The Senator also suggests this is not going to go anywhere because 
the House will not accept it. I certainly agree with my chairman, 
Senator Conrad. The one thing that makes sure nothing happens is if we 
do not do anything at all in the Senate. If we send a message to the 
House that we do not need rules and disciplines, that is an invitation 
to them to do nothing.
  On the other hand, if we do something here, and even though the 
Senator from Texas knows it is much less than I wanted to do at the 
beginning, and less than he wanted to do, maybe it will put a little 
pressure on the other body. Maybe they will hear from their 
constituents, who will say: At least in the Senate they still believe 
there ought to be some limits and some caps and some rules. Why don't 
you folks in the House do the same thing?
  If we do nothing, there is no pressure on them. As the chairman 
indicated, if we at least put a marker down here, put something in this 
bill that suggests some limits and some rules, we have a chance that 
something will come through in a conference report that will achieve 
bipartisan limitation on this.
  We have now heard arguments about the levels in our amendment being 
too high. We also heard arguments that they are too low. In this 
respect the debate is taking on sort of the hallmarks of any debate to 
set a level. There is always going to be disagreement about the amount. 
But let's be clear about the amount in this 2-year period. The chairman 
of the committee has indicated we have sought to use what I believe to 
be the most neutral starting point. The number for 2003 is what the 
Budget Committee reported. It is what we included in the Gregg-Feingold 
amendment, for which 49 Senators voted, including the Senator from 
Texas. On June 5, he voted for these exact 2-year limitations. I admit 
there were 3 other years there on top of it, but he did vote for these 
figures for those 2 years.
  It is also the most neutral and most appropriate figure because it is 
our best estimate, as the chairman has pointed out, of what the 
President's budget request actually requires, what it really is when 
you cut away the gimmicks and see what the real number is.
  I think this is a consensus number that is reasonable. As the Senator 
from Texas knows, he and I have worked together in various meetings to 
try to have an even stronger budget process. We have tried to draft 
amendments, and we reached agreement on a budget process amendment 
that, had it been enacted, would have created powerful incentives to 
reduce the deficit and further protect Social Security. I stood ready 
and I stand ready to work with him to tighten fiscal discipline. In the 
battle for fiscal responsibility, I want the Senator from Texas to know 
I am and will be his ally.
  But as the Senator from Texas also knows, we did not offer the 
amendment we drafted. Now the question is, In the absence of that, in 
the absence of a more perfect solution to the budget process, what will 
we do?
  We really only have a couple of choices. We can stand by and simply 
do nothing or we can at least do this. That is the choice before the 
Senate today. Nobody really believes there are going to be a lot of 
real opportunities to do this in the future if we do not do it today.
  I would prefer a stronger budget process. In fact, not only in 
committee but on the floor I, with Senator Gregg, fought for a stronger 
budget enforcement regime, and we offered our amendment to the 
supplemental appropriations bill.
  I voted with the Senators from Arizona and Texas when they sought to 
limit spending on the supplemental appropriations bill. I stood ready, 
and I continue to stand ready, to work with the Senator from Texas to 
fight for the process changes that we worked on together. But the 
amendment that Senator Gregg and I offered received only half of the 
votes--it actually needed 60 to prevail.
  The efforts to stop spending items on the supplemental appropriations 
bill fell well short of a majority, and we have not offered the 
amendment we worked on together.
  So we face a very stark choice. We face the expiration of the budget 
process. We have to face the question, Is the absence of a budget 
process preferable to the 2-year extension of the existing process that 
I and Chairman Conrad and Senator Cantwell and now Senator Domenici 
offer today? Obviously, it most assuredly is not. Even though there are 
imperfections in the existing budget process, it does provide some 
budget discipline. It creates 60-vote hurdles for spending measures 
that exceed the caps. It requires 60 votes to expand entitlements or 
cut taxes without paying for the cuts.
  These constraints have been a valuable force for consensus. They have 
helped ensure the work we do in the Senate can garner the support of 
three-fifths of the Senate, not just a bare majority. I think these are 
useful bulwarks in the defense of the taxpayers' dollars.
  Again, there could be better budget processes. After the adoption of 
this amendment, if it is adopted, I will still join with others who 
seek to advance further budget improvements. Even if this amendment is 
adopted, nothing will stop the Senator from Texas from offering the 
budget process on which he and I were working.
  But at least let's draw the line. Let's at least prevent further 
erosion of budget discipline. Let's seek further improvement where we 
can, but let's at least ensure that things do not get worse.
  The Senator from Texas may consider the amendment before the Senate 
today to be half a loaf or maybe even less. I admit the amendment 
before the Senate today is not perfect, but it is a far better result 
than doing absolutely nothing, and that is where we are headed. Nothing 
is what we will get if the Senate votes down this very modest attempt 
at fiscal discipline.
  I urge my colleagues to join at this barricade, if you will, this 
last stand this year for fiscal responsibility. I urge my colleagues, 
more than anything else, to do this to defend the Social Security 
surplus. I urge them to support this amendment.
  How much time do we have?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin has 12 minutes; the 
Senator from Texas has just under 22 minutes.
  Who yields time?
  The Senator from Texas.
  Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, let me make clear I feel strongly about 
this amendment, but I have profound respect for my colleague. I am a 
longtime believer in the Jeffersonian thesis that good men, with the 
same facts, are prone to disagree.
  I point out the Gregg amendment that I voted for had 5 years of 
budget numbers; not just the 2 years where the budget went up, but 3 
years where it went down. So I thought, in terms of the whole package, 
it was an improvement over nothing. But I do not think it is an 
accident that this amendment has only the 2 years where spending goes 
up.
  Maybe I was not tending my business, but I do not think that the 
Gregg amendment struck the provision on delayed obligations. If it did, 
I was not aware of it, and I would stand to be corrected if anybody 
corrected me.
  I think the Gregg amendment left advanced appropriations untouched, 
whereas this amendment increases them by $2.4 billion.
  But ultimately, if we are talking about this being a consensus 
product, there is one person who is not part of this consensus and that 
is the President.
  The President is taking a hard position, and, quite frankly, it is 
about

[[Page 10921]]

time. I love our President. I have known him for a long time. I respect 
him. But I thought last year, in trying to work with both parties and 
trying to bring a new environment of bipartisanship to Washington, that 
he let Congress spend too much money. But it was a price he was willing 
to pay to try to work with everybody and try to be bipartisan. But our 
President is a Texan. And once you have slapped him once or twice, then 
he begins to think maybe you mean to fight. The bottom line is the 
President has said, I am going to limit spending to the budget that I 
proposed, and to the aggregate number adopted in the House. The 
amendment before us would add billions of dollars to that. It would not 
only condone but basically justify $25.4 billion of spending--in 
addition to the $9 billion I spoke of earlier--counted a year later 
through a process called advanced appropriations. This would be the 
highest level in American history.
  Finally, to add insult to injury--and I asked somebody to explain to 
me why it is in here--this amendment strikes the language on delayed 
obligations. If people weren't meaning to cheat, why do they make it 
legal? If people didn't expect to be in jail, why are they pulling the 
bars out of the windows? If people aren't expecting to take advantage 
of something we had stopped in the past, why are they taking the 
prohibition against it out?
  I do not know if my colleague from Oklahoma is aware of it, but the 
amendment before us in part strikes our old language preventing delayed 
obligation.
  Our colleague will remember the bad old days when you wanted to fund 
a great big old costly program but you didn't have the money in the 
budget, so you started it on September 30--the last day of the fiscal 
year. Then it cost only 1 day. It was just magic. You could spend 365 
times as much money by just starting the program on the last day. We 
finally wised up to that. We stopped it.
  Now we have an amendment where our colleagues say they are trying to 
stop spending. They are not for spending. They want to stop spending. 
But yet they strike the language on delayed obligations, which is a 
gimmick that has been used to spend billions of dollars.
  I do not know how you could say they don't intend to do it when they 
are legalizing it.
  To sum up--because I know we have others who want to speak, including 
my colleague from Oklahoma--this comes down to whether you are with the 
President or you are with the spenders.
  With all good intentions--I don't doubt good intentions on the other 
side--the bottom line is that this amendment, if adopted, gives 
credence to and gives cover to people who mean to bust the President's 
budget in three ways: $9 billion on its face, $25.4 billion in advanced 
appropriations, and then cheating with delayed obligation.
  If you are with the President, if you are for fiscal restraint, if 
you want to stop the spending spree in Washington, this is not the way 
to do it.
  I don't mind people making the best arguments they can. But I don't 
think you can have it both ways. I don't think you can say this is 
about fiscal restraint, and then say: Oh, by the way, we want to bust 
the President's budget by adopting this.
  I mean you have to be fish or fowl. You are either with the man or 
you are against the man. I am with the man.
  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, the Concord Coalition indicated today 
that our amendment ``provides a strong and needed dose of fiscal 
discipline.'' I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the complete 
Concord Coalition statement appear in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                        The Concord Coalition,

                                    Washington, DC, June 20, 2002.


        concord coalition supports budget enforcement amendment

       Washington.--The Concord Coalition said today that the 
     Conrad-Feingold-Domenici bipartisan budget enforcement 
     amendment provides a strong and needed dose of fiscal 
     discipline. It sets new discretionary spending caps for two 
     years at tough but achievable levels, extends the pay-as-you-
     go (paygo) requirement for entitlement expansions and tax 
     cuts, and renews important points of order that enforce 
     discipline.
       The rapidly deteriorating budget outlook highlights the 
     importance of this amendment. With sudden speed, budget 
     deficits are back and the first time in several years there 
     is no clear agreed upon fiscal goal. As a result, open-ended 
     budgeting is back. Rather than setting priorities and making 
     hard choices, Congress and the President are falling back on 
     the old habit--cut taxes, increase spending, eat up the 
     Social Security surplus, and run up the debt. It's a 
     dangerous path to follow when looming just beyond the 
     artificial 10-year budget window are the huge unfunded 
     retirement and health care costs of the coming senior boom.
       Restoring a sense of fiscal discipline--and eventually 
     returning to non-Social Security surpluses--is a very 
     difficult challenge. It is virtually impossible without the 
     type of enforcement mechanisms established in this amendment.
       With the discretionary spending gaps, paygo, and vital 
     enforcement points of order scheduled to expire, the choice 
     for policymakers is whether to extend the current 
     mechanisms--and thus maintain a measure of fiscal 
     discipline--or to simply let the entire budget enforcement 
     framework expire and be left with renewed deficits and no 
     mechanism for enforcing fiscal discipline.
       In Concord's view the choice is clear. Allowing caps, 
     paygo, and 60-vote points of order to expire is an open 
     invitation to fiscal chaos. The Concord Coalition strongly 
     commends and supports this bipartisan effort to restore 
     fiscal discipline to the budget process.

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from 
New Mexico.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico is recognized for 
5 minutes.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, first of all, my good friend, Senator 
Gramm, is doing exactly what good debaters do, except that I caught 
him, so it won't work.
  First of all, it is obvious on the point of the President's budget 
and this budget that this isn't the President's budget, it is 
Congress's budget. The President's budget is alive. The President's 
veto powers are alive.
  What we are trying to do is pass some constraints that Congress will 
impose on itself in terms of entitlements, which have the opportunity 
of going through the roof in hundreds of billions of dollars, between 
now and October 1 and thereafter with no 60-vote point of order.
  Down at the end of Pennsylvania Avenue, Mr. OMB Director, just get 
the President ready when this Congress sends entitlement programs that 
are going through the roof, because the 60 votes won't be available 
here, and they will end up on your desk.
  The Senator from Texas said it 10 times, but I will only say it once.
  I am with the President. He is the best President we will have in 
this century. When his first term is finished, that is what we will 
begin saying about him. But, Mr. President, do not be fooled by people 
who want you to get involved in something in which you don't have to 
get involved. And you lose no prerogatives; you keep all of them.
  The second point is, when Senator Gramm loses his major argument, he 
turns to another one. So he is up here about as loud as I speak talking 
about this delayed obligation.
  Let me tell Senator Gramm, just take another look at the late 
obligations. First of all, it sunsets at the end of this year. So it 
isn't around. It is literally not around.
  Mr. GRAMM. Why didn't you extend it?
  Mr. DOMENICI. I don't speak when you are speaking, Senator. Would you 
mind?
  Mr. GRAMM. All right.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Would you mind acknowledging that you shouldn't be 
speaking when I am speaking? I would appreciate it very much.
  Mr. GRAMM. All right.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico has the floor.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, the second point is, for as long as we 
have had this provision that he is now telling the President he is 
going to lose, which provision I invented, we have never used it 
because it can't be interpreted. We have never been able to interpret 
what these words mean, which

[[Page 10922]]

is now the real reason the President should come down on us because we 
are getting rid of it. It never was used. It will never be used. It is 
not interpretable. I knew that one year after it was passed, and I 
considered getting rid of it because it isn't necessary. It wouldn't be 
used.
  My last point is a very simple one.
  Fellow Senators, writing a budget resolution is essentially the work 
of the Congress. The President is not bound by it. He loses no 
authority. He can veto every bill that comes through here if it doesn't 
meet what he wants. But I will tell you, fellow Senators, if you think 
you can live within the President's budget with no problems, then I 
suggest to you that you had better look at what is eliminated from the 
budget: $1.2 billion for veterans' medical care, $1.2 billion for the 
violent crime trust fund, and $1.7 billion for State and local 
enforcement. They are not in his budget.
  We will have to decide whether we are going to put them in and cut 
something else. Nonetheless, this will not change the President's 
prerogative to veto every single bill.
  But, Mr. President--I am not speaking to you, Mr. President, but I am 
speaking to the President down the street on Pennsylvania Avenue--if 
something like this is not adopted, then remember this afternoon when 
Senator Phil Gramm said there was an invitation to spend, and see what 
you have when entitlement programs come down to your desk because they 
passed up here 51 to 48, or 51 to 49 because there was no 60-vote point 
of order to keep them from breaking the budget because we will not have 
that protection unless this amendment is adopted.
  I would say for an afternoon that it is a pretty good piece of change 
for the American people and a pretty good way for the President to say, 
I will veto, but I would rather not have all the entitlements coming up 
here. Which entitlements? You know what they are. They have to do with 
the various medical programs. They have to do with everything we are 
going to be looking at for Medicaid reforms and Medicare reforms. Sixty 
votes is not going to be applicable.
  It seems to this Senator, Mr. President, that you ought to stick to 
your work and to your veto authority, and you ought to let us do our 
budget because we can help you a lot when we don't send you all the 
entitlement bills.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
  Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, first of all, I am not telling the 
President anything. The President was telling me. I read what the 
President said last night. I am joining my voice with the President's, 
but I am not speaking for the President.
  Second, our problem is that the whole budget enforcement expired--not 
just this one provision. We are extending the rest of it. We are not 
extending this provision.
  The bottom line is, this is about $9 billion. Senator Domenici says 
we can't live within the President's budget. I believe we can live 
within the President's budget. And the President has asked us to try.
  Now, granted, the President can do whatever he wants to do. The 
question is, Do Republican Senators want to vote to go on record for a 
budget number that is $9 billion more than the President says he is 
going to stand behind? I think that is why it comes down to the 
question of whether you are with him or whether you are against him. I 
am with him.
  Mr. President, how much time do we have?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas controls 14\1/2\ 
minutes.
  Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from 
Oklahoma.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I thank my friend and colleague from 
Texas for his remarks. I will just make a comment. I see the chairman 
of the Budget Committee is in the Chamber. Bring the budget to the 
floor. I can tell you, my colleagues--who might have listened to my 
very good friend, Senate Domenici, who says, let's vote for this 
amendment--this amendment is going absolutely nowhere, even if it is 
adopted--and it is not going to be adopted--because it is on the 
Department of Defense bill, I tell my colleague.
  It does not belong on the Department of Defense bill. I have urged 
Senator Warner and Senator Levin that they should table this amendment. 
It does not belong on this bill. Maybe we will make a budget point of 
order it is a little higher--it does not belong on this bill.
  I am on the Budget Committee. Let's bring the budget before the 
Senate. Then we can have a good debate. Are we going to change points 
of order? Are we going to change on whether or not you can have end-of-
year spending gimmicks that we have banned in the past, which evidently 
this one-day budget is going to do? Are we going to reverse that? I 
would like to know. I am on the Budget Committee.
  I tell my good friend from Nevada, I believe the Senate procedures 
should work. Now, for whatever reason, the majority has not decided to 
call up the budget. So this is the second time that various Senators 
have said: Well, let's do the budget on whatever authorization bill is 
going through the Senate. That is not the way it should work. It is not 
the way it has worked. I have been in the Senate for 22 years, and it 
has never worked this way.
  We have always passed the budget, and it has not been easy. I will 
tell the majority, I know it is not easy. I will help them try to work 
it. I want to see the Senate pass a budget. I do not happen to agree 
with the majority's budget, but I will help to try to formulate the 
process to go through the budget procedure to pass a budget. I believe 
in it. But it does not belong on DOD authorization.
  Let's just assume that it passed. I hope and I believe it will not, 
but let's just assume that it passes. OK. So the Senate passes the 
Senate budget--or part of the Senate budget, because I do not believe 
this is the entire Senate budget. I do not think this is what passed 
the Senate Budget Committee, which I serve on, and we spent a couple 
days in markup. But we had lots and lots of hearings. It was a lot more 
extensive.
  I don't know the difference between this and what passed out of the 
Senate Budget Committee, but I did not vote for it when it came out of 
the Senate Budget Committee. But I know one thing: It doesn't belong on 
the DOD authorization bill. I know my friends and colleagues from the 
House, and they would say: Thank you very much. That is not going to be 
accepted in conference. You have wasted your time--totally, completely.
  Budgets have to pass both the House and the Senate if you want to 
have a binding budget. It does not do any good just to pass it in the 
Senate by one amendment on one day. That has no impact whatsoever. So 
we are absolutely wasting our time.
  I urge my colleagues--I urge the majority because this is not in the 
minority's capability. The majority should bring this budget as passed 
out of the Budget Committee and try to pass it on the floor. That is 
what we should do. Instead, we have this game, and it just happens to 
be the Democrats' budget. Obviously, the President does not want it.
  My Budget Committee staff tells me it is $21 billion higher than the 
figure the President submitted. It is not a 1-year budget; it is a 2-
year budget. Wow. OK, it is $21 billion. We increased the amount you 
can have on advanced appropriations, something that probably not three 
people in the Senate really understand. But we are going to increase 
that figure from $23 billion to $25 billion. Oh, we are going to do 
that. Oh, now we are going to be changing the rules of the Senate 
dealing with end of the year, beginning new programs, delayed 
obligations. Oh, we are changing that.
  Wait a minute. I say, if we are going to do all these things, let's 
do it on a budget. Then, when we eventually pass it--it may not have my 
vote--but when we eventually pass it, it goes to the conference with 
the House, with budget conferees, not with DOD conferees.

[[Page 10923]]

DOD conferees in the House would laugh this off: We don't agree with 
that. It is dropped.
  The President is against it. He would say he would veto it if it is 
in the DOT authorization bill. It has no business being in DOD 
authorization.
  We have to learn in the Senate at some point to have a little 
discipline and say, when we are going to bring up the DOD authorization 
bill, we are going to stay on DOD. That means the managers of the bill 
have to table nongermane amendments. That means the majority has to 
bring up a budget in a timely manner, which the law says we are 
supposed to bring up and pass by April 15. And now we are past June 15, 
and we have not had the budget brought up on the floor.
  The majority needs to bring it up. It does not belong on this bill. 
It is not going to be included in this bill, I hope. I believe a budget 
point of order will be sustained. It takes 60 votes to pass it, as it 
should, because the budget statute says it has to come out of the 
Budget Committee, not to be done on DOD authorization. Oh, we are going 
to have Senator Warner and Senator Levin be the conferees on the 
budget? It is not going to happen. We are wasting our time.
  I am embarrassed for the Senate and the way this Senate is being run, 
the fact that we did not bring up a budget. And then some people say: 
Well, we will take pieces of it and put it on DOD authorization. That 
is absurd. And it just happens to be a couple of pieces that say: Oh, 
we are going to spend billions of dollars more than the President 
anticipated.
  I will be happy to consider pay-go. I will be happy to consider a lot 
of different things that are in the germane jurisdiction of the Budget 
Committee on a budget resolution. But to do it on DOD authorization, I 
think, is just a total, complete waste of time.
  The point of order that it does not belong on this bill is exactly 
right. I am sure--and I hope--that our colleagues will sustain that 
point of order.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, the Senator from Oklahoma argues that we 
should not have brought up this amendment on this bill.
  This bill authorizes appropriations for the majority of appropriated 
spending. It may well be the largest spending bill we consider this 
year. So I think it is absolutely appropriate to consider the total 
amount of appropriate spending on this bill.
  Mr. NICKLES. Will my colleague yield for a question?
  Mr. FEINGOLD. For a question.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. NICKLES. I respect my colleague from Wisconsin. I have agreed 
with him on many issues dealing with fiscal matters.
  Wouldn't you agree we should have a budget resolution that passed the 
Senate Budget Committee for consideration by both Democrats and 
Republicans so we would go through the budget procedure as we have 
always done for the last 20-some years?
  Mr. FEINGOLD. It would be great to have a budget resolution, but far 
more important, far more useful is a statute to guarantee that these 
caps and enforcement mechanisms exist to bind both Houses, a mechanism 
that is actually the law of the land.
  So this is far more important. This is an appropriate vehicle to do 
it.
  Mr. President, I yield the remainder of my time to the Senator from 
North Dakota.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota is recognized.
  Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, how much time remains?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Five minutes remains for the Senator from 
North Dakota.
  Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I say to my colleague, the Senator from 
Oklahoma, that the Senator from Oklahoma argues against himself. He 
gives advances as a reason to oppose putting it on this measure, that 
it will never pass both Houses, and that a budget has to pass both 
Houses.
  I say to my colleague, one of the key reasons we have not brought the 
budget resolution to the floor is because the House passed a 5-year 
budget when the requirement of the law is a 10-year budget. The 
President submitted a 10-year budget. We passed a 10-year budget 
through the Senate Budget Committee. The House passed a 5-year budget, 
even though they cut taxes and committed to spending money outside the 
5-year window.
  In addition to that, they used rosy scenario forecasts.
  Mr. NICKLES. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. CONRAD. I will not yield.
  They used an estimate of Medicare expenses in the House that says 
Medicare is going to rise at the lowest percentage in the history of 
the program.
  Now, how are we ever going to reconcile a 10-year budget in the 
Senate, which is what the law requires, with a 5-year budget in the 
House, when we used Congressional Budget Office estimates, which we are 
supposed to do, and they used Office of Management Budget estimates 
because it made it easier for them to cover up the raid on Social 
Security in which they were engaged?
  That is a fundamental reason that we have passed a budget resolution 
through the committee and not brought it to the floor because we know 
we would spend a week of the Senate's time and never be able to 
reconcile with the House because they have adopted rosy scenario 
forecasts, and they have adopted a 5-year budget when a 10-year budget 
is required.
  Mr. NICKLES. Will the Senator yield for a quick question?
  Mr. CONRAD. No, I will not yield.
  We hear, over and over, this is more money than the President's 
budget. Well, the President's budget is exactly the same amount as in 
this amendment. The President called for $768 billion in discretionary 
spending. It is true, we did not adopt his policy. There is a $9 
billion difference because he wanted to transfer money from mandatory 
spending to discretionary.
  Do you know what he wanted to transfer? He wanted to transfer the 
cost of Federal employees' retirement and claim it was discretionary 
rather than mandatory. I have not found anybody who thinks that is a 
wise policy. Clearly, it is required that we pay the retirement costs 
of Federal employees. That is not discretionary.
  The fact is, the President's discretionary number is exactly the same 
as the number we have. We didn't adopt his policy, but that is his 
number.
  Now, let's look, in comparison, to last year. Last year we spent $710 
billion in discretionary. These are the increases: $45 billion for 
defense, every penny of it requested by the President; $5.4 billion in 
homeland security, every penny requested by the President. The only 
difference is $7 billion, the difference between last year and this 
year, that is going to other things. All of the rest of the increase is 
for defense and homeland security, every dollar requested by the 
President.
  There is $7 billion more, 1 percent, for all the rest of Government. 
That doesn't even keep pace with inflation. Between 2003 and 2004, we 
are capping spending at $786 billion, an $18 billion increase, a 2-
percent increase, for total discretionary spending by the Federal 
Government. That does not even keep pace with inflation, either. For 
those who say this is spending, spending, that doesn't pass the laugh 
test. This is a cap on spending, a cap on spending at the same number 
the President proposed, a cap on spending for the second year that 
allows a 2-percent increase for all of domestic spending. That is 
defense, parks, law enforcement--all the rest.
  The fact is, without this amendment passing, there will be no budget. 
There will be no budget disciplines. They expire on September 30. That 
is the reality.
  This is a choice that really matters. I reserve the remainder of my 
time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 20 seconds remaining. Who 
yields time?
  Mr. GRAMM. How much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas has 8 minutes 25 
seconds.
  Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, first, I want to respond. Our dear 
colleague from North Dakota said that the President submitted a budget 
that actually

[[Page 10924]]

cut some programs. Can you imagine it? Can you imagine it? In $2 
trillion of spending, the President was able to find some low priority 
items so that when a vicious set of terrorists attacked and killed 
thousands of our people we could redirect some of that money.
  Our colleagues are shocked. In fact, our colleagues can give you 100 
taxes that they are willing to raise. They can give you dozens of tax 
cuts they are willing to take back. But they can't give you one 
Government program that they are willing to cut. And they are stunned 
that in a $2 trillion Government, the President was able to come up 
with about $10 billion of things that we might defer or do without so 
we could instead grab a few terrorists by the throat and break their 
necks.
  I am not stunned. I am proud. We are the only people in the world who 
never set a priority, who never had to make a hard choice. The 
President is willing to make choices. That is one of the reasons I am 
supporting the President.
  It is true that this amendment before us does have some things from 
the budget resolution considered in committee. But basically three of 
the things are things that spend more money. The President said last 
night and the OMB Director wrote us this morning, asking us to oppose 
this amendment to help the President hold the line on spending. That is 
what this issue is about.
  It is not just about $9 billion that our colleagues want to spend and 
the President doesn't want to spend. It is also about $25 billion more 
spending now that won't count until next year. And then there is the 
whole issue about this delayed obligation where you can play these 
games when you start a program.
  It is true that the amendment before us has some support, but when I 
look at the President's position and when I look at the position before 
us, if our colleagues had offered the President's number without this 
delayed obligation and without the $25 billion of spending that doesn't 
count until next year, I would have voted for it. I would have been a 
cosponsor of it. But it spends $9 billion more than the President 
wants. He is pretty adamant about it. It opens up a floodgate for 
advanced appropriations where we spend it now so that when next year 
comes we say, we can't possibly hold the line on spending because we 
have already committed to spend part of it. Only Government could get 
away with that. No person in the real world could possibly get away 
with that.
  The issue before us is, Are you with the man, or are you against the 
man? The President asked us to hold the line on spending. He asked us 
to enforce his budget. Now are we going to go on record and say: Thank 
you, Mr. President, we appreciate your letting us know what you think, 
but we are going to raise spending $9 billion above what you want 
whether you like it or not? That is not part of any budget. It is part 
of a 2-year deal where we increase spending, but it really boils down 
to that.
  I raised a point of order. So the question is, Are there 60 Members 
of the Senate willing to say to the President: We are going to 
basically commit ourselves and condone $9 billion of spending you 
didn't ask for? Or are we going to stand with the President.
  I urge my colleagues, this is a good day to start fiscal 
responsibility. This is a good day to start saying no to business as 
usual in Washington, DC.
  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  The Republican leader.
  Mr. LOTT. Parliamentary inquiry: Do we have an agreement to get the 
vote at 3 on this issue?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Three is correct.
  Mr. LOTT. How much time remains on each side?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Three and a half minutes controlled by the 
Senator from Texas; 21 seconds controlled by the Senator from 
Wisconsin.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I yield myself some time out of my leader 
time to comment on this issue.
  First, this situation has been caused by the fact that we don't have 
a budget resolution. I think that is very unfortunate. Ordinarily, we 
try to get a budget resolution by April 15 or as soon thereafter as 
possible. Usually we get one done by May. Here we are in June. We have 
not heard anything about when it might come up. Apparently it never 
will. That presents us problems in terms of what is the aggregate cap, 
what are the enforcement mechanisms that we are going to use to try to 
control spending, keep it within some reasonable amount.
  I also recognize without these caps, some orderly disposition to the 
subcommittees, it is going be very difficult to hold the line when 
these various appropriations bills come to the floor.
  I don't know when that might be. We need to get going on the 
appropriations bills. Usually in June we do anywhere between two and 
five appropriations bills. Then in July we usually do anywhere between, 
I guess, five and as many as nine. Right now I see none anywhere in 
sight. We have done a supplemental after a very difficult time. It is 
not clear when we will get going on appropriations.
  I believe the House is going to pass the Defense appropriations bill 
and then the military construction appropriations bill before the 
Fourth of July recess. So that will begin the process. That is good.
  I think to do this number and this procedure on this bill at this 
time is a mistake. First, this is the Defense authorization bill. You 
need some vehicle on which to put this. If not here, then where, 
somebody might ask. But now that this door is open, we are being 
advised that we are going to have all kinds of nongermane amendments on 
the Defense authorization bill. I had been pleading with Senator 
Daschle to call this issue up. And to his credit, he did. He could have 
gone to other issues, but he did the right thing and moved to Defense 
authorization.
  Now we will be off on a discussion of taxes and Mexican trucks and 
perhaps an abortion amendment. I am hearing all kinds of things. At 
some point we will have to get back to Defense authorization itself. 
That is point No. 1. I believe this is the wrong place to do it.
  Secondly, while the mechanisms have been improved--there is a 
firewall in here now, and also some clarification with regard to 
advanced appropriations--the number, 768, is still a problem. That is 
about $9 billion above the President's request. Some people maintain--
and I am sure it has been maintained--we are going to have to have more 
than what was asked for in the original budget as we try to move to a 
conclusion this year. Somebody even said: ``You are fighting over 
twosies and threesies here.'' It is $2 billion here, or $3 billion for 
the supplemental, and $9 billion there. Pretty soon, all those billions 
add up to real money.
  So while I understand what we are trying to accomplish, I am 
concerned about how we go forward from here. I think the number is 
still too high. I think this is the wrong bill on which to be putting 
this. It is similar to the debt ceiling. If we are going to do this, 
probably we need to do it clean. That won't be easy. But a lot of 
people were shocked that we were able to move the debt ceiling the way 
we did in a bipartisan vote; 15 or so Democrats voted with most of the 
Republicans. We didn't do a budget resolution, and I think that is a 
travesty, but we are going to have to come to some agreement on how we 
proceed and how we get to a conclusion at the end of this fiscal year.
  My urgent plea is that we look for a number that is closer to what 
the President and his advisers have indicated they could accept.
  With that, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. CONRAD. How much time remains?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin controls 21 
seconds.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. I yield that remaining time to the Senator from North 
Dakota.
  Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, we cannot very well have it both ways. You 
can't, on the one hand, decry not having budget discipline and a 
budget, and,

[[Page 10925]]

on the other hand, oppose those very provisions. That is what this vote 
is about. It is a budget and it is budget discipline provisions. They 
are critically needed. I hope colleagues will support it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I believe my colleague is right on one 
point. You can't have it both ways. You can't say I am for fiscal 
restraint and then say we are going to make the President take $9 
billion he doesn't want.
  I think this boils down to a question, Are you with the President or 
are you against him? The President asked us to hold the line on 
spending. I am with the President, and therefore I am going to vote 
against waiving the budget point of order. I urge my colleagues to do 
the same.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion.
  The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. 
Helms) is necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Nelson of Florida). Are there any other 
Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 59, nays 40, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 159 Leg.]

                                YEAS--59

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Byrd
     Cantwell
     Carnahan
     Carper
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Clinton
     Collins
     Conrad
     Corzine
     Daschle
     Dayton
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Edwards
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Graham
     Gregg
     Harkin
     Hollings
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     McCain
     Mikulski
     Miller
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Reed
     Reid
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Shelby
     Snowe
     Stabenow
     Stevens
     Torricelli
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                                NAYS--40

     Allard
     Allen
     Bennett
     Bond
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Campbell
     Cochran
     Craig
     Crapo
     DeWine
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Fitzgerald
     Frist
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Kyl
     Lott
     Lugar
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Roberts
     Santorum
     Sessions
     Smith (NH)
     Smith (OR)
     Specter
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Voinovich
     Warner

                             NOT VOTING--1

       
     Helms
       
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote, the yeas are 59, the nays are 
40. Three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn not having voted 
in the affirmative, the motion is rejected. The point of order is 
sustained. The amendment falls.
  Mr. GRAMM. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. NICKLES. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. REID. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum 
call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I ask to speak for 1 minute.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I worked very hard this afternoon and today for what I 
thought was the right approach. I am back on board, and I will do 
everything I can to see that we keep some process and there is some 
order for the remainder of the year in getting our work done.
  I thank you very much.
  Mr. REID. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, has the Pastore rule run its course?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes, it has.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I speak out of order.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
  (The remarks of Senator Byrd are printed in today's Record under 
``Morning Business.''
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________